This file contains common functions (e.g. policy I/O, pattern matching).
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <[email protected]>
---
security/tomoyo/common.c | 2209 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/tomoyo/common.h | 320 ++++++
2 files changed, 2529 insertions(+)
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-2.6.28-rc2-mm1/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2209 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/common.c
+ *
+ * Common functions for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2008/10/10
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+#include "realpath.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+
+/* Set default specified by the kernel config. */
+#define MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY 2048
+
+/* Has /sbin/init started? */
+bool sbin_init_started;
+
+/* String table for functionality that takes 4 modes. */
+static const char *mode_4[4] = {
+ "disabled", "learning", "permissive", "enforcing"
+};
+/* String table for functionality that takes 2 modes. */
+static const char *mode_2[4] = {
+ "disabled", "enabled", "enabled", "enabled"
+};
+
+/* Table for profile. */
+static struct {
+ const char *keyword;
+ unsigned int current_value;
+ const unsigned int max_value;
+} tmy_control_array[TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX] = {
+ [TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE] = { "MAC_FOR_FILE", 0, 3 },
+ [TMY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY]
+ = { "MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY", MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY, INT_MAX },
+ [TMY_TOMOYO_VERBOSE] = { "TOMOYO_VERBOSE", 1, 1 },
+};
+
+/* Profile table. Memory is allocated as needed. */
+static struct profile {
+ unsigned int value[TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX];
+ const struct path_info *comment;
+} *profile_ptr[MAX_PROFILES];
+
+/* Permit policy management by non-root user? */
+static bool manage_by_non_root;
+
+/* Utility functions. */
+
+/* Open operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tmy_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file);
+/* Close /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tmy_close_control(struct file *file);
+/* Read operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tmy_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+ const int buffer_len);
+/* Write operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tmy_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
+ const int buffer_len);
+
+/**
+ * is_byte_range - Check whether the string isa \ooo style octal value.
+ *
+ * @str: Pointer to the string.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @str is a \ooo style octal value, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_byte_range(const char *str)
+{
+ return *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '3' &&
+ *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '7' &&
+ *str >= '0' && *str <= '7';
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_decimal - Check whether the character is a decimal character.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is a decimal character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_decimal(const char c)
+{
+ return c >= '0' && c <= '9';
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_hexadecimal - Check whether the character is a hexadecimal character.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is a hexadecimal character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_hexadecimal(const char c)
+{
+ return (c >= '0' && c <= '9') ||
+ (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') ||
+ (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f');
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_alphabet_char - Check whether the character is an alphabet.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is an alphabet character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_alphabet_char(const char c)
+{
+ return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f');
+}
+
+/**
+ * make_byte - Make byte value from three octal characters.
+ *
+ * @c1: The first character.
+ * @c2: The second character.
+ * @c3: The third character.
+ *
+ * Returns byte value.
+ */
+static u8 make_byte(const u8 c1, const u8 c2, const u8 c3)
+{
+ return ((c1 - '0') << 6) + ((c2 - '0') << 3) + (c3 - '0');
+}
+
+/**
+ * str_starts - Check whether the given string starts with the given keyword.
+ *
+ * @src: Pointer to pointer to the string.
+ * @find: Pointer to the keyword.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @src starts with @find, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The @src is updated to point the first character after the @find
+ * if @src starts with @find.
+ */
+static bool str_starts(char **src, const char *find)
+{
+ const int len = strlen(find);
+ char *tmp = *src;
+
+ if (strncmp(tmp, find, len))
+ return false;
+ tmp += len;
+ *src = tmp;
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * normalize_line - Format string.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The line to normalize.
+ *
+ * Leading and trailing whitespaces are removed.
+ * Multiple whitespaces are packed into single space.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+ unsigned char *sp = buffer;
+ unsigned char *dp = buffer;
+ bool first = true;
+
+ while (*sp && (*sp <= ' ' || *sp >= 127))
+ sp++;
+ while (*sp) {
+ if (!first)
+ *dp++ = ' ';
+ first = false;
+ while (*sp > ' ' && *sp < 127)
+ *dp++ = *sp++;
+ while (*sp && (*sp <= ' ' || *sp >= 127))
+ sp++;
+ }
+ *dp = '\0';
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_is_correct_path - Validate a pathname.
+ * @filename: The pathname to check.
+ * @start_type: Should the pathname start with '/'?
+ * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
+ * @pattern_type: Can the pathname contain a wildcard?
+ * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
+ * @end_type: Should the pathname end with '/'?
+ * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
+ * @function: The name of function calling me.
+ *
+ * Check whether the given filename follows the naming rules.
+ * Returns true if @filename follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
+ const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type,
+ const char *function)
+{
+ bool contains_pattern = false;
+ unsigned char c;
+ unsigned char d;
+ unsigned char e;
+ const char *original_filename = filename;
+
+ if (!filename)
+ goto out;
+ c = *filename;
+ if (start_type == 1) { /* Must start with '/' */
+ if (c != '/')
+ goto out;
+ } else if (start_type == -1) { /* Must not start with '/' */
+ if (c == '/')
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (c)
+ c = *(strchr(filename, '\0') - 1);
+ if (end_type == 1) { /* Must end with '/' */
+ if (c != '/')
+ goto out;
+ } else if (end_type == -1) { /* Must not end with '/' */
+ if (c == '/')
+ goto out;
+ }
+ while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') {
+ if (c == '\\') {
+ switch ((c = *filename++)) {
+ case '\\': /* "\\" */
+ continue;
+ case '$': /* "\$" */
+ case '+': /* "\+" */
+ case '?': /* "\?" */
+ case '*': /* "\*" */
+ case '@': /* "\@" */
+ case 'x': /* "\x" */
+ case 'X': /* "\X" */
+ case 'a': /* "\a" */
+ case 'A': /* "\A" */
+ case '-': /* "\-" */
+ if (pattern_type == -1)
+ break; /* Must not contain pattern */
+ contains_pattern = true;
+ continue;
+ case '0': /* "\ooo" */
+ case '1':
+ case '2':
+ case '3':
+ d = *filename++;
+ if (d < '0' || d > '7')
+ break;
+ e = *filename++;
+ if (e < '0' || e > '7')
+ break;
+ c = make_byte(c, d, e);
+ if (c && (c <= ' ' || c >= 127))
+ continue; /* pattern is not \000 */
+ }
+ goto out;
+ } else if (c <= ' ' || c >= 127) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (pattern_type == 1) { /* Must contain pattern */
+ if (!contains_pattern)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ return true;
+out:
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid pathname '%s'\n", function,
+ original_filename);
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_is_correct_domain - Check whether the given domainname follows the naming rules.
+ * @domainname: The domainname to check.
+ * @function: The name of function calling me.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @domainname follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname,
+ const char *function)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ unsigned char d;
+ unsigned char e;
+ const char *org_domainname = domainname;
+
+ if (!domainname || strncmp(domainname, ROOT_NAME, ROOT_NAME_LEN))
+ goto out;
+ domainname += ROOT_NAME_LEN;
+ if (!*domainname)
+ return true;
+ do {
+ if (*domainname++ != ' ')
+ goto out;
+ if (*domainname++ != '/')
+ goto out;
+ while ((c = *domainname) != '\0' && c != ' ') {
+ domainname++;
+ if (c == '\\') {
+ c = *domainname++;
+ switch ((c)) {
+ case '\\': /* "\\" */
+ continue;
+ case '0': /* "\ooo" */
+ case '1':
+ case '2':
+ case '3':
+ d = *domainname++;
+ if (d < '0' || d > '7')
+ break;
+ e = *domainname++;
+ if (e < '0' || e > '7')
+ break;
+ c = make_byte(c, d, e);
+ if (c && (c <= ' ' || c >= 127))
+ /* pattern is not \000 */
+ continue;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ } else if (c < ' ' || c >= 127) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ } while (*domainname);
+ return true;
+out:
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid domainname '%s'\n", function,
+ org_domainname);
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_is_domain_def - Check whether the given token can be a domainname.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The token to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @buffer possibly be a domainname, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+ return !strncmp(buffer, ROOT_NAME, ROOT_NAME_LEN);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_find_domain - Find a domain by the given name.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The domainname to find.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct domain_info" if found, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct domain_info *tmy_find_domain(const char *domainname)
+{
+ struct domain_info *domain;
+ struct path_info name;
+
+ name.name = domainname;
+ tmy_fill_path_info(&name);
+ list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
+ if (!domain->is_deleted &&
+ !tmy_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname))
+ return domain;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * path_depth - Evaluate the number of '/' in a string.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The string to evaluate.
+ *
+ * Returns path depth of the string.
+ *
+ * I score 2 for each of the '/' in the @pathname
+ * and score 1 if the @pathname ends with '/'.
+ */
+static int path_depth(const char *pathname)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ if (pathname) {
+ char *ep = strchr(pathname, '\0');
+ if (pathname < ep--) {
+ if (*ep != '/')
+ i++;
+ while (pathname <= ep)
+ if (*ep-- == '/')
+ i += 2;
+ }
+ }
+ return i;
+}
+
+/**
+ * const_part_length - Evaluate the initial length without a pattern in a token.
+ *
+ * @filename: The string to evaluate.
+ *
+ * Returns the initial length without a pattern in @filename.
+ */
+static int const_part_length(const char *filename)
+{
+ char c;
+ int len = 0;
+
+ if (!filename)
+ return 0;
+ while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') {
+ if (c != '\\') {
+ len++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ c = *filename++;
+ switch (c) {
+ case '\\': /* "\\" */
+ len += 2;
+ continue;
+ case '0': /* "\ooo" */
+ case '1':
+ case '2':
+ case '3':
+ c = *filename++;
+ if (c < '0' || c > '7')
+ break;
+ c = *filename++;
+ if (c < '0' || c > '7')
+ break;
+ len += 4;
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_fill_path_info - Fill in "struct path_info" members.
+ *
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct path_info" to fill in.
+ *
+ * The caller sets "struct path_info"->name.
+ */
+void tmy_fill_path_info(struct path_info *ptr)
+{
+ const char *name = ptr->name;
+ const int len = strlen(name);
+
+ ptr->total_len = len;
+ ptr->const_len = const_part_length(name);
+ ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/');
+ ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len);
+ ptr->hash = full_name_hash(name, len);
+ ptr->depth = path_depth(name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * file_matches_to_pattern2 - Pattern matching without '/' character
+ * and "\-" pattern.
+ *
+ * @filename: The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern: The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end: The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool file_matches_to_pattern2(const char *filename,
+ const char *filename_end,
+ const char *pattern,
+ const char *pattern_end)
+{
+ while (filename < filename_end && pattern < pattern_end) {
+ char c;
+ if (*pattern != '\\') {
+ if (*filename++ != *pattern++)
+ return false;
+ continue;
+ }
+ c = *filename;
+ pattern++;
+ switch (*pattern) {
+ int i;
+ int j;
+ case '?':
+ if (c == '/') {
+ return false;
+ } else if (c == '\\') {
+ if (filename[1] == '\\')
+ filename++;
+ else if (is_byte_range(filename + 1))
+ filename += 3;
+ else
+ return false;
+ }
+ break;
+ case '\\':
+ if (c != '\\')
+ return false;
+ if (*++filename != '\\')
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case '+':
+ if (!is_decimal(c))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case 'x':
+ if (!is_hexadecimal(c))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case 'a':
+ if (!is_alphabet_char(c))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case '0':
+ case '1':
+ case '2':
+ case '3':
+ if (c == '\\' && is_byte_range(filename + 1)
+ && strncmp(filename + 1, pattern, 3) == 0) {
+ filename += 3;
+ pattern += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ return false; /* Not matched. */
+ case '*':
+ case '@':
+ for (i = 0; i <= filename_end - filename; i++) {
+ if (file_matches_to_pattern2(filename + i,
+ filename_end,
+ pattern + 1,
+ pattern_end))
+ return true;
+ c = filename[i];
+ if (c == '.' && *pattern == '@')
+ break;
+ if (c != '\\')
+ continue;
+ if (filename[i + 1] == '\\')
+ i++;
+ else if (is_byte_range(filename + i + 1))
+ i += 3;
+ else
+ break; /* Bad pattern. */
+ }
+ return false; /* Not matched. */
+ default:
+ j = 0;
+ c = *pattern;
+ if (c == '$') {
+ while (is_decimal(filename[j]))
+ j++;
+ } else if (c == 'X') {
+ while (is_hexadecimal(filename[j]))
+ j++;
+ } else if (c == 'A') {
+ while (is_alphabet_char(filename[j]))
+ j++;
+ }
+ for (i = 1; i <= j; i++) {
+ if (file_matches_to_pattern2(filename + i,
+ filename_end,
+ pattern + 1,
+ pattern_end))
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false; /* Not matched or bad pattern. */
+ }
+ filename++;
+ pattern++;
+ }
+ while (*pattern == '\\' &&
+ (*(pattern + 1) == '*' || *(pattern + 1) == '@'))
+ pattern += 2;
+ return filename == filename_end && pattern == pattern_end;
+}
+
+/**
+ * file_matches_to_pattern - Pattern matching without without '/' character.
+ *
+ * @filename: The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern: The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end: The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool file_matches_to_pattern(const char *filename,
+ const char *filename_end,
+ const char *pattern,
+ const char *pattern_end)
+{
+ const char *pattern_start = pattern;
+ bool first = true;
+ bool result;
+
+ while (pattern < pattern_end - 1) {
+ /* Split at "\-" pattern. */
+ if (*pattern++ != '\\' || *pattern++ != '-')
+ continue;
+ result = file_matches_to_pattern2(filename, filename_end,
+ pattern_start, pattern - 2);
+ if (first)
+ result = !result;
+ if (result)
+ return false;
+ first = false;
+ pattern_start = pattern;
+ }
+ result = file_matches_to_pattern2(filename, filename_end,
+ pattern_start, pattern_end);
+ return first ? result : !result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_path_matches_pattern - Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern.
+ * @filename: The filename to check.
+ * @pattern: The pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if matches, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The following patterns are available.
+ * \\ \ itself.
+ * \ooo Octal representation of a byte.
+ * \* More than or equals to 0 character other than '/'.
+ * \@ More than or equals to 0 character other than '/' or '.'.
+ * \? 1 byte character other than '/'.
+ * \$ More than or equals to 1 decimal digit.
+ * \+ 1 decimal digit.
+ * \X More than or equals to 1 hexadecimal digit.
+ * \x 1 hexadecimal digit.
+ * \A More than or equals to 1 alphabet character.
+ * \a 1 alphabet character.
+ * \- Subtraction operator.
+ */
+bool tmy_path_matches_pattern(const struct path_info *filename,
+ const struct path_info *pattern)
+{
+ /*
+ if (!filename || !pattern)
+ return false;
+ */
+ const char *f = filename->name;
+ const char *p = pattern->name;
+ const int len = pattern->const_len;
+
+ /* If @pattern doesn't contain pattern, I can use strcmp(). */
+ if (!pattern->is_patterned)
+ return !tmy_pathcmp(filename, pattern);
+ /* Dont compare if the number of '/' differs. */
+ if (filename->depth != pattern->depth)
+ return false;
+ /* Compare the initial length without patterns. */
+ if (strncmp(f, p, len))
+ return false;
+ f += len;
+ p += len;
+ /* Main loop. Compare each directory component. */
+ while (*f && *p) {
+ const char *f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/');
+ const char *p_delimiter = strchr(p, '/');
+ if (!f_delimiter)
+ f_delimiter = strchr(f, '\0');
+ if (!p_delimiter)
+ p_delimiter = strchr(p, '\0');
+ if (!file_matches_to_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p, p_delimiter))
+ return false;
+ f = f_delimiter;
+ if (*f)
+ f++;
+ p = p_delimiter;
+ if (*p)
+ p++;
+ }
+ /* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */
+ while (*p == '\\' &&
+ (*(p + 1) == '*' || *(p + 1) == '@'))
+ p += 2;
+ return !*f && !*p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_io_printf - Transactional printf() to "struct tmy_io_buffer" structure.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ * @fmt: The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The snprintf() will truncate, but tmy_io_printf() won't.
+ */
+bool tmy_io_printf(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ int len;
+ int pos = head->read_avail;
+ int size = head->readbuf_size - pos;
+
+ if (size <= 0)
+ return false;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ len = vsnprintf(head->read_buf + pos, size, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ if (pos + len >= head->readbuf_size)
+ return false;
+ head->read_avail += len;
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_get_exe - Get tmy_realpath() of current process.
+ *
+ * Returns the tmy_realpath() of current process on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This function uses tmy_alloc(), so the caller must call tmy_free()
+ * if this function didn't return NULL.
+ */
+static const char *tmy_get_exe(void)
+{
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ const char *cp = NULL;
+
+ if (!mm)
+ return NULL;
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) {
+ cp = tmy_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ return cp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_get_msg - Get warning message.
+ *
+ * @is_enforce: Is it enforcing mode?
+ *
+ * Returns "ERROR" or "WARNING".
+ */
+const char *tmy_get_msg(const bool is_enforce)
+{
+ if (is_enforce)
+ return "ERROR";
+ else
+ return "WARNING";
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_check_flags - Check mode for specified functionality.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ * @index: The functionality to check mode.
+ *
+ * Returns the mode of specified functionality.
+ */
+unsigned int tmy_check_flags(const struct domain_info *domain, const u8 index)
+{
+ const u8 profile = domain->profile;
+
+ if (unlikely(in_interrupt())) {
+ static u8 count = 20;
+ if (count) {
+ count--;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "BUG: sleeping function called "
+ "from invalid context.\n");
+ dump_stack();
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return sbin_init_started && index < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX
+#if MAX_PROFILES != 256
+ && profile < MAX_PROFILES
+#endif
+ && profile_ptr[profile] ?
+ profile_ptr[profile]->value[index] : 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_verbose_mode - Check whether TOMOYO is verbose mode.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if domain policy violation warning should be printed to
+ * console.
+ */
+bool tmy_verbose_mode(const struct domain_info *domain)
+{
+ return tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_VERBOSE) != 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_check_domain_quota - Check for domain's quota.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if the domain is not exceeded quota, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tmy_check_domain_quota(struct domain_info * const domain)
+{
+ unsigned int count = 0;
+ struct acl_info *ptr;
+
+ if (!domain)
+ return true;
+ list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->type & ACL_DELETED)
+ continue;
+ switch (tmy_acl_type2(ptr)) {
+ struct single_path_acl_record *acl1;
+ struct double_path_acl_record *acl2;
+ u16 perm;
+ case TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL:
+ acl1 = container_of(ptr, struct single_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ perm = acl1->perm;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm &
+ ((1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL) |
+ (1 << TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL)))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_CREATE_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL))
+ count++;
+ break;
+ case TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL:
+ acl2 = container_of(ptr, struct double_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ perm = acl2->perm;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_LINK_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_RENAME_ACL))
+ count++;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (count < tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY))
+ return true;
+ if (!domain->quota_warned) {
+ domain->quota_warned = true;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-WARNING: "
+ "Domain '%s' has so many ACLs to hold. "
+ "Stopped learning mode.\n", domain->domainname->name);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_find_or_assign_new_profile - Create a new profile.
