From: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
Allow the following blk-zoned ioctls: BLKREPORTZONE, BLKRESETZONE,
BLKOPENZONE, BLKCLOSEZONE, and BLKFINISHZONE to be performed without
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
These ioctls instead only requires that the corresponding R/W access
control flag to be successfully set on the opened file descriptor.
(open()/openat() will fail with -EPERM if you try to open a file with
flags that you lack permission for.)
Niklas Cassel (2):
blk-zoned: allow zone management send operations without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
blk-zoned: allow BLKREPORTZONE without CAP_SYS_ADMIN
block/blk-zoned.c | 7 ++-----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--
2.31.1
From: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
Zone management send operations (BLKRESETZONE, BLKOPENZONE, BLKCLOSEZONE
and BLKFINISHZONE) should be allowed under the same permissions as write().
(write() does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
Additionally, other ioctls like BLKSECDISCARD and BLKZEROOUT only check if
the fd was successfully opened with FMODE_WRITE.
(They do not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
Currently, zone management send operations require both CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and that the fd was successfully opened with FMODE_WRITE.
Remove the CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement, so that zone management send
operations match the access control requirement of write(), BLKSECDISCARD
and BLKZEROOUT.
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
---
block/blk-zoned.c | 3 ---
1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/block/blk-zoned.c b/block/blk-zoned.c
index 250cb76ee615..0789e6e9f7db 100644
--- a/block/blk-zoned.c
+++ b/block/blk-zoned.c
@@ -349,9 +349,6 @@ int blkdev_zone_mgmt_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode,
if (!blk_queue_is_zoned(q))
return -ENOTTY;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
-
if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return -EBADF;
--
2.31.1
From: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
Performing a BLKREPORTZONE operation should be allowed under the same
permissions as read(). (read() does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
Remove the CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement, and instead check that the fd was
successfully opened with FMODE_READ. This way BLKREPORTZONE will match
the access control requirement of read().
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
---
block/blk-zoned.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/block/blk-zoned.c b/block/blk-zoned.c
index 0789e6e9f7db..e05fe8dbb06d 100644
--- a/block/blk-zoned.c
+++ b/block/blk-zoned.c
@@ -288,8 +288,8 @@ int blkdev_report_zones_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode,
if (!blk_queue_is_zoned(q))
return -ENOTTY;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EACCES;
+ if (!(mode & FMODE_READ))
+ return -EBADF;
if (copy_from_user(&rep, argp, sizeof(struct blk_zone_report)))
return -EFAULT;
--
2.31.1
On Mon, May 31, 2021 at 01:54:53PM +0000, Niklas Cassel wrote:
> From: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
>
> Performing a BLKREPORTZONE operation should be allowed under the same
> permissions as read(). (read() does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
>
> Remove the CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement, and instead check that the fd was
> successfully opened with FMODE_READ. This way BLKREPORTZONE will match
> the access control requirement of read().
Does this mean that a process that does not have read nor write access
to the device itself (blocks) is capable of reading the zone
information? Eg. some monitoring tool.
On 2021/06/03 18:54, David Sterba wrote:
> On Mon, May 31, 2021 at 01:54:53PM +0000, Niklas Cassel wrote:
>> From: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
>>
>> Performing a BLKREPORTZONE operation should be allowed under the same
>> permissions as read(). (read() does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
>>
>> Remove the CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement, and instead check that the fd was
>> successfully opened with FMODE_READ. This way BLKREPORTZONE will match
>> the access control requirement of read().
>
> Does this mean that a process that does not have read nor write access
> to the device itself (blocks) is capable of reading the zone
> information? Eg. some monitoring tool.
With this change, to do a report zones, the process will only need to have read
access to the device. And if it has read access, it also means that it can read
the zones content.
--
Damien Le Moal
Western Digital Research
On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 10:00:08AM +0000, Damien Le Moal wrote:
> On 2021/06/03 18:54, David Sterba wrote:
> > On Mon, May 31, 2021 at 01:54:53PM +0000, Niklas Cassel wrote:
> >> From: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
> >>
> >> Performing a BLKREPORTZONE operation should be allowed under the same
> >> permissions as read(). (read() does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
> >>
> >> Remove the CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement, and instead check that the fd was
> >> successfully opened with FMODE_READ. This way BLKREPORTZONE will match
> >> the access control requirement of read().
