From: Madhuparna Bhowmik <[email protected]>
This patch fixes the following warning and few other
instances of traversal of evm_config_xattrnames list:
[ 32.848432] =============================
[ 32.848707] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[ 32.848966] 5.7.0-rc1-00006-ga8d5875ce5f0b #1 Not tainted
[ 32.849308] -----------------------------
[ 32.849567] security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:231 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
Since entries are only added to the list and never deleted,
use list_For_each_entry_lockless() instead of
list_for_each_entry_rcu() for traversing the list.
Also, add a relevant comment in evm_secfs.c to indicate this fact.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <[email protected]>
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 4 ++--
security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 9 ++++++++-
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 35682852ddea..b2dc87da5f50 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
error = -ENODATA;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
bool is_ima = false;
if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index d361d7fdafc4..0d36259b690d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
if (error < 0) {
if (error == -ENODATA)
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
struct xattr_list *xattr;
namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
&& (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
found = 1;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index 39ad1038d45d..cfc3075769bb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -232,7 +232,14 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
- /* Guard against races in evm_read_xattrs */
+ /*
+ * xattr_list_mutex guards against races in evm_read_xattrs().
+ * Entries are only added to the evm_config_xattrnames list
+ * and never deleted. Therefore, the list is traversed
+ * using list_for_each_entry_lockless() without holding
+ * the mutex in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), evm_find_protected_xattrs()
+ * and evm_protected_xattr().
+ */
mutex_lock(&xattr_list_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) {
--
2.17.1
On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 09:32:05PM +0530, [email protected] wrote:
> From: Madhuparna Bhowmik <[email protected]>
>
> This patch fixes the following warning and few other
> instances of traversal of evm_config_xattrnames list:
>
> [ 32.848432] =============================
> [ 32.848707] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
> [ 32.848966] 5.7.0-rc1-00006-ga8d5875ce5f0b #1 Not tainted
> [ 32.849308] -----------------------------
> [ 32.849567] security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:231 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
>
> Since entries are only added to the list and never deleted,
> use list_For_each_entry_lockless() instead of
> list_for_each_entry_rcu() for traversing the list.
> Also, add a relevant comment in evm_secfs.c to indicate this fact.
>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
> Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <[email protected]>
From an RCU viewpoint:
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
> ---
> security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 4 ++--
> security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 9 ++++++++-
> 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> index 35682852ddea..b2dc87da5f50 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
> data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
>
> error = -ENODATA;
> - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> bool is_ima = false;
>
> if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index d361d7fdafc4..0d36259b690d 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
> if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
> if (error < 0) {
> if (error == -ENODATA)
> @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
> struct xattr_list *xattr;
>
> namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
> - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
> && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
> found = 1;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> index 39ad1038d45d..cfc3075769bb 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> @@ -232,7 +232,14 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - /* Guard against races in evm_read_xattrs */
> + /*
> + * xattr_list_mutex guards against races in evm_read_xattrs().
> + * Entries are only added to the evm_config_xattrnames list
> + * and never deleted. Therefore, the list is traversed
> + * using list_for_each_entry_lockless() without holding
> + * the mutex in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), evm_find_protected_xattrs()
> + * and evm_protected_xattr().
> + */
> mutex_lock(&xattr_list_mutex);
> list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) {
> --
> 2.17.1
>
Hi all,
On Thu, 30 Apr 2020 21:32:05 +0530 [email protected] wrote:
>
> From: Madhuparna Bhowmik <[email protected]>
>
> This patch fixes the following warning and few other
> instances of traversal of evm_config_xattrnames list:
>
> [ 32.848432] =============================
> [ 32.848707] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
> [ 32.848966] 5.7.0-rc1-00006-ga8d5875ce5f0b #1 Not tainted
> [ 32.849308] -----------------------------
> [ 32.849567] security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:231 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
>
> Since entries are only added to the list and never deleted,
> use list_For_each_entry_lockless() instead of
> list_for_each_entry_rcu() for traversing the list.
> Also, add a relevant comment in evm_secfs.c to indicate this fact.