+ *
+ * @profile: Profile number to create.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct profile" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static struct profile *tmy_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned int
+ profile)
+{
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+ struct profile *ptr = NULL;
+
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ mutex_lock(&lock);
+ if (profile < MAX_PROFILES) {
+ ptr = profile_ptr[profile];
+ if (ptr)
+ goto ok;
+ ptr = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*ptr));
+ if (ptr) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++)
+ ptr->value[i]
+ = tmy_control_array[i].current_value;
+ mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */
+ profile_ptr[profile] = ptr;
+ }
+ }
+ok:
+ mutex_unlock(&lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_profile - Write profile table.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int write_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ char *data = head->write_buf;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int value;
+ char *cp;
+ struct profile *profile;
+ unsigned long num;
+
+ cp = strchr(data, '-');
+ if (cp)
+ *cp = '\0';
+ if (strict_strtoul(data, 10, &num))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (cp)
+ data = cp + 1;
+ profile = tmy_find_or_assign_new_profile(num);
+ if (!profile)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ cp = strchr(data, '=');
+ if (!cp)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *cp = '\0';
+ tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_PROFILE);
+ if (!strcmp(data, "COMMENT")) {
+ profile->comment = tmy_save_name(cp + 1);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(data, tmy_control_array[i].keyword))
+ continue;
+ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &value) != 1) {
+ int j;
+ const char **modes;
+ switch (i) {
+ case TMY_TOMOYO_VERBOSE:
+ modes = mode_2;
+ break;
+ default:
+ modes = mode_4;
+ break;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+ if (strcmp(cp + 1, modes[j]))
+ continue;
+ value = j;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (j == 4)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (value > tmy_control_array[i].max_value) {
+ value = tmy_control_array[i].max_value;
+ }
+ profile->value[i] = value;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_profile - Read profile table.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int read_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ static const int total = TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX + 1;
+ int step;
+
+ if (head->read_eof)
+ return 0;
+ for (step = head->read_step; step < MAX_PROFILES * total; step++) {
+ const u8 index = step / total;
+ u8 type = step % total;
+ const struct profile *profile = profile_ptr[index];
+ head->read_step = step;
+ if (!profile)
+ continue;
+ if (!type) { /* Print profile' comment tag. */
+ if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%u-COMMENT=%s\n",
+ index, profile->comment ?
+ profile->comment->name : ""))
+ break;
+ continue;
+ }
+ type--;
+ if (type < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX) {
+ const unsigned int value = profile->value[type];
+ const char **modes = NULL;
+ const char *keyword = tmy_control_array[type].keyword;
+ switch (tmy_control_array[type].max_value) {
+ case 3:
+ modes = mode_4;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ modes = mode_2;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (modes) {
+ if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%s\n", index,
+ keyword, modes[value]))
+ break;
+ } else {
+ if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%u\n", index,
+ keyword, value))
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (step == MAX_PROFILES * total)
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Structure for policy manager. */
+struct policy_manager_entry {
+ struct list1_head list;
+ /* A path to program or a domainname. */
+ const struct path_info *manager;
+ bool is_domain; /* True if manager is a domainname. */
+ bool is_deleted; /* True if this entry is deleted. */
+};
+
+/*
+ * The list for "struct policy_manager_entry".
+ *
+ * This list is updated only inside update_manager_entry(), thus
+ * no global mutex exists.
+ */
+static LIST1_HEAD(policy_manager_list);
+
+/**
+ * update_manager_entry - Add a manager entry.
+ *
+ * @manager: The path to manager or the domainnamme.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int update_manager_entry(const char *manager, const bool is_delete)
+{
+ struct policy_manager_entry *new_entry;
+ struct policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+ const struct path_info *saved_manager;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ bool is_domain = false;
+
+ if (tmy_is_domain_def(manager)) {
+ if (!tmy_is_correct_domain(manager, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ is_domain = true;
+ } else {
+ if (!tmy_is_correct_path(manager, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ saved_manager = tmy_save_name(manager);
+ if (!saved_manager)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ mutex_lock(&lock);
+ list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &policy_manager_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->manager != saved_manager)
+ continue;
+ ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (is_delete) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ new_entry = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+ if (!new_entry)
+ goto out;
+ new_entry->manager = saved_manager;
+ new_entry->is_domain = is_domain;
+ list1_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &policy_manager_list);
+ error = 0;
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ if (!error)
+ tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_MANAGER);
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_manager_policy - Write manager policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int write_manager_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ char *data = head->write_buf;
+ bool is_delete = str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_DELETE);
+
+ if (!strcmp(data, "manage_by_non_root")) {
+ manage_by_non_root = !is_delete;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return update_manager_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_manager_policy - Read manager policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int read_manager_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list1_head *pos;
+
+ if (head->read_eof)
+ return 0;
+ list1_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &policy_manager_list) {
+ struct policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+ ptr = list1_entry(pos, struct policy_manager_entry, list);
+ if (ptr->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%s\n", ptr->manager->name))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_policy_manager - Check whether the current process is a policy manager.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the current process is permitted to modify policy
+ * via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ */
+static bool is_policy_manager(void)
+{
+ struct policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+ const char *exe;
+ const struct task_struct *task = current;
+ const struct path_info *domainname = tmy_domain()->domainname;
+ bool found = false;
+
+ if (!sbin_init_started)
+ return true;
+ if (!manage_by_non_root && (task->cred->uid || task->cred->euid))
+ return false;
+ list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &policy_manager_list, list) {
+ if (!ptr->is_deleted && ptr->is_domain
+ && !tmy_pathcmp(domainname, ptr->manager))
+ return true;
+ }
+ exe = tmy_get_exe();
+ if (!exe)
+ return false;
+ list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &policy_manager_list, list) {
+ if (!ptr->is_deleted && !ptr->is_domain
+ && !strcmp(exe, ptr->manager->name)) {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) { /* Reduce error messages. */
+ static pid_t last_pid;
+ const pid_t pid = current->pid;
+ if (last_pid != pid) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s ( %s ) is not permitted to "
+ "update policies.\n", domainname->name, exe);
+ last_pid = pid;
+ }
+ }
+ tmy_free(exe);
+ return found;
+}
+
+/**
+ * is_select_one - Parse select command.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool is_select_one(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, const char *data)
+{
+ unsigned int pid;
+ struct domain_info *domain = NULL;
+
+ if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1) {
+ struct task_struct *p;
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+ if (p)
+ domain = tmy_real_domain(p);
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+ } else if (!strncmp(data, "domain=", 7)) {
+ if (tmy_is_domain_def(data + 7))
+ domain = tmy_find_domain(data + 7);
+ } else
+ return false;
+ head->read_avail = 0;
+ tmy_io_printf(head, "# select %s\n", data);
+ head->read_single_domain = true;
+ head->read_eof = !domain;
+ if (domain) {
+ struct domain_info *d;
+ head->read_var1 = NULL;
+ list1_for_each_entry(d, &domain_list, list) {
+ if (d == domain)
+ break;
+ head->read_var1 = &d->list;
+ }
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_bit = 0;
+ head->read_step = 0;
+ if (domain->is_deleted)
+ tmy_io_printf(head, "# This is a deleted domain.\n");
+ }
+ head->write_var1 = domain;
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_domain_policy - Write domain policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int write_domain_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ char *data = head->write_buf;
+ struct domain_info *domain = head->write_var1;
+ bool is_delete = false;
+ bool is_select = false;
+ bool is_undelete = false;
+ unsigned int profile;
+
+ if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_DELETE))
+ is_delete = true;
+ else if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_SELECT))
+ is_select = true;
+ else if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_UNDELETE))
+ is_undelete = true;
+ if (is_select && is_select_one(head, data))
+ return 0;
+ /* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */
+ if (!is_policy_manager())
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (tmy_is_domain_def(data)) {
+ domain = NULL;
+ if (is_delete)
+ tmy_delete_domain(data);
+ else if (is_select)
+ domain = tmy_find_domain(data);
+ else if (is_undelete)
+ domain = tmy_undelete_domain(data);
+ else
+ domain = tmy_find_or_assign_new_domain(data, 0);
+ head->write_var1 = domain;
+ tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!domain)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (sscanf(data, KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u", &profile) == 1
+ && profile < MAX_PROFILES) {
+ if (profile_ptr[profile] || !sbin_init_started)
+ domain->profile = (u8) profile;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(data, KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)) {
+ tmy_set_domain_flag(domain, is_delete,
+ DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return tmy_write_file_policy(data, domain, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * print_single_path_acl - Print a single path ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct single_path_acl_record".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool print_single_path_acl(struct tmy_io_buffer *head,
+ struct single_path_acl_record *ptr)
+{
+ int pos;
+ u8 bit;
+ const char *atmark = "";
+ const char *filename;
+ const u16 perm = ptr->perm;
+
+ filename = ptr->filename->name;
+ for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION; bit++) {
+ const char *msg;
+ if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+ continue;
+ /* Print "read/write" instead of "read" and "write". */
+ if ((bit == TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL || bit == TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL)
+ && (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL)))
+ continue;
+ msg = tmy_sp2keyword(bit);
+ pos = head->read_avail;
+ if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s\n", msg,
+ atmark, filename))
+ goto out;
+ }
+ head->read_bit = 0;
+ return true;
+out:
+ head->read_bit = bit;
+ head->read_avail = pos;
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * print_double_path_acl - Print a double path ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct double_path_acl_record".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool print_double_path_acl(struct tmy_io_buffer *head,
+ struct double_path_acl_record *ptr)
+{
+ int pos;
+ const char *atmark1 = "";
+ const char *atmark2 = "";
+ const char *filename1;
+ const char *filename2;
+ const u8 perm = ptr->perm;
+ u8 bit;
+
+ filename1 = ptr->filename1->name;
+ filename2 = ptr->filename2->name;
+ for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION; bit++) {
+ const char *msg;
+ if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+ continue;
+ msg = tmy_dp2keyword(bit);
+ pos = head->read_avail;
+ if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s %s%s\n", msg,
+ atmark1, filename1, atmark2, filename2))
+ goto out;
+ }
+ head->read_bit = 0;
+ return true;
+out:
+ head->read_bit = bit;
+ head->read_avail = pos;
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * print_entry - Print an ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to an ACL entry.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool print_entry(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, struct acl_info *ptr)
+{
+ const u8 acl_type = tmy_acl_type2(ptr);
+
+ if (acl_type & ACL_DELETED)
+ return true;
+ if (acl_type == TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL) {
+ struct single_path_acl_record *acl
+ = container_of(ptr, struct single_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ return print_single_path_acl(head, acl);
+ }
+ if (acl_type == TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL) {
+ struct double_path_acl_record *acl
+ = container_of(ptr, struct double_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ return print_double_path_acl(head, acl);
+ }
+ BUG(); /* This must not happen. */
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_domain_policy - Read domain policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int read_domain_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list1_head *dpos;
+ struct list1_head *apos;
+
+ if (head->read_eof)
+ return 0;
+ if (head->read_step == 0)
+ head->read_step = 1;
+ list1_for_each_cookie(dpos, head->read_var1, &domain_list) {
+ struct domain_info *domain;
+ const char *quota_exceeded = "";
+ const char *transition_failed = "";
+ const char *ignore_global_allow_read = "";
+ domain = list1_entry(dpos, struct domain_info, list);
+ if (head->read_step != 1)
+ goto acl_loop;
+ if (domain->is_deleted && !head->read_single_domain)
+ continue;
+ /* Print domainname and flags. */
+ if (domain->quota_warned)
+ quota_exceeded = "quota_exceeded\n";
+ if (domain->flags & DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED)
+ transition_failed = "transition_failed\n";
+ if (domain->flags & DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)
+ ignore_global_allow_read
+ = KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "\n";
+ if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%s\n" KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u\n"
+ "%s%s%s\n", domain->domainname->name,
+ domain->profile, quota_exceeded,
+ transition_failed, ignore_global_allow_read))
+ return 0;
+ head->read_step = 2;
+acl_loop:
+ if (head->read_step == 3)
+ goto tail_mark;
+ /* Print ACL entries in the domain. */
+ list1_for_each_cookie(apos, head->read_var2,
+ &domain->acl_info_list) {
+ struct acl_info *ptr
+ = list1_entry(apos, struct acl_info, list);
+ if (!print_entry(head, ptr))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ head->read_step = 3;
+tail_mark:
+ if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "\n"))
+ return 0;
+ head->read_step = 1;
+ if (head->read_single_domain)
+ break;
+ }
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_domain_profile - Assign profile for specified domain.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to doing
+ *
+ * ( echo "select " $domainname; echo "use_profile " $profile ) |
+ * /usr/lib/ccs/loadpolicy -d
+ */
+static int write_domain_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ char *data = head->write_buf;
+ char *cp = strchr(data, ' ');
+ struct domain_info *domain;
+ unsigned long profile;
+
+ if (!cp)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *cp = '\0';
+ domain = tmy_find_domain(cp + 1);
+ strict_strtoul(data, 10, &profile);
+ if (domain && profile < MAX_PROFILES
+ && (profile_ptr[profile] || !sbin_init_started))
+ domain->profile = (u8) profile;
+ tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_domain_profile - Read only domainname and profile.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns list of profile number and domainname pairs.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to doing
+ *
+ * grep -A 1 '^<kernel>' /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy |
+ * awk ' { if ( domainname == "" ) { if ( $1 == "<kernel>" )
+ * domainname = $0; } else if ( $1 == "use_profile" ) {
+ * print $2 " " domainname; domainname = ""; } } ; '
+ */
+static int read_domain_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list1_head *pos;
+
+ if (head->read_eof)
+ return 0;
+ list1_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var1, &domain_list) {
+ struct domain_info *domain;
+ domain = list1_entry(pos, struct domain_info, list);
+ if (domain->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%u %s\n", domain->profile,
+ domain->domainname->name))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_pid: Specify PID to obtain domainname.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int write_pid(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ unsigned long pid;
+ strict_strtoul(head->write_buf, 10, &pid);
+ head->read_step = (int) pid;
+ head->read_eof = false;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_pid - Get domainname of the specified PID.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns the domainname which the specified PID is in on success,
+ * empty string otherwise.
+ * The PID is specified by write_pid() so that the user can obtain
+ * using read()/write() interface rather than sysctl() interface.
+ */
+static int read_pid(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ if (head->read_avail == 0 && !head->read_eof) {
+ const int pid = head->read_step;
+ struct task_struct *p;
+ struct domain_info *domain = NULL;
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+ if (p)
+ domain = tmy_real_domain(p);
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+ if (domain)
+ tmy_io_printf(head, "%d %u %s", pid, domain->profile,
+ domain->domainname->name);
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * write_exception_policy - Write exception policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int write_exception_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ char *data = head->write_buf;
+ bool is_delete = str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_DELETE);
+
+ if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN))
+ return tmy_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, false, is_delete);
+ if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN))
+ return tmy_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, true, is_delete);
+ if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN))
+ return tmy_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, false,
+ is_delete);
+ if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN))
+ return tmy_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, true,
+ is_delete);
+ if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_ALIAS))
+ return tmy_write_alias_policy(data, is_delete);
+ if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ))
+ return tmy_write_globally_readable_policy(data, is_delete);
+ if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN))
+ return tmy_write_pattern_policy(data, is_delete);
+ if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE))
+ return tmy_write_no_rewrite_policy(data, is_delete);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_exception_policy - Read exception policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ */
+static int read_exception_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ if (!head->read_eof) {
+ switch (head->read_step) {
+ case 0:
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 1;
+ case 1:
+ if (!tmy_read_domain_keeper_policy(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 2;
+ case 2:
+ if (!tmy_read_globally_readable_policy(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 3;
+ case 3:
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 4;
+ case 4:
+ if (!tmy_read_domain_initializer_policy(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 5;
+ case 5:
+ if (!tmy_read_alias_policy(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 6;
+ case 6:
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 7;
+ case 7:
+ if (!tmy_read_file_pattern(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 8;
+ case 8:
+ if (!tmy_read_no_rewrite_policy(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 9;
+ case 9:
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* path to policy loader */
+static const char *tmy_loader = "/sbin/tomoyo-init";
+
+/**
+ * policy_loader_exists - Check whether /sbin/tomoyo-init exists.
+ *
+ * Returns true if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool policy_loader_exists(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Don't activate MAC if the policy loader doesn't exist.
+ * If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not
+ * mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since
+ * policies are not loaded yet.
+ * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime.
+ */
+ struct nameidata nd;
+
+ if (path_lookup(tmy_loader, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd)) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Not activating Mandatory Access Control now "
+ "since %s doesn't exist.\n", tmy_loader);
+ return false;
+ }
+ path_put(&nd.path);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_load_policy - Run external policy loader to load policy.
+ *
+ * @filename: The program about to start.
+ *
+ * This function checks whether @filename is /sbin/init , and if so
+ * invoke /sbin/tomoyo-init and wait for the termination of /sbin/tomoyo-init
+ * and then continues invocation of /sbin/init.
+ * /sbin/tomoyo-init reads policy files in /etc/tomoyo/ directory and
+ * writes to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interfaces.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tmy_load_policy(const char *filename)
+{
+ char *argv[2];
+ char *envp[3];
+
+ if (sbin_init_started)
+ return;
+ /*
+ * Check filename is /sbin/init or /sbin/tomoyo-start.
+ * /sbin/tomoyo-start is a dummy filename in case where /sbin/init can't
+ * be passed.
+ * You can create /sbin/tomoyo-start by
+ * "ln -s /bin/true /sbin/tomoyo-start".
+ */
+ if (strcmp(filename, "/sbin/init") &&
+ strcmp(filename, "/sbin/tomoyo-start"))
+ return;
+ if (!policy_loader_exists())
+ return;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Calling %s to load policy. Please wait.\n",
+ tmy_loader);
+ argv[0] = (char *) tmy_loader;
+ argv[1] = NULL;
+ envp[0] = "HOME=/";
+ envp[1] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin";
+ envp[2] = NULL;
+ call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, 1);
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO: 2.2.0-pre 2008/10/10\n");
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Mandatory Access Control activated.\n");
+ sbin_init_started = true;
+ { /* Check all profiles currently assigned to domains are defined. */
+ struct domain_info *domain;
+ list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
+ const u8 profile = domain->profile;
+ if (profile_ptr[profile])
+ continue;
+ panic("Profile %u (used by '%s') not defined.\n",
+ profile, domain->domainname->name);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* Policy updates counter. */
+static atomic_t updates_counter[MAX_TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER];
+
+/**
+ * tmy_update_counter - Increment policy change counter.
+ *
+ * @index: Type of policy.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tmy_update_counter(const unsigned char index)
+{
+ if (index < MAX_TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER)
+ atomic_inc(&updates_counter[index]);
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_updates_counter - Check for policy change counter.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns how many times policy has changed since the previous check.
+ */
+static int read_updates_counter(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ if (head->read_eof)
+ return 0;
+ tmy_io_printf(head,
+ "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy: %10u\n"
+ "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy: %10u\n"
+ "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile: %10u\n"
+ "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager: %10u\n",
+ atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
+ [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY], 0),
+ atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
+ [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY], 0),
+ atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
+ [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_PROFILE], 0),
+ atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
+ [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_MANAGER], 0));
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_version: Get version.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns version information.
