LinuxLists.cc - [PATCH v8 0/2] seccomp trap to userspace

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Subject: [PATCH v8 2/2] samples: add an example of seccomp user trap

The idea here is just to give a demonstration of how one could safely use
the SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF feature to do mount policies. This particular
policy is (as noted in the comment) not very interesting, but it serves to
illustrate how one might apply a policy dodging the various TOCTOU issues.

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
CC: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
CC: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
CC: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
CC: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
CC: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
CC: Akihiro Suda <[email protected]>
---
v5: new in v5
v7: updates for v7 API changes
v8: * add some more comments about what's happening in main() (Kees)
* move from ptrace API to SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER
---
samples/seccomp/.gitignore | 1 +
samples/seccomp/Makefile | 7 +-
samples/seccomp/user-trap.c | 345 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 352 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/samples/seccomp/.gitignore b/samples/seccomp/.gitignore
index 78fb78184291..d1e2e817d556 100644
--- a/samples/seccomp/.gitignore
+++ b/samples/seccomp/.gitignore
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
bpf-direct
bpf-fancy
dropper
+user-trap
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/Makefile b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
index cf34ff6b4065..4920903c8009 100644
--- a/samples/seccomp/Makefile
+++ b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
ifndef CROSS_COMPILE
-hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_SECCOMP) := bpf-fancy dropper bpf-direct
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_SECCOMP) := bpf-fancy dropper bpf-direct user-trap

HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include
@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-direct.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-direct.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include
bpf-direct-objs := bpf-direct.o

+HOSTCFLAGS_user-trap.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
+HOSTCFLAGS_user-trap.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include
+user-trap-objs := user-trap.o
+
# Try to match the kernel target.
ifndef CONFIG_64BIT

@@ -33,6 +37,7 @@ HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += $(MFLAG)
HOSTLDLIBS_bpf-direct += $(MFLAG)
HOSTLDLIBS_bpf-fancy += $(MFLAG)
HOSTLDLIBS_dropper += $(MFLAG)
+HOSTLDLIBS_user-trap += $(MFLAG)
endif
always := $(hostprogs-m)
endif
diff --git a/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c b/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bba7ac803c6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/user.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+
+#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
+
+static int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
+{
+ errno = 0;
+ return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
+}
+
+static int send_fd(int sock, int fd)
+{
+ struct msghdr msg = {};
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+ char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c';
+ struct iovec io = {
+ .iov_base = &c,
+ .iov_len = 1,
+ };
+
+ msg.msg_iov = &io;
+ msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+ msg.msg_control = buf;
+ msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf);
+ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+ cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+ cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
+ cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
+ *((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg)) = fd;
+ msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;
+
+ if (sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
+ perror("sendmsg");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int recv_fd(int sock)
+{
+ struct msghdr msg = {};
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+ char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c';
+ struct iovec io = {
+ .iov_base = &c,
+ .iov_len = 1,
+ };
+
+ msg.msg_iov = &io;
+ msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+ msg.msg_control = buf;
+ msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf);
+
+ if (recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
+ perror("recvmsg");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+
+ return *((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg));
+}
+
+static int user_trap_syscall(int nr, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+
+ return seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &prog);
+}
+
+static int handle_req(struct seccomp_notif *req,
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp, int listener)
+{
+ char path[PATH_MAX], source[PATH_MAX], target[PATH_MAX];
+ int ret = -1, mem;
+
+ resp->id = req->id;
+ resp->error = -EPERM;
+ resp->val = 0;
+
+ if (req->data.nr != __NR_mount) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "huh? trapped something besides mknod? %d\n", req->data.nr);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Only allow bind mounts. */
+ if (!(req->data.args[3] & MS_BIND))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Ok, let's read the task's memory to see where they wanted their
+ * mount to go.
+ */
+ snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/mem", req->pid);
+ mem = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+ if (mem < 0) {
+ perror("open mem");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we avoid a TOCTOU: we referred to a pid by its pid, but since
+ * the pid that made the syscall may have died, we need to confirm that
+ * the pid is still valid after we open its /proc/pid/mem file. We can
+ * ask the listener fd this as follows.
+ *
+ * Note that this check should occur *after* any task-specific
+ * resources are opened, to make sure that the task has not died and
+ * we're not wrongly reading someone else's state in order to make
+ * decisions.
+ */
+ if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req->id) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "task died before we could map its memory\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Phew, we've got the right /proc/pid/mem. Now we can read it. Note
+ * that to avoid another TOCTOU, we should read all of the pointer args
+ * before we decide to allow the syscall.
+ */
+ if (lseek(mem, req->data.args[0], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ perror("seek");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = read(mem, source, sizeof(source));
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ perror("read");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (lseek(mem, req->data.args[1], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ perror("seek");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = read(mem, target, sizeof(target));
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ perror("read");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Our policy is to only allow bind mounts inside /tmp. This isn't very
+ * interesting, because we could do unprivlieged bind mounts with user
+ * namespaces already, but you get the idea.
+ */
+ if (!strncmp(source, "/tmp", 4) && !strncmp(target, "/tmp", 4)) {
+ if (mount(source, target, NULL, req->data.args[3], NULL) < 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ perror("actual mount");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ resp->error = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Even if we didn't allow it because of policy, generating the
+ * response was be a success, because we want to tell the worker EPERM.
+ */
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ close(mem);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ int sk_pair[2], ret = 1, status, listener;
+ pid_t worker = 0 , tracer = 0;
+
+ if (socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, sk_pair) < 0) {
+ perror("socketpair");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ worker = fork();
+ if (worker < 0) {
+ perror("fork");
+ goto close_pair;
+ }
+
+ if (worker == 0) {
+ listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_mount,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ if (listener < 0) {
+ perror("seccomp");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Drop privileges. We definitely can't mount as uid 1000.
+ */
+ if (setuid(1000) < 0) {
+ perror("setuid");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Send the listener to the parent; also serves as
+ * synchronization.
+ */
+ if (send_fd(sk_pair[1], listener) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ close(listener);
+
+ if (mkdir("/tmp/foo", 0755) < 0) {
+ perror("mkdir");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Try a bad mount just for grins.
+ */
+ if (mount("/dev/sda", "/tmp/foo", NULL, 0, NULL) != -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "huh? mounted /dev/sda?\n");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (errno != EPERM) {
+ perror("bad error from mount");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ok, we expect this one to succeed.
+ */
+ if (mount("/tmp/foo", "/tmp/foo", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
+ perror("mount");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get the listener from the child.
+ */
+ listener = recv_fd(sk_pair[0]);
+ if (listener < 0)
+ goto out_kill;
+
+ /*
+ * Fork a task to handle the requests. This isn't strictly necessary,
+ * but it makes the particular writing of this sample easier, since we
+ * can just wait ofr the tracee to exit and kill the tracer.
+ */
+ tracer = fork();
+ if (tracer < 0) {
+ perror("fork");
+ goto out_kill;
+ }
+
+ if (tracer == 0) {
+ while (1) {
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+
+ if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req)) {
+ perror("ioctl recv");
+ goto out_close;
+ }
+
+ if (handle_req(&req, &resp, listener) < 0)
+ goto out_close;
+
+ if (ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp)) {
+ perror("ioctl send");
+ goto out_close;
+ }
+ }
+out_close:
+ close(listener);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ close(listener);
+
+ if (waitpid(worker, &status, 0) != worker) {
+ perror("waitpid");
+ goto out_kill;
+ }
+
+ if (umount2("/tmp/foo", MNT_DETACH) < 0 && errno != EINVAL) {
+ perror("umount2");
+ goto out_kill;
+ }
+
+ if (remove("/tmp/foo") < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
+ perror("remove");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "worker exited nonzero\n");
+ goto out_kill;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+out_kill:
+ if (tracer > 0)
+ kill(tracer, SIGKILL);
+ if (worker > 0)
+ kill(worker, SIGKILL);
+
+close_pair:
+ close(sk_pair[0]);
+ close(sk_pair[1]);
+ return ret;
+}
--
2.17.1

2018-10-29 22:41:58

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Subject: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

This patch introduces a means for syscalls matched in seccomp to notify
some other task that a particular filter has been triggered.

The motivation for this is primarily for use with containers. For example,
if a container does an init_module(), we obviously don't want to load this
untrusted code, which may be compiled for the wrong version of the kernel
anyway. Instead, we could parse the module image, figure out which module
the container is trying to load and load it on the host.

As another example, containers cannot mount() in general since various
filesystems assume a trusted image. However, if an orchestrator knows that
e.g. a particular block device has not been exposed to a container for
writing, it want to allow the container to mount that block device (that
is, handle the mount for it).

This patch adds functionality that is already possible via at least two
other means that I know about, both of which involve ptrace(): first, one
could ptrace attach, and then iterate through syscalls via PTRACE_SYSCALL.
Unfortunately this is slow, so a faster version would be to install a
filter that does SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, which triggers a PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP.
Since ptrace allows only one tracer, if the container runtime is that
tracer, users inside the container (or outside) trying to debug it will not
be able to use ptrace, which is annoying. It also means that older
distributions based on Upstart cannot boot inside containers using ptrace,
since upstart itself uses ptrace to monitor services while starting.

The actual implementation of this is fairly small, although getting the
synchronization right was/is slightly complex.

Finally, it's worth noting that the classic seccomp TOCTOU of reading
memory data from the task still applies here, but can be avoided with
careful design of the userspace handler: if the userspace handler reads all
of the task memory that is necessary before applying its security policy,
the tracee's subsequent memory edits will not be read by the tracer.

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
CC: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
CC: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
CC: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
CC: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
CC: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
CC: Akihiro Suda <[email protected]>
---
v2: * make id a u64; the idea here being that it will never overflow,
because 64 is huge (one syscall every nanosecond => wrap every 584
years) (Andy)
* prevent nesting of user notifications: if someone is already attached
the tree in one place, nobody else can attach to the tree (Andy)
* notify the listener of signals the tracee receives as well (Andy)
* implement poll
v3: * lockdep fix (Oleg)
* drop unnecessary WARN()s (Christian)
* rearrange error returns to be more rpetty (Christian)
* fix build in !CONFIG_SECCOMP_USER_NOTIFICATION case
v4: * fix implementation of poll to use poll_wait() (Jann)
* change listener's fd flags to be 0 (Jann)
* hoist filter initialization out of ifdefs to its own function
init_user_notification()
* add some more testing around poll() and closing the listener while a
syscall is in action
* s/GET_LISTENER/NEW_LISTENER, since you can't _get_ a listener, but it
creates a new one (Matthew)
* correctly handle pid namespaces, add some testcases (Matthew)
* use EINPROGRESS instead of EINVAL when a notification response is
written twice (Matthew)
* fix comment typo from older version (SEND vs READ) (Matthew)
* whitespace and logic simplification (Tobin)
* add some Documentation/ bits on userspace trapping
v5: * fix documentation typos (Jann)
* add signalled field to struct seccomp_notif (Jann)
* switch to using ioctls instead of read()/write() for struct passing
(Jann)
* add an ioctl to ensure an id is still valid
v6: * docs typo fixes, update docs for ioctl() change (Christian)
v7: * switch struct seccomp_knotif's id member to a u64 (derp :)
* use notify_lock in IS_ID_VALID query to avoid racing
* s/signalled/signaled (Tyler)
* fix docs to reflect that ids are not globally unique (Tyler)
* add a test to check -ERESTARTSYS behavior (Tyler)
* drop CONFIG_SECCOMP_USER_NOTIFICATION (Tyler)
* reorder USER_NOTIF in seccomp return codes list (Tyler)
* return size instead of sizeof(struct user_notif) (Tyler)
* ENOENT instead of EINVAL when invalid id is passed (Tyler)
* drop CONFIG_SECCOMP_USER_NOTIFICATION guards (Tyler)
* s/IS_ID_VALID/ID_VALID and switch ioctl to be "well behaved" (Tyler)
* add a new struct notification to minimize the additions to
struct seccomp_filter, also pack the necessary additions a bit more
cleverly (Tyler)
* switch to keeping track of the task itself instead of the pid (we'll
use this for implementing PUT_FD)
v8: * in recv, don't copy_to_user() while holding notify lock, in case
userfaultfd blocks and causes all syscalls to block (Kees)
* switch ioctl character to something more fun ! (Kees)
* switch ioctl defines to use their own SECCOMP_IO* macros (Kees)
* rename seccomp ioctls to be SECCOMP_IOCTL_* (Kees)
* move comment of notify_lock to the right place (Jann)
* drop comment abount reference count bounding in __get_seccomp_filter (Jann)
* add lockdep_assert_held() in seccomp_next_notify_id() (Kees)
* in seccomp_do_user_notification(), always increment semaphore before
releasing lock, to prevent use after free of ->notif (Kees)
* add another wake_up_poll() when a signal is received (Jann)
* make all listener fds O_CLOEXEC (Jann/Kees)
* use memset() instead of = {} initialization for structures (Kees)
* move casting of buf pointer to ioctl, instead of in handler functions (Kees)
* fix ENOENT testing in seccomp_notify_send() (Jann)
* use ENOENT instead of -1 (EPERM) for ID_VALID ioctl (Jann)
* use ()s around "nested" bit operations (Kees)
* init struct notification members in the order they're declared (Jann)
* rearrange things so no forward declaration of init_listener() is
required (Kees)
* switch to a flags based future-proofing mechanism for struct
seccomp_notif and seccomp_notif_resp, thus avoiding version issues
with structure length (Kees)
* fix a memory leak in init_listener() in a failure case
* fix a use-after-free of filter->notif in do_user_notification() when
the listener fd is closed after a signal is sent
* add a comment about semaphore state in the interrupt case in
do_user_notification() + seccomp_notify_recv()
---
Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt | 1 +
.../userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst | 66 +++
include/linux/seccomp.h | 7 +-
include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 35 +-
kernel/seccomp.c | 475 +++++++++++++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/foo | 106 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 355 ++++++++++++-
7 files changed, 1035 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt b/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
index 13a7c999c04a..fa299c33e472 100644
--- a/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
+++ b/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ Code Seq#(hex) Include File Comments
0x1b all InfiniBand Subsystem <http://infiniband.sourceforge.net/>
0x20 all drivers/cdrom/cm206.h
0x22 all scsi/sg.h
+'!' 00-1F uapi/linux/seccomp.h
'#' 00-3F IEEE 1394 Subsystem Block for the entire subsystem
'$' 00-0F linux/perf_counter.h, linux/perf_event.h
'%' 00-0F include/uapi/linux/stm.h
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
index 82a468bc7560..fe1d88a25c93 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst
@@ -122,6 +122,11 @@ In precedence order, they are:
Results in the lower 16-bits of the return value being passed
to userland as the errno without executing the system call.

