On 11/07/2017 09:38 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
> As described in the final patch:
>
> Nearly all modern compilers support a stack-protector option, and nearly
> all modern distributions enable the kernel stack-protector, so enabling
> this by default in kernel builds would make sense. However, Kconfig does
> not have knowledge of available compiler features, so it isn't safe to
> force on, as this would unconditionally break builds for the compilers
> or architectures that don't have support. Instead, this introduces a new
> option, CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO, which attempts to discover the best
> possible stack-protector available, and will allow builds to proceed even
> if the compiler doesn't support any stack-protector.
>
> This option is made the default so that kernels built with modern
> compilers will be protected-by-default against stack buffer overflows,
> avoiding things like the recent BlueBorne attack. Selection of a specific
> stack-protector option remains available, including disabling it.
>
>
> This has lived over the last several days without any unfixed 0day failures.
>
> v2:
> - under ..._AUTO, warn and continue on _all_ stack protector failure cases
> - fix 32-bit boot regression due to lazy gz.
> - set CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE for tiny.config.
>
> Thanks,
>
> -Kees
>
This passed a test build on all Fedora arches, including s390 and ppc.
On x86 it picks up the strong option correctly.
You're welcome to add
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Thanks,
Laura
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