This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.292 release.
There are 42 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 04 Sep 2022 12:13:47 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.292-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.14.292-rc1
Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
net: neigh: don't call kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
kprobes: don't call disarm_kprobe() for disabled kprobes
Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
netfilter: conntrack: NF_CONNTRACK_PROCFS should no longer default to y
Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
s390/hypfs: avoid error message under KVM
Denis V. Lunev <[email protected]>
neigh: fix possible DoS due to net iface start/stop loop
Jann Horn <[email protected]>
mm/rmap: Fix anon_vma->degree ambiguity leading to double-reuse
Yang Jihong <[email protected]>
ftrace: Fix NULL pointer dereference in is_ftrace_trampoline when ftrace is dead
Letu Ren <[email protected]>
fbdev: fb_pm2fb: Avoid potential divide by zero error
Karthik Alapati <[email protected]>
HID: hidraw: fix memory leak in hidraw_release()
Dongliang Mu <[email protected]>
media: pvrusb2: fix memory leak in pvr_probe
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix build errors in some archs
Jing Leng <[email protected]>
kbuild: Fix include path in scripts/Makefile.modpost
Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
x86/bugs: Add "unknown" reporting for MMIO Stale Data
Gayatri Kammela <[email protected]>
x86/cpu: Add Tiger Lake to Intel family
Gerald Schaefer <[email protected]>
s390/mm: do not trigger write fault when vma does not allow VM_WRITE
Hsin-Yi Wang <[email protected]>
arm64: map FDT as RW for early_init_dt_scan()
Jann Horn <[email protected]>
mm: Force TLB flush for PFNMAP mappings before unlink_file_vma()
Guoqing Jiang <[email protected]>
md: call __md_stop_writes in md_stop
David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
mm/hugetlb: fix hugetlb not supporting softdirty tracking
Quanyang Wang <[email protected]>
asm-generic: sections: refactor memory_intersects
Siddh Raman Pant <[email protected]>
loop: Check for overflow while configuring loop
Goldwyn Rodrigues <[email protected]>
btrfs: check if root is readonly while setting security xattr
Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
ixgbe: stop resetting SYSTIME in ixgbe_ptp_start_cyclecounter
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
net: Fix a data-race around sysctl_somaxconn.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
net: Fix a data-race around netdev_budget_usecs.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
net: Fix a data-race around netdev_budget.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
net: Fix a data-race around sysctl_net_busy_read.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
net: Fix a data-race around sysctl_net_busy_poll.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
net: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tstamp_allow_data.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
ratelimit: Fix data-races in ___ratelimit().
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
net: Fix data-races around weight_p and dev_weight_[rt]x_bias.
Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
netfilter: nft_payload: do not truncate csum_offset and csum_type
Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
netfilter: nft_payload: report ERANGE for too long offset and length
Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
netfilter: ebtables: reject blobs that don't provide all entry points
Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>
net: ipvtap - add __init/__exit annotations to module init/exit funcs
Jonathan Toppins <[email protected]>
bonding: 802.3ad: fix no transmission of LACPDUs
Bernard Pidoux <[email protected]>
rose: check NULL rose_loopback_neigh->loopback
Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
af_key: Do not call xfrm_probe_algs in parallel
Xin Xiong <[email protected]>
xfrm: fix refcount leak in __xfrm_policy_check()
Basavaraj Natikar <[email protected]>
pinctrl: amd: Don't save/restore interrupt status and wake status bits
Helge Deller <[email protected]>
parisc: Fix exception handler for fldw and fstw instructions
Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>
audit: fix potential double free on error path from fsnotify_add_inode_mark
-------------
Diffstat:
.../hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst | 14 +++++
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c | 5 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 9 +++-
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 15 +-----
arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c | 2 +-
arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.c | 2 +-
arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c | 2 +-
arch/s390/mm/fault.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 3 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 ++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 34 +++++++++----
drivers/block/loop.c | 5 ++
drivers/hid/hidraw.c | 3 ++
drivers/md/md.c | 1 +
drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-hdw.c | 1 +
drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c | 38 ++++++--------
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ptp.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++-----
drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvtap.c | 4 +-
drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c | 11 +++-
drivers/video/fbdev/pm2fb.c | 5 ++
fs/btrfs/xattr.c | 3 ++
include/asm-generic/sections.h | 7 ++-
include/linux/netfilter_bridge/ebtables.h | 4 --
include/linux/rmap.h | 7 ++-
include/net/busy_poll.h | 2 +-
kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 +
kernel/kprobes.c | 10 ++--
kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 10 ++++
lib/ratelimit.c | 12 +++--
mm/mmap.c | 20 +++++++-
mm/rmap.c | 31 +++++++-----
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 10 ++--
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_broute.c | 8 ---
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_filter.c | 8 ---
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_nat.c | 8 ---
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 8 +--
net/core/dev.c | 6 +--
net/core/neighbour.c | 27 +++++++---
net/core/skbuff.c | 2 +-
net/core/sock.c | 2 +-
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 15 +++---
net/key/af_key.c | 3 ++
net/netfilter/Kconfig | 1 -
net/netfilter/nft_payload.c | 29 ++++++++---
net/rose/rose_loopback.c | 3 +-
net/sched/sch_generic.c | 2 +-
net/socket.c | 2 +-
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 1 +
scripts/Makefile.modpost | 3 +-
52 files changed, 306 insertions(+), 177 deletions(-)
From: Yang Jihong <[email protected]>
commit c3b0f72e805f0801f05fa2aa52011c4bfc694c44 upstream.
ftrace_startup does not remove ops from ftrace_ops_list when
ftrace_startup_enable fails:
register_ftrace_function
ftrace_startup
__register_ftrace_function
...
add_ftrace_ops(&ftrace_ops_list, ops)
...
...
ftrace_startup_enable // if ftrace failed to modify, ftrace_disabled is set to 1
...
return 0 // ops is in the ftrace_ops_list.
When ftrace_disabled = 1, unregister_ftrace_function simply returns without doing anything:
unregister_ftrace_function
ftrace_shutdown
if (unlikely(ftrace_disabled))
return -ENODEV; // return here, __unregister_ftrace_function is not executed,
// as a result, ops is still in the ftrace_ops_list
__unregister_ftrace_function
...
If ops is dynamically allocated, it will be free later, in this case,
is_ftrace_trampoline accesses NULL pointer:
is_ftrace_trampoline
ftrace_ops_trampoline
do_for_each_ftrace_op(op, ftrace_ops_list) // OOPS! op may be NULL!
Syzkaller reports as follows:
[ 1203.506103] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000010b
[ 1203.508039] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 1203.508798] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 1203.509558] PGD 800000011660b067 P4D 800000011660b067 PUD 130fb8067 PMD 0
[ 1203.510560] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 1203.511189] CPU: 6 PID: 29532 Comm: syz-executor.2 Tainted: G B W 5.10.0 #8
[ 1203.512324] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 1203.513895] RIP: 0010:is_ftrace_trampoline+0x26/0xb0
[ 1203.514644] Code: ff eb d3 90 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 55 53 e8 f2 00 fd ff 48 8b 1d 3b 35 5d 03 e8 e6 00 fd ff 48 8d bb 90 00 00 00 e8 2a 81 26 00 <48> 8b ab 90 00 00 00 48 85 ed 74 1d e8 c9 00 fd ff 48 8d bb 98 00
[ 1203.518838] RSP: 0018:ffffc900012cf960 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1203.520092] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000007b RCX: ffffffff8a331866
[ 1203.521469] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 000000000000010b
[ 1203.522583] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8df18b07
[ 1203.523550] R10: fffffbfff1be3160 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000478399
[ 1203.524596] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888145088000 R15: 0000000000000008
[ 1203.525634] FS: 00007f429f5f4700(0000) GS:ffff8881daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1203.526801] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1203.527626] CR2: 000000000000010b CR3: 0000000170e1e001 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[ 1203.528611] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1203.529605] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Therefore, when ftrace_startup_enable fails, we need to rollback registration