> >
> > Does this mean that a process that does not have read nor write access
> > to the device itself (blocks) is capable of reading the zone
> > information? Eg. some monitoring tool.
>
> With this change, to do a report zones, the process will only need to have read
> access to the device. And if it has read access, it also means that it can read
> the zones content.
Ok, so this is a bit restricting. The zone information is like block
device metadata, comparing it to a file that has permissionx 0600 I can
see the all the stat info (name, tiemstamps) but can't read the data.
But as the ioctl work, it needs a file descriptor and there's probably
no way to separate the permissions to read blocks and just the metadata.
For a monitoring/reporting tool this would be useful. Eg. for btrfs it
could be part of filesystem status overview regarding full or near-full
zones and emitting an early warning or poking some service to start the
reclaim.
On 2021/06/03 19:07, David Sterba wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 10:00:08AM +0000, Damien Le Moal wrote:
>> On 2021/06/03 18:54, David Sterba wrote:
>>> On Mon, May 31, 2021 at 01:54:53PM +0000, Niklas Cassel wrote:
>>>> From: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
>>>>
>>>> Performing a BLKREPORTZONE operation should be allowed under the same
>>>> permissions as read(). (read() does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
>>>>
>>>> Remove the CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement, and instead check that the fd was
>>>> successfully opened with FMODE_READ. This way BLKREPORTZONE will match
>>>> the access control requirement of read().
>>>
>>> Does this mean that a process that does not have read nor write access
>>> to the device itself (blocks) is capable of reading the zone
>>> information? Eg. some monitoring tool.
>>
>> With this change, to do a report zones, the process will only need to have read
>> access to the device. And if it has read access, it also means that it can read
>> the zones content.
>
> Ok, so this is a bit restricting. The zone information is like block
> device metadata, comparing it to a file that has permissionx 0600 I can
> see the all the stat info (name, tiemstamps) but can't read the data.
>
> But as the ioctl work, it needs a file descriptor and there's probably
> no way to separate the permissions to read blocks and just the metadata.
> For a monitoring/reporting tool this would be useful. Eg. for btrfs it
> could be part of filesystem status overview regarding full or near-full
> zones and emitting an early warning or poking some service to start the
> reclaim.
You lost me... the change is less restrictive than before because the process
does not need SYS_CAP_ADMIN anymore. The block device file open is untouched, no
change. So whatever process could open it before, will still be able to do so as
is. More processes will be able to do report zones with the change. That is all
really that changes, so I do not see what potentially breaks, nor how this may
prevent writing some monitoring tool. Whoever can open the block device file has
FMODE_READ rights, no ? Am I missing something here ?
--
Damien Le Moal
Western Digital Research
On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 11:20:33AM +0000, Damien Le Moal wrote:
> On 2021/06/03 19:07, David Sterba wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 10:00:08AM +0000, Damien Le Moal wrote:
> >> On 2021/06/03 18:54, David Sterba wrote:
> >>> On Mon, May 31, 2021 at 01:54:53PM +0000, Niklas Cassel wrote:
> >>>> From: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
> >>>>
> >>>> Performing a BLKREPORTZONE operation should be allowed under the same
> >>>> permissions as read(). (read() does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
> >>>>
> >>>> Remove the CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement, and instead check that the fd was
> >>>> successfully opened with FMODE_READ. This way BLKREPORTZONE will match
> >>>> the access control requirement of read().
> >>>
> >>> Does this mean that a process that does not have read nor write access
> >>> to the device itself (blocks) is capable of reading the zone
> >>> information? Eg. some monitoring tool.
> >>
> >> With this change, to do a report zones, the process will only need to have read
> >> access to the device. And if it has read access, it also means that it can read
> >> the zones content.
> >
> > Ok, so this is a bit restricting. The zone information is like block
> > device metadata, comparing it to a file that has permissionx 0600 I can
> > see the all the stat info (name, tiemstamps) but can't read the data.
