Quoting Mahesh Bandewar ([email protected]):
> From: Mahesh Bandewar <[email protected]>
>
> Add a sysctl variable kernel.controlled_userns_caps_whitelist. This
> takes input as capability mask expressed as two comma separated hex
> u32 words. The mask, however, is stored in kernel as kernel_cap_t type.
>
> Any capabilities that are not part of this mask will be controlled and
> will not be allowed to processes in controlled user-ns.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
> ---
> v2:
> Rebase
> v1:
> Initial submission
>
> Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 21 ++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/capability.h | 3 +++
> kernel/capability.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/sysctl.c | 5 +++++
> 4 files changed, 76 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index 694968c7523c..a1d39dbae847 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
> - bootloader_version [ X86 only ]
> - callhome [ S390 only ]
> - cap_last_cap
> +- controlled_userns_caps_whitelist
> - core_pattern
> - core_pipe_limit
> - core_uses_pid
> @@ -187,6 +188,26 @@ CAP_LAST_CAP from the kernel.
>
> ==============================================================
>
> +controlled_userns_caps_whitelist
> +
> +Capability mask that is whitelisted for "controlled" user namespaces.
> +Any capability that is missing from this mask will not be allowed to
> +any process that is attached to a controlled-userns. e.g. if CAP_NET_RAW
> +is not part of this mask, then processes running inside any controlled
> +userns's will not be allowed to perform action that needs CAP_NET_RAW
> +capability. However, processes that are attached to a parent user-ns
> +hierarchy that is *not* controlled and has CAP_NET_RAW can continue
> +performing those actions. User-namespaces are marked "controlled" at
> +the time of their creation based on the capabilities of the creator.
> +A process that does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN will create user-namespaces
> +that are controlled.
> +
> +The value is expressed as two comma separated hex words (u32). This
> +sysctl is avaialble in init-ns and users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init-ns
> +are allowed to make changes.
> +
> +==============================================================
> +
> core_pattern:
>
> core_pattern is used to specify a core dumpfile pattern name.
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index f640dcbc880c..7d79a4689625 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
> #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
>
> #include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
> +#include <linux/sysctl.h>
>
>
> #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
> @@ -248,6 +249,8 @@ extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
>
> /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
> extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
> +int proc_douserns_caps_whitelist(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> + void __user *buff, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
>
> extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size);
>
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index 1e1c0236f55b..4a859b7d4902 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
>
> int file_caps_enabled = 1;
>
> +kernel_cap_t controlled_userns_caps_whitelist = CAP_FULL_SET;
> +
> static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
> {
> file_caps_enabled = 0;
> @@ -507,3 +509,48 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns)
> rcu_read_unlock();
> return (ret == 0);
> }
> +
> +/* Controlled-userns capabilities routines */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
> +int proc_douserns_caps_whitelist(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
> + void __user *buff, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + DECLARE_BITMAP(caps_bitmap, CAP_LAST_CAP);
> + struct ctl_table caps_table;
> + char tbuf[NAME_MAX];
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = bitmap_from_u32array(caps_bitmap, CAP_LAST_CAP,
> + controlled_userns_caps_whitelist.cap,
> + _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S);
> + if (ret != CAP_LAST_CAP)
> + return -1;
> +
> + scnprintf(tbuf, NAME_MAX, "%*pb", CAP_LAST_CAP, caps_bitmap);
> +
> + caps_table.data = tbuf;
> + caps_table.maxlen = NAME_MAX;
> + caps_table.mode = table->mode;
> + ret = proc_dostring(&caps_table, write, buff, lenp, ppos);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + if (write) {
> + kernel_cap_t tmp;
> +
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> + ret = bitmap_parse_user(buff, *lenp, caps_bitmap, CAP_LAST_CAP);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + ret = bitmap_to_u32array(tmp.cap, _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S,
> + caps_bitmap, CAP_LAST_CAP);
> + if (ret != CAP_LAST_CAP)
> + return -1;
> +
> + controlled_userns_caps_whitelist = tmp;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> index d9c31bc2eaea..25c3f7b76ece 100644
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -1226,6 +1226,11 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
> .extra2 = &one,
> },
> #endif
> + {
> + .procname = "controlled_userns_caps_whitelist",
> + .mode = 0644,
> + .proc_handler = proc_douserns_caps_whitelist,
> + },
> { }
> };
>
> --
> 2.15.0.448.gf294e3d99a-goog
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