2022-03-25 23:05:06

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v7 0/5] ima: support fs-verity digests and signatures

Support for including fs-verity file digests and signatures in the IMA
measurement list as well as verifying the fs-verity file digest based
signatures was discussed prior to fs-verity being upstreamed[1,2].

Including fs-verity file digests and signatures in the IMA measurement
list need to be based on policy and be identifiable. To address being
based on policy, a new policy rule option "digest_type=verity", applicable
to both "measure" and "appraise" policy rules, is defined. To address
being identifiable, a new template field 'd-ngv2' and two new template
formats 'ima-ngv2' and 'ima-sigv2' are defined.

d-ngv2: prefixes the digest type ("ima", "verity") to the digest
algorithm and digest.

ima-ngv2', ima-sigv2: templates with the new d-ngv2 field defined.

In addition the signatures stored in 'security.ima' xattr need to be
disambiguated. So instead of directly signing the fs-verity digest, the
fs-verity digest is indirectly signed, by signing the hash of the new
ima_file_id structure data (signature version 3) containing the fs-verity
digest and other metadata.

New policy rule option:
appraise_type=sigv3: support for new IMA signature version 3


[1] https://events19.linuxfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/fs-verify_Mike-Halcrow_Eric-Biggers.pdf
[2] Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst

Changelog v7:
- Based on Stefan Berger's review, cleaned up code by defining an enum,
removed unnecessary memcpy, fs-verity documentation suggestions.
- Add comment in ima_get_verify_digest() with explanation for always
returning the fs-verity digest.

Changelog v6:
- As suggested by Eric Bigger's, instead of defining a new field to
differentiate between IMA and fs-verity signatures, prepend the
digest type to the digest field.
- Addressed Eric Bigger's comments: updated the patch description,
corrected comment, squashed patches, fixed enumeration usage,and
added assumption to fsverity_get_digest.
- Removed the now unnecessary IMA_VERITY_DIGEST flag
- Updated kernel-parameters.txt

Changelog v5:
- Define ima_max_digest_size struct, removing the locally defined versions.
- Don't overload the 'digest_type=verity' to imply a verity signature,
but extend the 'appraise_type' policy rule option to define 'sigv3'.

Changelog v4:
- Based on Eric Bigger's signature verification concerns of replacing the
contents of a file with the ima_file_id struct hash, require per policy
rule signature versions.
- Addressed Eric Bigger's other comments.
- Added new audit messages "causes".
- Updated patch descriptions.

Changelog v3:
- Addressed Eric Bigger's comments: included Ack, incremented the
signature format version, the crypto issues are generic and will be
addressed by him separately.
- Addressed Vitaly Chikunov's comments: hard coded maximum digest size
rather than using a flexible array, removed unnecessary assignment, and
fixed comment to match variable name.
- Defined new "ima_max_digest_size" struct to avoid wrapping the
"ima_digest_data" struct inside a function local structure or
having to dynamically allocate it with enough memory for the specific
hash algo size.

Changelog v2:
- Addressed Eric Bigger's comments: sign the hash of fsverity's digest
and the digest's metadata, use match_string, use preferred function
name fsverity_get_digest(), support including unsigned fs-verity's
digests in the IMA measurement list.
- Remove signatures requirement for including fs-verity's file digests in
the 'd-ng' field of the measurement list.

Changelog v1:
- Updated both fsverity and IMA documentation.
- Addressed both Eric Bigger's and Lakshmi's comments.

Mimi Zohar (5):
fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file
digest
ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates
ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list
ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures
fsverity: update the documentation

Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 36 +++++-
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +-
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 20 +--
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 12 +-
fs/verity/Kconfig | 1 +
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 7 --
fs/verity/measure.c | 43 +++++++
include/linux/fsverity.h | 18 +++
security/integrity/digsig.c | 3 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 44 ++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 68 ++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 4 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 86 +++++++++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 +
security/integrity/integrity.h | 26 +++-
16 files changed, 445 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

--
2.27.0


2022-03-25 23:05:14

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v7 1/5] fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest

Define a function named fsverity_get_digest() to return the verity file
digest and the associated hash algorithm (enum hash_algo).

This assumes that before calling fsverity_get_digest() the file must have
been opened, which is even true for the IMA measure/appraise on file
open policy rule use case (func=FILE_CHECK). do_open() calls vfs_open()
immediately prior to ima_file_check().

Acked-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
---
fs/verity/Kconfig | 1 +
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 7 ------
fs/verity/measure.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/fsverity.h | 18 +++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/verity/Kconfig b/fs/verity/Kconfig
index 24d1b54de807..54598cd80145 100644
--- a/fs/verity/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/verity/Kconfig
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
config FS_VERITY
bool "FS Verity (read-only file-based authenticity protection)"
select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
# SHA-256 is implied as it's intended to be the default hash algorithm.
# To avoid bloat, other wanted algorithms must be selected explicitly.
# Note that CRYPTO_SHA256 denotes the generic C implementation, but
diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
index a7920434bae5..c6fb62e0ef1a 100644
--- a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
+++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@

#define pr_fmt(fmt) "fs-verity: " fmt

-#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include <linux/mempool.h>

@@ -26,12 +25,6 @@ struct ahash_request;
*/
#define FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS 8

-/*
- * Largest digest size among all hash algorithms supported by fs-verity.
- * Currently assumed to be <= size of fsverity_descriptor::root_hash.
- */
-#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
-
/* A hash algorithm supported by fs-verity */
struct fsverity_hash_alg {
struct crypto_ahash *tfm; /* hash tfm, allocated on demand */
diff --git a/fs/verity/measure.c b/fs/verity/measure.c
index f0d7b30c62db..e99c00350c28 100644
--- a/fs/verity/measure.c
+++ b/fs/verity/measure.c
@@ -57,3 +57,46 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_ioctl_measure);
+
+/**
+ * fsverity_get_digest() - get a verity file's digest
+ * @inode: inode to get digest of
+ * @digest: (out) pointer to the digest
+ * @alg: (out) pointer to the hash algorithm enumeration
+ *
+ * Return the file hash algorithm and digest of an fsverity protected file.
+ * Assumption: before calling fsverity_get_digest(), the file must have been
+ * opened.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
+ */
+int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
+ u8 digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE],
+ enum hash_algo *alg)
+{
+ const struct fsverity_info *vi;
+ const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg;
+ int i;
+
+ vi = fsverity_get_info(inode);
+ if (!vi)
+ return -ENODATA; /* not a verity file */
+
+ hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg;
+ memset(digest, 0, FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ /* convert the verity hash algorithm name to a hash_algo_name enum */
+ i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, hash_alg->name);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *alg = i;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hash_alg->digest_size != hash_digest_size[*alg]))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ memcpy(digest, vi->file_digest, hash_alg->digest_size);
+
+ pr_debug("file digest %s:%*phN\n", hash_algo_name[*alg],
+ hash_digest_size[*alg], digest);
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h
index b568b3c7d095..9a1b70cc7318 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsverity.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h
@@ -12,8 +12,16 @@
#define _LINUX_FSVERITY_H

#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h>

+/*
+ * Largest digest size among all hash algorithms supported by fs-verity.
+ * Currently assumed to be <= size of fsverity_descriptor::root_hash.
+ */
+#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
+
/* Verity operations for filesystems */
struct fsverity_operations {

@@ -131,6 +139,9 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg);
/* measure.c */

int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *arg);
+int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
+ u8 digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE],
+ enum hash_algo *alg);

/* open.c */

@@ -170,6 +181,13 @@ static inline int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}

+static inline int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
+ u8 digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE],
+ enum hash_algo *alg)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
/* open.c */

static inline int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
--
2.27.0

2022-03-25 23:05:18

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v7 2/5] ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates

In preparation to differentiate between unsigned regular IMA file
hashes and fs-verity's file digests in the IMA measurement list,
define a new template field named 'd-ngv2'.