process and remove ops from ftrace_ops_list.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
--- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c
@@ -2818,6 +2818,16 @@ static int ftrace_startup(struct ftrace_
ftrace_startup_enable(command);
+ /*
+ * If ftrace is in an undefined state, we just remove ops from list
+ * to prevent the NULL pointer, instead of totally rolling it back and
+ * free trampoline, because those actions could cause further damage.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(ftrace_disabled)) {
+ __unregister_ftrace_function(ops);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
ops->flags &= ~FTRACE_OPS_FL_ADDING;
return 0;
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit aa5762c34213aba7a72dc58e70601370805fa794 ]
NF_CONNTRACK_PROCFS was marked obsolete in commit 54b07dca68557b09
("netfilter: provide config option to disable ancient procfs parts") in
v3.3.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/Kconfig | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/netfilter/Kconfig
+++ b/net/netfilter/Kconfig
@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ config NF_CONNTRACK_ZONES
config NF_CONNTRACK_PROCFS
bool "Supply CT list in procfs (OBSOLETE)"
- default y
depends on PROC_FS
---help---
This option enables for the list of known conntrack entries
From: Basavaraj Natikar <[email protected]>
commit b8c824a869f220c6b46df724f85794349bafbf23 upstream.
Saving/restoring interrupt and wake status bits across suspend can
cause the suspend to fail if an IRQ is serviced across the
suspend cycle.
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Basavaraj Natikar <[email protected]>
Fixes: 79d2c8bede2c ("pinctrl/amd: save pin registers over suspend/resume")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c
+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c
@@ -753,6 +753,7 @@ int amd_gpio_suspend(struct device *dev)
struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev);
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
struct pinctrl_desc *desc = gpio_dev->pctrl->desc;
+ unsigned long flags;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < desc->npins; i++) {
@@ -761,7 +762,9 @@ int amd_gpio_suspend(struct device *dev)
if (!amd_gpio_should_save(gpio_dev, pin))
continue;
- gpio_dev->saved_regs[i] = readl(gpio_dev->base + pin*4);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
+ gpio_dev->saved_regs[i] = readl(gpio_dev->base + pin * 4) & ~PIN_IRQ_PENDING;
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
}
return 0;
@@ -772,6 +775,7 @@ int amd_gpio_resume(struct device *dev)
struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev);
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
struct pinctrl_desc *desc = gpio_dev->pctrl->desc;
+ unsigned long flags;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < desc->npins; i++) {
@@ -780,7 +784,10 @@ int amd_gpio_resume(struct device *dev)
if (!amd_gpio_should_save(gpio_dev, pin))
continue;
- writel(gpio_dev->saved_regs[i], gpio_dev->base + pin*4);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
+ gpio_dev->saved_regs[i] |= readl(gpio_dev->base + pin * 4) & PIN_IRQ_PENDING;
+ writel(gpio_dev->saved_regs[i], gpio_dev->base + pin * 4);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
}
return 0;
From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ba953a9d89a00c078b85f4b190bc1dde66fe16b5 ]
When namespace support was added to xfrm/afkey, it caused the
previously single-threaded call to xfrm_probe_algs to become
multi-threaded. This is buggy and needs to be fixed with a mutex.
Reported-by: Abhishek Shah <[email protected]>
Fixes: 283bc9f35bbb ("xfrm: Namespacify xfrm state/policy locks")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/key/af_key.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c
index 035123bf7259b..5f0d6a567a1e3 100644
--- a/net/key/af_key.c
+++ b/net/key/af_key.c
@@ -1707,9 +1707,12 @@ static int pfkey_register(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sad
pfk->registered |= (1<<hdr->sadb_msg_satype);
}
+ mutex_lock(&pfkey_mutex);
xfrm_probe_algs();
supp_skb = compose_sadb_supported(hdr, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ mutex_unlock(&pfkey_mutex);
+
if (!supp_skb) {
if (hdr->sadb_msg_satype != SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC)
pfk->registered &= ~(1<<hdr->sadb_msg_satype);
--
2.35.1
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bf955b5ab8f6f7b0632cdef8e36b14e4f6e77829 ]
While reading weight_p, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need
to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
Also, dev_[rt]x_weight can be read/written at the same time. So, we
need to use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() for its access. Moreover, to
use the same weight_p while changing dev_[rt]x_weight, we add a mutex
in proc_do_dev_weight().