+``SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF``:
+ Results in a ``struct seccomp_notif`` message sent on the userspace
+ notification fd, if it is attached, or ``-ENOSYS`` if it is not. See below
+ on discussion of how to handle user notifications.
+
``SECCOMP_RET_TRACE``:
When returned, this value will cause the kernel to attempt to
notify a ``ptrace()``-based tracer prior to executing the system
@@ -183,6 +188,67 @@ The ``samples/seccomp/`` directory contains both an x86-specific example
and a more generic example of a higher level macro interface for BPF
program generation.

+Userspace Notification
+======================
+
+The ``SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF`` return code lets seccomp filters pass a
+particular syscall to userspace to be handled. This may be useful for
+applications like container managers, which wish to intercept particular
+syscalls (``mount()``, ``finit_module()``, etc.) and change their behavior.
+
+To acquire a notification FD, use the ``SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER``
+argument to the ``seccomp()`` syscall:
+
+.. code-block::
+
+ fd = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER, &prog);
+
+which (on success) will return a listener fd for the filter, which can then be
+passed around via ``SCM_RIGHTS`` or similar. Note that filter fds correspond to
+a particular filter, and not a particular task. So if this task then forks,
+notifications from both tasks will appear on the same filter fd. Reads and
+writes to/from a filter fd are also synchronized, so a filter fd can safely
+have many readers.
+
+The interface for a seccomp notification fd consists of two structures:
+
+.. code-block::
+
+ struct seccomp_notif {
+ __u64 id;
+ __u32 pid;
+ __u32 flags;
+ struct seccomp_data data;
+ };
+
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp {
+ __u64 id;
+ __s64 val;
+ __s32 error;
+ __u32 flags;
+ };
+
+Users can read via ``ioctl(SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV)`` (or ``poll()``) on a
+seccomp notification fd to receive a ``struct seccomp_notif``, which contains
+five members: the input length of the structure, a unique-per-filter ``id``,
+the ``pid`` of the task which triggered this request (which may be 0 if the
+task is in a pid ns not visible from the listener's pid namespace), a ``flags``
+member which for now only has ``SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED``, representing
+whether or not the notification is a result of a non-fatal signal, and the
+``data`` passed to seccomp. Userspace can then make a decision based on this
+information about what to do, and ``ioctl(SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND)`` a
+response, indicating what should be returned to userspace. The ``id`` member of
+``struct seccomp_notif_resp`` should be the same ``id`` as in ``struct
+seccomp_notif``.
+
+It is worth noting that ``struct seccomp_data`` contains the values of register
+arguments to the syscall, but does not contain pointers to memory. The task's
+memory is accessible to suitably privileged traces via ``ptrace()`` or
+``/proc/pid/mem``. However, care should be taken to avoid the TOCTOU mentioned
+above in this document: all arguments being read from the tracee's memory
+should be read into the tracer's memory before any policy decisions are made.
+This allows for an atomic decision on syscall arguments.
+
Sysctls
=======

diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index e5320f6c8654..017444b5efed 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@

#include <uapi/linux/seccomp.h>

-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK (SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC | \
- SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG | \
- SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW)
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK (SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC | \
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG | \
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW | \
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER)

#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
index 9efc0e73d50b..b1bfa566ab53 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -17,9 +17,10 @@
#define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2

/* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0)
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG (1UL << 1)
-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (1UL << 2)
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0)
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG (1UL << 1)
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (1UL << 2)
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER (1UL << 3)

/*
* All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@
#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF 0x7fc00000U /* notifies userspace */
#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
#define SECCOMP_RET_LOG 0x7ffc0000U /* allow after logging */
#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */
@@ -60,4 +62,31 @@ struct seccomp_data {
__u64 args[6];
};

+struct seccomp_notif {
+ __u64 id;
+ __u32 pid;
+ __u32 flags;
+ struct seccomp_data data;
+};
+
+struct seccomp_notif_resp {
+ __u64 id;
+ __s64 val;
+ __s32 error;
+ __u32 flags;
+};
+
+#define SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC '!'
+#define SECCOMP_IO(nr) _IO(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr)
+#define SECCOMP_IOR(nr, type) _IOR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
+#define SECCOMP_IOW(nr, type) _IOW(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
+#define SECCOMP_IOWR(nr, type) _IOWR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
+
+/* Flags for seccomp notification fd ioctl. */
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV SECCOMP_IOWR(0, struct seccomp_notif)
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND SECCOMP_IOWR(1, \
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp)
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID SECCOMP_IOR(2, __u64)
+
+#define SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED (1U << 0)
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index fd023ac24e10..4c5fb6ced4cd 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -33,12 +33,77 @@
#endif

#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
+
+enum notify_state {
+ SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT,
+ SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT,
+ SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED,
+};
+
+struct seccomp_knotif {
+ /* The struct pid of the task whose filter triggered the notification */
+ struct task_struct *task;
+
+ /* The "cookie" for this request; this is unique for this filter. */
+ u64 id;
+
+ /* Whether or not this task has been given an interruptible signal. */
+ bool signaled;
+
+ /*
+ * The seccomp data. This pointer is valid the entire time this
+ * notification is active, since it comes from __seccomp_filter which
+ * eclipses the entire lifecycle here.
+ */
+ const struct seccomp_data *data;
+
+ /*
+ * Notification states. When SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF is returned, a
+ * struct seccomp_knotif is created and starts out in INIT. Once the
+ * handler reads the notification off of an FD, it transitions to SENT.
+ * If a signal is received the state transitions back to INIT and
+ * another message is sent. When the userspace handler replies, state
+ * transitions to REPLIED.
+ */
+ enum notify_state state;
+
+ /* The return values, only valid when in SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED */
+ int error;
+ long val;
+
+ /* Signals when this has entered SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED */
+ struct completion ready;
+
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct notification - container for seccomp userspace notifications. Since
+ * most seccomp filters will not have notification listeners attached and this
+ * structure is fairly large, we store the notification-specific stuff in a
+ * separate structure.
+ *
+ * @request: A semaphore that users of this notification can wait on for
+ * changes. Actual reads and writes are still controlled with
+ * filter->notify_lock.
+ * @next_id: The id of the next request.
+ * @notifications: A list of struct seccomp_knotif elements.
+ * @wqh: A wait queue for poll.
+ */
+struct notification {
+ struct semaphore request;
+ u64 next_id;
+ struct list_head notifications;
+ wait_queue_head_t wqh;
+};

/**
* struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
@@ -50,6 +115,8 @@
* @log: true if all actions except for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW should be logged
* @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
* @prog: the BPF program to evaluate
+ * @notif: the struct that holds all notification related information
+ * @notify_lock: A lock for all notification-related accesses.
*
* seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
* pointer. For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
@@ -66,6 +133,8 @@ struct seccomp_filter {
bool log;
struct seccomp_filter *prev;
struct bpf_prog *prog;
+ struct notification *notif;
+ struct mutex notify_lock;
};

/* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
@@ -392,6 +461,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
if (!sfilter)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

+ mutex_init(&sfilter->notify_lock);
ret = bpf_prog_create_from_user(&sfilter->prog, fprog,
seccomp_check_filter, save_orig);
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -485,7 +555,6 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,

static void __get_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
{
- /* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
refcount_inc(&filter->usage);
}

@@ -556,11 +625,13 @@ static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
#define SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE (1 << 4)
#define SECCOMP_LOG_LOG (1 << 5)
#define SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW (1 << 6)
+#define SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF (1 << 7)

static u32 seccomp_actions_logged = SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS |
SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD |
SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP |
SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO |
+ SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF |
SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE |
SECCOMP_LOG_LOG;

@@ -581,6 +652,9 @@ static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action,
case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE;
break;
+ case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
+ log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF;
+ break;
case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_LOG;
break;
@@ -652,6 +726,95 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
#else

#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+static u64 seccomp_next_notify_id(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ /*
+ * Note: overflow is ok here, the id just needs to be unique per
+ * filter.
+ */
+ lockdep_assert_held(&filter->notify_lock);
+ return filter->notif->next_id++;
+}
+
+static void seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall,
+ struct seccomp_filter *match,
+ const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+{
+ int err;
+ long ret = 0;
+ struct seccomp_knotif n = {};
+
+ mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);
+ err = -ENOSYS;
+ if (!match->notif)
+ goto out;
+
+ n.task = current;
+ n.state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT;
+ n.data = sd;
+ n.id = seccomp_next_notify_id(match);
+ init_completion(&n.ready);
+
+ list_add(&n.list, &match->notif->notifications);
+ wake_up_poll(&match->notif->wqh, EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
+
+ up(&match->notif->request);
+ mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock);
+
+ /* This is where we wait for a reply from userspace. */
+ err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready);
+ mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * If the noticiation fd died before we re-acquired the lock, we still
+ * give -ENOSYS.
+ */
+ if (!match->notif)
+ goto remove_list;
+
+ /*
+ * Here it's possible we got a signal and then had to wait on the mutex
+ * while the reply was sent, so let's be sure there wasn't a response
+ * in the meantime.
+ */
+ if (err < 0 && n.state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED) {
+ /*
+ * We got a signal. Let's tell userspace about it (potentially
+ * again, if we had already notified them about the first one).
+ */
+ n.signaled = true;
+ if (n.state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) {
+ n.state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT;
+ up(&match->notif->request);
+ }
+
+ wake_up_poll(&match->notif->wqh, EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock);
+ err = wait_for_completion_killable(&n.ready);
+ mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Here it's possible that we're leaving the semaphore count
+ * too high, if the notification was never read by userspace.
+ * However, there is corresponding code in seccomp_notif_recv()
+ * to return -ENOENT in this case.
+ */
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto remove_list;
+ }
+
+ ret = n.val;
+ err = n.error;
+
+remove_list:
+ list_del(&n.list);
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock);
+ syscall_set_return_value(current, task_pt_regs(current),
+ err, ret);
+}
+
static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
const bool recheck_after_trace)
{
@@ -728,6 +891,10 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,

return 0;