Also define two new templates named 'ima-ngv2' and 'ima-sigv2', which
include the new 'd-ngv2' field.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 4 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 +
4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index f5a27f067db9..47386ac10471 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1876,7 +1876,8 @@

ima_template= [IMA]
Select one of defined IMA measurements template formats.
- Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" | "ima-sig" }
+ Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" | "ima-ngv2" | "ima-sig" |
+ "ima-sigv2" }
Default: "ima-ng"

ima_template_fmt=
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index db1ad6d7a57f..c25079faa208 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = {
{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
+ {.name = "ima-ngv2", .fmt = "d-ngv2|n-ng"},
+ {.name = "ima-sigv2", .fmt = "d-ngv2|n-ng|sig"},
{.name = "ima-buf", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|buf"},
{.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"},
{.name = "evm-sig",
@@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
.field_show = ima_show_template_string},
{.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
+ {.field_id = "d-ngv2", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init,
+ .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ngv2},
{.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
.field_show = ima_show_template_string},
{.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 7155d17a3b75..af269b94b369 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -24,11 +24,22 @@ static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo)
enum data_formats {
DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
+ DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO,
DATA_FMT_STRING,
DATA_FMT_HEX,
DATA_FMT_UINT
};

+enum digest_type {
+ DIGEST_TYPE_IMA,
+ DIGEST_TYPE__LAST
+};
+
+#define DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX 4 /* including NULL */
+static const char * const digest_type_name[DIGEST_TYPE__LAST] = {
+ [DIGEST_TYPE_IMA] = "ima"
+};
+
static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
enum data_formats datafmt,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
@@ -72,8 +83,9 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
u32 buflen = field_data->len;

switch (datafmt) {
+ case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO:
- buf_ptr = strnchr(field_data->data, buflen, ':');
+ buf_ptr = strrchr(field_data->data, ':');
if (buf_ptr != field_data->data)
seq_printf(m, "%s", field_data->data);

@@ -178,6 +190,14 @@ void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
field_data);
}

+void ima_show_template_digest_ngv2(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+ ima_show_template_field_data(m, show,
+ DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO,
+ field_data);
+}
+
void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
@@ -265,26 +285,39 @@ int ima_parse_buf(void *bufstartp, void *bufendp, void **bufcurp,
}

static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize,
- u8 hash_algo,
+ u8 digest_type, u8 hash_algo,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
/*
* digest formats:
* - DATA_FMT_DIGEST: digest
* - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: [<hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
+ * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
+ * [<digest type> + ':' + <hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
+ * where <hash type> is either "ima" or "verity",
* where <hash algo> is provided if the hash algorithm is not
* SHA1 or MD5
*/
- u8 buffer[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 + IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
+ u8 buffer[DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX + CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 +
+ IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST;
u32 offset = 0;

- if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
- fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO;
- offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1, "%s",
+ if (digest_type < DIGEST_TYPE__LAST && hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
+ fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO;
+ offset += snprintf(buffer, DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX +
+ CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1, "%*s:%s",
+ (int)strlen(digest_type_name[digest_type]),
+ digest_type_name[digest_type],
hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
buffer[offset] = ':';
offset += 2;
+ } else if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
+ fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO;
+ offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1,
+ "%s", hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
+ buffer[offset] = ':';
+ offset += 2;
}

if (digest)
@@ -359,7 +392,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
cur_digestsize = hash.hdr.length;
out:
return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
- HASH_ALGO__LAST, field_data);
+ DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, HASH_ALGO__LAST,
+ field_data);
}

/*
@@ -380,7 +414,32 @@ int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
out:
return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
- hash_algo, field_data);
+ DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, hash_algo,
+ field_data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit),
+ * prefixed with both the hash type and algorithm.
+ */
+int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+{
+ u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
+ u8 digest_type = DIGEST_TYPE_IMA;
+
+ if (event_data->violation) /* recording a violation. */
+ goto out;
+
+ cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
+ cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
+
+ hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
+out:
+ return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
+ digest_type, hash_algo,
+ field_data);
}

/*
@@ -415,7 +474,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
}

return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
- hash_algo, field_data);
+ DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, hash_algo,
+ field_data);
}

static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
index c71f1de95753..9f7c335f304f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+void ima_show_template_digest_ngv2(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data);
void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
@@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
--
2.27.0

2022-03-25 23:05:40

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v7 5/5] fsverity: update the documentation

Update the fsverity documentation related to IMA signature support.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 20 ++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
index 1d831e3cbcb3..c1d355f17a54 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
@@ -74,8 +74,12 @@ authenticating the files is up to userspace. However, to meet some
users' needs, fs-verity optionally supports a simple signature
verification mechanism where users can configure the kernel to require
that all fs-verity files be signed by a key loaded into a keyring; see
-`Built-in signature verification`_. Support for fs-verity file hashes
-in IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) policies is also planned.
+`Built-in signature verification`_.
+
+The Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) supports including
+fs-verity file digests and signatures in the IMA measurement list
+and verifying fs-verity based file signatures stored as security.ima
+xattrs, based on policy.

User API
========
@@ -653,12 +657,12 @@ weren't already directly answered in other parts of this document.
hashed and what to do with those hashes, such as log them,
authenticate them, or add them to a measurement list.

- IMA is planned to support the fs-verity hashing mechanism as an
- alternative to doing full file hashes, for people who want the
- performance and security benefits of the Merkle tree based hash.
- But it doesn't make sense to force all uses of fs-verity to be
- through IMA. As a standalone filesystem feature, fs-verity
- already meets many users' needs, and it's testable like other
+ IMA supports the fs-verity hashing mechanism as an alternative
+ to full file hashes, for those who want the performance and
+ security benefits of the Merkle tree based hash. However, it
+ doesn't make sense to force all uses of fs-verity to be through
+ IMA. fs-verity already meets many users' needs even as a
+ standalone filesystem feature, and it's testable like other
filesystem features e.g. with xfstests.

:Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just modify the
--
2.27.0

2022-03-25 23:05:40

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v7 3/5] ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list

Permit fsverity's file digest (a hash of struct fsverity_digest) to be
included in the IMA measurement list, based on the new measurement
policy rule 'digest_type=verity' option.

To differentiate between a regular IMA file hash from an fsverity's
file digest, use the new d-ngv2 format field included in the ima-ngv2
template.

The following policy rule requires fsverity file digests and specifies
the new 'ima-ngv2' template, which contains the new 'd-ngv2' field. The
policy rule may be constrained, for example based on a fsuuid or LSM
label.

measure func=FILE_CHECK digest_type=verity template=ima-ngv2

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 9 +++++
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 8 +++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 8 +++--
security/integrity/integrity.h | 3 +-
6 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 839fab811b18..2e0c501ce9c8 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ Description:
appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist]
Currently, blacklist check is only for files signed with appended
signature.
+ digest_type:= verity
+ Require fs-verity's file digest instead of the
+ regular IMA file hash.
keyrings:= list of keyrings
(eg, .builtin_trusted_keys|.ima). Only valid
when action is "measure" and func is KEY_CHECK.
@@ -149,3 +152,9 @@ Description:
security.ima xattr of a file:

appraise func=SETXATTR_CHECK appraise_algos=sha256,sha384,sha512
+
+ Example of a 'measure' rule requiring fs-verity's digests
+ with indication of type of digest in the measurement list.
+
+ measure func=FILE_CHECK digest_type=verity \
+ template=ima-ngv2
diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
index 1a91d92950a7..2d4789dc7750 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string
- 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
+ - 'd-ngv2': same as d-ng, but prefixed with the digest type.
+ field format: [<digest type>:<hash algo>:]digest,
+ where the digest type is either "ima" or "verity".
- 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig;
- 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations;
- 'sig': the file signature, or the EVM portable signature if the file
@@ -106,3 +109,8 @@ currently the following methods are supported:
the ``ima_template=`` parameter;
- register a new template descriptor with custom format through the kernel
command line parameter ``ima_template_fmt=``.
+
+
+References
+==========
+[1] Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c6805af46211..6bcf42168376 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/iversion.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>