+ */
+static int read_version(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ if (!head->read_eof) {
+ tmy_io_printf(head, "2.2.0-pre");
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * read_self_domain - Get the current process's domainname.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns the current process's domainname.
+ */
+static int read_self_domain(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ if (!head->read_eof) {
+ /*
+ * tmy_domain()->domainname != NULL
+ * because every process belongs to a domain and
+ * the domain's name cannot be NULL.
+ */
+ tmy_io_printf(head, "%s", tmy_domain()->domainname->name);
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_open_control - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @type: Type of interface.
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Associates policy handler and returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise.
+ */
+static int tmy_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct tmy_io_buffer *head = tmy_alloc(sizeof(*head));
+
+ if (!head)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ mutex_init(&head->io_sem);
+ switch (type) {
+ case TMY_DOMAINPOLICY:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy */
+ head->write = write_domain_policy;
+ head->read = read_domain_policy;
+ break;
+ case TMY_EXCEPTIONPOLICY:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy */
+ head->write = write_exception_policy;
+ head->read = read_exception_policy;
+ break;
+ case TMY_SELFDOMAIN:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain */
+ head->read = read_self_domain;
+ break;
+ case TMY_DOMAIN_STATUS:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.domain_status */
+ head->write = write_domain_profile;
+ head->read = read_domain_profile;
+ break;
+ case TMY_PROCESS_STATUS:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.process_status */
+ head->write = write_pid;
+ head->read = read_pid;
+ break;
+ case TMY_VERSION:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version */
+ head->read = read_version;
+ head->readbuf_size = 128;
+ break;
+ case TMY_MEMINFO:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo */
+ head->write = tmy_write_memory_quota;
+ head->read = tmy_read_memory_counter;
+ head->readbuf_size = 512;
+ break;
+ case TMY_PROFILE:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile */
+ head->write = write_profile;
+ head->read = read_profile;
+ break;
+ case TMY_MANAGER:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager */
+ head->write = write_manager_policy;
+ head->read = read_manager_policy;
+ break;
+ case TMY_UPDATESCOUNTER:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.updates_counter */
+ head->read = read_updates_counter;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
+ /*
+ * No need to allocate read_buf since it is not opened
+ * for reading.
+ */
+ head->read = NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (!head->readbuf_size)
+ head->readbuf_size = 4096 * 2;
+ head->read_buf = tmy_alloc(head->readbuf_size);
+ if (!head->read_buf) {
+ tmy_free(head);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) {
+ /*
+ * No need to allocate write_buf since it is not opened
+ * for writing.
+ */
+ head->write = NULL;
+ } else if (head->write) {
+ head->writebuf_size = 4096 * 2;
+ head->write_buf = tmy_alloc(head->writebuf_size);
+ if (!head->write_buf) {
+ tmy_free(head->read_buf);
+ tmy_free(head);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+ file->private_data = head;
+ /*
+ * Call the handler now if the file is
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain
+ * so that the user can use
+ * cat < /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain"
+ * to know the current process's domainname.
+ */
+ if (type == TMY_SELFDOMAIN)
+ tmy_read_control(file, NULL, 0);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_read_control - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buffer: Poiner to buffer to write to.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tmy_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+ const int buffer_len)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ struct tmy_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+ char *cp;
+
+ if (!head->read)
+ return -ENOSYS;
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, buffer_len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
+ return -EINTR;
+ /* Call the policy handler. */
+ len = head->read(head);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* Write to buffer. */
+ len = head->read_avail;
+ if (len > buffer_len)
+ len = buffer_len;
+ if (!len)
+ goto out;
+ /* head->read_buf changes by some functions. */
+ cp = head->read_buf;
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, cp, len)) {
+ len = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ head->read_avail -= len;
+ memmove(cp, cp + len, head->read_avail);
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_write_control - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buffer: Pointer to buffer to read from.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns @buffer_len on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tmy_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
+ const int buffer_len)
+{
+ struct tmy_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+ int error = buffer_len;
+ int avail_len = buffer_len;
+ char *cp0 = head->write_buf;
+
+ if (!head->write)
+ return -ENOSYS;
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buffer, buffer_len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ /* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */
+ if (head->write != write_pid && head->write != write_domain_policy &&
+ !is_policy_manager())
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
+ return -EINTR;
+ /* Read a line and dispatch it to the policy handler. */
+ while (avail_len > 0) {
+ char c;
+ if (head->write_avail >= head->writebuf_size - 1) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ } else if (get_user(c, buffer)) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer++;
+ avail_len--;
+ cp0[head->write_avail++] = c;
+ if (c != '\n')
+ continue;
+ cp0[head->write_avail - 1] = '\0';
+ head->write_avail = 0;
+ normalize_line(cp0);
+ head->write(head);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_close_control - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Releases memory and returns 0.
+ */
+static int tmy_close_control(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct tmy_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+
+ /* Release memory used for policy I/O. */
+ tmy_free(head->read_buf);
+ head->read_buf = NULL;
+ tmy_free(head->write_buf);
+ head->write_buf = NULL;
+ tmy_free(head);
+ head = NULL;
+ file->private_data = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_alloc_acl_element - Allocate permanent memory for ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @acl_type: Type of ACL entry.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to the ACL entry on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+void *tmy_alloc_acl_element(const u8 acl_type)
+{
+ int len;
+ struct acl_info *ptr;
+
+ switch (acl_type) {
+ case TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL:
+ len = sizeof(struct single_path_acl_record);
+ break;
+ case TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL:
+ len = sizeof(struct double_path_acl_record);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ptr = tmy_alloc_element(len);
+ if (!ptr)
+ return NULL;
+ ptr->type = acl_type;
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_open - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tmy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return tmy_open_control(((u8 *) file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_private)
+ - ((u8 *) NULL), file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_release - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tmy_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return tmy_close_control(file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_read - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf: Pointer to buffer.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos: Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tmy_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return tmy_read_control(file, buf, count);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_write - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf: Pointer to buffer.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos: Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns @count on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tmy_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return tmy_write_control(file, buf, count);
+}
+
+/* Operations for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static struct file_operations tmy_operations = {
+ .open = tmy_open,
+ .release = tmy_release,
+ .read = tmy_read,
+ .write = tmy_write,
+};
+
+/**
+ * create_entry - Create interface files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory.
+ *
+ * @name: The name of the interface file.
+ * @mode: The permission of the interface file.
+ * @parent: The parent directory.
+ * @key: Type of interface.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void __init create_entry(const char *name, const mode_t mode,
+ struct dentry *parent, const u8 key)
+{
+ securityfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, ((u8 *) NULL) + key,
+ &tmy_operations);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tmy_initerface_init - Initialize /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int __init tmy_initerface_init(void)
+{
+ struct dentry *tmy_dir;
+
+ tmy_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL);
+ create_entry("domain_policy", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_DOMAINPOLICY);
+ create_entry("exception_policy", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_EXCEPTIONPOLICY);
+ create_entry("self_domain", 0400, tmy_dir, TMY_SELFDOMAIN);
+ create_entry(".domain_status", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_DOMAIN_STATUS);
+ create_entry(".process_status", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_PROCESS_STATUS);
+ create_entry("meminfo", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_MEMINFO);
+ create_entry("profile", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_PROFILE);
+ create_entry("manager", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_MANAGER);
+ create_entry(".updates_counter", 0400, tmy_dir, TMY_UPDATESCOUNTER);
+ create_entry("version", 0400, tmy_dir, TMY_VERSION);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+fs_initcall(tmy_initerface_init);
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-2.6.28-rc2-mm1/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/common.h
+ *
+ * Common functions for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2008/10/10
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H
+#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H
+
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/kmod.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/list1.h>
+
+struct dentry;
+struct vfsmount;
+
+#define false 0
+#define true 1
+
+/* Temporary buffer for holding pathnames. */
+struct tmy_page_buffer {
+ char buffer[4096];
+};
+
+/* Structure for attribute checks in addition to pathname checks. */
+struct obj_info {
+ struct tmy_page_buffer *tmp;
+};
+
+/* Structure for holding a token. */
+struct path_info {
+ const char *name;
+ u32 hash; /* = full_name_hash(name, strlen(name)) */
+ u16 total_len; /* = strlen(name) */
+ u16 const_len; /* = const_part_length(name) */
+ bool is_dir; /* = strendswith(name, "/") */
+ bool is_patterned; /* = path_contains_pattern(name) */
+ u16 depth; /* = path_depth(name) */
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is the max length of a token.
+ *
+ * A token consists of only ASCII printable characters.
+ * Non printable characters in a token is represented in \ooo style
+ * octal string. Thus, \ itself is represented as \\.
+ */
+#define TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN 4000
+
+/* Structure for holding requested pathname. */
+struct path_info_with_data {
+ /* Keep "head" first, for this pointer is passed to tmy_free(). */
+ struct path_info head;
+ char bariier1[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */
+ char body[TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN];
+ char barrier2[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */
+};
+
+/* Common header for holding ACL entries. */
+struct acl_info {
+ struct list1_head list;
+ /*
+ * Type of this ACL entry.
+ *
+ * MSB is is_deleted flag.
+ */
+ u8 type;
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+/* This ACL entry is deleted. */
+#define ACL_DELETED 0x80
+
+/* Structure for domain information. */
+struct domain_info {
+ struct list1_head list;
+ struct list1_head acl_info_list;
+ /* Name of this domain. Never NULL. */
+ const struct path_info *domainname;
+ u8 profile; /* Profile number to use. */
+ u8 is_deleted; /* Delete flag.
+ 0 = active.
+ 1 = deleted but undeletable.
+ 255 = deleted and no longer undeletable. */
+ bool quota_warned; /* Quota warnning flag. */
+ /* DOMAIN_FLAGS_*. Use tmy_set_domain_flag() to modify. */
+ u8 flags;
+};
+
+/* Profile number is an integer between 0 and 255. */
+#define MAX_PROFILES 256
+
+/* Ignore "allow_read" directive in exception policy. */
+#define DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ 1
+/*
+ * This domain was unable to create a new domain at tmy_find_next_domain()
+ * because the name of the domain to be created was too long or
+ * it could not allocate memory.
+ * More than one process continued execve() without domain transition.
+ */
+#define DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED 2
+
+/*
+ * Structure for "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read",
+ * "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir",
+ * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar",
+ * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink" and "allow_rewrite" directive.
+ */
+struct single_path_acl_record {
+ struct acl_info head; /* type = TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL */
+ u16 perm;
+ /* Pointer to single pathname. */
+ const struct path_info *filename;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "allow_rename" and "allow_link" directive. */
+struct double_path_acl_record {
+ struct acl_info head; /* type = TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL */
+ u8 perm;
+ /* Pointer to single pathname. */
+ const struct path_info *filename1;
+ /* Pointer to single pathname. */
+ const struct path_info *filename2;
+};
+
+/* Keywords for ACLs. */
+#define KEYWORD_ALIAS "alias "
+#define KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "allow_read "
+#define KEYWORD_DELETE "delete "
+#define KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE "deny_rewrite "
+#define KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN "file_pattern "
+#define KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN "initialize_domain "
+#define KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN "keep_domain "
+#define KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN "no_initialize_domain "
+#define KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN "no_keep_domain "
+#define KEYWORD_SELECT "select "
+#define KEYWORD_UNDELETE "undelete "
+#define KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "use_profile "
+#define KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "ignore_global_allow_read"
+/* A domain definition starts with <kernel>. */
+#define ROOT_NAME "<kernel>"
+#define ROOT_NAME_LEN (sizeof(ROOT_NAME) - 1)
+
+/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
+#define TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE 0 /* domain_policy.conf */
+#define TMY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY 1
+#define TMY_TOMOYO_VERBOSE 2
+#define TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX 3
+
+/* Index numbers for updates counter. */
+#define TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY 0
+#define TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY 1
+#define TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_PROFILE 2
+#define TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_MANAGER 3
+#define MAX_TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER 4
+
+/* Structure for reading/writing policy via securityfs interfaces. */
+struct tmy_io_buffer {
+ int (*read) (struct tmy_io_buffer *);
+ int (*write) (struct tmy_io_buffer *);
+ /* Exclusive lock for this structure. */
+ struct mutex io_sem;
+ /* The position currently reading from. */
+ struct list1_head *read_var1;
+ /* Extra variables for reading. */
+ struct list1_head *read_var2;
+ /* The position currently writing to. */
+ struct domain_info *write_var1;
+ /* The step for reading. */
+ int read_step;
+ /* Buffer for reading. */
+ char *read_buf;
+ /* EOF flag for reading. */
+ bool read_eof;
+ /* Read domain ACL of specified PID? */
+ bool read_single_domain;
+ /* Extra variable for reading. */
+ u8 read_bit;
+ /* Bytes available for reading. */
+ int read_avail;
+ /* Size of read buffer. */
+ int readbuf_size;
+ /* Buffer for writing. */
+ char *write_buf;
+ /* Bytes available for writing. */
+ int write_avail;
+ /* Size of write buffer. */
+ int writebuf_size;
+};
+
+/* Check whether the domain has too many ACL entries to hold. */
+bool tmy_check_domain_quota(struct domain_info * const domain);
+/* Transactional sprintf() for policy dump. */
+bool tmy_io_printf(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+/* Check whether the domainname is correct. */
+bool tmy_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname,
+ const char *function);
+/* Check whether the token is correct. */
+bool tmy_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
+ const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type,
+ const char *function);
+/* Check whether the token can be a domainname. */
+bool tmy_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer);
+/* Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern. */
+bool tmy_path_matches_pattern(const struct path_info *filename,
+ const struct path_info *pattern);
+/* Read "alias" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tmy_read_alias_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+/*
+ * Read "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry
+ * in exception policy.
+ */
+bool tmy_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tmy_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tmy_read_file_pattern(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tmy_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tmy_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
+/* Write domain policy violation warning message to console? */
+bool tmy_verbose_mode(const struct domain_info *domain);
+/* Convert double path operation to operation name. */
+const char *tmy_dp2keyword(const u8 operation);
+/* Get the last component of the given domainname. */
+const char *tmy_get_last_name(const struct domain_info *domain);
+/* Get warning message. */
+const char *tmy_get_msg(const bool is_enforce);
+/* Convert single path operation to operation name. */
+const char *tmy_sp2keyword(const u8 operation);
+/* Delete a domain. */
+int tmy_delete_domain(char *data);
+/* Create "alias" entry in exception policy. */
+int tmy_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/*
+ * Create "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry
+ * in exception policy.
+ */
+int tmy_write_domain_initializer_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+ const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */
+int tmy_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+ const bool is_delete);
+/*
+ * Create "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read", "allow_write",
+ * "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir",
+ * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar",
+ * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_rename" and
+ * "allow_link" entry in domain policy.
+ */
+int tmy_write_file_policy(char *data, struct domain_info *domain,
+ const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */
+int tmy_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */
+int tmy_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
+int tmy_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Find a domain by the given name. */
+struct domain_info *tmy_find_domain(const char *domainname);
+/* Find or create a domain by the given name. */
+struct domain_info *tmy_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *domainname,
+ const u8 profile);
+/* Undelete a domain. */
+struct domain_info *tmy_undelete_domain(const char *domainname);
+/* Check mode for specified functionality. */
+unsigned int tmy_check_flags(const struct domain_info *domain, const u8 index);
+/* Allocate memory for structures. */
+void *tmy_alloc_acl_element(const u8 acl_type);
+/* Fill in "struct path_info" members. */
+void tmy_fill_path_info(struct path_info *ptr);
+/* Run policy loader when /sbin/init starts. */
+void tmy_load_policy(const char *filename);
+/* Change "struct domain_info"->flags. */
+void tmy_set_domain_flag(struct domain_info *domain, const bool is_delete,
+ const u8 flags);
+/* Update the policy change counter. */
+void tmy_update_counter(const unsigned char index);
+
+/* strcmp() for "struct path_info" structure. */
+static inline bool tmy_pathcmp(const struct path_info *a,
+ const struct path_info *b)
+{
+ return a->hash != b->hash || strcmp(a->name, b->name);
+}
+
+/* Get type of an ACL entry. */
+static inline u8 tmy_acl_type1(struct acl_info *ptr)
+{
+ return ptr->type & ~ACL_DELETED;
+}
+
+/* Get type of an ACL entry. */
+static inline u8 tmy_acl_type2(struct acl_info *ptr)
+{
+ return ptr->type;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct domain_info". */
+extern struct list1_head domain_list;
+
+/* Has /sbin/init started? */
+extern bool sbin_init_started;
+
+/* The kernel's domain. */
+extern struct domain_info KERNEL_DOMAIN;
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H) */
--
On Tue, 04 Nov 2008 15:08:53 +0900
Kentaro Takeda <[email protected]> wrote:
> This file contains common functions (e.g. policy I/O, pattern matching).
>
> +
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> +#include <linux/hardirq.h>
> +#include "realpath.h"
> +#include "common.h"
> +#include "tomoyo.h"
> +
> +/* Set default specified by the kernel config. */
> +#define MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY 2048
> +
> +/* Has /sbin/init started? */
> +bool sbin_init_started;
> +
> +/* String table for functionality that takes 4 modes. */
> +static const char *mode_4[4] = {
> + "disabled", "learning", "permissive", "enforcing"
> +};
> +/* String table for functionality that takes 2 modes. */
> +static const char *mode_2[4] = {
> + "disabled", "enabled", "enabled", "enabled"
> +};
> +
> +/* Table for profile. */
> +static struct {
> + const char *keyword;
> + unsigned int current_value;
> + const unsigned int max_value;
> +} tmy_control_array[TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX] = {
> + [TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE] = { "MAC_FOR_FILE", 0, 3 },
> + [TMY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY]
> + = { "MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY", MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY, INT_MAX },
> + [TMY_TOMOYO_VERBOSE] = { "TOMOYO_VERBOSE", 1, 1 },
> +};
> +
> +/* Profile table. Memory is allocated as needed. */
> +static struct profile {
> + unsigned int value[TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX];
> + const struct path_info *comment;
> +} *profile_ptr[MAX_PROFILES];
> +
> +/* Permit policy management by non-root user? */
> +static bool manage_by_non_root;
> +
> +/* Utility functions. */
> +
> +/* Open operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
> +static int tmy_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file);
> +/* Close /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
> +static int tmy_close_control(struct file *file);
> +/* Read operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
> +static int tmy_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
> + const int buffer_len);
> +/* Write operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
> +static int tmy_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
> + const int buffer_len);
> +
> +/**
> + * is_byte_range - Check whether the string isa \ooo style octal value.
> + *
> + * @str: Pointer to the string.
> + *
> + * Returns true if @str is a \ooo style octal value, false otherwise.
> + */
> +static bool is_byte_range(const char *str)
> +{
> + return *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '3' &&
> + *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '7' &&
> + *str >= '0' && *str <= '7';
> +}
Well... why?