+ case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
+ seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, sd);
+ goto skip;
+
case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, true);
return 0;
@@ -834,6 +1001,279 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+static int seccomp_notify_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
+ struct seccomp_knotif *knotif;
+
+ mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * If this file is being closed because e.g. the task who owned it
+ * died, let's wake everyone up who was waiting on us.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(knotif, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
+ if (knotif->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED)
+ continue;
+
+ knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED;
+ knotif->error = -ENOSYS;
+ knotif->val = 0;
+
+ complete(&knotif->ready);
+ }
+
+ wake_up_all(&filter->notif->wqh);
+ kfree(filter->notif);
+ filter->notif = NULL;
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+ __put_seccomp_filter(filter);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static long seccomp_notify_recv(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
+ void __user *buf)
+{
+ struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL, *cur;
+ struct seccomp_notif unotif;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ memset(&unotif, 0, sizeof(unotif));
+
+ ret = down_interruptible(&filter->notif->request);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
+ if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT) {
+ knotif = cur;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we didn't find a notification, it could be that the task was
+ * interrupted by a fatal signal between the time we were woken and
+ * when we were able to acquire the rw lock.
+ *
+ * This is the place where we handle the extra high semaphore count
+ * mentioned in seccomp_do_user_notification().
+ */
+ if (!knotif) {
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ unotif.id = knotif->id;
+ unotif.pid = task_pid_vnr(knotif->task);
+ if (knotif->signaled)
+ unotif.flags |= SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED;
+ unotif.data = *(knotif->data);
+
+ knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT;
+ wake_up_poll(&filter->notif->wqh, EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM);
+ ret = 0;
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+
+ if (ret == 0 && copy_to_user(buf, &unotif, sizeof(unotif))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+ /*
+ * Userspace screwed up. To make sure that we keep this
+ * notification alive, let's reset it back to INIT. It
+ * may have died when we released the lock, so we need to make
+ * sure it's still around.
+ */
+ knotif = NULL;
+ mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
+ if (cur->id == unotif.id) {
+ knotif = cur;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (knotif) {
+ knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT;
+ up(&filter->notif->request);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static long seccomp_notify_send(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
+ void __user *buf)
+{
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+ struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL, *cur;
+ long ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&resp, buf, sizeof(resp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (resp.flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
+ if (cur->id == resp.id) {
+ knotif = cur;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!knotif) {
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Allow exactly one reply. */
+ if (knotif->state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) {
+ ret = -EINPROGRESS;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED;
+ knotif->error = resp.error;
+ knotif->val = resp.val;
+ complete(&knotif->ready);
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static long seccomp_notify_id_valid(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
+ void __user *buf)
+{
+ struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL;
+ u64 id;
+ long ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&id, buf, sizeof(id)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ list_for_each_entry(knotif, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
+ if (knotif->id == id) {
+ if (knotif->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT)
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static long seccomp_notify_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
+ void __user *buf = (void __user *)arg;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV:
+ return seccomp_notify_recv(filter, buf);
+ case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND:
+ return seccomp_notify_send(filter, buf);
+ case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID:
+ return seccomp_notify_id_valid(filter, buf);
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+
+static __poll_t seccomp_notify_poll(struct file *file,
+ struct poll_table_struct *poll_tab)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
+ __poll_t ret = 0;
+ struct seccomp_knotif *cur;
+
+ poll_wait(file, &filter->notif->wqh, poll_tab);
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return EPOLLERR;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
+ if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT)
+ ret |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+ if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT)
+ ret |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+ if ((ret & EPOLLIN) && (ret & EPOLLOUT))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations seccomp_notify_ops = {
+ .poll = seccomp_notify_poll,
+ .release = seccomp_notify_release,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = seccomp_notify_ioctl,
+};
+
+static struct file *init_listener(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ struct file *ret = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
+ struct seccomp_filter *cur, *last_locked = NULL;
+ int filter_nesting = 0;
+
+ for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
+ mutex_lock_nested(&cur->notify_lock, filter_nesting);
+ filter_nesting++;
+ last_locked = cur;
+ if (cur->notif)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ filter->notif = kzalloc(sizeof(*(filter->notif)), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!filter->notif)
+ goto out;
+
+ sema_init(&filter->notif->request, 0);
+ filter->notif->next_id = get_random_u64();
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&filter->notif->notifications);
+ init_waitqueue_head(&filter->notif->wqh);
+
+ ret = anon_inode_getfile("seccomp notify", &seccomp_notify_ops,
+ filter, O_RDWR);
+ if (IS_ERR(ret))
+ goto out_notif;
+
+ /* The file has a reference to it now */
+ __get_seccomp_filter(filter);
+
+out_notif:
+ if (ret < 0)
+ kfree(filter->notif);
+out:
+ for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
+ mutex_unlock(&cur->notify_lock);
+ if (cur == last_locked)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/**
* seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
* @flags: flags to change filter behavior
@@ -853,6 +1293,8 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
struct seccomp_filter *prepared = NULL;
long ret = -EINVAL;
+ int listener = -1;
+ struct file *listener_f = NULL;

/* Validate flags. */
if (flags & ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK)
@@ -863,13 +1305,28 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
if (IS_ERR(prepared))
return PTR_ERR(prepared);

+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) {
+ listener = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (listener < 0) {
+ ret = listener;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ listener_f = init_listener(prepared);
+ if (IS_ERR(listener_f)) {
+ put_unused_fd(listener);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(listener_f);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
* while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
*/
if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC &&
mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
- goto out_free;
+ goto out_put_fd;

spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);

@@ -887,6 +1344,16 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+out_put_fd:
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) {
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ fput(listener_f);
+ put_unused_fd(listener);
+ } else {
+ fd_install(listener, listener_f);
+ ret = listener;
+ }
+ }
out_free:
seccomp_filter_free(prepared);
return ret;
@@ -911,6 +1378,7 @@ static long seccomp_get_action_avail(const char __user *uaction)
case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD:
case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
@@ -1111,6 +1579,7 @@ long seccomp_get_metadata(struct task_struct *task,
#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME "kill_thread"
#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME "trap"
#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME "errno"
+#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME "user_notif"
#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME "trace"
#define SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME "log"
#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME "allow"
@@ -1120,6 +1589,7 @@ static const char seccomp_actions_avail[] =
SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME " "
SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME " "
SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME " "
+ SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME " "
SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME " "
SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME " "
SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME;
@@ -1134,6 +1604,7 @@ static const struct seccomp_log_name seccomp_log_names[] = {
{ SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME },
{ SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME },
{ SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME },
+ { SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME },
{ SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME },
{ SECCOMP_LOG_LOG, SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME },
{ SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME },
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/foo b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/foo
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0c82073367a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/foo
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * Check that a pid in a child namespace still shows up as valid in ours.
+ */
+TEST(user_notification_child_pid_ns)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ int status, listener;
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
+
+ listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0)
+ exit(syscall(__NR_getpid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+
+ req.len = sizeof(req);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), sizeof(req));
+ EXPECT_EQ(req.pid, pid);
+
+ resp.len = sizeof(resp);
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), sizeof(resp));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ close(listener);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a pid in a sibling (i.e. unrelated) namespace shows up as 0, i.e.
+ * invalid.
+ */
+TEST(user_notification_sibling_pid_ns)
+{
+ pid_t pid, pid2;
+ int status, listener;
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+
+ listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
+
+ pid2 = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid2, 0);
+
+ if (pid2 == 0)
+ exit(syscall(__NR_getpid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid2, &status, 0), pid2);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ }
+
+ /* Create the sibling ns, and sibling in it. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, 0);
+
+ pid2 = fork();
+ EXPECT_GE(pid2, 0);
+
+ if (pid2 == 0) {
+ req.len = sizeof(req);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), sizeof(req));
+ /*
+ * The pid should be 0, i.e. the task is in some namespace that
+ * we can't "see".
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(req.pid, 0);
+
+ resp.len = sizeof(resp);
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), sizeof(resp));
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ close(listener);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid2, &status, 0), pid2);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
index e1473234968d..a6130c0c183f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
* Test code for seccomp bpf.
*/

+#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sys/types.h>

/*
@@ -40,10 +41,12 @@
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/times.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>

-#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <poll.h>

#include "../kselftest_harness.h"

@@ -154,6 +157,40 @@ struct seccomp_metadata {
};
#endif

+#ifndef SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER (1UL << 3)
+
+#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF 0x7fc00000U
+
+#define SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED (1U << 0)
+
+#define SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC '!'
+#define SECCOMP_IO(nr) _IO(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr)
+#define SECCOMP_IOR(nr, type) _IOR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
+#define SECCOMP_IOW(nr, type) _IOW(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
+#define SECCOMP_IOWR(nr, type) _IOWR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
+
+/* Flags for seccomp notification fd ioctl. */
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV SECCOMP_IOWR(0, struct seccomp_notif)
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND SECCOMP_IOWR(1, \
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp)
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID SECCOMP_IOR(2, __u64)
+
+struct seccomp_notif {
+ __u64 id;
+ __u32 pid;
+ __u32 flags;
+ struct seccomp_data data;
+};
+
+struct seccomp_notif_resp {
+ __u64 id;
+ __s64 val;
+ __s32 error;
+ __u32 flags;
+};
+#endif
+
#ifndef seccomp
int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
{
@@ -2077,7 +2114,8 @@ TEST(detect_seccomp_filter_flags)
{
unsigned int flags[] = { SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC,
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG,
- SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW };
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER };
unsigned int flag, all_flags;
int i;
long ret;
@@ -2933,6 +2971,319 @@ TEST(get_metadata)
ASSERT_EQ(0, kill(pid, SIGKILL));
}

+static int user_trap_syscall(int nr, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF),
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+
+ return seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &prog);
+}
+
+static int read_notif(int listener, struct seccomp_notif *req)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ do {
+ errno = 0;
+ ret = ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, req);
+ } while (ret == -1 && errno == ENOENT);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void signal_handler(int signal)
+{
+}
+
+#define USER_NOTIF_MAGIC 116983961184613L
+TEST(get_user_notification_syscall)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ long ret;
+ int status, listener;
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+ struct pollfd pollfd;
+
+ struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET|BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+ };
+ struct sock_fprog prog = {
+ .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+ .filter = filter,
+ };
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ /* Check that we get -ENOSYS with no listener attached */
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ if (user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, 0) < 0)
+ exit(1);
+ ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
+ exit(ret >= 0 || errno != ENOSYS);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ /* Add some no-op filters so that we (don't) trigger lockdep. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
+
+ /* Check that the basic notification machinery works */
+ listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ EXPECT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ /* Installing a second listener in the chain should EBUSY */
+ EXPECT_EQ(user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid,
+ SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER),
+ -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBUSY);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
+ exit(ret != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+ }
+
+ pollfd.fd = listener;
+ pollfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
+
+ EXPECT_GT(poll(&pollfd, 1, -1), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(pollfd.revents, POLLIN);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+
+ pollfd.fd = listener;
+ pollfd.events = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
+
+ EXPECT_GT(poll(&pollfd, 1, -1), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(pollfd.revents, POLLOUT);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(req.data.nr, __NR_getpid);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+
+ /* check that we make sure flags == 0 */
+ resp.flags = 1;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+ resp.flags = 0;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ /*
+ * Check that nothing bad happens when we kill the task in the middle
+ * of a syscall.
+ */
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
+ exit(ret != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req.id), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(kill(pid, SIGKILL), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0), pid);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID, &req.id), -1);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ ret = ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, ENOENT);
+
+ /*
+ * Check that we get another notification about a signal in the middle
+ * of a syscall.
+ */
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ if (signal(SIGUSR1, signal_handler) == SIG_ERR) {
+ perror("signal");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
+ exit(ret != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+ }
+
+ ret = read_notif(listener, &req);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(kill(pid, SIGUSR1), 0);
+
+ ret = read_notif(listener, &req);
+ EXPECT_EQ(req.flags & SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED, SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, 0);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = -512; /* -ERESTARTSYS */
+ resp.val = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
+
+ ret = read_notif(listener, &req);
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+ ret = ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ /*
+ * Check that we get an ENOSYS when the listener is closed.
+ */
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ close(listener);
+ ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
+ exit(ret != -1 && errno != ENOSYS);
+ }
+
+ close(listener);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a pid in a child namespace still shows up as valid in ours.
+ */
+TEST(user_notification_child_pid_ns)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+ int status, listener;
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
+
+ listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0)
+ exit(syscall(__NR_getpid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(req.pid, pid);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ close(listener);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a pid in a sibling (i.e. unrelated) namespace shows up as 0, i.e.
+ * invalid.
+ */
+TEST(user_notification_sibling_pid_ns)
+{
+ pid_t pid, pid2;
+ int status, listener;
+ struct seccomp_notif req = {};
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+
+ listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+ ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
+
+ pid2 = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(pid2, 0);
+
+ if (pid2 == 0)
+ exit(syscall(__NR_getpid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid2, &status, 0), pid2);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ }
+
+ /* Create the sibling ns, and sibling in it. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, 0);
+
+ pid2 = fork();
+ EXPECT_GE(pid2, 0);
+
+ if (pid2 == 0) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
+ /*
+ * The pid should be 0, i.e. the task is in some namespace that
+ * we can't "see".
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(req.pid, 0);
+
+ resp.id = req.id;
+ resp.error = 0;
+ resp.val = USER_NOTIF_MAGIC;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ close(listener);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid, &status, 0), pid);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid2, &status, 0), pid2);
+ EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
/*
* TODO:
* - add microbenchmarks
--
2.17.1

2018-10-29 23:32:01

by Serge E. Hallyn

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 2/2] samples: add an example of seccomp user trap