#include "ima.h"

@@ -200,6 +201,30 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
allowed_algos);
}

+static int ima_get_verity_digest(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct ima_max_digest_data *hash)
+{
+ enum hash_algo verity_alg;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = fsverity_get_digest(iint->inode, hash->digest, &verity_alg);
+ if (ret) {
+ memset(hash->digest, 0, sizeof(hash->digest));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Unlike in the case of actually calculating the file hash, in
+ * the fsverity case regardless of the hash algorithm, return
+ * the verity digest to be included in the measurement list. A
+ * mismatch between the verity algorithm and the xattr signature
+ * algorithm, if one exists, will be detected later.
+ */
+ hash->hdr.algo = verity_alg;
+ hash->hdr.length = hash_digest_size[verity_alg];
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement
*
@@ -242,14 +267,29 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
*/
i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
hash.hdr.algo = algo;
+ hash.hdr.length = hash_digest_size[algo];

/* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));

- if (buf)
+ if (buf) {
result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
- else
+ } else if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) {
+ result = ima_get_verity_digest(iint, &hash);
+ switch (result) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case -ENODATA:
+ audit_cause = "no-verity-digest";
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ audit_cause = "invalid-verity-digest";
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+ }

if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
goto out;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index a0f3775cbd82..c6b0454b2e25 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1024,6 +1024,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
Opt_fowner_gt, Opt_fgroup_gt,
Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_gid_lt, Opt_egid_lt,
Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_fgroup_lt,
+ Opt_digest_type,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
Opt_label, Opt_err
@@ -1066,6 +1067,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_egid_lt, "egid<%s"},
{Opt_fowner_lt, "fowner<%s"},
{Opt_fgroup_lt, "fgroup<%s"},
+ {Opt_digest_type, "digest_type=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_flag, "appraise_flag=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_algos, "appraise_algos=%s"},
@@ -1173,6 +1175,21 @@ static void check_template_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *template)
#undef MSG
}

+/*
+ * Make sure the policy rule and template format are in sync.
+ */
+static void check_template_field(const struct ima_template_desc *template,
+ const char *field, const char *msg)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < template->num_fields; i++)
+ if (!strcmp(template->fields[i]->field_id, field))
+ return;
+
+ pr_notice_once("%s", msg);
+}
+
static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
/* Ensure that the action is set and is compatible with the flags */
@@ -1215,7 +1232,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
IMA_FSNAME | IMA_GID | IMA_EGID |
IMA_FGROUP | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
- IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS))
+ IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS |
+ IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED))
return false;

break;
@@ -1708,6 +1726,13 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
break;
+ case Opt_digest_type:
+ ima_log_string(ab, "digest_type", args[0].from);
+ if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "verity")) == 0)
+ entry->flags |= IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED;
+ else
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
case Opt_appraise_type:
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
@@ -1798,6 +1823,15 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
check_template_modsig(template_desc);
}

+ /* d-ngv2 template field recommended for unsigned fs-verity digests */
+ if (!result && entry->action == MEASURE &&
+ entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) {
+ template_desc = entry->template ? entry->template :
+ ima_template_desc_current();
+ check_template_field(template_desc, "d-ngv2",
+ "verity rules should include d-ngv2");
+ }
+
audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
@@ -2155,6 +2189,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
else
seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
}
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ seq_puts(m, "digest_type=verity ");
if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)
seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index af269b94b369..590b32b4eedd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -32,12 +32,14 @@ enum data_formats {

enum digest_type {
DIGEST_TYPE_IMA,
+ DIGEST_TYPE_VERITY,
DIGEST_TYPE__LAST
};

-#define DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX 4 /* including NULL */
+#define DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX 7 /* including NULL */
static const char * const digest_type_name[DIGEST_TYPE__LAST] = {
- [DIGEST_TYPE_IMA] = "ima"
+ [DIGEST_TYPE_IMA] = "ima",
+ [DIGEST_TYPE_VERITY] = "verity"
};

static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
@@ -436,6 +438,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;

hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
+ if (event_data->iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ digest_type = DIGEST_TYPE_VERITY;
out:
return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
digest_type, hash_algo,
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index daf49894fd7d..d42a01903f08 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
#define IMA_HASHED 0x00000200

/* iint policy rule cache flags */
-#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000
+#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS 0xff800000
#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000
#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000
#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000
#define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000
#define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000
+#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED 0x80000000

#define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
--
2.27.0

2022-03-25 23:05:46

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: [PATCH v7 4/5] ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures

IMA may verify a file's integrity against a "good" value stored in the
'security.ima' xattr or as an appended signature, based on policy. When
the "good value" is stored in the xattr, the xattr may contain a file
hash or signature. In either case, the "good" value is preceded by a
header. The first byte of the xattr header indicates the type of data
- hash, signature - stored in the xattr. To support storing fs-verity
signatures in the 'security.ima' xattr requires further differentiating
the fs-verity signature from the existing IMA signature.

In addition the signatures stored in 'security.ima' xattr, need to be
disambiguated. Instead of directly signing the fs-verity digest, a new
signature version 3 is defined as the hash of the ima_file_id structure,
which identifies the type of signature and the digest.

The IMA policy defines "which" files are to be measured, verified, and/or
audited. For those files being verified, the policy rules indicate "how"
the file should be verified. For example to require a file be signed,
the appraise policy rule must include the 'appraise_type' option.

appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3]
where 'imasig' is the original or v2 signature (default),
where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
where 'sigv3' is the signature v3 format.

The policy rule must also indicate the type of signature, if not the IMA
default, by specifying the digest type:

digest_type:= [verity]

The following policy rule requires fsverity signatures. The rule may be
constrained, for example, based on a fsuuid or LSM label.

appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity appraise_type=sigv3

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 27 ++++-
Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst | 4 +-
security/integrity/digsig.c | 3 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 30 +++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 4 +-
security/integrity/integrity.h | 23 ++++-
7 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index 2e0c501ce9c8..acd17183ad8c 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -47,7 +47,11 @@ Description:
fgroup:= decimal value
lsm: are LSM specific
option:
- appraise_type:= [imasig] [imasig|modsig]
+ appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3]
+ where 'imasig' is the original or v2 signature,
+ where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
+ where 'sigv3' is the IMA v3 signature.
+
appraise_flag:= [check_blacklist]
Currently, blacklist check is only for files signed with appended
signature.
@@ -158,3 +162,24 @@ Description:

measure func=FILE_CHECK digest_type=verity \
template=ima-ngv2
+
+ Example of 'measure' and 'appraise' rules requiring fs-verity
+ signatures (version 3) stored in security.ima xattr.
+
+ The 'measure' rule specifies the 'ima-sigv2' template option,
+ which includes the indication of type of digest and the file
+ signature in the measurement list.
+
+ measure func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \
+ template=ima-sigv2
+
+
+ The 'appraise' rule specifies the type and signature version
+ (sigv3) required.
+
+ appraise func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \
+ appraise_type=sigv3
+
+ All of these policy rules could, for example, be constrained
+ either based on a filesystem's UUID (fsuuid) or based on LSM
+ labels.
diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
index 2d4789dc7750..06cddcd510da 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
@@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string
where the digest type is either "ima" or "verity".
- 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig;
- 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations;
- - 'sig': the file signature, or the EVM portable signature if the file
- signature is not found;
+ - 'sig': the file signature, based on either the file's/fsverity's digest[1],
+ or the EVM portable signature, if 'security.ima' contains a file hash.
- 'modsig' the appended file signature;
- 'buf': the buffer data that was used to generate the hash without size limitations;
- 'evmsig': the EVM portable signature;
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 3b06a01bd0fd..56472bc8e44c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
/* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */
return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest,
digestlen);
- case 2:
+ case 2: /* regular file data hash based signature */
+ case 3: /* struct ima_file_id data base signature */
return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest,
digestlen);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 17232bbfb9f9..e76d88b309a2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h>