I cannot think of any kernel interfaces which use octal strings. What
is special about Tomoyo?
> +/**
> + * is_decimal - Check whether the character is a decimal character.
> + *
> + * @c: The character to check.
> + *
> + * Returns true if @c is a decimal character, false otherwise.
> + */
> +static bool is_decimal(const char c)
> +{
> + return c >= '0' && c <= '9';
> +}
This duplicates a standard ctype.h function.
> +/**
> + * is_hexadecimal - Check whether the character is a hexadecimal character.
> + *
> + * @c: The character to check.
> + *
> + * Returns true if @c is a hexadecimal character, false otherwise.
> + */
> +static bool is_hexadecimal(const char c)
> +{
> + return (c >= '0' && c <= '9') ||
> + (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') ||
> + (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f');
> +}
And so does this.
> +/**
> + * is_alphabet_char - Check whether the character is an alphabet.
> + *
> + * @c: The character to check.
> + *
> + * Returns true if @c is an alphabet character, false otherwise.
> + */
> +static bool is_alphabet_char(const char c)
> +{
> + return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f');
> +}
As does this.
> +/**
> + * make_byte - Make byte value from three octal characters.
> + *
> + * @c1: The first character.
> + * @c2: The second character.
> + * @c3: The third character.
> + *
> + * Returns byte value.
> + */
> +static u8 make_byte(const u8 c1, const u8 c2, const u8 c3)
> +{
> + return ((c1 - '0') << 6) + ((c2 - '0') << 3) + (c3 - '0');
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * str_starts - Check whether the given string starts with the given keyword.
> + *
> + * @src: Pointer to pointer to the string.
> + * @find: Pointer to the keyword.
> + *
> + * Returns true if @src starts with @find, false otherwise.
> + *
> + * The @src is updated to point the first character after the @find
> + * if @src starts with @find.
> + */
> +static bool str_starts(char **src, const char *find)
> +{
> + const int len = strlen(find);
> + char *tmp = *src;
> +
> + if (strncmp(tmp, find, len))
> + return false;
> + tmp += len;
> + *src = tmp;
> + return true;
> +}
hrm. Isn't there a standard string.h way of doing this?
If not, it looks like a pretty common thing. I'd suggest that it a) be
coded to not do two passes across the input and b) proposed as a
generic addition to the kernel's string library functions.
> +/**
> + * normalize_line - Format string.
> + *
> + * @buffer: The line to normalize.
> + *
> + * Leading and trailing whitespaces are removed.
> + * Multiple whitespaces are packed into single space.
> + *
> + * Returns nothing.
> + */
> +static void normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer)
> +{
> + unsigned char *sp = buffer;
> + unsigned char *dp = buffer;
> + bool first = true;
> +
> + while (*sp && (*sp <= ' ' || *sp >= 127))
> + sp++;
> + while (*sp) {
> + if (!first)
> + *dp++ = ' ';
> + first = false;
> + while (*sp > ' ' && *sp < 127)
> + *dp++ = *sp++;
> + while (*sp && (*sp <= ' ' || *sp >= 127))
> + sp++;
> + }
> + *dp = '\0';
> +}
that looks pretty generic as well.
It seems to have duplicated isprint() in lots of places.
> +/**
> + * tmy_is_correct_path - Validate a pathname.
> + * @filename: The pathname to check.
> + * @start_type: Should the pathname start with '/'?
> + * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
> + * @pattern_type: Can the pathname contain a wildcard?
> + * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
> + * @end_type: Should the pathname end with '/'?
> + * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
> + * @function: The name of function calling me.
> + *
> + * Check whether the given filename follows the naming rules.
> + * Returns true if @filename follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
> + */
> +bool tmy_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
> + const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type,
> + const char *function)
> +{
> + bool contains_pattern = false;
> + unsigned char c;
> + unsigned char d;
> + unsigned char e;
> + const char *original_filename = filename;
> +
> + if (!filename)
> + goto out;
> + c = *filename;
> + if (start_type == 1) { /* Must start with '/' */
> + if (c != '/')
> + goto out;
> + } else if (start_type == -1) { /* Must not start with '/' */
> + if (c == '/')
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if (c)
> + c = *(strchr(filename, '\0') - 1);
> + if (end_type == 1) { /* Must end with '/' */
> + if (c != '/')
> + goto out;
> + } else if (end_type == -1) { /* Must not end with '/' */
> + if (c == '/')
> + goto out;
> + }
> + while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') {
> + if (c == '\\') {
> + switch ((c = *filename++)) {
> + case '\\': /* "\\" */
> + continue;
> + case '$': /* "\$" */
> + case '+': /* "\+" */
> + case '?': /* "\?" */
> + case '*': /* "\*" */
> + case '@': /* "\@" */
> + case 'x': /* "\x" */
> + case 'X': /* "\X" */
> + case 'a': /* "\a" */
> + case 'A': /* "\A" */
> + case '-': /* "\-" */
> + if (pattern_type == -1)
> + break; /* Must not contain pattern */
> + contains_pattern = true;
> + continue;
> + case '0': /* "\ooo" */
> + case '1':
> + case '2':
> + case '3':
> + d = *filename++;
> + if (d < '0' || d > '7')
> + break;
> + e = *filename++;
> + if (e < '0' || e > '7')
> + break;
> + c = make_byte(c, d, e);
> + if (c && (c <= ' ' || c >= 127))
> + continue; /* pattern is not \000 */
> + }
> + goto out;
> + } else if (c <= ' ' || c >= 127) {
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> + if (pattern_type == 1) { /* Must contain pattern */
> + if (!contains_pattern)
> + goto out;
> + }
> + return true;
> +out:
> + printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid pathname '%s'\n", function,
> + original_filename);
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_is_correct_domain - Check whether the given domainname follows the naming rules.
> + * @domainname: The domainname to check.
> + * @function: The name of function calling me.
> + *
> + * Returns true if @domainname follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
> + */
> +bool tmy_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname,
> + const char *function)
> +{
> + unsigned char c;
> + unsigned char d;
> + unsigned char e;
> + const char *org_domainname = domainname;
> +
> + if (!domainname || strncmp(domainname, ROOT_NAME, ROOT_NAME_LEN))
> + goto out;
> + domainname += ROOT_NAME_LEN;
> + if (!*domainname)
> + return true;
> + do {
> + if (*domainname++ != ' ')
> + goto out;
> + if (*domainname++ != '/')
> + goto out;
> + while ((c = *domainname) != '\0' && c != ' ') {
> + domainname++;
> + if (c == '\\') {
> + c = *domainname++;
> + switch ((c)) {
> + case '\\': /* "\\" */
> + continue;
> + case '0': /* "\ooo" */
> + case '1':
> + case '2':
> + case '3':
> + d = *domainname++;
> + if (d < '0' || d > '7')
> + break;
> + e = *domainname++;
> + if (e < '0' || e > '7')
> + break;
> + c = make_byte(c, d, e);
> + if (c && (c <= ' ' || c >= 127))
isprint?
> + /* pattern is not \000 */
> + continue;
> + }
> + goto out;
> + } else if (c < ' ' || c >= 127) {
> + goto out;
> + }
> + }
> + } while (*domainname);
> + return true;
> +out:
> + printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid domainname '%s'\n", function,
> + org_domainname);
> + return false;
> +}
Tomoyo does an *amazing* amount of string hacking. It's weird.
What happens if I have a filename which includes a character in the
128->255 range?
> +/**
> + * tmy_is_domain_def - Check whether the given token can be a domainname.
> + *
> + * @buffer: The token to check.
> + *
> + * Returns true if @buffer possibly be a domainname, false otherwise.
> + */
> +bool tmy_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer)
> +{
> + return !strncmp(buffer, ROOT_NAME, ROOT_NAME_LEN);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_find_domain - Find a domain by the given name.
> + *
> + * @domainname: The domainname to find.
> + *
> + * Returns pointer to "struct domain_info" if found, NULL otherwise.
> + */
> +struct domain_info *tmy_find_domain(const char *domainname)
> +{
> + struct domain_info *domain;
> + struct path_info name;
> +
> + name.name = domainname;
> + tmy_fill_path_info(&name);
> + list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
> + if (!domain->is_deleted &&
> + !tmy_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname))
> + return domain;
> + }
> + return NULL;
> +}
No lock was taken to protect that list.
If the caller must take some lock then that precondition should be
documented in the function's comment.
> +/**
> + * path_depth - Evaluate the number of '/' in a string.
> + *
> + * @pathname: The string to evaluate.
> + *
> + * Returns path depth of the string.
> + *
> + * I score 2 for each of the '/' in the @pathname
> + * and score 1 if the @pathname ends with '/'.
> + */
> +static int path_depth(const char *pathname)
> +{
> + int i = 0;
> +
> + if (pathname) {
> + char *ep = strchr(pathname, '\0');
what? Does that even work? strchr(p, 0) should always return NULL:
RETURN VALUE
The strchr() and strrchr() functions return a pointer to the matched
character or NULL if the character is not found.
Using
pathname + strlen(pathname)
would be saner, no?
> + if (pathname < ep--) {
> + if (*ep != '/')
> + i++;
> + while (pathname <= ep)
> + if (*ep-- == '/')
> + i += 2;
> + }
> + }
> + return i;
> +}
I cannot imagine why this function exists :(
> [vast amounts of string hacking snipped]
This seems like madness, sorry.
Why the heck is so much string bashing going on in here???
> +/**
> + * tmy_io_printf - Transactional printf() to "struct tmy_io_buffer" structure.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + * @fmt: The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters.
> + *
> + * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
This comment should explain what the terms "success" and "failure"
refer to. Perhaps "success"=="the output didn't overflow" or something.
> + * The snprintf() will truncate, but tmy_io_printf() won't.
> + */
> +bool tmy_io_printf(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...)
> +{
> + va_list args;
> + int len;
> + int pos = head->read_avail;
> + int size = head->readbuf_size - pos;
> +
> + if (size <= 0)
> + return false;
> + va_start(args, fmt);
> + len = vsnprintf(head->read_buf + pos, size, fmt, args);
> + va_end(args);
> + if (pos + len >= head->readbuf_size)
> + return false;
> + head->read_avail += len;
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_get_exe - Get tmy_realpath() of current process.
> + *
> + * Returns the tmy_realpath() of current process on success, NULL otherwise.
> + *
> + * This function uses tmy_alloc(), so the caller must call tmy_free()
> + * if this function didn't return NULL.
> + */
> +static const char *tmy_get_exe(void)
> +{
> + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> + const char *cp = NULL;
> +
> + if (!mm)
> + return NULL;
> + down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
> + for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
> + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) {
> + cp = tmy_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path);
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
> + return cp;
> +}
What guarantees that the first executable mapping in the mapping list
is the correct one for the executable?
What prevents us from accidentally breaking that guarantee in the
future? I wasn't even aware that this was the case.
What happens if the executable was unlinked?
> +/**
> + * tmy_get_msg - Get warning message.
> + *
> + * @is_enforce: Is it enforcing mode?
> + *
> + * Returns "ERROR" or "WARNING".
> + */
> +const char *tmy_get_msg(const bool is_enforce)
> +{
> + if (is_enforce)
> + return "ERROR";
> + else
> + return "WARNING";
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_check_flags - Check mode for specified functionality.
> + *
> + * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
> + * @index: The functionality to check mode.
> + *
> + * Returns the mode of specified functionality.
That description is rather meaningless.
> + */
> +unsigned int tmy_check_flags(const struct domain_info *domain, const u8 index)
> +{
> + const u8 profile = domain->profile;
> +
> + if (unlikely(in_interrupt())) {
> + static u8 count = 20;
> + if (count) {
> + count--;
> + printk(KERN_ERR "BUG: sleeping function called "
> + "from invalid context.\n");
> + dump_stack();
> + }
> + return 0;
> + }
a) WARN_ON is preferred
b) WARN_ON_ONCE might be usable here
c) what on earth is this code doing??
> + return sbin_init_started && index < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX
> +#if MAX_PROFILES != 256
> + && profile < MAX_PROFILES
> +#endif
> + && profile_ptr[profile] ?
> + profile_ptr[profile]->value[index] : 0;
> +}
And this. I cannot imagine why Tomoyo cares whether /sbin/init has
started yet. This sort of thing should be commented!
What happens in a cgroups environment where there will be multiple
/sbin/inits running?
> +/**
> + * tmy_verbose_mode - Check whether TOMOYO is verbose mode.
> + *
> + * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
> + *
> + * Returns true if domain policy violation warning should be printed to
> + * console.
> + */
> +bool tmy_verbose_mode(const struct domain_info *domain)
> +{
> + return tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_VERBOSE) != 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_check_domain_quota - Check for domain's quota.
> + *
> + * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
> + *
> + * Returns true if the domain is not exceeded quota, false otherwise.
> + */
> +bool tmy_check_domain_quota(struct domain_info * const domain)
> +{
> + unsigned int count = 0;
> + struct acl_info *ptr;
> +
> + if (!domain)
> + return true;
> + list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
> + if (ptr->type & ACL_DELETED)
> + continue;
> + switch (tmy_acl_type2(ptr)) {
> + struct single_path_acl_record *acl1;
> + struct double_path_acl_record *acl2;
> + u16 perm;
> + case TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL:
> + acl1 = container_of(ptr, struct single_path_acl_record,
> + head);
> + perm = acl1->perm;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL))
> + count++;
> + if (perm &
> + ((1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL) |
> + (1 << TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL)))
> + count++;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_CREATE_ACL))
> + count++;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL))
> + count++;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL))
> + count++;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL))
> + count++;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL))
> + count++;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL))
> + count++;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL))
> + count++;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL))
> + count++;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL))
> + count++;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL))
> + count++;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL))
> + count++;
> + break;
> + case TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL:
> + acl2 = container_of(ptr, struct double_path_acl_record,
> + head);
> + perm = acl2->perm;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_LINK_ACL))
> + count++;
> + if (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_RENAME_ACL))
> + count++;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + if (count < tmy_check_flags(domain, TMY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY))
> + return true;
> + if (!domain->quota_warned) {
> + domain->quota_warned = true;
> + printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-WARNING: "
> + "Domain '%s' has so many ACLs to hold. "
> + "Stopped learning mode.\n", domain->domainname->name);
> + }
> + return false;
> +}
This function is poorly named.
If I see code such as
if (tmy_check_domain_quota(...))
<something>
then I cannot tell whether <something> will be called when the quota is
exceeded, or whether it is called when the quota is _not_ exceeded.
This is because the term "check" carries no information about the
results of that check.
Now, if the code was:
if (tmy_domain_quota_exceeded(...))
<something>
then I would immediately know what caused <something> to be called.
see?
> +/**
> + * tmy_find_or_assign_new_profile - Create a new profile.
> + *
> + * @profile: Profile number to create.
> + *
> + * Returns pointer to "struct profile" on success, NULL otherwise.
> + */
> +static struct profile *tmy_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned int
> + profile)
> +{
> + static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
> + struct profile *ptr = NULL;
> +
> + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
> + mutex_lock(&lock);
> + if (profile < MAX_PROFILES) {
This check didn't need to be inside the lock.
> + ptr = profile_ptr[profile];
> + if (ptr)
> + goto ok;
> + ptr = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*ptr));
> + if (ptr) {
> + int i;
> + for (i = 0; i < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++)
> + ptr->value[i]
> + = tmy_control_array[i].current_value;
> + mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */
hm.
> + profile_ptr[profile] = ptr;
> + }
> + }
> +ok:
> + mutex_unlock(&lock);
> + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
> + return ptr;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * write_profile - Write profile table.
where to?
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
> + */
> +static int write_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + char *data = head->write_buf;
> + unsigned int i;
> + unsigned int value;
> + char *cp;
> + struct profile *profile;
> + unsigned long num;
> +
> + cp = strchr(data, '-');
> + if (cp)
> + *cp = '\0';
> + if (strict_strtoul(data, 10, &num))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + if (cp)
> + data = cp + 1;
> + profile = tmy_find_or_assign_new_profile(num);
> + if (!profile)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + cp = strchr(data, '=');
> + if (!cp)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + *cp = '\0';
> + tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_PROFILE);
> + if (!strcmp(data, "COMMENT")) {
> + profile->comment = tmy_save_name(cp + 1);
> + return 0;
> + }
> + for (i = 0; i < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++) {
> + if (strcmp(data, tmy_control_array[i].keyword))
> + continue;
> + if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &value) != 1) {
> + int j;
> + const char **modes;
> + switch (i) {
> + case TMY_TOMOYO_VERBOSE:
> + modes = mode_2;
> + break;
> + default:
> + modes = mode_4;
> + break;
> + }
> + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
> + if (strcmp(cp + 1, modes[j]))
> + continue;
> + value = j;
> + break;
> + }
> + if (j == 4)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + } else if (value > tmy_control_array[i].max_value) {
> + value = tmy_control_array[i].max_value;
> + }
> + profile->value[i] = value;
> + return 0;
> + }
> + return -EINVAL;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * read_profile - Read profile table.
Where from?
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
> + *
> + * Returns 0.
> + */
> +static int read_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + static const int total = TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX + 1;
> + int step;
> +
> + if (head->read_eof)
> + return 0;
> + for (step = head->read_step; step < MAX_PROFILES * total; step++) {
> + const u8 index = step / total;
> + u8 type = step % total;
> + const struct profile *profile = profile_ptr[index];
> + head->read_step = step;
> + if (!profile)
> + continue;
> + if (!type) { /* Print profile' comment tag. */
> + if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%u-COMMENT=%s\n",
> + index, profile->comment ?
> + profile->comment->name : ""))
> + break;
> + continue;
> + }
> + type--;
> + if (type < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX) {
> + const unsigned int value = profile->value[type];
> + const char **modes = NULL;
> + const char *keyword = tmy_control_array[type].keyword;
> + switch (tmy_control_array[type].max_value) {
> + case 3:
> + modes = mode_4;
> + break;
> + case 1:
> + modes = mode_2;
> + break;
> + }
> + if (modes) {
> + if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%s\n", index,
> + keyword, modes[value]))
> + break;
> + } else {
> + if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%u\n", index,
> + keyword, value))
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + }
> + if (step == MAX_PROFILES * total)
> + head->read_eof = true;
> + return 0;
> +}
These functions appear to be implementing more userspace interfaces.
The userspace interface is the most important part of any kernel code.
We can change all the internal details, but the interfaces will live
forever.
Hence we should review the proposed interfaces before even looking at
the code. Indeed, before even writing the code.
What are the Tomoyo kernel interfaces?
> +/* Structure for policy manager. */
> +struct policy_manager_entry {
> + struct list1_head list;
> + /* A path to program or a domainname. */
> + const struct path_info *manager;
> + bool is_domain; /* True if manager is a domainname. */
> + bool is_deleted; /* True if this entry is deleted. */
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * The list for "struct policy_manager_entry".
> + *
> + * This list is updated only inside update_manager_entry(), thus
> + * no global mutex exists.
> + */
> +static LIST1_HEAD(policy_manager_list);
> +
> +/**
> + * update_manager_entry - Add a manager entry.
> + *
> + * @manager: The path to manager or the domainnamme.
> + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
> + */
> +static int update_manager_entry(const char *manager, const bool is_delete)
> +{
> + struct policy_manager_entry *new_entry;
> + struct policy_manager_entry *ptr;
> + static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
> + const struct path_info *saved_manager;
> + int error = -ENOMEM;
> + bool is_domain = false;
> +
> + if (tmy_is_domain_def(manager)) {
> + if (!tmy_is_correct_domain(manager, __func__))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + is_domain = true;
> + } else {
> + if (!tmy_is_correct_path(manager, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> + saved_manager = tmy_save_name(manager);
> + if (!saved_manager)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
> + mutex_lock(&lock);
> + list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &policy_manager_list, list) {
> + if (ptr->manager != saved_manager)
> + continue;
> + ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
> + error = 0;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if (is_delete) {
> + error = -ENOENT;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + new_entry = tmy_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
> + if (!new_entry)
> + goto out;
> + new_entry->manager = saved_manager;
> + new_entry->is_domain = is_domain;
> + list1_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &policy_manager_list);
> + error = 0;
> +out:
> + mutex_unlock(&lock);
> + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
> + if (!error)
> + tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_MANAGER);
> + return error;
> +}
eh? So deleted entries get their "is_deleted" flag set but they are
never actually removed from the list nor freed? So over time the list
gets longer and longer and consumes more and more memory?
> +/**
> + * write_manager_policy - Write manager policy.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
> + */
> +static int write_manager_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + char *data = head->write_buf;
> + bool is_delete = str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_DELETE);
> +
> + if (!strcmp(data, "manage_by_non_root")) {
> + manage_by_non_root = !is_delete;
> + return 0;
> + }
> + return update_manager_entry(data, is_delete);
> +}
More userspace ABI proposals?
> +/**
> + * read_manager_policy - Read manager policy.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
> + *
> + * Returns 0.
> + */
> +static int read_manager_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + struct list1_head *pos;
> +
> + if (head->read_eof)
> + return 0;
> + list1_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &policy_manager_list) {
> + struct policy_manager_entry *ptr;
> + ptr = list1_entry(pos, struct policy_manager_entry, list);
> + if (ptr->is_deleted)
> + continue;
> + if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%s\n", ptr->manager->name))
> + return 0;
> + }
> + head->read_eof = true;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * is_policy_manager - Check whether the current process is a policy manager.
> + *
> + * Returns true if the current process is permitted to modify policy
> + * via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
> + */
> +static bool is_policy_manager(void)
> +{
> + struct policy_manager_entry *ptr;
> + const char *exe;
> + const struct task_struct *task = current;
> + const struct path_info *domainname = tmy_domain()->domainname;
> + bool found = false;
> +
> + if (!sbin_init_started)
> + return true;
> + if (!manage_by_non_root && (task->cred->uid || task->cred->euid))
> + return false;
What happens in a containerised environment where uids are non-unique
and where there are multiple /sbin/inits?
> + list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &policy_manager_list, list) {
> + if (!ptr->is_deleted && ptr->is_domain
> + && !tmy_pathcmp(domainname, ptr->manager))
> + return true;
> + }
> + exe = tmy_get_exe();
> + if (!exe)
> + return false;
> + list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &policy_manager_list, list) {
> + if (!ptr->is_deleted && !ptr->is_domain
> + && !strcmp(exe, ptr->manager->name)) {
> + found = true;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> + if (!found) { /* Reduce error messages. */
> + static pid_t last_pid;
> + const pid_t pid = current->pid;
> + if (last_pid != pid) {
> + printk(KERN_WARNING "%s ( %s ) is not permitted to "
> + "update policies.\n", domainname->name, exe);
It appears that unprivileged userspace can cause this messge to be
printed at will. That can cause the logs to fill and is considered to
be a small denial of service security hole.
> + last_pid = pid;
> + }
> + }
> + tmy_free(exe);
> + return found;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * is_select_one - Parse select command.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + * @data: String to parse.
> + *
> + * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
> + */
> +static bool is_select_one(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, const char *data)
> +{
> + unsigned int pid;
> + struct domain_info *domain = NULL;
> +
> + if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1) {
PIDs are no longer system-wide unique, and here we appear to be
implementing new userspace ABIs using PIDs.
> + struct task_struct *p;
> + /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
> + read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
> + p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
> + if (p)
> + domain = tmy_real_domain(p);
> + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
> + /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
> + } else if (!strncmp(data, "domain=", 7)) {
> + if (tmy_is_domain_def(data + 7))
> + domain = tmy_find_domain(data + 7);
> + } else
> + return false;
> + head->read_avail = 0;
> + tmy_io_printf(head, "# select %s\n", data);
> + head->read_single_domain = true;
> + head->read_eof = !domain;
> + if (domain) {
> + struct domain_info *d;
> + head->read_var1 = NULL;
> + list1_for_each_entry(d, &domain_list, list) {
> + if (d == domain)
> + break;
> + head->read_var1 = &d->list;
> + }
> + head->read_var2 = NULL;
> + head->read_bit = 0;
> + head->read_step = 0;
> + if (domain->is_deleted)
> + tmy_io_printf(head, "# This is a deleted domain.\n");
> + }
> + head->write_var1 = domain;
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * write_domain_policy - Write domain policy.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
> + */
> +static int write_domain_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + char *data = head->write_buf;
> + struct domain_info *domain = head->write_var1;
> + bool is_delete = false;
> + bool is_select = false;
> + bool is_undelete = false;
> + unsigned int profile;
> +
> + if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_DELETE))
> + is_delete = true;
> + else if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_SELECT))
> + is_select = true;
> + else if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_UNDELETE))
> + is_undelete = true;
> + if (is_select && is_select_one(head, data))
> + return 0;
> + /* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */
> + if (!is_policy_manager())
> + return -EPERM;
> + if (tmy_is_domain_def(data)) {
> + domain = NULL;
> + if (is_delete)
> + tmy_delete_domain(data);
> + else if (is_select)
> + domain = tmy_find_domain(data);
> + else if (is_undelete)
> + domain = tmy_undelete_domain(data);
> + else
> + domain = tmy_find_or_assign_new_domain(data, 0);
> + head->write_var1 = domain;
> + tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY);
> + return 0;
> + }
> + if (!domain)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (sscanf(data, KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u", &profile) == 1
> + && profile < MAX_PROFILES) {
> + if (profile_ptr[profile] || !sbin_init_started)
> + domain->profile = (u8) profile;
> + return 0;
> + }
> + if (!strcmp(data, KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)) {
> + tmy_set_domain_flag(domain, is_delete,
> + DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ);
> + return 0;
> + }
> + return tmy_write_file_policy(data, domain, is_delete);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * print_single_path_acl - Print a single path ACL entry.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + * @ptr: Pointer to "struct single_path_acl_record".
> + *
> + * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
> + */
> +static bool print_single_path_acl(struct tmy_io_buffer *head,
> + struct single_path_acl_record *ptr)
> +{
> + int pos;
> + u8 bit;
> + const char *atmark = "";
> + const char *filename;
> + const u16 perm = ptr->perm;
> +
> + filename = ptr->filename->name;
> + for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION; bit++) {
> + const char *msg;
> + if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
> + continue;
> + /* Print "read/write" instead of "read" and "write". */
> + if ((bit == TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL || bit == TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL)
> + && (perm & (1 << TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL)))
> + continue;
> + msg = tmy_sp2keyword(bit);
> + pos = head->read_avail;
> + if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s\n", msg,
> + atmark, filename))
> + goto out;
> + }
> + head->read_bit = 0;
> + return true;
> +out:
> + head->read_bit = bit;
> + head->read_avail = pos;
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * print_double_path_acl - Print a double path ACL entry.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + * @ptr: Pointer to "struct double_path_acl_record".
> + *
> + * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
> + */
> +static bool print_double_path_acl(struct tmy_io_buffer *head,
> + struct double_path_acl_record *ptr)
> +{
> + int pos;
> + const char *atmark1 = "";
> + const char *atmark2 = "";
> + const char *filename1;
> + const char *filename2;
> + const u8 perm = ptr->perm;
> + u8 bit;
> +
> + filename1 = ptr->filename1->name;
> + filename2 = ptr->filename2->name;
> + for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION; bit++) {
> + const char *msg;
> + if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
> + continue;
> + msg = tmy_dp2keyword(bit);
> + pos = head->read_avail;
> + if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s %s%s\n", msg,
> + atmark1, filename1, atmark2, filename2))
> + goto out;
> + }
> + head->read_bit = 0;
> + return true;
> +out:
> + head->read_bit = bit;
> + head->read_avail = pos;
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * print_entry - Print an ACL entry.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + * @ptr: Pointer to an ACL entry.
> + *
> + * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
> + */
> +static bool print_entry(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, struct acl_info *ptr)
> +{
> + const u8 acl_type = tmy_acl_type2(ptr);
> +
> + if (acl_type & ACL_DELETED)
> + return true;
> + if (acl_type == TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL) {
> + struct single_path_acl_record *acl
> + = container_of(ptr, struct single_path_acl_record,
> + head);
> + return print_single_path_acl(head, acl);
> + }
> + if (acl_type == TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL) {
> + struct double_path_acl_record *acl
> + = container_of(ptr, struct double_path_acl_record,
> + head);
> + return print_double_path_acl(head, acl);
> + }
> + BUG(); /* This must not happen. */
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * read_domain_policy - Read domain policy.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + *
> + * Returns 0.
> + */
> +static int read_domain_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + struct list1_head *dpos;
> + struct list1_head *apos;
> +
> + if (head->read_eof)
> + return 0;
> + if (head->read_step == 0)
> + head->read_step = 1;
> + list1_for_each_cookie(dpos, head->read_var1, &domain_list) {
> + struct domain_info *domain;
> + const char *quota_exceeded = "";
> + const char *transition_failed = "";
> + const char *ignore_global_allow_read = "";
> + domain = list1_entry(dpos, struct domain_info, list);
> + if (head->read_step != 1)
> + goto acl_loop;
> + if (domain->is_deleted && !head->read_single_domain)
> + continue;
> + /* Print domainname and flags. */
> + if (domain->quota_warned)
> + quota_exceeded = "quota_exceeded\n";
> + if (domain->flags & DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED)
> + transition_failed = "transition_failed\n";
> + if (domain->flags & DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)
> + ignore_global_allow_read
> + = KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "\n";
> + if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%s\n" KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u\n"
> + "%s%s%s\n", domain->domainname->name,
> + domain->profile, quota_exceeded,
> + transition_failed, ignore_global_allow_read))
> + return 0;
> + head->read_step = 2;
> +acl_loop:
> + if (head->read_step == 3)
> + goto tail_mark;
> + /* Print ACL entries in the domain. */
> + list1_for_each_cookie(apos, head->read_var2,
> + &domain->acl_info_list) {
> + struct acl_info *ptr
> + = list1_entry(apos, struct acl_info, list);
> + if (!print_entry(head, ptr))
> + return 0;
> + }
> + head->read_step = 3;
> +tail_mark:
> + if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "\n"))
> + return 0;
> + head->read_step = 1;
> + if (head->read_single_domain)
> + break;
> + }
> + head->read_eof = true;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * write_domain_profile - Assign profile for specified domain.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise.
> + *
> + * This is equivalent to doing
> + *
> + * ( echo "select " $domainname; echo "use_profile " $profile ) |
> + * /usr/lib/ccs/loadpolicy -d
> + */
> +static int write_domain_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + char *data = head->write_buf;
> + char *cp = strchr(data, ' ');
> + struct domain_info *domain;
> + unsigned long profile;
> +
> + if (!cp)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + *cp = '\0';
> + domain = tmy_find_domain(cp + 1);
> + strict_strtoul(data, 10, &profile);
Unchecked return value?
> + if (domain && profile < MAX_PROFILES
> + && (profile_ptr[profile] || !sbin_init_started))
> + domain->profile = (u8) profile;
> + tmy_update_counter(TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * read_domain_profile - Read only domainname and profile.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + *
> + * Returns list of profile number and domainname pairs.
> + *
> + * This is equivalent to doing
> + *
> + * grep -A 1 '^<kernel>' /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy |
> + * awk ' { if ( domainname == "" ) { if ( $1 == "<kernel>" )
> + * domainname = $0; } else if ( $1 == "use_profile" ) {
> + * print $2 " " domainname; domainname = ""; } } ; '
> + */
> +static int read_domain_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + struct list1_head *pos;
> +
> + if (head->read_eof)
> + return 0;
> + list1_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var1, &domain_list) {
> + struct domain_info *domain;
> + domain = list1_entry(pos, struct domain_info, list);
> + if (domain->is_deleted)
> + continue;
> + if (!tmy_io_printf(head, "%u %s\n", domain->profile,
> + domain->domainname->name))
> + return 0;
> + }
> + head->read_eof = true;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * write_pid: Specify PID to obtain domainname.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + *
> + * Returns 0.
> + */
> +static int write_pid(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + unsigned long pid;
> + strict_strtoul(head->write_buf, 10, &pid);
> + head->read_step = (int) pid;
> + head->read_eof = false;
> + return 0;
> +}
Again, PIDs are not reliable when used for userspace ABI purposes.
> +/**
> + * read_pid - Get domainname of the specified PID.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + *
> + * Returns the domainname which the specified PID is in on success,
> + * empty string otherwise.
> + * The PID is specified by write_pid() so that the user can obtain
> + * using read()/write() interface rather than sysctl() interface.
> + */
> +static int read_pid(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + if (head->read_avail == 0 && !head->read_eof) {
> + const int pid = head->read_step;
> + struct task_struct *p;
> + struct domain_info *domain = NULL;
> + /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
> + read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
> + p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
> + if (p)
> + domain = tmy_real_domain(p);
> + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
> + /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
> + if (domain)
> + tmy_io_printf(head, "%d %u %s", pid, domain->profile,
> + domain->domainname->name);
> + head->read_eof = true;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * write_exception_policy - Write exception policy.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
> + */
> +static int write_exception_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + char *data = head->write_buf;
> + bool is_delete = str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_DELETE);
> +
> + if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN))
> + return tmy_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, false, is_delete);
> + if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN))
> + return tmy_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, true, is_delete);
> + if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN))
> + return tmy_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, false,
> + is_delete);
> + if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN))
> + return tmy_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, true,
> + is_delete);
> + if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_ALIAS))
> + return tmy_write_alias_policy(data, is_delete);
> + if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ))
> + return tmy_write_globally_readable_policy(data, is_delete);
> + if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN))
> + return tmy_write_pattern_policy(data, is_delete);
> + if (str_starts(&data, KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE))
> + return tmy_write_no_rewrite_policy(data, is_delete);
> + return -EINVAL;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * read_exception_policy - Read exception policy.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise.
> + */
> +static int read_exception_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + if (!head->read_eof) {
> + switch (head->read_step) {
> + case 0:
> + head->read_var2 = NULL;
> + head->read_step = 1;
> + case 1:
> + if (!tmy_read_domain_keeper_policy(head))
> + break;
> + head->read_var2 = NULL;
> + head->read_step = 2;
> + case 2:
> + if (!tmy_read_globally_readable_policy(head))
> + break;
> + head->read_var2 = NULL;
> + head->read_step = 3;
> + case 3:
> + head->read_var2 = NULL;
> + head->read_step = 4;
> + case 4:
> + if (!tmy_read_domain_initializer_policy(head))
> + break;
> + head->read_var2 = NULL;
> + head->read_step = 5;
> + case 5:
> + if (!tmy_read_alias_policy(head))
> + break;
> + head->read_var2 = NULL;
> + head->read_step = 6;
> + case 6:
> + head->read_var2 = NULL;
> + head->read_step = 7;
> + case 7:
> + if (!tmy_read_file_pattern(head))
> + break;
> + head->read_var2 = NULL;
> + head->read_step = 8;
> + case 8:
> + if (!tmy_read_no_rewrite_policy(head))
> + break;
> + head->read_var2 = NULL;
> + head->read_step = 9;
> + case 9:
> + head->read_eof = true;
> + break;
> + default:
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/* path to policy loader */
> +static const char *tmy_loader = "/sbin/tomoyo-init";
hm, hard-wired knowledge of filesytem layout.
We did this in a few places already, reluctantly. We did at least make
them configurable (eg: /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe).
It's rather ugly to be doing this sort of thing.
> +/**
> + * policy_loader_exists - Check whether /sbin/tomoyo-init exists.
> + *
> + * Returns true if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists, false otherwise.
> + */
> +static bool policy_loader_exists(void)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Don't activate MAC if the policy loader doesn't exist.
> + * If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not
> + * mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since
> + * policies are not loaded yet.
> + * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime.
> + */
> + struct nameidata nd;
> +
> + if (path_lookup(tmy_loader, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd)) {
> + printk(KERN_INFO "Not activating Mandatory Access Control now "
> + "since %s doesn't exist.\n", tmy_loader);
> + return false;
> + }
> + path_put(&nd.path);
> + return true;
> +}
If you really really have to do this then a simple call to sys_access()
might suffice.
But it is of course racy against concurrent rename, unlink, etc.
> +/**
> + * tmy_load_policy - Run external policy loader to load policy.
> + *
> + * @filename: The program about to start.
> + *
> + * This function checks whether @filename is /sbin/init , and if so
> + * invoke /sbin/tomoyo-init and wait for the termination of /sbin/tomoyo-init
> + * and then continues invocation of /sbin/init.
> + * /sbin/tomoyo-init reads policy files in /etc/tomoyo/ directory and
> + * writes to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interfaces.
> + *
> + * Returns nothing.
> + */
> +void tmy_load_policy(const char *filename)
> +{
> + char *argv[2];
> + char *envp[3];
> +
> + if (sbin_init_started)
> + return;
> + /*
> + * Check filename is /sbin/init or /sbin/tomoyo-start.
> + * /sbin/tomoyo-start is a dummy filename in case where /sbin/init can't
> + * be passed.
> + * You can create /sbin/tomoyo-start by
> + * "ln -s /bin/true /sbin/tomoyo-start".
> + */
> + if (strcmp(filename, "/sbin/init") &&
> + strcmp(filename, "/sbin/tomoyo-start"))
> + return;
> + if (!policy_loader_exists())
> + return;
Why do this? call_usermodehelper() will simply fail if the file isn't here.
> + printk(KERN_INFO "Calling %s to load policy. Please wait.\n",
> + tmy_loader);
> + argv[0] = (char *) tmy_loader;
> + argv[1] = NULL;
> + envp[0] = "HOME=/";
> + envp[1] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin";
> + envp[2] = NULL;
> + call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, 1);
> +
> + printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO: 2.2.0-pre 2008/10/10\n");
> + printk(KERN_INFO "Mandatory Access Control activated.\n");
> + sbin_init_started = true;
> + { /* Check all profiles currently assigned to domains are defined. */
> + struct domain_info *domain;
> + list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
> + const u8 profile = domain->profile;
> + if (profile_ptr[profile])
> + continue;
> + panic("Profile %u (used by '%s') not defined.\n",
> + profile, domain->domainname->name);
> + }
> + }
> +}
> +
> +/* Policy updates counter. */
> +static atomic_t updates_counter[MAX_TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER];
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_update_counter - Increment policy change counter.