On Mon, Oct 29, 2018 at 04:40:31PM -0600, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> The idea here is just to give a demonstration of how one could safely use
> the SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF feature to do mount policies. This particular
> policy is (as noted in the comment) not very interesting, but it serves to
> illustrate how one might apply a policy dodging the various TOCTOU issues.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
> CC: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> CC: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
> CC: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
> CC: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
> CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
> CC: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
> CC: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
> CC: Akihiro Suda <[email protected]>
> ---
> v5: new in v5
> v7: updates for v7 API changes
> v8: * add some more comments about what's happening in main() (Kees)
> * move from ptrace API to SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER
> ---
> samples/seccomp/.gitignore | 1 +
> samples/seccomp/Makefile | 7 +-
> samples/seccomp/user-trap.c | 345 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 352 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/samples/seccomp/.gitignore b/samples/seccomp/.gitignore
> index 78fb78184291..d1e2e817d556 100644
> --- a/samples/seccomp/.gitignore
> +++ b/samples/seccomp/.gitignore
> @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
> bpf-direct
> bpf-fancy
> dropper
> +user-trap
> diff --git a/samples/seccomp/Makefile b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
> index cf34ff6b4065..4920903c8009 100644
> --- a/samples/seccomp/Makefile
> +++ b/samples/seccomp/Makefile
> @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
> # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> ifndef CROSS_COMPILE
> -hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_SECCOMP) := bpf-fancy dropper bpf-direct
> +hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_SECCOMP) := bpf-fancy dropper bpf-direct user-trap
>
> HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
> HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include
> @@ -16,6 +16,10 @@ HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-direct.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
> HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-direct.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include
> bpf-direct-objs := bpf-direct.o
>
> +HOSTCFLAGS_user-trap.o += -I$(objtree)/usr/include
> +HOSTCFLAGS_user-trap.o += -idirafter $(objtree)/include
> +user-trap-objs := user-trap.o
> +
> # Try to match the kernel target.
> ifndef CONFIG_64BIT
>
> @@ -33,6 +37,7 @@ HOSTCFLAGS_bpf-fancy.o += $(MFLAG)
> HOSTLDLIBS_bpf-direct += $(MFLAG)
> HOSTLDLIBS_bpf-fancy += $(MFLAG)
> HOSTLDLIBS_dropper += $(MFLAG)
> +HOSTLDLIBS_user-trap += $(MFLAG)
> endif
> always := $(hostprogs-m)
> endif
> diff --git a/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c b/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..bba7ac803c6c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/samples/seccomp/user-trap.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
> +#include <signal.h>
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include <unistd.h>
> +#include <errno.h>
> +#include <fcntl.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <stddef.h>
> +#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
> +#include <sys/types.h>
> +#include <sys/wait.h>
> +#include <sys/socket.h>
> +#include <sys/stat.h>
> +#include <sys/mman.h>
> +#include <sys/syscall.h>
> +#include <sys/user.h>
> +#include <sys/ioctl.h>
> +#include <sys/ptrace.h>
> +#include <sys/mount.h>
> +#include <linux/limits.h>
> +#include <linux/filter.h>
> +#include <linux/seccomp.h>
> +
> +#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
> +
> +static int seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags, void *args)
> +{
> + errno = 0;
> + return syscall(__NR_seccomp, op, flags, args);
> +}
> +
> +static int send_fd(int sock, int fd)
> +{
> + struct msghdr msg = {};
> + struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
> + char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c';
> + struct iovec io = {
> + .iov_base = &c,
> + .iov_len = 1,
> + };
> +
> + msg.msg_iov = &io;
> + msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
> + msg.msg_control = buf;
> + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf);
> + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
> + cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
> + cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
> + cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
> + *((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg)) = fd;
> + msg.msg_controllen = cmsg->cmsg_len;
> +
> + if (sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
> + perror("sendmsg");
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int recv_fd(int sock)
> +{
> + struct msghdr msg = {};
> + struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
> + char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))] = {0}, c = 'c';
> + struct iovec io = {
> + .iov_base = &c,
> + .iov_len = 1,
> + };
> +
> + msg.msg_iov = &io;
> + msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
> + msg.msg_control = buf;
> + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(buf);
> +
> + if (recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0) < 0) {
> + perror("recvmsg");
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
> +
> + return *((int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg));
> +}
> +
> +static int user_trap_syscall(int nr, unsigned int flags)
> +{
> + struct sock_filter filter[] = {
> + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
> + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
> + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1),
> + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF),
> + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
> + };
> +
> + struct sock_fprog prog = {
> + .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
> + .filter = filter,
> + };
> +
> + return seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, flags, &prog);
> +}
> +
> +static int handle_req(struct seccomp_notif *req,
> + struct seccomp_notif_resp *resp, int listener)
> +{
> + char path[PATH_MAX], source[PATH_MAX], target[PATH_MAX];
> + int ret = -1, mem;
> +
> + resp->id = req->id;
> + resp->error = -EPERM;
> + resp->val = 0;
> +
> + if (req->data.nr != __NR_mount) {
> + fprintf(stderr, "huh? trapped something besides mknod? %d\n", req->data.nr);

'besides mount' ?

2018-10-30 02:05:47

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 2/2] samples: add an example of seccomp user trap

On Mon, Oct 29, 2018 at 11:31:00PM +0000, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 29, 2018 at 04:40:31PM -0600, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > + if (req->data.nr != __NR_mount) {
> > + fprintf(stderr, "huh? trapped something besides mknod? %d\n", req->data.nr);
>
> 'besides mount' ?

Yes, thanks :)

Tycho

2018-10-30 14:36:11

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On 10/29, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>
> + /* This is where we wait for a reply from userspace. */
> + err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready);
> + mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);
> +
> + /*
> + * If the noticiation fd died before we re-acquired the lock, we still
> + * give -ENOSYS.
> + */
> + if (!match->notif)
> + goto remove_list;
> +
> + /*
> + * Here it's possible we got a signal and then had to wait on the mutex
> + * while the reply was sent, so let's be sure there wasn't a response
> + * in the meantime.
> + */
> + if (err < 0 && n.state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED) {
> + /*
> + * We got a signal. Let's tell userspace about it (potentially
> + * again, if we had already notified them about the first one).
> + */
> + n.signaled = true;
> + if (n.state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) {
> + n.state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT;
> + up(&match->notif->request);
> + }

I am not sure I understand the value of signaled/SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED...
I mean, why it is actually useful?

Sorry if this was already discussed.

> + wake_up_poll(&match->notif->wqh, EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
> +
> + mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock);
> + err = wait_for_completion_killable(&n.ready);
> + mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);

And it seems that SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED is the only reason why
seccomp_do_user_notification() doesn't do wait_for_completion_killable() from
the very beginning.

But my main concern is that either way wait_for_completion_killable() allows
to trivially create a process which doesn't react to SIGSTOP, not good...

Note also that this can happen if, say, both the tracer and tracee run in the
same process group and SIGSTOP is sent to their pgid, if the tracer gets the
signal first the tracee won't stop.

Of freezer. try_to_freeze_tasks() can fail if it freezes the tracer before
it does SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND.

Oleg.

2018-10-30 15:06:21

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On 10/29, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>
> +static long seccomp_notify_recv(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
> + void __user *buf)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL, *cur;
> + struct seccomp_notif unotif;
> + ssize_t ret;
> +
> + memset(&unotif, 0, sizeof(unotif));
> +
> + ret = down_interruptible(&filter->notif->request);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
> + list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
> + if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT) {
> + knotif = cur;
> + break;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * If we didn't find a notification, it could be that the task was
> + * interrupted by a fatal signal between the time we were woken and
> + * when we were able to acquire the rw lock.
> + *
> + * This is the place where we handle the extra high semaphore count
> + * mentioned in seccomp_do_user_notification().
> + */
> + if (!knotif) {
> + ret = -ENOENT;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + unotif.id = knotif->id;
> + unotif.pid = task_pid_vnr(knotif->task);
> + if (knotif->signaled)
> + unotif.flags |= SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED;
> + unotif.data = *(knotif->data);

Tycho, I forgot everything about seccomp, most probably I am wrong but let me
ask anyway.

__seccomp_filter(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) does

/*
* Recheck the syscall, since it may have changed. This
* intentionally uses a NULL struct seccomp_data to force
* a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since
* a skip would have already been reported.
*/
if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true))
return -1;

and the next seccomp_run_filters() can return SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, right?
seccomp_do_user_notification() doesn't check recheck_after_trace and it simply
does n.data = sd.

Doesn't this mean that "unotif.data = *(knotif->data)" can hit NULL ?

seccomp_run_filters() does populate_seccomp_data() in this case, but this
won't affect "seccomp_data *sd" passed to seccomp_do_user_notification().

Oleg.

2018-10-30 15:55:28

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 04:02:54PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 10/29, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> >
> > +static long seccomp_notify_recv(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
> > + void __user *buf)
> > +{
> > + struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL, *cur;
> > + struct seccomp_notif unotif;
> > + ssize_t ret;
> > +
> > + memset(&unotif, 0, sizeof(unotif));
> > +
> > + ret = down_interruptible(&filter->notif->request);
> > + if (ret < 0)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
> > + list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
> > + if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT) {
> > + knotif = cur;
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * If we didn't find a notification, it could be that the task was
> > + * interrupted by a fatal signal between the time we were woken and
> > + * when we were able to acquire the rw lock.
> > + *
> > + * This is the place where we handle the extra high semaphore count
> > + * mentioned in seccomp_do_user_notification().
> > + */
> > + if (!knotif) {
> > + ret = -ENOENT;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + unotif.id = knotif->id;
> > + unotif.pid = task_pid_vnr(knotif->task);
> > + if (knotif->signaled)
> > + unotif.flags |= SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED;
> > + unotif.data = *(knotif->data);
>
> Tycho, I forgot everything about seccomp, most probably I am wrong but let me
> ask anyway.
>
> __seccomp_filter(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) does
>
> /*
> * Recheck the syscall, since it may have changed. This
> * intentionally uses a NULL struct seccomp_data to force
> * a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since
> * a skip would have already been reported.
> */
> if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true))
> return -1;
>
> and the next seccomp_run_filters() can return SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, right?
> seccomp_do_user_notification() doesn't check recheck_after_trace and it simply
> does n.data = sd.
>
> Doesn't this mean that "unotif.data = *(knotif->data)" can hit NULL ?
>
> seccomp_run_filters() does populate_seccomp_data() in this case, but this
> won't affect "seccomp_data *sd" passed to seccomp_do_user_notification().

Oof, yes, you're right. Seems like there are no other users of sd in
__seccomp_filter(). Seems to me like we can just do the
populate_seccomp_data() one level higher in __seccomp_filter()?

Tycho

From 9e0f75ea51a2c328567910df3122a236ebeccab0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 09:51:14 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] seccomp: hoist struct seccomp_data recalculation higher

Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
---
kernel/seccomp.c | 12 ++++++------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 4c5fb6ced4cd..1525cb753ad2 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -257,7 +257,6 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
struct seccomp_filter **match)
{
- struct seccomp_data sd_local;
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
/* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
struct seccomp_filter *f =
@@ -267,11 +266,6 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f == NULL)))
return SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS;

- if (!sd) {
- populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
- sd = &sd_local;
- }
-
/*
* All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
* value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
@@ -821,6 +815,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
u32 filter_ret, action;
struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL;
int data;
+ struct seccomp_data sd_local;

/*
* Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
@@ -828,6 +823,11 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
*/
rmb();

+ if (!sd) {
+ populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
+ sd = &sd_local;
+ }
+
filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match);
data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL;
--
2.17.1

2018-10-30 16:18:33

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

Hi Oleg,

On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 03:32:36PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 10/29, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> >
> > + /* This is where we wait for a reply from userspace. */
> > + err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready);
> > + mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * If the noticiation fd died before we re-acquired the lock, we still
> > + * give -ENOSYS.
> > + */
> > + if (!match->notif)
> > + goto remove_list;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Here it's possible we got a signal and then had to wait on the mutex
> > + * while the reply was sent, so let's be sure there wasn't a response
> > + * in the meantime.
> > + */
> > + if (err < 0 && n.state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED) {
> > + /*
> > + * We got a signal. Let's tell userspace about it (potentially
> > + * again, if we had already notified them about the first one).
> > + */
> > + n.signaled = true;
> > + if (n.state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) {
> > + n.state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT;
> > + up(&match->notif->request);
> > + }
>
> I am not sure I understand the value of signaled/SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED...
> I mean, why it is actually useful?
>
> Sorry if this was already discussed.