> >
> > But as the ioctl work, it needs a file descriptor and there's probably
> > no way to separate the permissions to read blocks and just the metadata.
> > For a monitoring/reporting tool this would be useful. Eg. for btrfs it
> > could be part of filesystem status overview regarding full or near-full
> > zones and emitting an early warning or poking some service to start the
> > reclaim.
>
> You lost me... the change is less restrictive than before because the process
> does not need SYS_CAP_ADMIN anymore. The block device file open is untouched, no
> change. So whatever process could open it before, will still be able to do so as
> is. More processes will be able to do report zones with the change. That is all
> really that changes, so I do not see what potentially breaks, nor how this may
> prevent writing some monitoring tool. Whoever can open the block device file has
> FMODE_READ rights, no ? Am I missing something here ?
What David is saying is that for e.g. stat(), you can get metadata when you
don't even have read permission for a device, since stat() takes a pathname.
An ioctl requires you to first do an open(), which will will check permissions,
so implementing the same is not really possible for an ioctl like BLKREPORTZONE.
However, I think the current ioctl is fine.
The amount of data that is transferred from a zoned block device for the zone
report is more than the data that is transferred when someone does a stat(),
so in one way getting the zone report is more like a read.
Doing what David suggests would, as far as I can tell, require another solution
than the existing ioctl method, which this patch changes.
We can think about his suggestion, but it would need to be addressed is a
separate patch series. (If his suggestion is something that we want to pursue.)
Kind regards,
Niklas
On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 11:20:33AM +0000, Damien Le Moal wrote:
> On 2021/06/03 19:07, David Sterba wrote:
> > On Thu, Jun 03, 2021 at 10:00:08AM +0000, Damien Le Moal wrote:
> >> On 2021/06/03 18:54, David Sterba wrote:
> >>> On Mon, May 31, 2021 at 01:54:53PM +0000, Niklas Cassel wrote:
> >>>> From: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
> >>>>
> >>>> Performing a BLKREPORTZONE operation should be allowed under the same
> >>>> permissions as read(). (read() does not require CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
> >>>>
> >>>> Remove the CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement, and instead check that the fd was
> >>>> successfully opened with FMODE_READ. This way BLKREPORTZONE will match
> >>>> the access control requirement of read().
> >>>
> >>> Does this mean that a process that does not have read nor write access
> >>> to the device itself (blocks) is capable of reading the zone
> >>> information? Eg. some monitoring tool.
> >>
> >> With this change, to do a report zones, the process will only need to have read
> >> access to the device. And if it has read access, it also means that it can read
> >> the zones content.
> >
> > Ok, so this is a bit restricting. The zone information is like block
> > device metadata, comparing it to a file that has permissionx 0600 I can
> > see the all the stat info (name, tiemstamps) but can't read the data.
> >
> > But as the ioctl work, it needs a file descriptor and there's probably
> > no way to separate the permissions to read blocks and just the metadata.
> > For a monitoring/reporting tool this would be useful. Eg. for btrfs it
> > could be part of filesystem status overview regarding full or near-full
> > zones and emitting an early warning or poking some service to start the
> > reclaim.
>
> You lost me... the change is less restrictive than before because the process
> does not need SYS_CAP_ADMIN anymore. The block device file open is untouched, no
> change. So whatever process could open it before, will still be able to do so as
> is. More processes will be able to do report zones with the change. That is all
> really that changes, so I do not see what potentially breaks, nor how this may
> prevent writing some monitoring tool. Whoever can open the block device file has
> FMODE_READ rights, no ? Am I missing something here ?
I'm not saying the patch is wrong or not doing what it says. What caught
my attention was the fact that the admin capabilities is not that
different from requiring the read permissions. Which for a block device
is not easy to get. Normally block devices have 0660 and group is
'disk', so yeah I can add a monitoring daemon to the group. But that
still would allow it to read all block devices.
So yeah, the patch is making it easier but from my POV it's not that
practical. A more fine grained access control would be needed, or
another way how to read just the zone info. Reading the information from
eg. sysfs has it's own issues.