>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
> Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
> ---
> security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 4 ++--
> security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 9 ++++++++-
> 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> index 35682852ddea..b2dc87da5f50 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
> data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
>
> error = -ENODATA;
> - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> bool is_ima = false;
>
> if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index d361d7fdafc4..0d36259b690d 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
> if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
> if (error < 0) {
> if (error == -ENODATA)
> @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
> struct xattr_list *xattr;
>
> namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
> - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
> && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
> found = 1;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> index 39ad1038d45d..cfc3075769bb 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> @@ -232,7 +232,14 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - /* Guard against races in evm_read_xattrs */
> + /*
> + * xattr_list_mutex guards against races in evm_read_xattrs().
> + * Entries are only added to the evm_config_xattrnames list
> + * and never deleted. Therefore, the list is traversed
> + * using list_for_each_entry_lockless() without holding
> + * the mutex in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), evm_find_protected_xattrs()
> + * and evm_protected_xattr().
> + */
> mutex_lock(&xattr_list_mutex);
> list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) {
I will apply this to linux-next today.
Is there something stopping this being applied to a tree? And does it
need to be sent to Linus soon?
--
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell
Hi Stephen,
On Fri, 2020-05-08 at 10:14 +1000, Stephen Rothwell wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> On Thu, 30 Apr 2020 21:32:05 +0530 [email protected] wrote:
> >
> > From: Madhuparna Bhowmik <[email protected]>
> >
> > This patch fixes the following warning and few other
> > instances of traversal of evm_config_xattrnames list:
> >
> > [ 32.848432] =============================
> > [ 32.848707] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
> > [ 32.848966] 5.7.0-rc1-00006-ga8d5875ce5f0b #1 Not tainted
> > [ 32.849308] -----------------------------
> > [ 32.849567] security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:231 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
> >
> > Since entries are only added to the list and never deleted,
> > use list_For_each_entry_lockless() instead of
> > list_for_each_entry_rcu() for traversing the list.
> > Also, add a relevant comment in evm_secfs.c to indicate this fact.
> >
> > Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
> > Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
> > Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <[email protected]>
> > Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 +-
> > security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 4 ++--
> > security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 9 ++++++++-
> > 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> > index 35682852ddea..b2dc87da5f50 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> > @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
> > data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
> >
> > error = -ENODATA;
> > - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > bool is_ima = false;
> >
> > if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > index d361d7fdafc4..0d36259b690d 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> > @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
> > if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
> > return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >
> > - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
> > if (error < 0) {
> > if (error == -ENODATA)
> > @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
> > struct xattr_list *xattr;
> >
> > namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
> > - list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > + list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
> > && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
> > found = 1;
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> > index 39ad1038d45d..cfc3075769bb 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> > @@ -232,7 +232,14 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> > goto out;
> > }
> >
> > - /* Guard against races in evm_read_xattrs */
> > + /*
> > + * xattr_list_mutex guards against races in evm_read_xattrs().
> > + * Entries are only added to the evm_config_xattrnames list
> > + * and never deleted. Therefore, the list is traversed
> > + * using list_for_each_entry_lockless() without holding
> > + * the mutex in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(), evm_find_protected_xattrs()
> > + * and evm_protected_xattr().
> > + */
> > mutex_lock(&xattr_list_mutex);
> > list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
> > if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) {
>
> I will apply this to linux-next today.
>
> Is there something stopping this being applied to a tree? And does it
> need to be sent to Linus soon?
Sorry for the delay in pushing this and other fixes to the next-
integrity branch. It's in my next-integrity-testing branch.
This isn't a bug per-se, just annotating the reason for the lack of
locking.
thanks,
Mimi
Hi Mimi,
On Thu, 07 May 2020 20:23:41 -0400 Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Sorry for the delay in pushing this and other fixes to the next-
> integrity branch. It's in my next-integrity-testing branch.
OK, thanks.
> This isn't a bug per-se, just annotating the reason for the lack of
> locking.
Yes, but these warnings stop the syzbot's testing in its tracks :-(
--
Cheers,
Stephen Rothwell