:) no problem, many people have complained about this. This is an
implementation of Andy's suggestion here:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/15/1122

You can see some more detailed discussion here:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/9/21/138

> > + wake_up_poll(&match->notif->wqh, EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
> > +
> > + mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock);
> > + err = wait_for_completion_killable(&n.ready);
> > + mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);
>
> And it seems that SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED is the only reason why
> seccomp_do_user_notification() doesn't do wait_for_completion_killable() from
> the very beginning.
>
> But my main concern is that either way wait_for_completion_killable() allows
> to trivially create a process which doesn't react to SIGSTOP, not good...
>
> Note also that this can happen if, say, both the tracer and tracee run in the
> same process group and SIGSTOP is sent to their pgid, if the tracer gets the
> signal first the tracee won't stop.
>
> Of freezer. try_to_freeze_tasks() can fail if it freezes the tracer before
> it does SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND.

I think in general the way this is intended to be used these things
wouldn't happen. Of course, it would be pretty easy for someone who
was malicious and had the ability to create a user namespace to
exhaust pids this way, so perhaps we should drop this part of the
patch. I have no real need for it, but perhaps Andy can elaborate?

Tycho

2018-10-30 16:40:45

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On 10/30, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>
> On 10/30, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> >
> > @@ -828,6 +823,11 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> > */
> > rmb();
> >
> > + if (!sd) {
> > + populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
> > + sd = &sd_local;
> > + }
> > +
>
> To me it would be more clean to remove the "if (!sd)" check, case(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE)
> in __seccomp_filter() can simply do populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local) unconditionally
> and pass &sd_local to __seccomp_filter().

Ah, please ignore, emulate_vsyscall() does secure_computing(NULL).

Btw. why __seccomp_filter() doesn't return a boolean?

Or at least, why can't case(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) simply do

return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true);

?

Oleg.

2018-10-30 17:25:29

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 05:39:26PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 10/30, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> >
> > On 10/30, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > >
> > > @@ -828,6 +823,11 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> > > */
> > > rmb();
> > >
> > > + if (!sd) {
> > > + populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
> > > + sd = &sd_local;
> > > + }
> > > +
> >
> > To me it would be more clean to remove the "if (!sd)" check, case(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE)
> > in __seccomp_filter() can simply do populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local) unconditionally
> > and pass &sd_local to __seccomp_filter().
>
> Ah, please ignore, emulate_vsyscall() does secure_computing(NULL).
>
> Btw. why __seccomp_filter() doesn't return a boolean?
>
> Or at least, why can't case(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) simply do
>
> return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true);
>
> ?

Yeah, at least the second one definitely makes sense. I can add that
as a patch in the next version of this series unless Kees does it
before.

Thanks for your help, Oleg!

Tycho

2018-10-30 18:25:17

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On 10/30, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>
> @@ -828,6 +823,11 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> */
> rmb();
>
> + if (!sd) {
> + populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
> + sd = &sd_local;
> + }
> +

To me it would be more clean to remove the "if (!sd)" check, case(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE)
in __seccomp_filter() can simply do populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local) unconditionally
and pass &sd_local to __seccomp_filter().

Oleg.

2018-10-30 21:34:46

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 10:21 AM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 05:39:26PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>> On 10/30, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>> >
>> > On 10/30, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>> > >
>> > > @@ -828,6 +823,11 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
>> > > */
>> > > rmb();
>> > >
>> > > + if (!sd) {
>> > > + populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
>> > > + sd = &sd_local;
>> > > + }
>> > > +
>> >
>> > To me it would be more clean to remove the "if (!sd)" check, case(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE)
>> > in __seccomp_filter() can simply do populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local) unconditionally
>> > and pass &sd_local to __seccomp_filter().
>>
>> Ah, please ignore, emulate_vsyscall() does secure_computing(NULL).

Right.

>>
>> Btw. why __seccomp_filter() doesn't return a boolean?

Because it was wrapped by __secure_computing(). *shrug* The common
method in the kernel is to use int and 0=ok.

>> Or at least, why can't case(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) simply do
>>
>> return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true);
>>
>> ?
>
> Yeah, at least the second one definitely makes sense. I can add that
> as a patch in the next version of this series unless Kees does it
> before.

I'd like to avoid changing the return value of __secure_computing() to
just avoid having to touch all the callers. And I'd prefer not to
change __seccomp_filter() to a bool, since I'd like the return values
to be consistent through the call chain.

I find the existing code more readable than a single-line return, just
because it's very explicit. I don't want to have to think any harder
when reading seccomp. ;)

-Kees

--
Kees Cook

2018-10-30 21:39:57

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 8:54 AM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 04:02:54PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>> On 10/29, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>> >
>> > +static long seccomp_notify_recv(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
>> > + void __user *buf)
>> > +{
>> > + struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL, *cur;
>> > + struct seccomp_notif unotif;
>> > + ssize_t ret;
>> > +
>> > + memset(&unotif, 0, sizeof(unotif));
>> > +
>> > + ret = down_interruptible(&filter->notif->request);
>> > + if (ret < 0)
>> > + return ret;
>> > +
>> > + mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
>> > + list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
>> > + if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT) {
>> > + knotif = cur;
>> > + break;
>> > + }
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + /*
>> > + * If we didn't find a notification, it could be that the task was
>> > + * interrupted by a fatal signal between the time we were woken and
>> > + * when we were able to acquire the rw lock.
>> > + *
>> > + * This is the place where we handle the extra high semaphore count
>> > + * mentioned in seccomp_do_user_notification().
>> > + */
>> > + if (!knotif) {
>> > + ret = -ENOENT;
>> > + goto out;
>> > + }
>> > +
>> > + unotif.id = knotif->id;
>> > + unotif.pid = task_pid_vnr(knotif->task);
>> > + if (knotif->signaled)
>> > + unotif.flags |= SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED;
>> > + unotif.data = *(knotif->data);
>>
>> Tycho, I forgot everything about seccomp, most probably I am wrong but let me
>> ask anyway.
>>
>> __seccomp_filter(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) does
>>
>> /*
>> * Recheck the syscall, since it may have changed. This
>> * intentionally uses a NULL struct seccomp_data to force
>> * a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since
>> * a skip would have already been reported.
>> */
>> if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true))
>> return -1;
>>
>> and the next seccomp_run_filters() can return SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, right?
>> seccomp_do_user_notification() doesn't check recheck_after_trace and it simply
>> does n.data = sd.
>>
>> Doesn't this mean that "unotif.data = *(knotif->data)" can hit NULL ?
>>
>> seccomp_run_filters() does populate_seccomp_data() in this case, but this
>> won't affect "seccomp_data *sd" passed to seccomp_do_user_notification().

Woo, yeah, good catch. :)

> Oof, yes, you're right. Seems like there are no other users of sd in
> __seccomp_filter(). Seems to me like we can just do the
> populate_seccomp_data() one level higher in __seccomp_filter()?

Agreed.

>
> Tycho
>
>
> From 9e0f75ea51a2c328567910df3122a236ebeccab0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
> Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 09:51:14 -0600
> Subject: [PATCH] seccomp: hoist struct seccomp_data recalculation higher
>
> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
> ---
> kernel/seccomp.c | 12 ++++++------
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index 4c5fb6ced4cd..1525cb753ad2 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -257,7 +257,6 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
> static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> struct seccomp_filter **match)
> {
> - struct seccomp_data sd_local;
> u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
> /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
> struct seccomp_filter *f =
> @@ -267,11 +266,6 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f == NULL)))
> return SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS;
>
> - if (!sd) {
> - populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
> - sd = &sd_local;
> - }
> -
> /*
> * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
> * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
> @@ -821,6 +815,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> u32 filter_ret, action;
> struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL;
> int data;
> + struct seccomp_data sd_local;
>
> /*
> * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
> @@ -828,6 +823,11 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
> */
> rmb();
>
> + if (!sd) {
> + populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
> + sd = &sd_local;
> + }
> +
> filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match);
> data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
> action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL;
> --
> 2.17.1
>

Looks good to me, yes.

--
Kees Cook

2018-10-30 21:52:17

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Mon, Oct 29, 2018 at 3:40 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
> * switch to a flags based future-proofing mechanism for struct
> seccomp_notif and seccomp_notif_resp, thus avoiding version issues
> with structure length (Kees)
[...]
>
> +struct seccomp_notif {
> + __u64 id;
> + __u32 pid;
> + __u32 flags;
> + struct seccomp_data data;
> +};
> +
> +struct seccomp_notif_resp {
> + __u64 id;
> + __s64 val;
> + __s32 error;
> + __u32 flags;
> +};

Hrm, so, what's the plan for when struct seccomp_data changes size?
I'm realizing that it might be "too late" for userspace to discover
it's running on a newer kernel. i.e. it gets a user notification, and
discovers flags it doesn't know how to handle. Do we actually need
both flags AND a length? Designing UAPI is frustrating! :)

Do we need another ioctl to discover the seccomp_data size maybe?

--
Kees Cook

2018-10-30 21:55:27

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 02:49:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 29, 2018 at 3:40 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
> > * switch to a flags based future-proofing mechanism for struct
> > seccomp_notif and seccomp_notif_resp, thus avoiding version issues
> > with structure length (Kees)
> [...]
> >
> > +struct seccomp_notif {
> > + __u64 id;
> > + __u32 pid;
> > + __u32 flags;
> > + struct seccomp_data data;
> > +};
> > +
> > +struct seccomp_notif_resp {
> > + __u64 id;
> > + __s64 val;
> > + __s32 error;
> > + __u32 flags;
> > +};
>
> Hrm, so, what's the plan for when struct seccomp_data changes size?

I guess my plan was don't ever change the size again, just use flags
and have extra state available via ioctl().

> I'm realizing that it might be "too late" for userspace to discover
> it's running on a newer kernel. i.e. it gets a user notification, and
> discovers flags it doesn't know how to handle. Do we actually need
> both flags AND a length? Designing UAPI is frustrating! :)

:). I don't see this as such a big problem -- in fact it's better than
the length mode, where you don't know what you don't know, because it
only copied as much info as you could handle. Older userspace would
simply not use information it didn't know how to use.

> Do we need another ioctl to discover the seccomp_data size maybe?

That could be an option as well, assuming we agree that size would
work, which I thought we didn't?

Tycho

2018-10-30 22:01:16

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 2:54 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 02:49:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Mon, Oct 29, 2018 at 3:40 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > * switch to a flags based future-proofing mechanism for struct
>> > seccomp_notif and seccomp_notif_resp, thus avoiding version issues
>> > with structure length (Kees)
>> [...]
>> >
>> > +struct seccomp_notif {
>> > + __u64 id;
>> > + __u32 pid;
>> > + __u32 flags;
>> > + struct seccomp_data data;
>> > +};
>> > +
>> > +struct seccomp_notif_resp {
>> > + __u64 id;
>> > + __s64 val;
>> > + __s32 error;
>> > + __u32 flags;
>> > +};
>>
>> Hrm, so, what's the plan for when struct seccomp_data changes size?
>
> I guess my plan was don't ever change the size again, just use flags
> and have extra state available via ioctl().
>
>> I'm realizing that it might be "too late" for userspace to discover
>> it's running on a newer kernel. i.e. it gets a user notification, and
>> discovers flags it doesn't know how to handle. Do we actually need
>> both flags AND a length? Designing UAPI is frustrating! :)
>
> :). I don't see this as such a big problem -- in fact it's better than
> the length mode, where you don't know what you don't know, because it
> only copied as much info as you could handle. Older userspace would
> simply not use information it didn't know how to use.
>
>> Do we need another ioctl to discover the seccomp_data size maybe?
>
> That could be an option as well, assuming we agree that size would
> work, which I thought we didn't?

Size alone wasn't able to determine the layout of the seccomp_notif
structure since it had holes (in the prior version). seccomp_data
doesn't have holes and is likely to change in size (see the recent
thread on adding the MPK register to it...)

I'm trying to imagine the right API for this. A portable user of
seccomp_notif expects the id/pid/flags/data to always be in the same
place, but it's the size of seccomp_data that may change. So it wants
to allocate space for seccomp_notif header and "everything else", of
which is may only understand the start of seccomp_data (and ignore any
new trailing fields).

So... perhaps the "how big are things?" ioctl would report the header
size and the seccomp_data size. Then both are flexible. And flags
would be left as a way to "version" the header?

Any Linux API list members want to chime in here?