> + *
> + * @index: Type of policy.
> + *
> + * Returns nothing.
> + */
> +void tmy_update_counter(const unsigned char index)
> +{
> + if (index < MAX_TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER)
> + atomic_inc(&updates_counter[index]);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * read_updates_counter - Check for policy change counter.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + *
> + * Returns how many times policy has changed since the previous check.
> + */
> +static int read_updates_counter(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + if (head->read_eof)
> + return 0;
> + tmy_io_printf(head,
> + "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy: %10u\n"
> + "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy: %10u\n"
> + "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile: %10u\n"
> + "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager: %10u\n",
> + atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
> + [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY], 0),
> + atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
> + [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY], 0),
> + atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
> + [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_PROFILE], 0),
> + atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
> + [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_MANAGER], 0));
> + head->read_eof = true;
> + return 0;
> +}
What is this doing? We print the absolute pathnames of sysfs files via
another sysfs file?
> +/**
> + * read_version: Get version.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + *
> + * Returns version information.
> + */
> +static int read_version(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + if (!head->read_eof) {
> + tmy_io_printf(head, "2.2.0-pre");
> + head->read_eof = true;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * read_self_domain - Get the current process's domainname.
> + *
> + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> + *
> + * Returns the current process's domainname.
> + */
> +static int read_self_domain(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> +{
> + if (!head->read_eof) {
> + /*
> + * tmy_domain()->domainname != NULL
> + * because every process belongs to a domain and
> + * the domain's name cannot be NULL.
> + */
> + tmy_io_printf(head, "%s", tmy_domain()->domainname->name);
> + head->read_eof = true;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_open_control - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
> + *
> + * @type: Type of interface.
> + * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
> + *
> + * Associates policy handler and returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise.
> + */
> +static int tmy_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
> +{
> + struct tmy_io_buffer *head = tmy_alloc(sizeof(*head));
> +
> + if (!head)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + mutex_init(&head->io_sem);
> + switch (type) {
> + case TMY_DOMAINPOLICY:
> + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy */
> + head->write = write_domain_policy;
> + head->read = read_domain_policy;
> + break;
> + case TMY_EXCEPTIONPOLICY:
> + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy */
> + head->write = write_exception_policy;
> + head->read = read_exception_policy;
> + break;
> + case TMY_SELFDOMAIN:
> + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain */
> + head->read = read_self_domain;
> + break;
> + case TMY_DOMAIN_STATUS:
> + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.domain_status */
> + head->write = write_domain_profile;
> + head->read = read_domain_profile;
> + break;
> + case TMY_PROCESS_STATUS:
> + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.process_status */
> + head->write = write_pid;
> + head->read = read_pid;
> + break;
> + case TMY_VERSION:
> + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version */
> + head->read = read_version;
> + head->readbuf_size = 128;
> + break;
> + case TMY_MEMINFO:
> + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo */
> + head->write = tmy_write_memory_quota;
> + head->read = tmy_read_memory_counter;
> + head->readbuf_size = 512;
> + break;
> + case TMY_PROFILE:
> + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile */
> + head->write = write_profile;
> + head->read = read_profile;
> + break;
> + case TMY_MANAGER:
> + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager */
> + head->write = write_manager_policy;
> + head->read = read_manager_policy;
> + break;
> + case TMY_UPDATESCOUNTER:
> + /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.updates_counter */
> + head->read = read_updates_counter;
> + break;
> + }
> + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
> + /*
> + * No need to allocate read_buf since it is not opened
> + * for reading.
> + */
> + head->read = NULL;
> + } else {
> + if (!head->readbuf_size)
> + head->readbuf_size = 4096 * 2;
> + head->read_buf = tmy_alloc(head->readbuf_size);
> + if (!head->read_buf) {
> + tmy_free(head);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> + }
> + if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) {
> + /*
> + * No need to allocate write_buf since it is not opened
> + * for writing.
> + */
> + head->write = NULL;
> + } else if (head->write) {
> + head->writebuf_size = 4096 * 2;
> + head->write_buf = tmy_alloc(head->writebuf_size);
> + if (!head->write_buf) {
> + tmy_free(head->read_buf);
> + tmy_free(head);
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> + }
> + file->private_data = head;
> + /*
> + * Call the handler now if the file is
> + * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain
> + * so that the user can use
> + * cat < /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain"
> + * to know the current process's domainname.
> + */
> + if (type == TMY_SELFDOMAIN)
> + tmy_read_control(file, NULL, 0);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_read_control - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
> + *
> + * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
> + * @buffer: Poiner to buffer to write to.
> + * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
> + *
> + * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
> + */
> +static int tmy_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
> + const int buffer_len)
> +{
> + int len = 0;
> + struct tmy_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
> + char *cp;
> +
> + if (!head->read)
> + return -ENOSYS;
> + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, buffer_len))
Unneeded - copy_to_user() checks this.
> + return -EFAULT;
> + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
> + return -EINTR;
> + /* Call the policy handler. */
> + len = head->read(head);
> + if (len < 0)
> + goto out;
> + /* Write to buffer. */
> + len = head->read_avail;
> + if (len > buffer_len)
> + len = buffer_len;
> + if (!len)
> + goto out;
> + /* head->read_buf changes by some functions. */
> + cp = head->read_buf;
> + if (copy_to_user(buffer, cp, len)) {
> + len = -EFAULT;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + head->read_avail -= len;
> + memmove(cp, cp + len, head->read_avail);
> +out:
> + mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
> + return len;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_write_control - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
> + *
> + * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
> + * @buffer: Pointer to buffer to read from.
> + * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
> + *
> + * Returns @buffer_len on success, negative value otherwise.
> + */
> +static int tmy_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
> + const int buffer_len)
> +{
> + struct tmy_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
> + int error = buffer_len;
> + int avail_len = buffer_len;
> + char *cp0 = head->write_buf;
> +
> + if (!head->write)
> + return -ENOSYS;
> + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buffer, buffer_len))
Unneeded.
> + return -EFAULT;
> + /* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */
> + if (head->write != write_pid && head->write != write_domain_policy &&
> + !is_policy_manager())
> + return -EPERM;
> + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
> + return -EINTR;
> + /* Read a line and dispatch it to the policy handler. */
> + while (avail_len > 0) {
> + char c;
> + if (head->write_avail >= head->writebuf_size - 1) {
> + error = -ENOMEM;
> + break;
> + } else if (get_user(c, buffer)) {
> + error = -EFAULT;
> + break;
> + }
> + buffer++;
> + avail_len--;
> + cp0[head->write_avail++] = c;
> + if (c != '\n')
> + continue;
> + cp0[head->write_avail - 1] = '\0';
> + head->write_avail = 0;
> + normalize_line(cp0);
> + head->write(head);
> + }
> + mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
> + return error;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_close_control - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
> + *
> + * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
> + *
> + * Releases memory and returns 0.
> + */
> +static int tmy_close_control(struct file *file)
> +{
> + struct tmy_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
> +
> + /* Release memory used for policy I/O. */
> + tmy_free(head->read_buf);
> + head->read_buf = NULL;
> + tmy_free(head->write_buf);
> + head->write_buf = NULL;
> + tmy_free(head);
> + head = NULL;
> + file->private_data = NULL;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_alloc_acl_element - Allocate permanent memory for ACL entry.
> + *
> + * @acl_type: Type of ACL entry.
> + *
> + * Returns pointer to the ACL entry on success, NULL otherwise.
> + */
> +void *tmy_alloc_acl_element(const u8 acl_type)
> +{
> + int len;
> + struct acl_info *ptr;
> +
> + switch (acl_type) {
> + case TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL:
> + len = sizeof(struct single_path_acl_record);
> + break;
> + case TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL:
> + len = sizeof(struct double_path_acl_record);
> + break;
> + default:
> + return NULL;
> + }
> + ptr = tmy_alloc_element(len);
> + if (!ptr)
> + return NULL;
> + ptr->type = acl_type;
> + return ptr;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_open - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
> + *
> + * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
> + * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
> + */
> +static int tmy_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> +{
> + return tmy_open_control(((u8 *) file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_private)
> + - ((u8 *) NULL), file);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_release - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
> + *
> + * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
> + * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
> + */
> +static int tmy_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> +{
> + return tmy_close_control(file);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_read - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
> + *
> + * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
> + * @buf: Pointer to buffer.
> + * @count: Size of @buf.
> + * @ppos: Unused.
> + *
> + * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
> + */
> +static ssize_t tmy_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
> + loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + return tmy_read_control(file, buf, count);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_write - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
> + *
> + * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
> + * @buf: Pointer to buffer.
> + * @count: Size of @buf.
> + * @ppos: Unused.
> + *
> + * Returns @count on success, negative value otherwise.
> + */
> +static ssize_t tmy_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> + size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + return tmy_write_control(file, buf, count);
> +}
> +
> +/* Operations for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
> +static struct file_operations tmy_operations = {
> + .open = tmy_open,
> + .release = tmy_release,
> + .read = tmy_read,
> + .write = tmy_write,
> +};
> +
> +/**
> + * create_entry - Create interface files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory.
> + *
> + * @name: The name of the interface file.
> + * @mode: The permission of the interface file.
> + * @parent: The parent directory.
> + * @key: Type of interface.
> + *
> + * Returns nothing.
> + */
> +static void __init create_entry(const char *name, const mode_t mode,
> + struct dentry *parent, const u8 key)
> +{
> + securityfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, ((u8 *) NULL) + key,
> + &tmy_operations);
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * tmy_initerface_init - Initialize /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
> + *
> + * Returns 0.
> + */
> +static int __init tmy_initerface_init(void)
> +{
> + struct dentry *tmy_dir;
> +
> + tmy_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL);
> + create_entry("domain_policy", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_DOMAINPOLICY);
> + create_entry("exception_policy", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_EXCEPTIONPOLICY);
> + create_entry("self_domain", 0400, tmy_dir, TMY_SELFDOMAIN);
> + create_entry(".domain_status", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_DOMAIN_STATUS);
> + create_entry(".process_status", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_PROCESS_STATUS);
> + create_entry("meminfo", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_MEMINFO);
> + create_entry("profile", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_PROFILE);
> + create_entry("manager", 0600, tmy_dir, TMY_MANAGER);
> + create_entry(".updates_counter", 0400, tmy_dir, TMY_UPDATESCOUNTER);
> + create_entry("version", 0400, tmy_dir, TMY_VERSION);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +fs_initcall(tmy_initerface_init);
> --- /dev/null
> +++ linux-2.6.28-rc2-mm1/security/tomoyo/common.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
> +/*
> + * security/tomoyo/common.h
> + *
> + * Common functions for TOMOYO.
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2005-2008 NTT DATA CORPORATION
> + *
> + * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2008/10/10
> + *
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H
> +#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H
> +
> +#include <linux/string.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/file.h>
> +#include <linux/kmod.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/namei.h>
> +#include <linux/mount.h>
> +#include <linux/list1.h>
> +
> +struct dentry;
> +struct vfsmount;
> +
> +#define false 0
> +#define true 1
The kernel already defines true and false.
> +/* Temporary buffer for holding pathnames. */
> +struct tmy_page_buffer {
> + char buffer[4096];
> +};
> +
> +/* Structure for attribute checks in addition to pathname checks. */
> +struct obj_info {
> + struct tmy_page_buffer *tmp;
> +};
> +
> +/* Structure for holding a token. */
> +struct path_info {
> + const char *name;
> + u32 hash; /* = full_name_hash(name, strlen(name)) */
> + u16 total_len; /* = strlen(name) */
> + u16 const_len; /* = const_part_length(name) */
> + bool is_dir; /* = strendswith(name, "/") */
> + bool is_patterned; /* = path_contains_pattern(name) */
> + u16 depth; /* = path_depth(name) */
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * This is the max length of a token.
> + *
> + * A token consists of only ASCII printable characters.
> + * Non printable characters in a token is represented in \ooo style
> + * octal string. Thus, \ itself is represented as \\.
> + */
> +#define TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN 4000
> +
> +/* Structure for holding requested pathname. */
> +struct path_info_with_data {
> + /* Keep "head" first, for this pointer is passed to tmy_free(). */
> + struct path_info head;
> + char bariier1[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */
> + char body[TMY_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN];
> + char barrier2[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */
> +};
> +
> +/* Common header for holding ACL entries. */
> +struct acl_info {
> + struct list1_head list;
> + /*
> + * Type of this ACL entry.
> + *
> + * MSB is is_deleted flag.
> + */
> + u8 type;
> +} __attribute__((__packed__));
I cannot tell from reading the code why this is packed. Hence a comment
is needed.
Please use __packed.
> +/* This ACL entry is deleted. */
> +#define ACL_DELETED 0x80
> +
> +/* Structure for domain information. */
> +struct domain_info {
> + struct list1_head list;
> + struct list1_head acl_info_list;
> + /* Name of this domain. Never NULL. */
> + const struct path_info *domainname;
> + u8 profile; /* Profile number to use. */
> + u8 is_deleted; /* Delete flag.
> + 0 = active.
> + 1 = deleted but undeletable.
> + 255 = deleted and no longer undeletable. */
> + bool quota_warned; /* Quota warnning flag. */
> + /* DOMAIN_FLAGS_*. Use tmy_set_domain_flag() to modify. */
> + u8 flags;
> +};
> +
> +/* Profile number is an integer between 0 and 255. */
> +#define MAX_PROFILES 256
> +
> +/* Ignore "allow_read" directive in exception policy. */
> +#define DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ 1
> +/*
> + * This domain was unable to create a new domain at tmy_find_next_domain()
> + * because the name of the domain to be created was too long or
> + * it could not allocate memory.
> + * More than one process continued execve() without domain transition.
> + */
> +#define DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED 2
> +
> +/*
> + * Structure for "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read",
> + * "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir",
> + * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar",
> + * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink" and "allow_rewrite" directive.
> + */
> +struct single_path_acl_record {
> + struct acl_info head; /* type = TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL */
> + u16 perm;
> + /* Pointer to single pathname. */
> + const struct path_info *filename;
> +};
> +
> +/* Structure for "allow_rename" and "allow_link" directive. */
> +struct double_path_acl_record {
> + struct acl_info head; /* type = TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL */
> + u8 perm;
> + /* Pointer to single pathname. */
> + const struct path_info *filename1;
> + /* Pointer to single pathname. */
> + const struct path_info *filename2;
> +};
> +
> +/* Keywords for ACLs. */
> +#define KEYWORD_ALIAS "alias "
> +#define KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "allow_read "
> +#define KEYWORD_DELETE "delete "
> +#define KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE "deny_rewrite "
> +#define KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN "file_pattern "
> +#define KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN "initialize_domain "
> +#define KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN "keep_domain "
> +#define KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN "no_initialize_domain "
> +#define KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN "no_keep_domain "
> +#define KEYWORD_SELECT "select "
> +#define KEYWORD_UNDELETE "undelete "
> +#define KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "use_profile "
> +#define KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "ignore_global_allow_read"
> +/* A domain definition starts with <kernel>. */
> +#define ROOT_NAME "<kernel>"
> +#define ROOT_NAME_LEN (sizeof(ROOT_NAME) - 1)
> +
> +/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
> +#define TMY_TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE 0 /* domain_policy.conf */
> +#define TMY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY 1
> +#define TMY_TOMOYO_VERBOSE 2
> +#define TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX 3
> +
> +/* Index numbers for updates counter. */
> +#define TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY 0
> +#define TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY 1
> +#define TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_PROFILE 2
> +#define TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_MANAGER 3
> +#define MAX_TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER 4
> +
> +/* Structure for reading/writing policy via securityfs interfaces. */
> +struct tmy_io_buffer {
> + int (*read) (struct tmy_io_buffer *);
> + int (*write) (struct tmy_io_buffer *);
> + /* Exclusive lock for this structure. */
> + struct mutex io_sem;
> + /* The position currently reading from. */
> + struct list1_head *read_var1;
> + /* Extra variables for reading. */
> + struct list1_head *read_var2;
> + /* The position currently writing to. */
> + struct domain_info *write_var1;
> + /* The step for reading. */
> + int read_step;
> + /* Buffer for reading. */
> + char *read_buf;
> + /* EOF flag for reading. */
> + bool read_eof;
> + /* Read domain ACL of specified PID? */
> + bool read_single_domain;
> + /* Extra variable for reading. */
> + u8 read_bit;
> + /* Bytes available for reading. */
> + int read_avail;
> + /* Size of read buffer. */
> + int readbuf_size;
> + /* Buffer for writing. */
> + char *write_buf;
> + /* Bytes available for writing. */
> + int write_avail;
> + /* Size of write buffer. */
> + int writebuf_size;
> +};
> +
> +/* Check whether the domain has too many ACL entries to hold. */
> +bool tmy_check_domain_quota(struct domain_info * const domain);
> +/* Transactional sprintf() for policy dump. */
> +bool tmy_io_printf(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...)
> + __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3)));
> +/* Check whether the domainname is correct. */
> +bool tmy_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname,
> + const char *function);
> +/* Check whether the token is correct. */
> +bool tmy_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
> + const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type,
> + const char *function);
> +/* Check whether the token can be a domainname. */
> +bool tmy_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer);
> +/* Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern. */
> +bool tmy_path_matches_pattern(const struct path_info *filename,
> + const struct path_info *pattern);
> +/* Read "alias" entry in exception policy. */
> +bool tmy_read_alias_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
> +/*
> + * Read "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry
> + * in exception policy.
> + */
> +bool tmy_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
> +/* Read "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */
> +bool tmy_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
> +/* Read "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
> +bool tmy_read_file_pattern(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
> +/* Read "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */
> +bool tmy_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
> +/* Read "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */
> +bool tmy_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tmy_io_buffer *head);
> +/* Write domain policy violation warning message to console? */
> +bool tmy_verbose_mode(const struct domain_info *domain);
> +/* Convert double path operation to operation name. */
> +const char *tmy_dp2keyword(const u8 operation);
> +/* Get the last component of the given domainname. */
> +const char *tmy_get_last_name(const struct domain_info *domain);
> +/* Get warning message. */
> +const char *tmy_get_msg(const bool is_enforce);
> +/* Convert single path operation to operation name. */
> +const char *tmy_sp2keyword(const u8 operation);
> +/* Delete a domain. */
> +int tmy_delete_domain(char *data);
> +/* Create "alias" entry in exception policy. */
> +int tmy_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
> +/*
> + * Create "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry
> + * in exception policy.
> + */
> +int tmy_write_domain_initializer_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
> + const bool is_delete);
> +/* Create "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */
> +int tmy_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
> + const bool is_delete);
> +/*
> + * Create "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read", "allow_write",
> + * "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir",
> + * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar",
> + * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_rename" and
> + * "allow_link" entry in domain policy.