Fixes: 3d48b53fb2ae ("net: dev_weight: TX/RX orthogonality")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/core/dev.c | 2 +-
net/core/sysctl_net_core.c | 15 +++++++++------
net/sched/sch_generic.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index ea09e0809c122..51721fb2e30cf 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -5186,7 +5186,7 @@ static int process_backlog(struct napi_struct *napi, int quota)
net_rps_action_and_irq_enable(sd);
}
- napi->weight = dev_rx_weight;
+ napi->weight = READ_ONCE(dev_rx_weight);
while (again) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
index ac1a32d5cad3c..1b5749f2ef9c0 100644
--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
@@ -229,14 +229,17 @@ static int set_default_qdisc(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
static int proc_do_dev_weight(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
- int ret;
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(dev_weight_mutex);
+ int ret, weight;
+ mutex_lock(&dev_weight_mutex);
ret = proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
- if (ret != 0)
- return ret;
-
- dev_rx_weight = weight_p * dev_weight_rx_bias;
- dev_tx_weight = weight_p * dev_weight_tx_bias;
+ if (!ret && write) {
+ weight = READ_ONCE(weight_p);
+ WRITE_ONCE(dev_rx_weight, weight * dev_weight_rx_bias);
+ WRITE_ONCE(dev_tx_weight, weight * dev_weight_tx_bias);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&dev_weight_mutex);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_generic.c b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
index 82752dcbf2a2c..4a76ceeca6fdd 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_generic.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_generic.c
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static inline int qdisc_restart(struct Qdisc *q, int *packets)
void __qdisc_run(struct Qdisc *q)
{
- int quota = dev_tx_weight;
+ int quota = READ_ONCE(dev_tx_weight);
int packets;
while (qdisc_restart(q, &packets)) {
--
2.35.1
From: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4b2e3a17e9f279325712b79fb01d1493f9e3e005 ]
Looks to have been left out in an oversight.
Cc: Mahesh Bandewar <[email protected]>
Cc: Sainath Grandhi <[email protected]>
Fixes: 235a9d89da97 ('ipvtap: IP-VLAN based tap driver')
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvtap.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvtap.c b/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvtap.c
index 0bcc07f346c3e..2e517e30c5ac1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvtap.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvtap.c
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static struct notifier_block ipvtap_notifier_block __read_mostly = {
.notifier_call = ipvtap_device_event,
};
-static int ipvtap_init(void)
+static int __init ipvtap_init(void)
{
int err;
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static int ipvtap_init(void)
}
module_init(ipvtap_init);
-static void ipvtap_exit(void)
+static void __exit ipvtap_exit(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipvtap_link_ops);
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&ipvtap_notifier_block);
--
2.35.1
From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7997eff82828304b780dc0a39707e1946d6f1ebf ]
Harshit Mogalapalli says:
In ebt_do_table() function dereferencing 'private->hook_entry[hook]'
can lead to NULL pointer dereference. [..] Kernel panic:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
[..]
RIP: 0010:ebt_do_table+0x1dc/0x1ce0
Code: 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 5c 16 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8b 6c df 08 48 8d 7d 2c 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 88
[..]
Call Trace:
nf_hook_slow+0xb1/0x170
__br_forward+0x289/0x730
maybe_deliver+0x24b/0x380
br_flood+0xc6/0x390
br_dev_xmit+0xa2e/0x12c0
For some reason ebtables rejects blobs that provide entry points that are
not supported by the table, but what it should instead reject is the
opposite: blobs that DO NOT provide an entry point supported by the table.
t->valid_hooks is the bitmask of hooks (input, forward ...) that will see
packets. Providing an entry point that is not support is harmless
(never called/used), but the inverse isn't: it results in a crash
because the ebtables traverser doesn't expect a NULL blob for a location
its receiving packets for.