--
Kees Cook

2018-10-30 22:33:29

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 03:00:17PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 2:54 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 02:49:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Mon, Oct 29, 2018 at 3:40 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> > * switch to a flags based future-proofing mechanism for struct
> >> > seccomp_notif and seccomp_notif_resp, thus avoiding version issues
> >> > with structure length (Kees)
> >> [...]
> >> >
> >> > +struct seccomp_notif {
> >> > + __u64 id;
> >> > + __u32 pid;
> >> > + __u32 flags;
> >> > + struct seccomp_data data;
> >> > +};
> >> > +
> >> > +struct seccomp_notif_resp {
> >> > + __u64 id;
> >> > + __s64 val;
> >> > + __s32 error;
> >> > + __u32 flags;
> >> > +};
> >>
> >> Hrm, so, what's the plan for when struct seccomp_data changes size?
> >
> > I guess my plan was don't ever change the size again, just use flags
> > and have extra state available via ioctl().
> >
> >> I'm realizing that it might be "too late" for userspace to discover
> >> it's running on a newer kernel. i.e. it gets a user notification, and
> >> discovers flags it doesn't know how to handle. Do we actually need
> >> both flags AND a length? Designing UAPI is frustrating! :)
> >
> > :). I don't see this as such a big problem -- in fact it's better than
> > the length mode, where you don't know what you don't know, because it
> > only copied as much info as you could handle. Older userspace would
> > simply not use information it didn't know how to use.
> >
> >> Do we need another ioctl to discover the seccomp_data size maybe?
> >
> > That could be an option as well, assuming we agree that size would
> > work, which I thought we didn't?
>
> Size alone wasn't able to determine the layout of the seccomp_notif
> structure since it had holes (in the prior version). seccomp_data
> doesn't have holes and is likely to change in size (see the recent
> thread on adding the MPK register to it...)

Oh, sorry, I misread this as seccomp_notif, not seccomp_data.

> I'm trying to imagine the right API for this. A portable user of
> seccomp_notif expects the id/pid/flags/data to always be in the same
> place, but it's the size of seccomp_data that may change. So it wants
> to allocate space for seccomp_notif header and "everything else", of
> which is may only understand the start of seccomp_data (and ignore any
> new trailing fields).
>
> So... perhaps the "how big are things?" ioctl would report the header
> size and the seccomp_data size. Then both are flexible. And flags
> would be left as a way to "version" the header?
>
> Any Linux API list members want to chime in here?

So:

struct seccomp_notify_sizes {
u16 seccomp_notify;
u16 seccomp_data;
};

ioctl(fd, SECCOMP_IOCTL_GET_SIZE, &sizes);

This would be only one extra syscall over the lifetime of the listener
process, which doesn't seem too bad. One thing that's slightly
annoying is that you can't do it until you actually get an event, so
maybe it could be a command on the seccomp syscall instead:

seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes);

?

Tycho

2018-10-30 22:37:42

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 03:00:17PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 2:54 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 02:49:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >> On Mon, Oct 29, 2018 at 3:40 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
>> >> > * switch to a flags based future-proofing mechanism for struct
>> >> > seccomp_notif and seccomp_notif_resp, thus avoiding version issues
>> >> > with structure length (Kees)
>> >> [...]
>> >> >
>> >> > +struct seccomp_notif {
>> >> > + __u64 id;
>> >> > + __u32 pid;
>> >> > + __u32 flags;
>> >> > + struct seccomp_data data;
>> >> > +};
>> >> > +
>> >> > +struct seccomp_notif_resp {
>> >> > + __u64 id;
>> >> > + __s64 val;
>> >> > + __s32 error;
>> >> > + __u32 flags;
>> >> > +};
>> >>
>> >> Hrm, so, what's the plan for when struct seccomp_data changes size?
>> >
>> > I guess my plan was don't ever change the size again, just use flags
>> > and have extra state available via ioctl().
>> >
>> >> I'm realizing that it might be "too late" for userspace to discover
>> >> it's running on a newer kernel. i.e. it gets a user notification, and
>> >> discovers flags it doesn't know how to handle. Do we actually need
>> >> both flags AND a length? Designing UAPI is frustrating! :)
>> >
>> > :). I don't see this as such a big problem -- in fact it's better than
>> > the length mode, where you don't know what you don't know, because it
>> > only copied as much info as you could handle. Older userspace would
>> > simply not use information it didn't know how to use.
>> >
>> >> Do we need another ioctl to discover the seccomp_data size maybe?
>> >
>> > That could be an option as well, assuming we agree that size would
>> > work, which I thought we didn't?
>>
>> Size alone wasn't able to determine the layout of the seccomp_notif
>> structure since it had holes (in the prior version). seccomp_data
>> doesn't have holes and is likely to change in size (see the recent
>> thread on adding the MPK register to it...)
>
> Oh, sorry, I misread this as seccomp_notif, not seccomp_data.
>
>> I'm trying to imagine the right API for this. A portable user of
>> seccomp_notif expects the id/pid/flags/data to always be in the same
>> place, but it's the size of seccomp_data that may change. So it wants
>> to allocate space for seccomp_notif header and "everything else", of
>> which is may only understand the start of seccomp_data (and ignore any
>> new trailing fields).
>>
>> So... perhaps the "how big are things?" ioctl would report the header
>> size and the seccomp_data size. Then both are flexible. And flags
>> would be left as a way to "version" the header?
>>
>> Any Linux API list members want to chime in here?
>
> So:
>
> struct seccomp_notify_sizes {
> u16 seccomp_notify;
> u16 seccomp_data;
> };
>
> ioctl(fd, SECCOMP_IOCTL_GET_SIZE, &sizes);
>
> This would be only one extra syscall over the lifetime of the listener
> process, which doesn't seem too bad. One thing that's slightly
> annoying is that you can't do it until you actually get an event, so
> maybe it could be a command on the seccomp syscall instead:
>
> seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes);

Yeah, top-level makes more sense. u16 seems fine too.

--
Kees Cook

2018-10-31 00:30:37

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 03:34:54PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 03:00:17PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 2:54 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> > On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 02:49:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> >> On Mon, Oct 29, 2018 at 3:40 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> >> > * switch to a flags based future-proofing mechanism for struct
> >> >> > seccomp_notif and seccomp_notif_resp, thus avoiding version issues
> >> >> > with structure length (Kees)
> >> >> [...]
> >> >> >
> >> >> > +struct seccomp_notif {
> >> >> > + __u64 id;
> >> >> > + __u32 pid;
> >> >> > + __u32 flags;
> >> >> > + struct seccomp_data data;
> >> >> > +};
> >> >> > +
> >> >> > +struct seccomp_notif_resp {
> >> >> > + __u64 id;
> >> >> > + __s64 val;
> >> >> > + __s32 error;
> >> >> > + __u32 flags;
> >> >> > +};
> >> >>
> >> >> Hrm, so, what's the plan for when struct seccomp_data changes size?
> >> >
> >> > I guess my plan was don't ever change the size again, just use flags
> >> > and have extra state available via ioctl().
> >> >
> >> >> I'm realizing that it might be "too late" for userspace to discover
> >> >> it's running on a newer kernel. i.e. it gets a user notification, and
> >> >> discovers flags it doesn't know how to handle. Do we actually need
> >> >> both flags AND a length? Designing UAPI is frustrating! :)
> >> >
> >> > :). I don't see this as such a big problem -- in fact it's better than
> >> > the length mode, where you don't know what you don't know, because it
> >> > only copied as much info as you could handle. Older userspace would
> >> > simply not use information it didn't know how to use.
> >> >
> >> >> Do we need another ioctl to discover the seccomp_data size maybe?
> >> >
> >> > That could be an option as well, assuming we agree that size would
> >> > work, which I thought we didn't?
> >>
> >> Size alone wasn't able to determine the layout of the seccomp_notif
> >> structure since it had holes (in the prior version). seccomp_data
> >> doesn't have holes and is likely to change in size (see the recent
> >> thread on adding the MPK register to it...)
> >
> > Oh, sorry, I misread this as seccomp_notif, not seccomp_data.
> >
> >> I'm trying to imagine the right API for this. A portable user of
> >> seccomp_notif expects the id/pid/flags/data to always be in the same
> >> place, but it's the size of seccomp_data that may change. So it wants
> >> to allocate space for seccomp_notif header and "everything else", of
> >> which is may only understand the start of seccomp_data (and ignore any
> >> new trailing fields).
> >>
> >> So... perhaps the "how big are things?" ioctl would report the header
> >> size and the seccomp_data size. Then both are flexible. And flags
> >> would be left as a way to "version" the header?
> >>
> >> Any Linux API list members want to chime in here?
> >
> > So:
> >
> > struct seccomp_notify_sizes {
> > u16 seccomp_notify;
> > u16 seccomp_data;
> > };
> >
> > ioctl(fd, SECCOMP_IOCTL_GET_SIZE, &sizes);
> >
> > This would be only one extra syscall over the lifetime of the listener
> > process, which doesn't seem too bad. One thing that's slightly
> > annoying is that you can't do it until you actually get an event, so
> > maybe it could be a command on the seccomp syscall instead:
> >
> > seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes);
>
> Yeah, top-level makes more sense. u16 seems fine too.

So one problem is this is that the third argument of the seccomp
syscall is declared as const char, so I get:

kernel/seccomp.c: In function ‘seccomp_get_notif_sizes’:
kernel/seccomp.c:1401:19: warning: passing argument 1 of ‘copy_to_user’ discards ‘const’ qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
if (copy_to_user(usizes, &sizes, sizeof(sizes)))
^~~~~~
In file included from ./include/linux/compat.h:19:0,
from kernel/seccomp.c:19:
./include/linux/uaccess.h:152:1: note: expected ‘void *’ but argument is of type ‘const char *’
copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
^~~~~~~~~~~~

If I drop the const it doesn't complain, but I'm not sure what the protocol is
for changing the types of syscall declarations. In principle it doesn't really
mean anything, but...

Tycho

2018-10-31 01:52:36

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 5:29 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 03:34:54PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 3:32 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 03:00:17PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >> On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 2:54 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
>> >> > On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 02:49:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >> >> On Mon, Oct 29, 2018 at 3:40 PM, Tycho Andersen <[email protected]> wrote:
>> >> >> > * switch to a flags based future-proofing mechanism for struct
>> >> >> > seccomp_notif and seccomp_notif_resp, thus avoiding version issues
>> >> >> > with structure length (Kees)
>> >> >> [...]
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > +struct seccomp_notif {
>> >> >> > + __u64 id;
>> >> >> > + __u32 pid;
>> >> >> > + __u32 flags;
>> >> >> > + struct seccomp_data data;
>> >> >> > +};
>> >> >> > +
>> >> >> > +struct seccomp_notif_resp {
>> >> >> > + __u64 id;
>> >> >> > + __s64 val;
>> >> >> > + __s32 error;
>> >> >> > + __u32 flags;
>> >> >> > +};
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Hrm, so, what's the plan for when struct seccomp_data changes size?
>> >> >
>> >> > I guess my plan was don't ever change the size again, just use flags
>> >> > and have extra state available via ioctl().
>> >> >
>> >> >> I'm realizing that it might be "too late" for userspace to discover
>> >> >> it's running on a newer kernel. i.e. it gets a user notification, and
>> >> >> discovers flags it doesn't know how to handle. Do we actually need
>> >> >> both flags AND a length? Designing UAPI is frustrating! :)
>> >> >
>> >> > :). I don't see this as such a big problem -- in fact it's better than
>> >> > the length mode, where you don't know what you don't know, because it
>> >> > only copied as much info as you could handle. Older userspace would
>> >> > simply not use information it didn't know how to use.
>> >> >
>> >> >> Do we need another ioctl to discover the seccomp_data size maybe?
>> >> >
>> >> > That could be an option as well, assuming we agree that size would
>> >> > work, which I thought we didn't?
>> >>
>> >> Size alone wasn't able to determine the layout of the seccomp_notif
>> >> structure since it had holes (in the prior version). seccomp_data
>> >> doesn't have holes and is likely to change in size (see the recent
>> >> thread on adding the MPK register to it...)
>> >
>> > Oh, sorry, I misread this as seccomp_notif, not seccomp_data.
>> >
>> >> I'm trying to imagine the right API for this. A portable user of
>> >> seccomp_notif expects the id/pid/flags/data to always be in the same
>> >> place, but it's the size of seccomp_data that may change. So it wants
>> >> to allocate space for seccomp_notif header and "everything else", of
>> >> which is may only understand the start of seccomp_data (and ignore any
>> >> new trailing fields).
>> >>
>> >> So... perhaps the "how big are things?" ioctl would report the header
>> >> size and the seccomp_data size. Then both are flexible. And flags
>> >> would be left as a way to "version" the header?
>> >>
>> >> Any Linux API list members want to chime in here?
>> >
>> > So:
>> >
>> > struct seccomp_notify_sizes {
>> > u16 seccomp_notify;
>> > u16 seccomp_data;
>> > };
>> >
>> > ioctl(fd, SECCOMP_IOCTL_GET_SIZE, &sizes);
>> >
>> > This would be only one extra syscall over the lifetime of the listener
>> > process, which doesn't seem too bad. One thing that's slightly
>> > annoying is that you can't do it until you actually get an event, so
>> > maybe it could be a command on the seccomp syscall instead:
>> >
>> > seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes);
>>
>> Yeah, top-level makes more sense. u16 seems fine too.
>
> So one problem is this is that the third argument of the seccomp
> syscall is declared as const char, so I get:
>
> kernel/seccomp.c: In function ‘seccomp_get_notif_sizes’:
> kernel/seccomp.c:1401:19: warning: passing argument 1 of ‘copy_to_user’ discards ‘const’ qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
> if (copy_to_user(usizes, &sizes, sizeof(sizes)))
> ^~~~~~
> In file included from ./include/linux/compat.h:19:0,
> from kernel/seccomp.c:19:
> ./include/linux/uaccess.h:152:1: note: expected ‘void *’ but argument is of type ‘const char *’
> copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> ^~~~~~~~~~~~
>
> If I drop the const it doesn't complain, but I'm not sure what the protocol is
> for changing the types of syscall declarations. In principle it doesn't really
> mean anything, but...