#include "ima.h"

@@ -183,13 +185,18 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
return ima_hash_algo;

switch (xattr_value->type) {
+ case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG:
+ sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
+ if (sig->version != 3 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) ||
+ sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+ return ima_hash_algo;
+ return sig->hash_algo;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)
|| sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
return ima_hash_algo;
return sig->hash_algo;
- break;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
/* first byte contains algorithm id */
ret = xattr_value->data[0];
@@ -225,6 +232,40 @@ int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
return ret;
}

+/*
+ * calc_file_id_hash - calculate the hash of the ima_file_id struct data
+ * @type: xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type]
+ * @algo: hash algorithm [enum hash_algo]
+ * @digest: pointer to the digest to be hashed
+ * @hash: (out) pointer to the hash
+ *
+ * IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed by
+ * indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data.
+ *
+ * Signing the ima_file_id struct is currently only supported for
+ * IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG type xattrs.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type,
+ enum hash_algo algo, const u8 *digest,
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+ struct ima_file_id file_id = {
+ .hash_type = IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG, .hash_algorithm = algo};
+ uint unused = HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE - hash_digest_size[algo];
+
+ if (type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memcpy(file_id.hash, digest, hash_digest_size[algo]);
+
+ hash->algo = algo;
+ hash->length = hash_digest_size[algo];
+
+ return ima_calc_buffer_hash(&file_id, sizeof(file_id) - unused, hash);
+}
+
/*
* xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature
*
@@ -236,7 +277,10 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause)
{
+ struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+ struct signature_v2_hdr *sig;
int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0;
+ int mask;

switch (xattr_value->type) {
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG:
@@ -246,7 +290,10 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) {
if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
- *cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ *cause = "verity-signature-required";
+ else
+ *cause = "IMA-signature-required";
*status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
@@ -274,6 +321,20 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
break;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
+ mask = IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED;
+ if ((iint->flags & mask) == mask) {
+ *cause = "verity-signature-required";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
+ if (sig->version != 2) {
+ *cause = "invalid-signature-version";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
(const char *)xattr_value,
xattr_len,
@@ -296,6 +357,44 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
} else {
*status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
}
+ break;
+ case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG:
+ set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
+
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+ if (!(iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)) {
+ *cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
+ if (sig->version != 3) {
+ *cause = "invalid-signature-version";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rc = calc_file_id_hash(IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG, iint->ima_hash->algo,
+ iint->ima_hash->digest, &hash.hdr);
+ if (rc) {
+ *cause = "sigv3-hashing-error";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA,
+ (const char *)xattr_value,
+ xattr_len, hash.digest,
+ hash.hdr.length);
+ if (rc) {
+ *cause = "invalid-verity-signature";
+ *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
+ } else {
+ *status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ }
+
break;
default:
*status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
@@ -396,8 +495,15 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
if (rc && rc != -ENODATA)
goto out;

- cause = iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ?
- "IMA-signature-required" : "missing-hash";
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ cause = "verity-signature-required";
+ else
+ cause = "IMA-signature-required";
+ } else {
+ cause = "missing-hash";
+ }
+
status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED)
iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index c6b0454b2e25..fbdea5c0cdc6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1311,6 +1311,16 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
!(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED))
return false;

+ /*
+ * To avoid 'appraise_type=sigv3' and 'digest_type=verity' ordering
+ * requirements, ensure both have been specified for file verity
+ * signatures.
+ */
+ if (entry->action == APPRAISE &&
+ (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) &&
+ !(entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED))
+ return false;
+
return true;
}

@@ -1735,14 +1745,24 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
break;
case Opt_appraise_type:
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
- if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
+ if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0) {
entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
- else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
- strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0)
+ } else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "sigv3") == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Only fsverity supports sigv3 for now.
+ * No need to define a new flag.
+ */
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
+ else
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
+ strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0) {
entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED;
- else
+ } else {
result = -EINVAL;
+ }
break;
case Opt_appraise_flag:
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
@@ -2186,6 +2206,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
if (entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED)
seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig|modsig ");
+ else if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
+ seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=sigv3 ");
else
seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 590b32b4eedd..5e6bebd7ee2b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -539,7 +539,9 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
{
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value;

- if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
+ if (!xattr_value ||
+ (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+ xattr_value->type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG))
return ima_eventevmsig_init(event_data, field_data);

return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index d42a01903f08..44418f0ec0ab 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type {
EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG,
IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG,
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG,
+ IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG,
IMA_XATTR_LAST
};

@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ struct evm_xattr {
u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
} __packed;

-#define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64
+#define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE

struct ima_digest_data {
u8 algo;
@@ -122,7 +123,11 @@ struct ima_max_digest_data {
} __packed;

/*
- * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
+ * signature header format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
+ *
+ * signature format:
+ * version 2: regular file data hash based signature
+ * version 3: struct ima_file_id data based signature
*/
struct signature_v2_hdr {
uint8_t type; /* xattr type */
@@ -133,6 +138,20 @@ struct signature_v2_hdr {
uint8_t sig[]; /* signature payload */
} __packed;

+/*
+ * IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed, by
+ * indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data,
+ * containing either the fsverity_descriptor struct digest or, in the
+ * future, the regular IMA file hash.
+ *
+ * (The hash of the ima_file_id structure is only of the portion used.)
+ */
+struct ima_file_id {
+ __u8 hash_type; /* xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type] */
+ __u8 hash_algorithm; /* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
+ __u8 hash[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
+} __packed;
+
/* integrity data associated with an inode */
struct integrity_iint_cache {
struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */
--
2.27.0

2022-03-28 13:39:40

by GUO Zihua

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 2/5] ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates

On 2022/3/26 6:38, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> In preparation to differentiate between unsigned regular IMA file
> hashes and fs-verity's file digests in the IMA measurement list,
> define a new template field named 'd-ngv2'.
>
> Also define two new templates named 'ima-ngv2' and 'ima-sigv2', which
> include the new 'd-ngv2' field.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
> ---
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 4 +
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 4 +
> 4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index f5a27f067db9..47386ac10471 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -1876,7 +1876,8 @@
>
> ima_template= [IMA]
> Select one of defined IMA measurements template formats.
> - Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" | "ima-sig" }
> + Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" | "ima-ngv2" | "ima-sig" |
> + "ima-sigv2" }
> Default: "ima-ng"
>
> ima_template_fmt=
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
> index db1ad6d7a57f..c25079faa208 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
> @@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = {
> {.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
> {.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
> {.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
> + {.name = "ima-ngv2", .fmt = "d-ngv2|n-ng"},
> + {.name = "ima-sigv2", .fmt = "d-ngv2|n-ng|sig"},
> {.name = "ima-buf", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|buf"},
> {.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"},
> {.name = "evm-sig",
> @@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
> .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
> {.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
> .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
> + {.field_id = "d-ngv2", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init,
> + .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ngv2},
> {.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
> .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
> {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> index 7155d17a3b75..af269b94b369 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> @@ -24,11 +24,22 @@ static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo)
> enum data_formats {
> DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
> DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
> + DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO,
> DATA_FMT_STRING,
> DATA_FMT_HEX,
> DATA_FMT_UINT
> };
>
> +enum digest_type {
> + DIGEST_TYPE_IMA,
> + DIGEST_TYPE__LAST
> +};
> +
> +#define DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX 4 /* including NULL */
> +static const char * const digest_type_name[DIGEST_TYPE__LAST] = {
> + [DIGEST_TYPE_IMA] = "ima"
> +};
> +
> static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
> enum data_formats datafmt,
> struct ima_field_data *field_data)
> @@ -72,8 +83,9 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_ascii(struct seq_file *m,
> u32 buflen = field_data->len;
>
> switch (datafmt) {
> + case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
> case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO:
> - buf_ptr = strnchr(field_data->data, buflen, ':');
> + buf_ptr = strrchr(field_data->data, ':');
> if (buf_ptr != field_data->data)
> seq_printf(m, "%s", field_data->data);
>
> @@ -178,6 +190,14 @@ void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
> field_data);
> }
>
> +void ima_show_template_digest_ngv2(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
> + struct ima_field_data *field_data)
> +{
> + ima_show_template_field_data(m, show,
> + DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO,
> + field_data);
> +}
> +
> void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
> struct ima_field_data *field_data)
> {
> @@ -265,26 +285,39 @@ int ima_parse_buf(void *bufstartp, void *bufendp, void **bufcurp,
> }
>
> static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize,
> - u8 hash_algo,
> + u8 digest_type, u8 hash_algo,
> struct ima_field_data *field_data)
> {
> /*
> * digest formats:
> * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST: digest
> * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: [<hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
> + * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
> + * [<digest type> + ':' + <hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
> + * where <hash type> is either "ima" or "verity",
> * where <hash algo> is provided if the hash algorithm is not
> * SHA1 or MD5
> */
> - u8 buffer[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 + IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
> + u8 buffer[DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX + CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 +
> + IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };

Hi Mimi,

Shouldn't this contains an additional ":", Thus should +1 again?

> enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST;
> u32 offset = 0;
>
> - if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
> - fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO;
> - offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1, "%s",
> + if (digest_type < DIGEST_TYPE__LAST && hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
> + fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO;
> + offset += snprintf(buffer, DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX +
> + CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1, "%*s:%s",
> + (int)strlen(digest_type_name[digest_type]),
> + digest_type_name[digest_type],
> hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
> buffer[offset] = ':';
> offset += 2;
> + } else if (hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
> + fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO;
> + offset += snprintf(buffer, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1,
> + "%s", hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
> + buffer[offset] = ':';
> + offset += 2;
> }
>
> if (digest)
> @@ -359,7 +392,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> cur_digestsize = hash.hdr.length;
> out:
> return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
> - HASH_ALGO__LAST, field_data);
> + DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, HASH_ALGO__LAST,
> + field_data);
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -380,7 +414,32 @@ int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
> out:
> return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
> - hash_algo, field_data);
> + DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, hash_algo,
> + field_data);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit),
> + * prefixed with both the hash type and algorithm.
> + */
> +int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> + struct ima_field_data *field_data)
> +{
> + u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
> + u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
> + u8 digest_type = DIGEST_TYPE_IMA;
> +
> + if (event_data->violation) /* recording a violation. */
> + goto out;
> +
> + cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
> + cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
> +
> + hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
> +out:
> + return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
> + digest_type, hash_algo,
> + field_data);
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -415,7 +474,8 @@ int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> }
>
> return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
> - hash_algo, field_data);
> + DIGEST_TYPE__LAST, hash_algo,
> + field_data);
> }
>
> static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
> index c71f1de95753..9f7c335f304f 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h
> @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ void ima_show_template_digest(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
> struct ima_field_data *field_data);
> void ima_show_template_digest_ng(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
> struct ima_field_data *field_data);
> +void ima_show_template_digest_ngv2(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
> + struct ima_field_data *field_data);
> void ima_show_template_string(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
> struct ima_field_data *field_data);
> void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
> @@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> struct ima_field_data *field_data);
> int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> struct ima_field_data *field_data);
> +int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> + struct ima_field_data *field_data);
> int ima_eventdigest_modsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> struct ima_field_data *field_data);
> int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,


--
Best
GUO Zihua

2022-03-28 16:11:24

by GUO Zihua

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 1/5] fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest

On 2022/3/26 6:38, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Define a function named fsverity_get_digest() to return the verity file
> digest and the associated hash algorithm (enum hash_algo).
>
> This assumes that before calling fsverity_get_digest() the file must have
> been opened, which is even true for the IMA measure/appraise on file
> open policy rule use case (func=FILE_CHECK). do_open() calls vfs_open()
> immediately prior to ima_file_check().
>
> Acked-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
> ---
> fs/verity/Kconfig | 1 +
> fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 7 ------
> fs/verity/measure.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/fsverity.h | 18 +++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/verity/Kconfig b/fs/verity/Kconfig
> index 24d1b54de807..54598cd80145 100644
> --- a/fs/verity/Kconfig
> +++ b/fs/verity/Kconfig
> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
> config FS_VERITY
> bool "FS Verity (read-only file-based authenticity protection)"
> select CRYPTO
> + select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
> # SHA-256 is implied as it's intended to be the default hash algorithm.
> # To avoid bloat, other wanted algorithms must be selected explicitly.
> # Note that CRYPTO_SHA256 denotes the generic C implementation, but
> diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
> index a7920434bae5..c6fb62e0ef1a 100644
> --- a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
> +++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
> @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
>
> #define pr_fmt(fmt) "fs-verity: " fmt
>
> -#include <crypto/sha2.h>
> #include <linux/fsverity.h>
> #include <linux/mempool.h>
>
> @@ -26,12 +25,6 @@ struct ahash_request;
> */
> #define FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS 8
>
> -/*
> - * Largest digest size among all hash algorithms supported by fs-verity.
> - * Currently assumed to be <= size of fsverity_descriptor::root_hash.
> - */
> -#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
> -
> /* A hash algorithm supported by fs-verity */
> struct fsverity_hash_alg {
> struct crypto_ahash *tfm; /* hash tfm, allocated on demand */
> diff --git a/fs/verity/measure.c b/fs/verity/measure.c
> index f0d7b30c62db..e99c00350c28 100644
> --- a/fs/verity/measure.c
> +++ b/fs/verity/measure.c
> @@ -57,3 +57,46 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
> return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_ioctl_measure);
> +
> +/**
> + * fsverity_get_digest() - get a verity file's digest
> + * @inode: inode to get digest of
> + * @digest: (out) pointer to the digest
> + * @alg: (out) pointer to the hash algorithm enumeration
> + *
> + * Return the file hash algorithm and digest of an fsverity protected file.
> + * Assumption: before calling fsverity_get_digest(), the file must have been
> + * opened.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
> + */
> +int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
> + u8 digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE],
> + enum hash_algo *alg)
> +{
> + const struct fsverity_info *vi;
> + const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg;
> + int i;
> +
> + vi = fsverity_get_info(inode);
> + if (!vi)
> + return -ENODATA; /* not a verity file */
> +
> + hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg;
> + memset(digest, 0, FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);

Hi Mimi,

I would suggest moving this memset downward right before the memcpy.

> +
> + /* convert the verity hash algorithm name to a hash_algo_name enum */
> + i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, hash_alg->name);
> + if (i < 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + *alg = i;
> +
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hash_alg->digest_size != hash_digest_size[*alg]))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + memcpy(digest, vi->file_digest, hash_alg->digest_size);
> +
> + pr_debug("file digest %s:%*phN\n", hash_algo_name[*alg],
> + hash_digest_size[*alg], digest);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
--
Best
GUO Zihua

2022-03-28 19:55:15

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 1/5] fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest

Hi Scott,

On Mon, 2022-03-28 at 11:45 +0800, Guozihua (Scott) wrote:
> > +
> > +/**
> > + * fsverity_get_digest() - get a verity file's digest
> > + * @inode: inode to get digest of
> > + * @digest: (out) pointer to the digest
> > + * @alg: (out) pointer to the hash algorithm enumeration
> > + *
> > + * Return the file hash algorithm and digest of an fsverity protected file.
> > + * Assumption: before calling fsverity_get_digest(), the file must have been
> > + * opened.
> > + *
> > + * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
> > + */
> > +int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
> > + u8 digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE],
> > + enum hash_algo *alg)
> > +{
> > + const struct fsverity_info *vi;
> > + const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg;
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + vi = fsverity_get_info(inode);
> > + if (!vi)
> > + return -ENODATA; /* not a verity file */
> > +
> > + hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg;
> > + memset(digest, 0, FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> Hi Mimi,
>
> I would suggest moving this memset downward right before the memcpy.