> + */
> +int tmy_write_file_policy(char *data, struct domain_info *domain,
> + const bool is_delete);
> +/* Create "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */
> +int tmy_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
> +/* Create "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */
> +int tmy_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
> +/* Create "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
> +int tmy_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
> +/* Find a domain by the given name. */
> +struct domain_info *tmy_find_domain(const char *domainname);
> +/* Find or create a domain by the given name. */
> +struct domain_info *tmy_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *domainname,
> + const u8 profile);
> +/* Undelete a domain. */
> +struct domain_info *tmy_undelete_domain(const char *domainname);
> +/* Check mode for specified functionality. */
> +unsigned int tmy_check_flags(const struct domain_info *domain, const u8 index);
> +/* Allocate memory for structures. */
> +void *tmy_alloc_acl_element(const u8 acl_type);
> +/* Fill in "struct path_info" members. */
> +void tmy_fill_path_info(struct path_info *ptr);
> +/* Run policy loader when /sbin/init starts. */
> +void tmy_load_policy(const char *filename);
> +/* Change "struct domain_info"->flags. */
> +void tmy_set_domain_flag(struct domain_info *domain, const bool is_delete,
> + const u8 flags);
> +/* Update the policy change counter. */
> +void tmy_update_counter(const unsigned char index);
> +
> +/* strcmp() for "struct path_info" structure. */
> +static inline bool tmy_pathcmp(const struct path_info *a,
> + const struct path_info *b)
> +{
> + return a->hash != b->hash || strcmp(a->name, b->name);
> +}
> +
> +/* Get type of an ACL entry. */
> +static inline u8 tmy_acl_type1(struct acl_info *ptr)
> +{
> + return ptr->type & ~ACL_DELETED;
> +}
> +
> +/* Get type of an ACL entry. */
> +static inline u8 tmy_acl_type2(struct acl_info *ptr)
> +{
> + return ptr->type;
> +}
> +
> +/* The list for "struct domain_info". */
> +extern struct list1_head domain_list;
> +
> +/* Has /sbin/init started? */
> +extern bool sbin_init_started;
> +
> +/* The kernel's domain. */
> +extern struct domain_info KERNEL_DOMAIN;
Why upper-case?
> +#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H) */
Many of the symbols which this header defines have quite
generic-sounding names. it would be better if their names were to
identify the symbols as being part of Tomoyo.
(That's two hours of tomoyo-reading for me. I need to stop now)
Hello.
Andrew Morton wrote:
> (That's two hours of tomoyo-reading for me. I need to stop now)
Thank you very much for reviewing.
Before I answer for individual comments, I'd like to show three basic outlines.
(1) The way TOMOYO handles string data.
To be able to handle any characters correctly, TOMOYO Linux follows the rules
shown below to represent a word. A word means all tokens that are treated as
string data, such as pathnames and comments.
* NUL character (0x00) is used for indicating end of string.
Thus you cannot include \000 in a word.
* \ character (0x5C) is used for indicating octal expression.
Thus, you need to use \\ to represent a \.
* Characters 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x7F - 0xFF are represented using octal
expression \ooo .
* The rest characters (i.e. 0x21 - 0x5B and 0x5D - 0x7E) are represented
as is.
* Space character (0x20) is used as a delimiter that separates words.
Line feed character (0x0A) is used as a delimiter that separates lines.
* Only words that follow the rule above and the delimiters (i.e. space
character and line feed characters) are valid. All other characters are
regarded as space character. Multiple spaces are automatically compressed
into one space. Leading and trailing spaces are automatically deleted.
(2) The way TOMOYO allocates memory.
In TOMOYO Linux, memory allocated for holding access permissions and words are
never freed. There is no way except rebooting the system that can free unneeded
memory.
But don't worry. The policy seldom changes after you start production mode.
By tuning policy before starting production mode, you can reduce memory usage
to (usually) less than 1 Mega Bytes. You can also enable memory quota.
(3) The kernel-userspace interface of TOMOYO.
Policy files are automatically loaded into the kernel upon boot.
When a system boots, /sbin/init is executed. When the execution of /sbin/init
is requested and if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists, /sbin/tomoyo-init is executed,
and /sbin/init is executed after /sbin/tomoyo-init terminates.
/sbin/tomoyo-init is called only once.
TOMOYO requires no modifications of existing userland applications.
The pathname /sbin/tomoyo-init is embedded into the kernel so that we don't
need to modify /sbin/init for loading policy.
/sbin/tomoyo-init loads policy via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
All data passed through this interface consists of only ASCII printable
characters, for all words consist of only ASCII printable characters.
Regards.
Hello.
Andrew Morton wrote:
> > +static bool is_select_one(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, const char *data)
> > +{
> > + unsigned int pid;
> > + struct domain_info *domain = NULL;
> > +
> > + if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1) {
>
> PIDs are no longer system-wide unique, and here we appear to be
> implementing new userspace ABIs using PIDs.
>
I'm not familiar with virtualized environment.
There are two PIDs, PID seen from inside virtualized environment and
PID seen from outside virtualized environment. To clarify, let me call
the former "PIDv" and the latter "PIDg".
PIDv is not system-wide unique. But PIDg is system-wide unique, aren't they?
The PID received from outside virtualized environment is PIDg and they are
system-wide unique, am I right?
This interface is designed to be accessed from outside virtualized environment.
Maybe some checks to prevent processes inside virtualized environment from
accessing this interface are needed.
Regards.
Quoting Tetsuo Handa ([email protected]):
> Hello.
>
> Andrew Morton wrote:
> > > +static bool is_select_one(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, const char *data)
> > > +{
> > > + unsigned int pid;
> > > + struct domain_info *domain = NULL;
> > > +
> > > + if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1) {
> >
> > PIDs are no longer system-wide unique, and here we appear to be
> > implementing new userspace ABIs using PIDs.
> >
> I'm not familiar with virtualized environment.
>
> There are two PIDs, PID seen from inside virtualized environment and
> PID seen from outside virtualized environment. To clarify, let me call
> the former "PIDv" and the latter "PIDg".
>
> PIDv is not system-wide unique. But PIDg is system-wide unique, aren't they?
> The PID received from outside virtualized environment is PIDg and they are
> system-wide unique, am I right?
You are doing find_task_by_vpid(), so you are not looking up a task by
global pid.
-serge
Hello.
Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > There are two PIDs, PID seen from inside virtualized environment and
> > PID seen from outside virtualized environment. To clarify, let me call
> > the former "PIDv" and the latter "PIDg".
> >
> > PIDv is not system-wide unique. But PIDg is system-wide unique, aren't they?
> > The PID received from outside virtualized environment is PIDg and they are
> > system-wide unique, am I right?
>
> You are doing find_task_by_vpid(), so you are not looking up a task by
> global pid.
>
I need to clarify reachability of "struct task_struct".
A process inside a virtualized environment cannot reach "struct task_struct"
which belongs to outside the virtualized environment.
A process outside virtualized environments can reach "struct task_struct"
which belongs to inside virtualized environments, can't it?
Regards.
Quoting Tetsuo Handa ([email protected]):
> Hello.
>
> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > There are two PIDs, PID seen from inside virtualized environment and
> > > PID seen from outside virtualized environment. To clarify, let me call
> > > the former "PIDv" and the latter "PIDg".
> > >
> > > PIDv is not system-wide unique. But PIDg is system-wide unique, aren't they?
> > > The PID received from outside virtualized environment is PIDg and they are
> > > system-wide unique, am I right?
> >
> > You are doing find_task_by_vpid(), so you are not looking up a task by
> > global pid.
> >
> I need to clarify reachability of "struct task_struct".
>
> A process inside a virtualized environment cannot reach "struct task_struct"
> which belongs to outside the virtualized environment.
>
> A process outside virtualized environments can reach "struct task_struct"
> which belongs to inside virtualized environments, can't it?
To be precise, there isn't a real 'inside' and 'outside' virtualized
environements. Rather pid namespaces are hierarchical.
(Taking another look) it looks like In is_select_one() you're doing the
right thing - you look up the domain of a task based on
find_task_by_vpid() on a passed-in pid. Seems correct.
thanks,
-serge
Hello.
Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > I need to clarify reachability of "struct task_struct".
> >
> > A process inside a virtualized environment cannot reach "struct task_struct"
> > which belongs to outside the virtualized environment.
> >
> > A process outside virtualized environments can reach "struct task_struct"
> > which belongs to inside virtualized environments, can't it?
>
> To be precise, there isn't a real 'inside' and 'outside' virtualized
> environements. Rather pid namespaces are hierarchical.
>
So, processes which have non-topmost namespace cannot see processes which have
topmost namespace (like chroot()).
Then, it might be preferable if TOMOYO can prevent processes which have
non-topmost namespace from modifying policy information.
Do you think TOMOYO should do "current->nsproxy->pid_ns == &init_pid_ns"
checking like below one?
static bool tomoyo_is_policy_manager(void)
{
struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr;
const char *exe;
const struct task_struct *task = current;
const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname = tomoyo_domain()->domainname;
bool found = false;
if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
return true;
if (!tomoyo_manage_by_non_root && (task->cred->uid || task->cred->euid))
return false;
/* Don't allow modifying policy by processes not having init_pid_ns. */
if (task->nsproxy->pid_ns != &init_pid_ns)
return false;
list1_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) {
if (!ptr->is_deleted && ptr->is_domain
&& !tomoyo_pathcmp(domainname, ptr->manager))
return true;
}
> (Taking another look) it looks like In is_select_one() you're doing the
> right thing - you look up the domain of a task based on
> find_task_by_vpid() on a passed-in pid. Seems correct.
>
I see, thanks.
Andrew Morton wrote:
> > +static bool is_byte_range(const char *str)
> > +{
> > + return *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '3' &&
> > + *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '7' &&
> > + *str >= '0' && *str <= '7';
> > +}
>
> Well... why?
>
> I cannot think of any kernel interfaces which use octal strings. What
> is special about Tomoyo?
>
TOMOYO uses \ooo style representation for 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x7F - 0xFF.
This function verifies that \ooo is in valid range.
> > +static bool is_decimal(const char c)
> > +{
> > + return c >= '0' && c <= '9';
> > +}
>
> This duplicates a standard ctype.h function.
>
Replaced "is_decimal" by "isdigit".
> > +static bool is_hexadecimal(const char c)
> > +{
> > + return (c >= '0' && c <= '9') ||
> > + (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') ||
> > + (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f');
> > +}
>
> And so does this.
>
Replaced "is_hexadecimal" by "isxdigit".
> > +static bool is_alphabet_char(const char c)
> > +{
> > + return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f');
> > +}
>
> As does this.
>
Oops! "(c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f');" was wrong. X-p
It is "(c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z');".
But, not found in a standard ctype.h function.
> > +static bool str_starts(char **src, const char *find)
> > +{
> > + const int len = strlen(find);
> > + char *tmp = *src;
> > +
> > + if (strncmp(tmp, find, len))
> > + return false;
> > + tmp += len;
> > + *src = tmp;
> > + return true;
> > +}
>
> hrm. Isn't there a standard string.h way of doing this?
>
> If not, it looks like a pretty common thing. I'd suggest that it a) be
> coded to not do two passes across the input and b) proposed as a
> generic addition to the kernel's string library functions.
>
> > +static void normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer)
> > +{
> > + unsigned char *sp = buffer;
> > + unsigned char *dp = buffer;
> > + bool first = true;
> > +
> > + while (*sp && (*sp <= ' ' || *sp >= 127))
> > + sp++;
> > + while (*sp) {
> > + if (!first)
> > + *dp++ = ' ';
> > + first = false;
> > + while (*sp > ' ' && *sp < 127)
> > + *dp++ = *sp++;
> > + while (*sp && (*sp <= ' ' || *sp >= 127))
> > + sp++;
> > + }
> > + *dp = '\0';
> > +}
>
> that looks pretty generic as well.
>
If you think TOMOYO's way of string representation (described below) is useful,
I'd like to propose these functions as generic functions.
> It seems to have duplicated isprint() in lots of places.
>
It is different from "isprint()".
TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word
delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter).
> What happens if I have a filename which includes a character in the
> 128->255 range?
0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF will be handled in \ooo style representation.
The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs.
Userland program can request
open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT)
and auditing such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format
will results in "fabrication of audit logs" like
Access /tmp/file granted.
Access /tmp/file rejected.
TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the auditing will generate
Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file rejected.
and the administrator can read the audited logs safely using /bin/cat .
> > +struct domain_info *tmy_find_domain(const char *domainname)
> > +{
> > + struct domain_info *domain;
> > + struct path_info name;
> > +
> > + name.name = domainname;
> > + tmy_fill_path_info(&name);
> > + list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
> > + if (!domain->is_deleted &&
> > + !tmy_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname))
> > + return domain;
> > + }
> > + return NULL;
> > +}
>
> No lock was taken to protect that list.
>
No lock needed for protecting "list1" list.
list1 was reviewed by Paul E. McKenney. ( http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/10/20/4 ).
> If the caller must take some lock then that precondition should be
> documented in the function's comment.
>
To your surprise, most functions are lock free, due to use of
"append only singly linked list" named "list1".
Only tmy_real_domain() requires the caller to take "tasklist_lock".
tmy_read_control() and tmy_write_control take "struct tmy_io_buffer"->io_sem
before calling "struct tmy_io_buffer"->read and "struct tmy_io_buffer"->write
methods.
All other functions don't require the caller to take some lock.
> > +/**
> > + * path_depth - Evaluate the number of '/' in a string.
> > + *
> > + * @pathname: The string to evaluate.
> > + *
> > + * Returns path depth of the string.
> > + *
> > + * I score 2 for each of the '/' in the @pathname
> > + * and score 1 if the @pathname ends with '/'.
> > + */
> > +static int path_depth(const char *pathname)
> > +{
> > + int i = 0;
> > +
> > + if (pathname) {
> > + char *ep = strchr(pathname, '\0');
>
> what? Does that even work? strchr(p, 0) should always return NULL:
>
> RETURN VALUE
> The strchr() and strrchr() functions return a pointer to the matched
> character or NULL if the character is not found.
>
>
> Using
>
> pathname + strlen(pathname)
>
> would be saner, no?
>
strchr(p, 0) returns the location of '\0', not NULL.
But, "p + strlen(p)" could generate faster assembly code than "strchr(p, 0)".
Replaced "strchr(p, 0)" by "p + strlen(p)".
> > + if (pathname < ep--) {
> > + if (*ep != '/')
> > + i++;
> > + while (pathname <= ep)
> > + if (*ep-- == '/')
> > + i += 2;
> > + }
> > + }
> > + return i;
> > +}
>
> I cannot imagine why this function exists :(
>
To hash string for faster comparison.
> > [vast amounts of string hacking snipped]
>
> This seems like madness, sorry.
>
> Why the heck is so much string bashing going on in here???
>
Yeah, You would go crazy with functions that handle string data.
But these functions are needed to stay inside the kernel for validating,
hashing and comparing string data.
> > +/**
> > + * tmy_io_printf - Transactional printf() to "struct tmy_io_buffer" structure.
> > + *
> > + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> > + * @fmt: The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters.
> > + *
> > + * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
>
> This comment should explain what the terms "success" and "failure"
> refer to. Perhaps "success"=="the output didn't overflow" or something.
>
Replaced "Returns true on success" by "Returns true if output was written".
> > +static const char *tmy_get_exe(void)
> > +{
> > + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> > + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> > + const char *cp = NULL;
> > +
> > + if (!mm)
> > + return NULL;
> > + down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
> > + for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
> > + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) {
> > + cp = tmy_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path);
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + }
> > + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
> > + return cp;
> > +}
>
> What guarantees that the first executable mapping in the mapping list
> is the correct one for the executable?
>
It is just for auditing. Not for security decision.
> What prevents us from accidentally breaking that guarantee in the
> future? I wasn't even aware that this was the case.
>
> What happens if the executable was unlinked?
>
audit_log_task_info() is doing the same thing.
> > +/**
> > + * tmy_check_flags - Check mode for specified functionality.
> > + *
> > + * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
> > + * @index: The functionality to check mode.
> > + *
> > + * Returns the mode of specified functionality.
>
> That description is rather meaningless.
>
Removed the description.
> > +unsigned int tmy_check_flags(const struct domain_info *domain, const u8 index)
> > +{
> > + const u8 profile = domain->profile;
> > +
> > + if (unlikely(in_interrupt())) {
> > + static u8 count = 20;
> > + if (count) {
> > + count--;
> > + printk(KERN_ERR "BUG: sleeping function called "
> > + "from invalid context.\n");
> > + dump_stack();
> > + }
> > + return 0;
> > + }
>
> a) WARN_ON is preferred
>
> b) WARN_ON_ONCE might be usable here
>
> c) what on earth is this code doing??
>
Replaced "count" with "WARN_ON".
TOMOYO checks only process context.
This code disables TOMOYO's enforcement in case the function is called from
interrupt context.
> > + return sbin_init_started && index < TMY_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX
> > +#if MAX_PROFILES != 256
> > + && profile < MAX_PROFILES
> > +#endif
> > + && profile_ptr[profile] ?
> > + profile_ptr[profile]->value[index] : 0;
> > +}
>
> And this. I cannot imagine why Tomoyo cares whether /sbin/init has
> started yet. This sort of thing should be commented!
>
TOMOYO loads policy using /sbin/tomoyo-init when /sbin/init starts.
Replaced "sbin_init_started" by "tmy_policy_loaded".
> What happens in a cgroups environment where there will be multiple
> /sbin/inits running?
Nothing. /sbin/tomoyo-init is called only for the first time /sbin/init
is requested and /sbin/tomoyo-init exists.
> > +/**
> > + * tmy_check_domain_quota - Check for domain's quota.
> > + *
> > + * @domain: Pointer to "struct domain_info".
> > + *
> > + * Returns true if the domain is not exceeded quota, false otherwise.
> > + */
>
> This function is poorly named.
>
Replaced "tmy_check_domain_quota" by "tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok".
> > +/**
> > + * tmy_find_or_assign_new_profile - Create a new profile.
> > + *
> > + * @profile: Profile number to create.
> > + *
> > + * Returns pointer to "struct profile" on success, NULL otherwise.
> > + */
> > +static struct profile *tmy_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned int
> > + profile)
> > +{
> > + static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
> > + struct profile *ptr = NULL;
> > +
> > + /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
> > + mutex_lock(&lock);
> > + if (profile < MAX_PROFILES) {
>
> This check didn't need to be inside the lock.
>
Moved the "if" to before the lock.
> > +/**
> > + * write_profile - Write profile table.
>
> where to?
>
Write to profile table. Fixed.
> > +/**
> > + * read_profile - Read profile table.
>
> Where from?
>
Read from profile table. Fixed.
> These functions appear to be implementing more userspace interfaces.
>
> The userspace interface is the most important part of any kernel code.
> We can change all the internal details, but the interfaces will live
> forever.
>
> Hence we should review the proposed interfaces before even looking at
> the code. Indeed, before even writing the code.
>
> What are the Tomoyo kernel interfaces?
I'll describe it in other posting.
> > +/* Structure for policy manager. */
> > +struct policy_manager_entry {
> > + struct list1_head list;
> > + /* A path to program or a domainname. */
> > + const struct path_info *manager;
> > + bool is_domain; /* True if manager is a domainname. */
> > + bool is_deleted; /* True if this entry is deleted. */
> > +};
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * The list for "struct policy_manager_entry".