Instead of fixing all the individual checks, do what iptables is doing and
reject all blobs that differ from the expected hooks.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/netfilter_bridge/ebtables.h | 4 ----
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_broute.c | 8 --------
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_filter.c | 8 --------
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_nat.c | 8 --------
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 8 +-------
5 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter_bridge/ebtables.h b/include/linux/netfilter_bridge/ebtables.h
index 0773b5a032f1f..f014aee2f7184 100644
--- a/include/linux/netfilter_bridge/ebtables.h
+++ b/include/linux/netfilter_bridge/ebtables.h
@@ -98,10 +98,6 @@ struct ebt_table {
struct ebt_replace_kernel *table;
unsigned int valid_hooks;
rwlock_t lock;
- /* e.g. could be the table explicitly only allows certain
- * matches, targets, ... 0 == let it in */
- int (*check)(const struct ebt_table_info *info,
- unsigned int valid_hooks);
/* the data used by the kernel */
struct ebt_table_info *private;
struct module *me;
diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_broute.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_broute.c
index 276b60262981c..b21c8a317be73 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_broute.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_broute.c
@@ -33,18 +33,10 @@ static struct ebt_replace_kernel initial_table = {
.entries = (char *)&initial_chain,
};
-static int check(const struct ebt_table_info *info, unsigned int valid_hooks)
-{
- if (valid_hooks & ~(1 << NF_BR_BROUTING))
- return -EINVAL;
- return 0;
-}
-
static const struct ebt_table broute_table = {
.name = "broute",
.table = &initial_table,
.valid_hooks = 1 << NF_BR_BROUTING,
- .check = check,
.me = THIS_MODULE,
};
diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_filter.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_filter.c
index c41da5fac84f4..c59021989af32 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_filter.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_filter.c
@@ -41,18 +41,10 @@ static struct ebt_replace_kernel initial_table = {
.entries = (char *)initial_chains,
};
-static int check(const struct ebt_table_info *info, unsigned int valid_hooks)
-{
- if (valid_hooks & ~FILTER_VALID_HOOKS)
- return -EINVAL;
- return 0;
-}
-
static const struct ebt_table frame_filter = {
.name = "filter",
.table = &initial_table,
.valid_hooks = FILTER_VALID_HOOKS,
- .check = check,
.me = THIS_MODULE,
};
diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_nat.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_nat.c
index 08df7406ecb38..1bb12157ce09d 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_nat.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtable_nat.c
@@ -41,18 +41,10 @@ static struct ebt_replace_kernel initial_table = {
.entries = (char *)initial_chains,
};
-static int check(const struct ebt_table_info *info, unsigned int valid_hooks)
-{
- if (valid_hooks & ~NAT_VALID_HOOKS)
- return -EINVAL;
- return 0;
-}
-
static const struct ebt_table frame_nat = {
.name = "nat",
.table = &initial_table,
.valid_hooks = NAT_VALID_HOOKS,
- .check = check,
.me = THIS_MODULE,
};
diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
index a1834ad7422ce..a54149f10f7ef 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -991,8 +991,7 @@ static int do_replace_finish(struct net *net, struct ebt_replace *repl,
goto free_iterate;
}
- /* the table doesn't like it */
- if (t->check && (ret = t->check(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks)))
+ if (repl->valid_hooks != t->valid_hooks)
goto free_unlock;
if (repl->num_counters && repl->num_counters != t->private->nentries) {
@@ -1200,11 +1199,6 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net, const struct ebt_table *input_table,
if (ret != 0)
goto free_chainstack;
- if (table->check && table->check(newinfo, table->valid_hooks)) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto free_chainstack;
- }
-
table->private = newinfo;
rwlock_init(&table->lock);
mutex_lock(&ebt_mutex);
--
2.35.1
From: Dongliang Mu <[email protected]>
commit 945a9a8e448b65bec055d37eba58f711b39f66f0 upstream.