I think this should be fine. It's documented as "void *"...

--
Kees Cook

2018-10-31 13:06:25

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On 10/30, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> I'd like to avoid changing the return value of __secure_computing() to
> just avoid having to touch all the callers. And I'd prefer not to
> change __seccomp_filter() to a bool, since I'd like the return values
> to be consistent through the call chain.

Sure, please forget.

> I find the existing code more readable than a single-line return, just
> because it's very explicit. I don't want to have to think any harder
> when reading seccomp. ;)

Heh ;) Again, please forget, this is cosmetic.

But I simply can't resist. I asked this question exactly because I was
confused by these 2 lines:

if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true))
return -1;

return 0;

to me it looks as if we need to filter out some non-zero return values and
turn them into -1. I had to spend some time (and think harder ;) to verify
that this is just the recursive call and nothing more.

nevermind, please ignore.

Oleg.

2018-11-01 13:57:29

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On 10/29, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>
> +static int seccomp_notify_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> +{
> + struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
> + struct seccomp_knotif *knotif;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
> +
> + /*
> + * If this file is being closed because e.g. the task who owned it
> + * died, let's wake everyone up who was waiting on us.
> + */
> + list_for_each_entry(knotif, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
> + if (knotif->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED)
> + continue;
> +
> + knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED;
> + knotif->error = -ENOSYS;
> + knotif->val = 0;
> +
> + complete(&knotif->ready);
> + }
> +
> + wake_up_all(&filter->notif->wqh);

Why? __fput() is not possible if there is another user of this file sleeping
in seccomp_notify_poll().

> + kfree(filter->notif);

Hmm, this looks wrong... we can't kfree ->notif if its ->notifications list
is not empty, otherwise seccomp_do_user_notification()->list_del(&n.list)
can write to the freed memory.

I think _release() should do list_for_each_entry_safe() + list_del_init()
and seccomp_do_user_notification() should use list_del_init() too.

Or, simpler, seccomp_do_user_notification() should do

if (!match->notif)
goto out;

instead of "goto remove_list".

Oleg.

2018-11-01 14:06:05

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On 10/29, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>
> +static struct file *init_listener(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> +{
> + struct file *ret = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
> + struct seccomp_filter *cur, *last_locked = NULL;
> + int filter_nesting = 0;
> +
> + for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
> + mutex_lock_nested(&cur->notify_lock, filter_nesting);
> + filter_nesting++;
> + last_locked = cur;
> + if (cur->notif)
> + goto out;
> + }

Somehow I no longer understand why do you need to take all locks. Isn't
the first filter's notify_lock enough? IOW,

for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
if (cur->notif)
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
first = cur;
}

if (first)
mutex_lock(&first->notify_lock);

... initialize filter->notif ...

out:
if (first)
mutex_unlock(&first->notify_lock);

return ret;

Oleg.

2018-11-01 14:48:56

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Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On 10/30, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>
> > I am not sure I understand the value of signaled/SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED...
> > I mean, why it is actually useful?
> >
> > Sorry if this was already discussed.
>
> :) no problem, many people have complained about this. This is an
> implementation of Andy's suggestion here:
> https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/15/1122
>
> You can see some more detailed discussion here:
> https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/9/21/138

Cough, sorry, I simply can't understand what are you talking about ;)
It seems that I need to read all the previous emails... So let me ask
a stupid question below.

> > But my main concern is that either way wait_for_completion_killable() allows
> > to trivially create a process which doesn't react to SIGSTOP, not good...
> >
> > Note also that this can happen if, say, both the tracer and tracee run in the
> > same process group and SIGSTOP is sent to their pgid, if the tracer gets the
> > signal first the tracee won't stop.
> >
> > Of freezer. try_to_freeze_tasks() can fail if it freezes the tracer before
> > it does SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND.
>
> I think in general the way this is intended to be used these things
> wouldn't happen.

Why?

> was malicious and had the ability to create a user namespace to
> exhaust pids this way,

Not sure I understand how this connects to my question... nevermind.

> so perhaps we should drop this part of the
> patch. I have no real need for it, but perhaps Andy can elaborate?

Yes I think it would be nice to avoid wait_for_completion_killable().

So please help me to understand the problem. Once again, why can not
seccomp_do_user_notification() use wait_for_completion_interruptible() only?

This is called before the task actually starts the syscall, so
-ERESTARTNOINTR if signal_pending() can't hurt.

Now lets suppose seccomp_do_user_notification() simply does

err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready);

if (err < 0 && state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED) {
syscall_set_return_value(ERESTARTNOINTR);
list_del(&n.list);
return -1;
}

(I am ignoring the locking/etc). Now the obvious problem is that the listener
doing SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND can't distinguish -ENOENT from the case when the
tracee was killed, yes?

Is it that important?

Any other problem?

Oleg.

2018-11-01 19:57:42

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Thu, Nov 01, 2018 at 02:40:02PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 10/29, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> >
> > +static struct file *init_listener(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
> > +{
> > + struct file *ret = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
> > + struct seccomp_filter *cur, *last_locked = NULL;
> > + int filter_nesting = 0;
> > +
> > + for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
> > + mutex_lock_nested(&cur->notify_lock, filter_nesting);
> > + filter_nesting++;
> > + last_locked = cur;
> > + if (cur->notif)
> > + goto out;
> > + }
>
> Somehow I no longer understand why do you need to take all locks. Isn't
> the first filter's notify_lock enough? IOW,
>
> for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
> if (cur->notif)
> return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
> first = cur;
> }
>
> if (first)
> mutex_lock(&first->notify_lock);
>
> ... initialize filter->notif ...
>
> out:
> if (first)
> mutex_unlock(&first->notify_lock);
>
> return ret;

The idea here is to prevent people from "nesting" notify filters. So
if any filter in the chain has a listener attached, it refuses to
install another filter with a listener.

But it just occurred to me that we don't handle the TSYNC case
correctly by doing it this way, and it's not necessarily obvious to me
how we can :). So let me look into that.

Tycho

2018-11-01 20:00:52

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Thu, Nov 01, 2018 at 02:56:34PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 10/29, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> >
> > +static int seccomp_notify_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> > +{
> > + struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
> > + struct seccomp_knotif *knotif;
> > +
> > + mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * If this file is being closed because e.g. the task who owned it
> > + * died, let's wake everyone up who was waiting on us.
> > + */
> > + list_for_each_entry(knotif, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
> > + if (knotif->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED)
> > + continue;
> > +
> > + knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED;
> > + knotif->error = -ENOSYS;
> > + knotif->val = 0;
> > +
> > + complete(&knotif->ready);
> > + }
> > +
> > + wake_up_all(&filter->notif->wqh);
>
> Why? __fput() is not possible if there is another user of this file sleeping
> in seccomp_notify_poll().

Yes, I was just trying to be extra defensive. But I can drop it.

> > + kfree(filter->notif);
>
> Hmm, this looks wrong... we can't kfree ->notif if its ->notifications list
> is not empty, otherwise seccomp_do_user_notification()->list_del(&n.list)
> can write to the freed memory.
>
> I think _release() should do list_for_each_entry_safe() + list_del_init()
> and seccomp_do_user_notification() should use list_del_init() too.
>
> Or, simpler, seccomp_do_user_notification() should do
>
> if (!match->notif)
> goto out;
>
> instead of "goto remove_list".

Yes, and we need another such check in this case after we re-acquire
the lock from the signal send. Thanks for catching this!

Tycho

2018-11-01 20:35:59

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Thu, Nov 01, 2018 at 03:48:05PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 10/30, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> >
> > > I am not sure I understand the value of signaled/SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED...
> > > I mean, why it is actually useful?
> > >
> > > Sorry if this was already discussed.
> >
> > :) no problem, many people have complained about this. This is an
> > implementation of Andy's suggestion here:
> > https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/15/1122
> >
> > You can see some more detailed discussion here:
> > https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/9/21/138
>
> Cough, sorry, I simply can't understand what are you talking about ;)
> It seems that I need to read all the previous emails... So let me ask
> a stupid question below.
>
> > > But my main concern is that either way wait_for_completion_killable() allows
> > > to trivially create a process which doesn't react to SIGSTOP, not good...
> > >
> > > Note also that this can happen if, say, both the tracer and tracee run in the
> > > same process group and SIGSTOP is sent to their pgid, if the tracer gets the
> > > signal first the tracee won't stop.
> > >
> > > Of freezer. try_to_freeze_tasks() can fail if it freezes the tracer before
> > > it does SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND.
> >
> > I think in general the way this is intended to be used these things
> > wouldn't happen.
>
> Why?

The intent is to run the tracer on the host and have it trace
containers, which would live in a different freezer cgroup, process
group, etc. Of course you could use it in a situation where they would
be, so the concern is still valid, but I'm not sure why you'd do that.

> > was malicious and had the ability to create a user namespace to
> > exhaust pids this way,
>
> Not sure I understand how this connects to my question... nevermind.
>
> > so perhaps we should drop this part of the
> > patch. I have no real need for it, but perhaps Andy can elaborate?
>
> Yes I think it would be nice to avoid wait_for_completion_killable().
>
> So please help me to understand the problem. Once again, why can not
> seccomp_do_user_notification() use wait_for_completion_interruptible() only?
>
> This is called before the task actually starts the syscall, so
> -ERESTARTNOINTR if signal_pending() can't hurt.

The idea was that when the tracee gets a signal, it notifies the
tracer exactly once, and then waits for the tracer to decide what to
do. So if we use another wait_for_completion_interruptible(), doesn't
it just get re-woken immediately because the signal is still pending?

...actually I just tested it, and it doesn't. So it seems we could use
_interruptible() here and achieve the same thing.

> Now lets suppose seccomp_do_user_notification() simply does
>
> err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready);
>
> if (err < 0 && state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED) {
> syscall_set_return_value(ERESTARTNOINTR);
> list_del(&n.list);
> return -1;
> }
>
> (I am ignoring the locking/etc). Now the obvious problem is that the listener
> doing SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND can't distinguish -ENOENT from the case when the
> tracee was killed, yes?
>
> Is it that important?

The answer to this question depends on how we want the listener to be
able to react. For example, if the listener is in the middle of doing
a mount() on behalf of the task and it gets a signal and we return
immediately, the listener will complete the mount(), try to respond
with success and get -ENOENT. If the task handles the signal and
restarts the mount(), it'll happen twice unless the listener undoes
it when it sees the -ENOENT. If we send another notification with the
SIGNALED flag, the listener has a better picture of what's going on,
which might be nice.

Tycho

2018-11-02 10:04:45

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On 11/01, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 01, 2018 at 02:40:02PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> >
> > Somehow I no longer understand why do you need to take all locks. Isn't
> > the first filter's notify_lock enough? IOW,
> >
> > for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
> > if (cur->notif)
> > return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
> > first = cur;
> > }
> >
> > if (first)
> > mutex_lock(&first->notify_lock);
> >
> > ... initialize filter->notif ...
> >
> > out:
> > if (first)
> > mutex_unlock(&first->notify_lock);
> >
> > return ret;
>
> The idea here is to prevent people from "nesting" notify filters. So
> if any filter in the chain has a listener attached, it refuses to
> install another filter with a listener.

Yes, I understand, so we need to check cur->notif. My point was, we do not
need to take all the locks in the ->prev chain, we need only one:
first->notify_lock.

But you know what? today I think that we do not need any locking at all,
all we need is the lockless

for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev)
if (cur->notif)
return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);

at the start, nothing more.

> But it just occurred to me that we don't handle the TSYNC case
> correctly by doing it this way,

Why? Perhaps I missed your point, but TSYNC case looks fine. I mean, if 2
threads do seccomp_set_mode_filter(NEW_LISTENER | TSYNC) then only one can
win the race and succeed, but this has nothing to do with init_listener(),
we rely on ->siglock and is_ancestor() check.

No?

Oleg.