By doing it here, any existing garbage stored in the digest is cleared
before returning a failure.

thanks,

Mimi
>
> > +
> > + /* convert the verity hash algorithm name to a hash_algo_name enum */
> > + i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, hash_alg->name);
> > + if (i < 0)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + *alg = i;
> > +
> > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(hash_alg->digest_size != hash_digest_size[*alg]))
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + memcpy(digest, vi->file_digest, hash_alg->digest_size);
> > +
> > + pr_debug("file digest %s:%*phN\n", hash_algo_name[*alg],
> > + hash_digest_size[*alg], digest);
> > +
> > + return 0;


2022-03-28 22:33:29

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 2/5] ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates

On Mon, 2022-03-28 at 14:14 +0800, Guozihua (Scott) wrote:
> > @@ -265,26 +285,39 @@ int ima_parse_buf(void *bufstartp, void *bufendp, void **bufcurp,
> > }
> >
> > static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize,
> > - u8 hash_algo,
> > + u8 digest_type, u8 hash_algo,
> > struct ima_field_data *field_data)
> > {
> > /*
> > * digest formats:
> > * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST: digest
> > * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: [<hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
> > + * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
> > + * [<digest type> + ':' + <hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
> > + * where <hash type> is either "ima" or "verity",
> > * where <hash algo> is provided if the hash algorithm is not
> > * SHA1 or MD5
> > */
> > - u8 buffer[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 + IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
> > + u8 buffer[DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX + CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 +
> > + IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
>
> Hi Mimi,
>
> Shouldn't this contains an additional ":", Thus should +1 again?

The length of the CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME includes room for the terminating
NULL. In this case, the terminating NULL isn't needed. It's replaced
with the ':'.

thanks,

Mimi

>
> > enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST;
> > u32 offset = 0;
> >


2022-04-06 11:02:04

by Eric Biggers

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 2/5] ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates

On Fri, Mar 25, 2022 at 06:38:21PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize,
> - u8 hash_algo,
> + u8 digest_type, u8 hash_algo,
> struct ima_field_data *field_data)
> {
> /*
> * digest formats:
> * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST: digest
> * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: [<hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
> + * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
> + * [<digest type> + ':' + <hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
> + * where <hash type> is either "ima" or "verity",
> * where <hash algo> is provided if the hash algorithm is not
> * SHA1 or MD5

This says both "hash type" and "digest type". It should be one or the other.

The square brackets are meant to indicate that the part within it is optional,
right? Are they in the right place? I don't see how this matches the code.
There is also no explanation for why or when <digest type> is optional with
DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO.

> + if (digest_type < DIGEST_TYPE__LAST && hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
> + fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO;
> + offset += snprintf(buffer, DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX +
> + CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1, "%*s:%s",
> + (int)strlen(digest_type_name[digest_type]),
> + digest_type_name[digest_type],
> hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
> buffer[offset] = ':';
> offset += 2;

There's no need to use %*s if the length argument is just going to be strlen().
It should just use %s.

Also, this is not correct use of snprintf(), given that the string is
unconditionally appended to at the offset which snprintf() returns. So it is
not providing buffer overflow protection. It might as well just be:

offset += 1 + sprintf(buffer, "%s:%s:",
digest_type_name[digest_type],
hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);

and likewise for the other case:

offset += 1 + sprintf(buffer, "%s:", hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);

> +/*
> + * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit),
> + * prefixed with both the hash type and algorithm.
> + */
> +int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> + struct ima_field_data *field_data)
> +{
> + u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;

Why is this defaulting to SHA-1?

- Eric

2022-04-06 11:55:25

by Eric Biggers

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 3/5] ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list

On Fri, Mar 25, 2022 at 06:38:22PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Permit fsverity's file digest (a hash of struct fsverity_digest) to be
> included in the IMA measurement list, based on the new measurement
> policy rule 'digest_type=verity' option.

"fsverity's file digest" *is* 'struct fsverity_digest', not a hash of it.
Did you mean to write 'struct fsverity_descriptor'?

> diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
> index 1a91d92950a7..2d4789dc7750 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
> @@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string
> - 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
> algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
> prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
> + - 'd-ngv2': same as d-ng, but prefixed with the digest type.
> + field format: [<digest type>:<hash algo>:]digest,
> + where the digest type is either "ima" or "verity".

As in patch 2, it is not clear what the square brackets mean here. Maybe they
mean that "<digest type>:<hash algo>:" is optional, but it is not explained when
they will be present and when they will not be present.

> - 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig;
> - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations;
> - 'sig': the file signature, or the EVM portable signature if the file
> @@ -106,3 +109,8 @@ currently the following methods are supported:
> the ``ima_template=`` parameter;
> - register a new template descriptor with custom format through the kernel
> command line parameter ``ima_template_fmt=``.
> +
> +
> +References
> +==========
> +[1] Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst

Is this meant to be a footnote? There are no references to it above.

> @@ -242,14 +267,29 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> */
> i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
> hash.hdr.algo = algo;
> + hash.hdr.length = hash_digest_size[algo];
>
> /* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
> memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
>
> - if (buf)
> + if (buf) {
> result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
> - else
> + } else if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) {
> + result = ima_get_verity_digest(iint, &hash);
> + switch (result) {
> + case 0:
> + break;
> + case -ENODATA:
> + audit_cause = "no-verity-digest";
> + result = -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + default:
> + audit_cause = "invalid-verity-digest";
> + break;
> + }
> + } else {
> result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
> + }
>
> if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
> goto out;

The above code only calls ima_get_verity_digest() if 'buf' is non-NULL,
otherwise it calls ima_calc_buffer_hash(). Under what circumstances is 'buf'
non-NULL? Does this imply that 'digest_type=verity' does not always use verity
digests, and if not, when are they used and when are they not used?

> +/*
> + * Make sure the policy rule and template format are in sync.
> + */
> +static void check_template_field(const struct ima_template_desc *template,
> + const char *field, const char *msg)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < template->num_fields; i++)
> + if (!strcmp(template->fields[i]->field_id, field))
> + return;
> +
> + pr_notice_once("%s", msg);
> +}

A better description for this function would be something like "Warn if the
template does not contain the given field."

> index daf49894fd7d..d42a01903f08 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
> #define IMA_HASHED 0x00000200
>
> /* iint policy rule cache flags */
> -#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000
> +#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS 0xff800000
> #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000
> #define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000
> #define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000
> @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
> #define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000
> #define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000
> #define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000
> +#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED 0x80000000

It is intentional that the new bit added to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS is not the same
as IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED?

- Eric

2022-04-06 12:06:32

by Eric Biggers

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 5/5] fsverity: update the documentation

On Fri, Mar 25, 2022 at 06:38:24PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Update the fsverity documentation related to IMA signature support.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
> ---
> Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 20 ++++++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
> index 1d831e3cbcb3..c1d355f17a54 100644
> --- a/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
> @@ -74,8 +74,12 @@ authenticating the files is up to userspace. However, to meet some
> users' needs, fs-verity optionally supports a simple signature
> verification mechanism where users can configure the kernel to require
> that all fs-verity files be signed by a key loaded into a keyring; see
> -`Built-in signature verification`_. Support for fs-verity file hashes
> -in IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) policies is also planned.
> +`Built-in signature verification`_.
> +
> +The Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) supports including
> +fs-verity file digests and signatures in the IMA measurement list
> +and verifying fs-verity based file signatures stored as security.ima
> +xattrs, based on policy.