The error handling code in pvr2_hdw_create forgets to unregister the
v4l2 device. When pvr2_hdw_create returns back to pvr2_context_create,
it calls pvr2_context_destroy to destroy context, but mp->hdw is NULL,
which leads to that pvr2_hdw_destroy directly returns.
Fix this by adding v4l2_device_unregister to decrease the refcount of
usb interface.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-hdw.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-hdw.c
+++ b/drivers/media/usb/pvrusb2/pvrusb2-hdw.c
@@ -2604,6 +2604,7 @@ struct pvr2_hdw *pvr2_hdw_create(struct
del_timer_sync(&hdw->encoder_run_timer);
del_timer_sync(&hdw->encoder_wait_timer);
flush_work(&hdw->workpoll);
+ v4l2_device_unregister(&hdw->v4l2_dev);
usb_free_urb(hdw->ctl_read_urb);
usb_free_urb(hdw->ctl_write_urb);
kfree(hdw->ctl_read_buffer);
From: Karthik Alapati <[email protected]>
commit a5623a203cffe2d2b84d2f6c989d9017db1856af upstream.
Free the buffered reports before deleting the list entry.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810e72f180 (size 32):
comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294945143 (age 16.080s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
64 f3 c6 6a d1 88 07 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d..j............
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff814ac6c3>] kmemdup+0x23/0x50 mm/util.c:128
[<ffffffff8357c1d2>] kmemdup include/linux/fortify-string.h:440 [inline]
[<ffffffff8357c1d2>] hidraw_report_event+0xa2/0x150 drivers/hid/hidraw.c:521
[<ffffffff8356ddad>] hid_report_raw_event+0x27d/0x740 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:1992
[<ffffffff8356e41e>] hid_input_report+0x1ae/0x270 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2065
[<ffffffff835f0d3f>] hid_irq_in+0x1ff/0x250 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:284
[<ffffffff82d3c7f9>] __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0xf9/0x230 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1670
[<ffffffff82d3cc26>] usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x1b6/0x1d0 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1747
[<ffffffff82ef1e14>] dummy_timer+0x8e4/0x14c0 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1988
[<ffffffff812f50a8>] call_timer_fn+0x38/0x200 kernel/time/timer.c:1474
[<ffffffff812f5586>] expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1519 [inline]
[<ffffffff812f5586>] __run_timers.part.0+0x316/0x430 kernel/time/timer.c:1790
[<ffffffff812f56e4>] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1768 [inline]
[<ffffffff812f56e4>] run_timer_softirq+0x44/0x90 kernel/time/timer.c:1803
[<ffffffff848000e6>] __do_softirq+0xe6/0x2ea kernel/softirq.c:571
[<ffffffff81246db0>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:445 [inline]
[<ffffffff81246db0>] __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:650 [inline]
[<ffffffff81246db0>] irq_exit_rcu+0xc0/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:662
[<ffffffff84574f02>] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa2/0xd0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1106
[<ffffffff84600c8b>] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:649
[<ffffffff8458a070>] native_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:51 [inline]
[<ffffffff8458a070>] arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:89 [inline]
[<ffffffff8458a070>] acpi_safe_halt drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:111 [inline]
[<ffffffff8458a070>] acpi_idle_do_entry+0xc0/0xd0 drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c:554
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=19a04b43c75ed1092021010419b5e560a8172c4f
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Karthik Alapati <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/hid/hidraw.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/hid/hidraw.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/hidraw.c
@@ -354,10 +354,13 @@ static int hidraw_release(struct inode *
unsigned int minor = iminor(inode);
struct hidraw_list *list = file->private_data;
unsigned long flags;
+ int i;
mutex_lock(&minors_lock);
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidraw_table[minor]->list_lock, flags);
+ for (i = list->tail; i < list->head; i++)
+ kfree(list->buffer[i].value);
list_del(&list->node);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hidraw_table[minor]->list_lock, flags);
kfree(list);
From: Xin Xiong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9c9cb23e00ddf45679b21b4dacc11d1ae7961ebe ]
The issue happens on an error path in __xfrm_policy_check(). When the
fetching process of the object `pols[1]` fails, the function simply
returns 0, forgetting to decrement the reference count of `pols[0]`,
which is incremented earlier by either xfrm_sk_policy_lookup() or
xfrm_policy_lookup(). This may result in memory leaks.