2018-11-02 11:29:51

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On 11/01, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 01, 2018 at 03:48:05PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> >
> > > > But my main concern is that either way wait_for_completion_killable() allows
> > > > to trivially create a process which doesn't react to SIGSTOP, not good...
> > > >
> > > > Note also that this can happen if, say, both the tracer and tracee run in the
> > > > same process group and SIGSTOP is sent to their pgid, if the tracer gets the
> > > > signal first the tracee won't stop.
> > > >
> > > > Of freezer. try_to_freeze_tasks() can fail if it freezes the tracer before
> > > > it does SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND.
> > >
> > > I think in general the way this is intended to be used these things
> > > wouldn't happen.
> >
> > Why?
>
> The intent is to run the tracer on the host and have it trace
> containers, which would live in a different freezer cgroup, process
> group, etc.

I didn't mean the freezer cgroup, suspend can fail, it does the "global" freeze.
Nevermind.

> > Yes I think it would be nice to avoid wait_for_completion_killable().
> >
> > So please help me to understand the problem. Once again, why can not
> > seccomp_do_user_notification() use wait_for_completion_interruptible() only?
> >
> > This is called before the task actually starts the syscall, so
> > -ERESTARTNOINTR if signal_pending() can't hurt.
>
> The idea was that when the tracee gets a signal, it notifies the
> tracer exactly once, and then waits for the tracer to decide what to
> do. So if we use another wait_for_completion_interruptible(), doesn't
> it just get re-woken immediately because the signal is still pending?

Hmm. I meant that we should use a single wait_for_completion_interruptible().

> > Now lets suppose seccomp_do_user_notification() simply does
> >
> > err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready);
> >
> > if (err < 0 && state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED) {
> > syscall_set_return_value(ERESTARTNOINTR);
> > list_del(&n.list);
> > return -1;
> > }
> >
> > (I am ignoring the locking/etc). Now the obvious problem is that the listener
> > doing SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND can't distinguish -ENOENT from the case when the
> > tracee was killed, yes?
> >
> > Is it that important?
>
> The answer to this question depends on how we want the listener to be
> able to react. For example, if the listener is in the middle of doing
> a mount() on behalf of the task and it gets a signal and we return
> immediately, the listener will complete the mount(), try to respond
> with success and get -ENOENT.

Yes. Should we undo the mount if the tracee is killed?

> If the task handles the signal and
> restarts the mount(), it'll happen twice unless the listener undoes
> it when it sees the -ENOENT.

Yes. But note that we know that if the same tracee sends another notification
it must be the same syscall.

So. If the listener needs to undo mount when the tracee is killed, it should
undo it if it was interrupted too.

If no, the listener can simply "ignore" the next notification and do
SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND(val = 0, error = 0).

I see no real difference...

> If we send another notification with the
> SIGNALED flag, the listener has a better picture of what's going on,
> which might be nice.

Yes, but this returns us to my my question: Is it that important?

What exactly the listener can do if it gets SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED?

Undo the mount? No. This doesn't differ from the case when the tracee gets
the non-fatal signal right after SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED.

Oleg.

2018-11-02 13:39:39

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Fri, Nov 02, 2018 at 11:02:35AM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 11/01, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Nov 01, 2018 at 02:40:02PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> > >
> > > Somehow I no longer understand why do you need to take all locks. Isn't
> > > the first filter's notify_lock enough? IOW,
> > >
> > > for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
> > > if (cur->notif)
> > > return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
> > > first = cur;
> > > }
> > >
> > > if (first)
> > > mutex_lock(&first->notify_lock);
> > >
> > > ... initialize filter->notif ...
> > >
> > > out:
> > > if (first)
> > > mutex_unlock(&first->notify_lock);
> > >
> > > return ret;
> >
> > The idea here is to prevent people from "nesting" notify filters. So
> > if any filter in the chain has a listener attached, it refuses to
> > install another filter with a listener.
>
> Yes, I understand, so we need to check cur->notif. My point was, we do not
> need to take all the locks in the ->prev chain, we need only one:
> first->notify_lock.
>
> But you know what? today I think that we do not need any locking at all,
> all we need is the lockless
>
> for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev)
> if (cur->notif)
> return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
>
> at the start, nothing more.

Hmm, you're right. The locking is residual from when the old ptrace()
API was also a thing: with that, you could attach a filter at any
point in the tree, so we needed to lock to prevent that. But now
that it's only possible to do it at the bottom, we don't need to lock.

> > But it just occurred to me that we don't handle the TSYNC case
> > correctly by doing it this way,
>
> Why? Perhaps I missed your point, but TSYNC case looks fine. I mean, if 2
> threads do seccomp_set_mode_filter(NEW_LISTENER | TSYNC) then only one can
> win the race and succeed, but this has nothing to do with init_listener(),
> we rely on ->siglock and is_ancestor() check.

Yes, agreed.

Thanks!

Tycho

2018-11-02 13:51:13

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Fri, Nov 02, 2018 at 12:29:03PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 11/01, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, Nov 01, 2018 at 03:48:05PM +0100, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> > >
> > > > > But my main concern is that either way wait_for_completion_killable() allows
> > > > > to trivially create a process which doesn't react to SIGSTOP, not good...
> > > > >
> > > > > Note also that this can happen if, say, both the tracer and tracee run in the
> > > > > same process group and SIGSTOP is sent to their pgid, if the tracer gets the
> > > > > signal first the tracee won't stop.
> > > > >
> > > > > Of freezer. try_to_freeze_tasks() can fail if it freezes the tracer before
> > > > > it does SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND.
> > > >
> > > > I think in general the way this is intended to be used these things
> > > > wouldn't happen.
> > >
> > > Why?
> >
> > The intent is to run the tracer on the host and have it trace
> > containers, which would live in a different freezer cgroup, process
> > group, etc.
>
> I didn't mean the freezer cgroup, suspend can fail, it does the "global" freeze.
> Nevermind.
>
> > > Yes I think it would be nice to avoid wait_for_completion_killable().
> > >
> > > So please help me to understand the problem. Once again, why can not
> > > seccomp_do_user_notification() use wait_for_completion_interruptible() only?
> > >
> > > This is called before the task actually starts the syscall, so
> > > -ERESTARTNOINTR if signal_pending() can't hurt.
> >
> > The idea was that when the tracee gets a signal, it notifies the
> > tracer exactly once, and then waits for the tracer to decide what to
> > do. So if we use another wait_for_completion_interruptible(), doesn't
> > it just get re-woken immediately because the signal is still pending?
>
> Hmm. I meant that we should use a single wait_for_completion_interruptible().

Yes, but if we can use a second _interruptible(), then we can avoid
the SIGSTOP issue and still perhaps preserve the SIGNALED bit if we
decide it's worth it at the conclusion of this thread.

> > > Now lets suppose seccomp_do_user_notification() simply does
> > >
> > > err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready);
> > >
> > > if (err < 0 && state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED) {
> > > syscall_set_return_value(ERESTARTNOINTR);
> > > list_del(&n.list);
> > > return -1;
> > > }
> > >
> > > (I am ignoring the locking/etc). Now the obvious problem is that the listener
> > > doing SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND can't distinguish -ENOENT from the case when the
> > > tracee was killed, yes?
> > >
> > > Is it that important?
> >
> > The answer to this question depends on how we want the listener to be
> > able to react. For example, if the listener is in the middle of doing
> > a mount() on behalf of the task and it gets a signal and we return
> > immediately, the listener will complete the mount(), try to respond
> > with success and get -ENOENT.
>
> Yes. Should we undo the mount if the tracee is killed?
>
> > If the task handles the signal and
> > restarts the mount(), it'll happen twice unless the listener undoes
> > it when it sees the -ENOENT.
>
> Yes. But note that we know that if the same tracee sends another notification
> it must be the same syscall.
>
> So. If the listener needs to undo mount when the tracee is killed, it should
> undo it if it was interrupted too.
>
> If no, the listener can simply "ignore" the next notification and do
> SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND(val = 0, error = 0).
>
> I see no real difference...

Well, doesn't it seem like a hack? What if the tracee really makes the
same syscall twice? How do we tell the difference between one that was
restarted and a real second call?

> > If we send another notification with the
> > SIGNALED flag, the listener has a better picture of what's going on,
> > which might be nice.
>
> Yes, but this returns us to my my question: Is it that important?
>
> What exactly the listener can do if it gets SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED?
>
> Undo the mount? No. This doesn't differ from the case when the tracee gets
> the non-fatal signal right after SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED.

I guess that in do_user_notification(), even if we get -EINTER from
the wait, we should check to see that the state is REPLIED. If it is,
we can use the err and val from it, and complete the syscall as
normal, since it did.

Tycho

2018-11-29 23:10:36

[permalink] [raw]

Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace

On Mon, Oct 29, 2018 at 04:40:30PM -0600, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> + resp.id = req.id;
> + resp.error = -512; /* -ERESTARTSYS */
> + resp.val = 0;
> +
> + EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND, &resp), 0);

So, it turns out this *doesn't* work, and the reason this test was
passing is because of poor hygiene on my part.

Per the documentation in include/linux/errno.h,

/*
* These should never be seen by user programs. To return one of ERESTART*
* codes, signal_pending() MUST be set. Note that ptrace can observe these
* at syscall exit tracing, but they will never be left for the debugged user
* process to see.
*/
#define ERESTARTSYS 512

So basically, if you respond with -ERESTARTSYS with no signal pending, you'll
leak it to userspace. It turns out this is already possible with
SECCOMP_RET_TRAP (and probably ptrace alone, although I didn't try it out),
see the program below.

The question is: do we care? If so, it seems like we may need to handle the
-ERESTARTSYS-style cases even when there is no signal pending. If we don't,
there's precedent for us to just do the same thing as what happens for
SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, but we should probably at least fix the docs.

Tycho

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <pthread.h>

static int filter_syscall(int syscall_nr)
{
struct sock_filter filter[] = {
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, syscall_nr, 0, 1),
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE),
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
};

struct sock_fprog bpf_prog = {
.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
.filter = filter,
};

int ret;

ret = syscall(__NR_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &bpf_prog);
if (ret < 0) {
perror("prctl failed");
return -1;
}

return ret;
}

typedef struct {
uint64_t r15;
uint64_t r14;
uint64_t r13;
uint64_t r12;
uint64_t bp;
uint64_t bx;
uint64_t r11;
uint64_t r10;
uint64_t r9;
uint64_t r8;
uint64_t ax;
uint64_t cx;
uint64_t dx;
uint64_t si;
uint64_t di;
uint64_t orig_ax;
uint64_t ip;
uint64_t cs;
uint64_t flags;
uint64_t sp;
uint64_t ss;
uint64_t fs_base;
uint64_t gs_base;
uint64_t ds;
uint64_t es;
uint64_t fs;
uint64_t gs;
} user_regs_struct64;

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t pid;
user_regs_struct64 regs;
struct iovec iov = {.iov_base = &regs, .iov_len = sizeof(regs)};
int status;

pid = fork();

if (pid == 0) {
if (signal(SIGUSR1, signal_handler) == SIG_ERR) {
perror("signal");
exit(1);
}

if (filter_syscall(__NR_getpid) < 0)
exit(1);

/* i'm lazy, so sue me :) */
sleep(1);

errno = 0;
pid = syscall(__NR_getpid);

/*
* we get:
* getpid(): -1, errno: 512
* probably should get
* getpid(): <pid> errno: 0
*/
printf("getpid(): %d, errno: %d\n", pid, errno);
exit(errno);
}

if (ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, NULL, 0) < 0) {
perror("ptrace attach");
goto out;
}

if (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) != pid) {
perror("waitpid");
goto out;
}

if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, pid, NULL, PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP) < 0) {
perror("ptrace setoptions");
goto out;
}

if (ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, NULL, 0) != 0) {
perror("ptrace cont");
goto out;
}

if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("wait for trace");
goto out;
}

if (status >> 8 != (SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP<<8))) {
printf("got bad trap event?\n");
goto out;
}

if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov) < 0) {
perror("getregset");
goto out;
}

/*
* Tell the syscall to restart. Per include/linux/errno.h this should
* only be set when signal_pending() is set. But we just won't send
* any signals to the process, and we'll see this in userspace.
*/
regs.ax = -512; /* -ERESTARTSYS */

/*
* This makes the this_syscall < 0 check in __seccomp_filter()
* trigger, so we skip the syscall and return whatever is in ax
*/
regs.orig_ax = -512; /* -ERESTARTSYS */

if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov) < 0) {
perror("setregset");
goto out;
}

if (ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, NULL, 0) < 0) {
perror("cont after setregset");
goto out;
}

while (1) {
if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid) {
perror("wait for death");
goto out;
}

if (!WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
break;
}

if (ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, NULL, 0) < 0) {
perror("cont after setregset");
goto out;
}

}

if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
printf("didn't exit: %d\n", WTERMSIG(status));
return 1;
}

if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
printf("exited: %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status));
return 1;
}

return 0;
out:
kill(pid, SIGKILL);
return 1;
}

2018-11-30 10:18:44