This looks okay, but this would be easier to understand as a list of alternative
ways to do signature verification with fs-verity:

* Userspace-only
* Built-in signature verification + userspace policy
* IMA

- Eric

2022-04-06 13:55:06

by Eric Biggers

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures

> The IMA policy defines "which" files are to be measured, verified, and/or
> audited. For those files being verified, the policy rules indicate "how"
> the file should be verified. For example to require a file be signed,
> the appraise policy rule must include the 'appraise_type' option.
>
> appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3]
> where 'imasig' is the original or v2 signature (default),
> where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
> where 'sigv3' is the signature v3 format.
>
> The policy rule must also indicate the type of signature, if not the IMA
> default, by specifying the digest type:
>
> digest_type:= [verity]

I don't understand the above paragraph. Should it say "type of digest" instead
of "type of signature"? And what does specifying the digest type do, exactly?

> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> index 2e0c501ce9c8..acd17183ad8c 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> @@ -47,7 +47,11 @@ Description:
> fgroup:= decimal value
> lsm: are LSM specific
> option:
> - appraise_type:= [imasig] [imasig|modsig]
> + appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3]
> + where 'imasig' is the original or v2 signature,
> + where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
> + where 'sigv3' is the IMA v3 signature.
> +

The documentation should explain the differences between the different signature
types, especially when a user would need to choose one or another.

> +
> + Example of 'measure' and 'appraise' rules requiring fs-verity
> + signatures (version 3) stored in security.ima xattr.
> +
> + The 'measure' rule specifies the 'ima-sigv2' template option,
> + which includes the indication of type of digest and the file
> + signature in the measurement list.
> +
> + measure func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \
> + template=ima-sigv2

This says it requires version 3 signatures, however it then uses "ima-sigv2".

> @@ -183,13 +185,18 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
> return ima_hash_algo;
>
> switch (xattr_value->type) {
> + case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG:
> + sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
> + if (sig->version != 3 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) ||
> + sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
> + return ima_hash_algo;
> + return sig->hash_algo;

It looks like this is falling back to SHA-1 if the xattr is invalid:

int __ro_after_init ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;

How about falling back to a more secure hash algorithm, or returning an error?

> +/*
> + * calc_file_id_hash - calculate the hash of the ima_file_id struct data
> + * @type: xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type]
> + * @algo: hash algorithm [enum hash_algo]
> + * @digest: pointer to the digest to be hashed
> + * @hash: (out) pointer to the hash
> + *
> + * IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed by
> + * indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data.
> + *
> + * Signing the ima_file_id struct is currently only supported for
> + * IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG type xattrs.
> + *
> + * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
> + */
> +static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type,
> + enum hash_algo algo, const u8 *digest,
> + struct ima_digest_data *hash)
> +{
> + struct ima_file_id file_id = {
> + .hash_type = IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG, .hash_algorithm = algo};
> + uint unused = HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE - hash_digest_size[algo];

'uint' is unusual in kernel code; please use 'unsigned int' instead.

> @@ -1735,14 +1745,24 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> break;
> case Opt_appraise_type:
> ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
> - if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
> + if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0) {
> entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
> - else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
> - strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0)
> + } else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "sigv3") == 0) {
> + /*
> + * Only fsverity supports sigv3 for now.
> + * No need to define a new flag.
> + */
> + if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
> + entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
> + else
> + result = -EINVAL;
> + } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
> + strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0) {
> entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
> IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED;
> - else
> + } else {
> result = -EINVAL;
> + }

This appears to be assuming that the appraise_type option is given after
digest_type rather than befoore, as digest_type is what sets the
IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED flag. Is this intentional? Does the order of options
matter in IMA rules, and if so where are the ordering requirements documented?

Also, it looks like this is allowing appraise_type=imasig or
appraise_type=imasig|modsig in combination with digest_type=verity. Is that
intentional? What is the use case for these combinations?

> /*
> - * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
> + * signature header format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
> + *
> + * signature format:
> + * version 2: regular file data hash based signature
> + * version 3: struct ima_file_id data based signature
> */
> struct signature_v2_hdr {

Is this struct also used with version 3, despite having v2 in its name?
The comment is not clear.

- Eric

2022-04-28 06:24:51

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 2/5] ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates

On Tue, 2022-04-05 at 19:11 +0000, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 25, 2022 at 06:38:21PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize,
> > - u8 hash_algo,
> > + u8 digest_type, u8 hash_algo,
> > struct ima_field_data *field_data)
> > {
> > /*
> > * digest formats:
> > * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST: digest
> > * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: [<hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
> > + * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO:
> > + * [<digest type> + ':' + <hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest,
> > + * where <hash type> is either "ima" or "verity",
> > * where <hash algo> is provided if the hash algorithm is not
> > * SHA1 or MD5
>
> This says both "hash type" and "digest type". It should be one or the other.
>
> The square brackets are meant to indicate that the part within it is optional,
> right? Are they in the right place? I don't see how this matches the code.
> There is also no explanation for why or when <digest type> is optional with
> DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO.

Agreed.

>
> > + if (digest_type < DIGEST_TYPE__LAST && hash_algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) {
> > + fmt = DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_TYPE_AND_ALGO;
> > + offset += snprintf(buffer, DIGEST_TYPE_NAME_LEN_MAX +
> > + CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 1, "%*s:%s",
> > + (int)strlen(digest_type_name[digest_type]),
> > + digest_type_name[digest_type],
> > hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
> > buffer[offset] = ':';
> > offset += 2;
>
> There's no need to use %*s if the length argument is just going to be strlen().
> It should just use %s.

Using "%*s" prevents having a trailing NULL.

>
> Also, this is not correct use of snprintf(), given that the string is
> unconditionally appended to at the offset which snprintf() returns. So it is
> not providing buffer overflow protection. It might as well just be:
>
> offset += 1 + sprintf(buffer, "%s:%s:",
> digest_type_name[digest_type],
> hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
>
> and likewise for the other case:
>
> offset += 1 + sprintf(buffer, "%s:", hash_algo_name[hash_algo]);
>
> > +/*
> > + * This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit),
> > + * prefixed with both the hash type and algorithm.
> > + */
> > +int ima_eventdigest_ngv2_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> > + struct ima_field_data *field_data)
> > +{
> > + u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>
> Why is this defaulting to SHA-1?

Violation records contain 0's in the file hash and the template data
hash fields. Changing the default hash algorithm would result in larger
violation digests without any real benefit other than cosmetic. Will
make the change anyway in the next version.

thanks,

Mimi

2022-04-28 08:48:26

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 3/5] ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list

On Tue, 2022-04-05 at 19:28 +0000, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 25, 2022 at 06:38:22PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Permit fsverity's file digest (a hash of struct fsverity_digest) to be
> > included in the IMA measurement list, based on the new measurement
> > policy rule 'digest_type=verity' option.
>
> "fsverity's file digest" *is* 'struct fsverity_digest', not a hash of it.
> Did you mean to write 'struct fsverity_descriptor'?

Fixed.

>
> > diff --git a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
> > index 1a91d92950a7..2d4789dc7750 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/security/IMA-templates.rst
> > @@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ descriptors by adding their identifier to the format string
> > - 'd-ng': the digest of the event, calculated with an arbitrary hash
> > algorithm (field format: [<hash algo>:]digest, where the digest
> > prefix is shown only if the hash algorithm is not SHA1 or MD5);
> > + - 'd-ngv2': same as d-ng, but prefixed with the digest type.
> > + field format: [<digest type>:<hash algo>:]digest,
> > + where the digest type is either "ima" or "verity".
>
> As in patch 2, it is not clear what the square brackets mean here. Maybe they
> mean that "<digest type>:<hash algo>:" is optional, but it is not explained when
> they will be present and when they will not be present.

Agreed, removed.