Fix it by decreasing the reference count of `pols[0]` in that path.
Fixes: 134b0fc544ba ("IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup")
Signed-off-by: Xin Xiong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
index e1840f70c0ff0..66c23a1b8758f 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
@@ -2332,6 +2332,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (pols[1]) {
if (IS_ERR(pols[1])) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINPOLERROR);
+ xfrm_pol_put(pols[0]);
return 0;
}
pols[1]->curlft.use_time = get_seconds();
--
2.35.1
From: Jonathan Toppins <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d745b5062ad2b5da90a5e728d7ca884fc07315fd ]
This is caused by the global variable ad_ticks_per_sec being zero as
demonstrated by the reproducer script discussed below. This causes
all timer values in __ad_timer_to_ticks to be zero, resulting
in the periodic timer to never fire.
To reproduce:
Run the script in
`tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/bonding/bond-break-lacpdu-tx.sh` which
puts bonding into a state where it never transmits LACPDUs.
line 44: ip link add fbond type bond mode 4 miimon 200 \
xmit_hash_policy 1 ad_actor_sys_prio 65535 lacp_rate fast
setting bond param: ad_actor_sys_prio
given:
params.ad_actor_system = 0
call stack:
bond_option_ad_actor_sys_prio()
-> bond_3ad_update_ad_actor_settings()
-> set ad.system.sys_priority = bond->params.ad_actor_sys_prio
-> ad.system.sys_mac_addr = bond->dev->dev_addr; because
params.ad_actor_system == 0
results:
ad.system.sys_mac_addr = bond->dev->dev_addr
line 48: ip link set fbond address 52:54:00:3B:7C:A6
setting bond MAC addr
call stack:
bond->dev->dev_addr = new_mac
line 52: ip link set fbond type bond ad_actor_sys_prio 65535
setting bond param: ad_actor_sys_prio
given:
params.ad_actor_system = 0
call stack:
bond_option_ad_actor_sys_prio()
-> bond_3ad_update_ad_actor_settings()
-> set ad.system.sys_priority = bond->params.ad_actor_sys_prio
-> ad.system.sys_mac_addr = bond->dev->dev_addr; because
params.ad_actor_system == 0
results:
ad.system.sys_mac_addr = bond->dev->dev_addr
line 60: ip link set veth1-bond down master fbond
given:
params.ad_actor_system = 0
params.mode = BOND_MODE_8023AD
ad.system.sys_mac_addr == bond->dev->dev_addr
call stack:
bond_enslave
-> bond_3ad_initialize(); because first slave
-> if ad.system.sys_mac_addr != bond->dev->dev_addr
return
results:
Nothing is run in bond_3ad_initialize() because dev_addr equals
sys_mac_addr leaving the global ad_ticks_per_sec zero as it is
never initialized anywhere else.
The if check around the contents of bond_3ad_initialize() is no longer
needed due to commit 5ee14e6d336f ("bonding: 3ad: apply ad_actor settings
changes immediately") which sets ad.system.sys_mac_addr if any one of
the bonding parameters whos set function calls
bond_3ad_update_ad_actor_settings(). This is because if
ad.system.sys_mac_addr is zero it will be set to the current bond mac
address, this causes the if check to never be true.
