On Sun, Jul 11, 2021 at 6:43 PM Pkshih <[email protected]> wrote:
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Len Baker [mailto:[email protected]]
> >
> > In the rtw_pci_init_rx_ring function the "if (len > TRX_BD_IDX_MASK)"
> > statement guarantees that len is less than or equal to GENMASK(11, 0) or
> > in other words that len is less than or equal to 4095. However the
> > rx_ring->buf has a size of RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM (defined as 512). This
> > way it is possible an out-of-bounds write in the for statement due to
> > the i variable can exceed the rx_ring->buff size.
> >
> > Fix it using the ARRAY_SIZE macro.
> >
> > Cc: [email protected]
> > Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1461515 ("Out-of-bounds write")
Coverity seems to be giving a false warning here. I presume it's
taking the |len| comparison as proof that |len| might be as large as
TRX_BD_IDX_MASK, but as noted below, that's not really true; the |len|
comparison is really just dead code.
> > Fixes: e3037485c68ec ("rtw88: new Realtek 802.11ac driver")
> > Signed-off-by: Len Baker <[email protected]>
> To prevent the 'len' argument from exceeding the array size of rx_ring->buff, I
> suggest to add another checking statement, like
>
> if (len > ARRAY_SIZE(rx_ring->buf)) {
> rtw_err(rtwdev, "len %d exceeds maximum RX ring buffer\n", len);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
That seems like a better idea, if we really need to patch anything.
> But, I wonder if this a false alarm because 'len' is equal to ARRAY_SIZE(rx_ring->buf)
> for now.
Or to the point: rtw_pci_init_rx_ring() is only ever called with a
fixed constant -- RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM (i.e., 512) -- so the alleged
overflow cannot happen.
Brian