>
> > - 'd-modsig': the digest of the event without the appended modsig;
> > - 'n-ng': the name of the event, without size limitations;
> > - 'sig': the file signature, or the EVM portable signature if the file
> > @@ -106,3 +109,8 @@ currently the following methods are supported:
> > the ``ima_template=`` parameter;
> > - register a new template descriptor with custom format through the kernel
> > command line parameter ``ima_template_fmt=``.
> > +
> > +
> > +References
> > +==========
> > +[1] Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
>
> Is this meant to be a footnote? There are no references to it above.
>
> > @@ -242,14 +267,29 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> > */
> > i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
> > hash.hdr.algo = algo;
> > + hash.hdr.length = hash_digest_size[algo];
> >
> > /* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */
> > memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest));
> >
> > - if (buf)
> > + if (buf) {
> > result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr);
> > - else
> > + } else if (iint->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED) {
> > + result = ima_get_verity_digest(iint, &hash);
> > + switch (result) {
> > + case 0:
> > + break;
> > + case -ENODATA:
> > + audit_cause = "no-verity-digest";
> > + result = -EINVAL;
> > + break;
> > + default:
> > + audit_cause = "invalid-verity-digest";
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + } else {
> > result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
> > + }
> >
> > if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL)
> > goto out;
>
> The above code only calls ima_get_verity_digest() if 'buf' is non-NULL,
> otherwise it calls ima_calc_buffer_hash(). Under what circumstances is 'buf'
> non-NULL? Does this imply that 'digest_type=verity' does not always use verity
> digests, and if not, when are they used and when are they not used?

Agreed, it should always be based on policy.

FYI, instead of IMA pre-reading and calculating the file hash, there
are instances where the kernel reads the entire file into memory. For
example, kernel_read_file() calls security_kernel_post_read_file(),
which calls ima_post_read_file().

>
> > +/*
> > + * Make sure the policy rule and template format are in sync.
> > + */
> > +static void check_template_field(const struct ima_template_desc *template,
> > + const char *field, const char *msg)
> > +{
> > + int i;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i < template->num_fields; i++)
> > + if (!strcmp(template->fields[i]->field_id, field))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + pr_notice_once("%s", msg);
> > +}
>
> A better description for this function would be something like "Warn if the
> template does not contain the given field."

Ok
>
> > index daf49894fd7d..d42a01903f08 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
> > +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
> > @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
> > #define IMA_HASHED 0x00000200
> >
> > /* iint policy rule cache flags */
> > -#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000
> > +#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS 0xff800000
> > #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000
> > #define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000
> > #define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000
> > @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
> > #define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000
> > #define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000
> > #define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000
> > +#define IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED 0x80000000
>
> It is intentional that the new bit added to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS is not the same
> as IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED?

Thanks for catching this. Previous versions required an additional
bit, but that isn't the case now.

thanks,

Mimi

2022-04-28 13:34:37

by Mimi Zohar

[permalink] [raw]
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/5] ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures

On Tue, 2022-04-05 at 20:31 +0000, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > The IMA policy defines "which" files are to be measured, verified, and/or
> > audited. For those files being verified, the policy rules indicate "how"
> > the file should be verified. For example to require a file be signed,
> > the appraise policy rule must include the 'appraise_type' option.
> >
> > appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3]
> > where 'imasig' is the original or v2 signature (default),
> > where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
> > where 'sigv3' is the signature v3 format.
> >
> > The policy rule must also indicate the type of signature, if not the IMA
> > default, by specifying the digest type:
> >
> > digest_type:= [verity]
>
> I don't understand the above paragraph. Should it say "type of digest" instead
> of "type of signature"? And what does specifying the digest type do, exactly?

Yes, the "type of digest".

Based on the type of digest, IMA either reads and calculates the file
hash or reads the fs-verity file hash. Based on policy, the hash is
then included in the IMA measurement list, used to verify the file
signature, and/or added to the audit log.

>
> > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> > index 2e0c501ce9c8..acd17183ad8c 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> > +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> > @@ -47,7 +47,11 @@ Description:
> > fgroup:= decimal value
> > lsm: are LSM specific
> > option:
> > - appraise_type:= [imasig] [imasig|modsig]
> > + appraise_type:= [imasig] | [imasig|modsig] | [sigv3]
> > + where 'imasig' is the original or v2 signature,
> > + where 'modsig' is an appended signature,
> > + where 'sigv3' is the IMA v3 signature.
> > +
>
> The documentation should explain the differences between the different signature
> types, especially when a user would need to choose one or another.

Agreed, it's confusing. The source of that confusion is a result of
struct signature_v2_hdr name and the field named "version" in the
structure. Here the signature_v2_hdr isn't changing, but a new field
"version" number is defined.
>
> > +
> > + Example of 'measure' and 'appraise' rules requiring fs-verity
> > + signatures (version 3) stored in security.ima xattr.
> > +
> > + The 'measure' rule specifies the 'ima-sigv2' template option,
> > + which includes the indication of type of digest and the file
> > + signature in the measurement list.
> > +
> > + measure func=BPRM_CHECK digest_type=verity \
> > + template=ima-sigv2
>
> This says it requires version 3 signatures, however it then uses "ima-sigv2".

Agreed, it would make more sense to name the template "ima-sigv3" to
refer to the "version" field.

>
> > @@ -183,13 +185,18 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
> > return ima_hash_algo;
> >
> > switch (xattr_value->type) {
> > + case IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG:
> > + sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value;
> > + if (sig->version != 3 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig) ||
> > + sig->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
> > + return ima_hash_algo;
> > + return sig->hash_algo;
>
> It looks like this is falling back to SHA-1 if the xattr is invalid:
>
> int __ro_after_init ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>
> How about falling back to a more secure hash algorithm, or returning an error?

ima_hash_algo is set to the configured default IMA hash algorithm in
init_ima().

>
> > +/*
> > + * calc_file_id_hash - calculate the hash of the ima_file_id struct data
> > + * @type: xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type]
> > + * @algo: hash algorithm [enum hash_algo]
> > + * @digest: pointer to the digest to be hashed
> > + * @hash: (out) pointer to the hash
> > + *
> > + * IMA signature version 3 disambiguates the data that is signed by
> > + * indirectly signing the hash of the ima_file_id structure data.
> > + *
> > + * Signing the ima_file_id struct is currently only supported for
> > + * IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG type xattrs.
> > + *
> > + * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise.
> > + */
> > +static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type,
> > + enum hash_algo algo, const u8 *digest,
> > + struct ima_digest_data *hash)
> > +{
> > + struct ima_file_id file_id = {
> > + .hash_type = IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG, .hash_algorithm = algo};
> > + uint unused = HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE - hash_digest_size[algo];
>
> 'uint' is unusual in kernel code; please use 'unsigned int' instead.

Ok
>
> > @@ -1735,14 +1745,24 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > break;
> > case Opt_appraise_type:
> > ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
> > - if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
> > + if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0) {
> > entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
> > - else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
> > - strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0)
> > + } else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "sigv3") == 0) {
> > + /*
> > + * Only fsverity supports sigv3 for now.
> > + * No need to define a new flag.
> > + */
> > + if (entry->flags & IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED)
> > + entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
> > + else
> > + result = -EINVAL;
> > + } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
> > + strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0) {
> > entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
> > IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED;
> > - else
> > + } else {
> > result = -EINVAL;
> > + }
>
> This appears to be assuming that the appraise_type option is given after
> digest_type rather than befoore, as digest_type is what sets the
> IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED flag. Is this intentional? Does the order of options
> matter in IMA rules, and if so where are the ordering requirements documented?
>
> Also, it looks like this is allowing appraise_type=imasig or
> appraise_type=imasig|modsig in combination with digest_type=verity. Is that
> intentional? What is the use case for these combinations?
>

All of your comments will be addressed in the next version, including
the ordering issue of "digest_type=verity" and "appraise_type=sigv3".

> > /*
> > - * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
> > + * signature header format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys
> > + *
> > + * signature format:
> > + * version 2: regular file data hash based signature
> > + * version 3: struct ima_file_id data based signature
> > */
> > struct signature_v2_hdr {
>
> Is this struct also used with version 3, despite having v2 in its name?
> The comment is not clear.

Agreed, it's confusing. Too many versions. This v2 refers to the
header format, while "version" in the signature_v2_hdr refers to the
signature format.

Mimi