> > + *
> > + * This list is updated only inside update_manager_entry(), thus
> > + * no global mutex exists.
> > + */
> > +static LIST1_HEAD(policy_manager_list);
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * update_manager_entry - Add a manager entry.
> > + *
> > + * @manager: The path to manager or the domainnamme.
> > + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
> > + *
> > + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
> > + */
>
> eh? So deleted entries get their "is_deleted" flag set but they are
> never actually removed from the list nor freed? So over time the list
> gets longer and longer and consumes more and more memory?
>
Right. Most of elements are allocated when /sbin/init starts, and they
are referred during lifetime of the kernel. Deleted entries get their
"is_deleted" flag set but they are never actually removed from the list
nor freed. But don't worry. The amount of memory used by TOMOYO is quite
small (about 1MB or so).
> > +/**
> > + * write_manager_policy - Write manager policy.
> > + *
> > + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer"
> > + *
> > + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
> > + */
>
> More userspace ABI proposals?
>
Yes. But, it is only for TOMOYO's management tools.
TOMOYO requires no modification of existing userland programs
and provides no API for existing userland programs.
> > +/**
> > + * is_policy_manager - Check whether the current process is a policy manager.
> > + *
> > + * Returns true if the current process is permitted to modify policy
> > + * via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
> > + */
> > +static bool is_policy_manager(void)
> > +{
> > + struct policy_manager_entry *ptr;
> > + const char *exe;
> > + const struct task_struct *task = current;
> > + const struct path_info *domainname = tmy_domain()->domainname;
> > + bool found = false;
> > +
> > + if (!sbin_init_started)
> > + return true;
> > + if (!manage_by_non_root && (task->cred->uid || task->cred->euid))
> > + return false;
>
> What happens in a containerised environment where uids are non-unique
> and where there are multiple /sbin/inits?
>
This interface is designed to be accessed by processes having init_pid_ns
namespace.
> > + if (!found) { /* Reduce error messages. */
> > + static pid_t last_pid;
> > + const pid_t pid = current->pid;
> > + if (last_pid != pid) {
> > + printk(KERN_WARNING "%s ( %s ) is not permitted to "
> > + "update policies.\n", domainname->name, exe);
>
> It appears that unprivileged userspace can cause this messge to be
> printed at will. That can cause the logs to fill and is considered to
> be a small denial of service security hole.
>
By default, this pseudo file is "root:root" and it's permission is 0600.
> > +static bool is_select_one(struct tmy_io_buffer *head, const char *data)
> > +{
> > + unsigned int pid;
> > + struct domain_info *domain = NULL;
> > +
> > + if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1) {
>
> PIDs are no longer system-wide unique, and here we appear to be
> implementing new userspace ABIs using PIDs.
>
This interface is designed to be accessed by processes having init_pid_ns
namespace.
> > +static int write_domain_profile(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> > +{
> > + char *data = head->write_buf;
> > + char *cp = strchr(data, ' ');
> > + struct domain_info *domain;
> > + unsigned long profile;
> > +
> > + if (!cp)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + *cp = '\0';
> > + domain = tmy_find_domain(cp + 1);
> > + strict_strtoul(data, 10, &profile);
>
> Unchecked return value?
>
Added checking.
> > +/* path to policy loader */
> > +static const char *tmy_loader = "/sbin/tomoyo-init";
>
> hm, hard-wired knowledge of filesytem layout.
>
> We did this in a few places already, reluctantly. We did at least make
> them configurable (eg: /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe).
>
> It's rather ugly to be doing this sort of thing.
>
This pathname is embedded into the kernel to avoid modification of
userland program.
/proc/sys/kernel/tmy_loader seems redundant. Should we use __setup()?
> > +static bool policy_loader_exists(void)
> > +{
> > + /*
> > + * Don't activate MAC if the policy loader doesn't exist.
> > + * If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not
> > + * mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since
> > + * policies are not loaded yet.
> > + * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime.
> > + */
> > + struct nameidata nd;
> > +
> > + if (path_lookup(tmy_loader, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd)) {
> > + printk(KERN_INFO "Not activating Mandatory Access Control now "
> > + "since %s doesn't exist.\n", tmy_loader);
> > + return false;
> > + }
> > + path_put(&nd.path);
> > + return true;
> > +}
>
> If you really really have to do this then a simple call to sys_access()
> might suffice.
>
To use sys_access(), we need to add get_fs()/set_fs() stuff.
It's not simple.
> But it is of course racy against concurrent rename, unlink, etc.
>
Racing is not a problem. Policy loader is called *only once* upon boot.
> > +void tmy_load_policy(const char *filename)
> > +{
> > + char *argv[2];
> > + char *envp[3];
> > +
> > + if (sbin_init_started)
> > + return;
> > + /*
> > + * Check filename is /sbin/init or /sbin/tomoyo-start.
> > + * /sbin/tomoyo-start is a dummy filename in case where /sbin/init can't
> > + * be passed.
> > + * You can create /sbin/tomoyo-start by
> > + * "ln -s /bin/true /sbin/tomoyo-start".
> > + */
> > + if (strcmp(filename, "/sbin/init") &&
> > + strcmp(filename, "/sbin/tomoyo-start"))
> > + return;
> > + if (!policy_loader_exists())
> > + return;
>
> Why do this? call_usermodehelper() will simply fail if the file isn't here.
>
Without policy_loader_exists(), the system will panic() if
/sbin/init is requested but the policy loader doesn't exist.
> > + printk(KERN_INFO "Calling %s to load policy. Please wait.\n",
> > + tmy_loader);
> > + argv[0] = (char *) tmy_loader;
> > + argv[1] = NULL;
> > + envp[0] = "HOME=/";
> > + envp[1] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin";
> > + envp[2] = NULL;
> > + call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, 1);
> > +
> > + printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO: 2.2.0-pre 2008/10/10\n");
> > + printk(KERN_INFO "Mandatory Access Control activated.\n");
> > + sbin_init_started = true;
> > + { /* Check all profiles currently assigned to domains are defined. */
> > + struct domain_info *domain;
> > + list1_for_each_entry(domain, &domain_list, list) {
> > + const u8 profile = domain->profile;
> > + if (profile_ptr[profile])
> > + continue;
> > + panic("Profile %u (used by '%s') not defined.\n",
> > + profile, domain->domainname->name);
> > + }
> > + }
> > +}
> > +/**
> > + * read_updates_counter - Check for policy change counter.
> > + *
> > + * @head: Pointer to "struct tmy_io_buffer".
> > + *
> > + * Returns how many times policy has changed since the previous check.
> > + */
> > +static int read_updates_counter(struct tmy_io_buffer *head)
> > +{
> > + if (head->read_eof)
> > + return 0;
> > + tmy_io_printf(head,
> > + "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy: %10u\n"
> > + "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy: %10u\n"
> > + "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile: %10u\n"
> > + "/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager: %10u\n",
> > + atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
> > + [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_DOMAIN_POLICY], 0),
> > + atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
> > + [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_EXCEPTION_POLICY], 0),
> > + atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
> > + [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_PROFILE], 0),
> > + atomic_xchg(&updates_counter
> > + [TMY_UPDATES_COUNTER_MANAGER], 0));
> > + head->read_eof = true;
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> What is this doing? We print the absolute pathnames of sysfs files via
> another sysfs file?
>
This is an interface to allow GUI management tool to examine policy changes.
But removed because GUI management tool is not ready to support this version.
> > +static int tmy_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
> > + const int buffer_len)
> > +{
> > + int len = 0;
> > + struct tmy_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
> > + char *cp;
> > +
> > + if (!head->read)
> > + return -ENOSYS;
> > + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buffer, buffer_len))
>
> Unneeded - copy_to_user() checks this.
>
Removed.
> > +/**
> > + * tmy_write_control - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
> > + *
> > + * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
> > + * @buffer: Pointer to buffer to read from.
> > + * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
> > + *
> > + * Returns @buffer_len on success, negative value otherwise.
> > + */
> > +static int tmy_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
> > + const int buffer_len)
> > +{
> > + struct tmy_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
> > + int error = buffer_len;
> > + int avail_len = buffer_len;
> > + char *cp0 = head->write_buf;
> > +
> > + if (!head->write)
> > + return -ENOSYS;
> > + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buffer, buffer_len))
>
> Unneeded.
>
I know. But to avoid partial copy, I check here too.
> > +/* Common header for holding ACL entries. */
> > +struct acl_info {
> > + struct list1_head list;
> > + /*
> > + * Type of this ACL entry.
> > + *
> > + * MSB is is_deleted flag.
> > + */
> > + u8 type;
> > +} __attribute__((__packed__));
>
> I cannot tell from reading the code why this is packed. Hence a comment
> is needed.
>
Packing "struct acl_info" allows "single_path_acl_record" to embed "u16" and
"struct double_path_acl_record" to embed "u8" without enlarging their structure
size. I added a comment.
> Please use __packed.
Replaced "__attribute__((__packed__))" with "__packed".
> > +/* The kernel's domain. */
> > +extern struct domain_info KERNEL_DOMAIN;
>
> Why upper-case?
>
Replaced "KERNEL_DOMAIN" by "kernel_domain".
> Many of the symbols which this header defines have quite
> generic-sounding names. it would be better if their names were to
> identify the symbols as being part of Tomoyo.
>
Added "tomoyo_" to all symbols.
Quoting Tetsuo Handa ([email protected]):
> Hello.
>
> Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > I need to clarify reachability of "struct task_struct".
> > >
> > > A process inside a virtualized environment cannot reach "struct task_struct"
> > > which belongs to outside the virtualized environment.
> > >
> > > A process outside virtualized environments can reach "struct task_struct"
> > > which belongs to inside virtualized environments, can't it?
> >
> > To be precise, there isn't a real 'inside' and 'outside' virtualized
> > environements. Rather pid namespaces are hierarchical.
> >
> So, processes which have non-topmost namespace cannot see processes which have
> topmost namespace (like chroot()).
> Then, it might be preferable if TOMOYO can prevent processes which have
> non-topmost namespace from modifying policy information.
> Do you think TOMOYO should do "current->nsproxy->pid_ns == &init_pid_ns"
> checking like below one?
Nah, I actually don't. There is nothing to stop init or getty from
doing an unshare(CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWPID) so noone would be able to
make modifications. The important thing is that the kernel won't
use another task than what userspace intended, so I think you're ok.
> static bool tomoyo_is_policy_manager(void)
> {
> struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr;
> const char *exe;
> const struct task_struct *task = current;
> const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname = tomoyo_domain()->domainname;
> bool found = false;
>
> if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
> return true;
> if (!tomoyo_manage_by_non_root && (task->cred->uid || task->cred->euid))
Now the point of LSM is to let you decide on your own policy, so this
is entirely up to you, but wouldn't it be nicer to use CAP_MAC_ADMIN's
presence like SMACK does?
> return false;
> /* Don't allow modifying policy by processes not having init_pid_ns. */
> if (task->nsproxy->pid_ns != &init_pid_ns)
> return false;
No, I think it's far better to keep this out. (Plus you'd have to use
task_nsproxy() under rcu_read_lock.)
I know at this point it might seem like I'm changing my mind left and
right (sorry), so here is the guiding principle: pids are appropriate
for userspace to communicate to userspace and, if done right, to the
kernel. But the kernel must not cache them internally.
(...and, if getting or sending them from/to user-space, must be careful
about the pidns, of course.)
So you're fine.
thanks,
-serge
Andrew Morton wrote:
> These functions appear to be implementing more userspace interfaces.
>
> The userspace interface is the most important part of any kernel code.
> We can change all the internal details, but the interfaces will live
> forever.
>
> Hence we should review the proposed interfaces before even looking at
> the code. Indeed, before even writing the code.
>
> What are the Tomoyo kernel interfaces?
TOMOYO Linux creates the following files on securityfs (normally
mounted on /sys/kernel/security) as interfaces between kernel and
userspace. These files are for TOMOYO Linux management tools *only*,
not for general programs.
* profile
* exception_policy
* domain_policy
* manager
* meminfo
* self_domain
* version
* .domain_status
* .process_status
*** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile ***
This file is used to read or write profiles.
"profile" means a running mode of process. A profile lists up
functions and their modes in "$number-$variable=$value" format. The
$number is profile number between 0 and 255. Each domain is assigned
one profile. To assign profile to domains, use "ccs-setprofile" or
"ccs-editpolicy" or "ccs-loadpolicy" commands.
(Example)
[root@tomoyo]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile
0-COMMENT=-----Disabled Mode-----
0-MAC_FOR_FILE=disabled
0-MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY=2048
0-TOMOYO_VERBOSE=disabled
1-COMMENT=-----Learning Mode-----
1-MAC_FOR_FILE=learning
1-MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY=2048
1-TOMOYO_VERBOSE=disabled
2-COMMENT=-----Permissive Mode-----
2-MAC_FOR_FILE=permissive
2-MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY=2048
2-TOMOYO_VERBOSE=enabled
3-COMMENT=-----Enforcing Mode-----
3-MAC_FOR_FILE=enforcing
3-MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY=2048
3-TOMOYO_VERBOSE=enabled
- MAC_FOR_FILE:
Specifies access control level regarding file access requests.
- MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY:
Limits the max number of ACL entries that are automatically appended
during learning mode. Default is 2048.
- TOMOYO_VERBOSE:
Specifies whether to print domain policy violation messages or not.
*** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager ***
This file is used to read or append the list of programs or domains
that can write to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo interface. By default,
only processes with both UID = 0 and EUID = 0 can modify policy via
/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo interface. You can use keyword
"manage_by_non_root" to allow policy modification by non root user.
(Example)
[root@tomoyo]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager
/usr/lib/ccs/loadpolicy
/usr/lib/ccs/editpolicy
/usr/lib/ccs/setlevel
/usr/lib/ccs/setprofile
/usr/lib/ccs/ld-watch
/usr/lib/ccs/ccs-queryd
*** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy ***
This file is used to read and write system global settings. Each line
has a directive and operand pair. Directives are listed below.
- initialize_domain:
To initialize domain transition when specific program is executed,
use initialize_domain directive.
* initialize_domain "program" from "domain"
* initialize_domain "program" from "the last program part of domain"
* initialize_domain "program"
If the part "from" and after is not given, the entry is applied to
all domain. If the "domain" doesn't start with "<kernel>", the entry
is applied to all domain whose domainname ends with "the last program
part of domain".
This directive is intended to aggregate domain transitions for daemon
program and program that are invoked by the kernel on demand, by
transiting to different domain.
- keep_domain
To prevent domain transition when program is executed from specific
domain, use keep_domain directive.
* keep_domain "program" from "domain"
* keep_domain "program" from "the last program part of domain"
* keep_domain "domain"
* keep_domain "the last program part of domain"
If the part "from" and before is not given, this entry is applied to
all program. If the "domain" doesn't start with "<kernel>", the entry
is applied to all domain whose domainname ends with "the last program
part of domain".
This directive is intended to reduce total number of domains and
memory usage by suppressing unneeded domain transitions.
To declare domain keepers, use keep_domain directive followed by
domain definition.
Any process that belongs to any domain declared with this directive,
the process stays at the same domain unless any program registered
with initialize_domain directive is executed.
In order to control domain transition in detail, you can use
no_keep_domain/no_initialize_domain keywrods.
- alias:
To allow executing programs using the name of symbolic links, use
alias keyword followed by dereferenced pathname and reference
pathname. For example, /sbin/pidof is a symbolic link to
/sbin/killall5 . In normal case, if /sbin/pidof is executed, the
domain is defined as if /sbin/killall5 is executed. By specifying
"alias /sbin/killall5 /sbin/pidof", you can run /sbin/pidof in the
domain for /sbin/pidof .
(Example)
alias /sbin/killall5 /sbin/pidof
- allow_read:
To grant unconditionally readable permissions, use allow_read keyword
followed by canonicalized file. This keyword is intended to reduce
size of domain policy by granting read access to library files such
as GLIBC and locale files. Exception is, if ignore_global_allow_read
keyword is given to a domain, entries specified by this keyword are
ignored.
(Example)
allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so
- file_pattern:
To declare pathname pattern, use file_pattern keyword followed by
pathname pattern. The pathname pattern must be a canonicalized
Pathname. This keyword is not applicable to neither granting execute
permissions nor domain definitions.
For example, canonicalized pathname that contains a process ID
(i.e. /proc/PID/ files) needs to be grouped in order to make access
control work well.
(Example)
file_pattern /proc/\$/cmdline
- path_group
To declare pathname group, use path_group keyword followed by name of
the group and pathname pattern. For example, if you want to group all
files under home directory, you can define
path_group HOME-DIR-FILE /home/\*/\*
path_group HOME-DIR-FILE /home/\*/\*/\*
path_group HOME-DIR-FILE /home/\*/\*/\*/\*
in the exception policy and use like
allow_read @HOME-DIR-FILE
to grant file access permission.
- deny_rewrite:
To deny overwriting already written contents of file (such as log
files) by default, use deny_rewrite keyword followed by pathname
pattern. Files whose pathname match the patterns are not permitted to
open for writing without append mode or truncate unless the pathnames
are explicitly granted using allow_rewrite keyword in domain policy.
(Example)
deny_rewrite /var/log/\*
- aggregator
To deal multiple programs as a single program, use aggregator keyword
followed by name of original program and aggregated program. This
keyword is intended to aggregate similar programs.
For example, /usr/bin/tac and /bin/cat are similar. By specifying
"aggregator /usr/bin/tac /bin/cat", you can run /usr/bin/tac in the
domain for /bin/cat .
For example, /usr/sbin/logrotate for Fedora Core 3 generates programs
like /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? and run them, but TOMOYO Linux
doesn't allow using patterns for granting execute permission and
defining domains. By specifying
"aggregator /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? /tmp/logrotate.tmp", you can
run /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? as if /tmp/logrotate.tmp is running.
*** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy ***
This file contains definition of all domains and permissions that are
granted to each domain.
Lines from the next line to a domain definition ( any lines starting
with "<kernel>") to the previous line to the next domain definitions
are interpreted as access permissions for that domain.
*** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo ***
This file is to show the total RAM used to keep policy in the kernel
by TOMOYO Linux in bytes.
(Example)
[root@tomoyo]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo
Shared: 61440
Private: 69632
Dynamic: 768
Total: 131840
You can set memory quota by writing to this file.
(Example)
[root@tomoyo]# echo Shared: 2097152 > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo
[root@tomoyo]# echo Private: 2097152 > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo
*** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain ***
This file is to show the name of domain the caller process belongs to.
(Example)
[root@etch]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain
<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/zsh /bin/cat
*** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version ***
This file is used for getting TOMOYO Linux's version.
(Example)
[root@etch]# cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version
2.2.0-pre
*** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.domain_status ***
This is a view (of a DBMS) that contains only profile number and
domainnames of domain so that "ccs-setprofile" command can do
line-oriented processing easily.
*** /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.process_status ***
This file is used by "ccs-ccstree" command to show "list of processes
currently running" and "domains which each process belongs to" and
"profile number which the domain is currently assigned" like "pstree"
command. This file is writable by programs that aren't registered as
policy manager.
Regards,