Fixes: 5ee14e6d336f ("bonding: 3ad: apply ad_actor settings changes immediately")
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Toppins <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c | 38 ++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c
index b3eaef31b7673..a6bb7e915f74f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_3ad.c
@@ -1977,30 +1977,24 @@ void bond_3ad_initiate_agg_selection(struct bonding *bond, int timeout)
*/
void bond_3ad_initialize(struct bonding *bond, u16 tick_resolution)
{
- /* check that the bond is not initialized yet */
- if (!MAC_ADDRESS_EQUAL(&(BOND_AD_INFO(bond).system.sys_mac_addr),
- bond->dev->dev_addr)) {
-
- BOND_AD_INFO(bond).aggregator_identifier = 0;
-
- BOND_AD_INFO(bond).system.sys_priority =
- bond->params.ad_actor_sys_prio;
- if (is_zero_ether_addr(bond->params.ad_actor_system))
- BOND_AD_INFO(bond).system.sys_mac_addr =
- *((struct mac_addr *)bond->dev->dev_addr);
- else
- BOND_AD_INFO(bond).system.sys_mac_addr =
- *((struct mac_addr *)bond->params.ad_actor_system);
+ BOND_AD_INFO(bond).aggregator_identifier = 0;
+ BOND_AD_INFO(bond).system.sys_priority =
+ bond->params.ad_actor_sys_prio;
+ if (is_zero_ether_addr(bond->params.ad_actor_system))
+ BOND_AD_INFO(bond).system.sys_mac_addr =
+ *((struct mac_addr *)bond->dev->dev_addr);
+ else
+ BOND_AD_INFO(bond).system.sys_mac_addr =
+ *((struct mac_addr *)bond->params.ad_actor_system);
- /* initialize how many times this module is called in one
- * second (should be about every 100ms)
- */
- ad_ticks_per_sec = tick_resolution;
+ /* initialize how many times this module is called in one
+ * second (should be about every 100ms)
+ */
+ ad_ticks_per_sec = tick_resolution;
- bond_3ad_initiate_agg_selection(bond,
- AD_AGGREGATOR_SELECTION_TIMER *
- ad_ticks_per_sec);
- }
+ bond_3ad_initiate_agg_selection(bond,
+ AD_AGGREGATOR_SELECTION_TIMER *
+ ad_ticks_per_sec);
}
/**
--
2.35.1
From: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
commit 7df548840c496b0141fb2404b889c346380c2b22 upstream.
Older Intel CPUs that are not in the affected processor list for MMIO
Stale Data vulnerabilities currently report "Not affected" in sysfs,
which may not be correct. Vulnerability status for these older CPUs is
unknown.
Add known-not-affected CPUs to the whitelist. Report "unknown"
mitigation status for CPUs that are not in blacklist, whitelist and also
don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits that reflect hardware
immunity to MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities.
Mitigation is not deployed when the status is unknown.
[ bp: Massage, fixup. ]
Fixes: 8d50cdf8b834 ("x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale Data")
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a932c154772f2121794a5f2eded1a11013114711.1657846269.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst | 14 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 +++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 34 ++++++----
4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
@@ -230,6 +230,20 @@ The possible values in this file are:
* - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
- The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
enabled.
+ * - 'Unknown: No mitigations'
+ - The processor vulnerability status is unknown because it is
+ out of Servicing period. Mitigation is not attempted.
+
+Definitions:
+------------
+
+Servicing period: The process of providing functional and security updates to
+Intel processors or platforms, utilizing the Intel Platform Update (IPU)
+process or other similar mechanisms.
+
+End of Servicing Updates (ESU): ESU is the date at which Intel will no
+longer provide Servicing, such as through IPU or other similar update
+processes. ESU dates will typically be aligned to end of quarter.
If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to
the above information:
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -394,5 +394,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -396,7 +396,8 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigatio
u64 ia32_cap;
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
- cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN) ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off()) {
mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
return;
}
@@ -501,6 +502,8 @@ out:
pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+ else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+ pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n");
}
static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
@@ -1823,6 +1826,9 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_stat
static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Unknown: No mitigations\n");
+
if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
@@ -1933,6 +1939,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
return srbds_show_state(buf);
case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
+ case X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN:
return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
default:
@@ -1989,6 +1996,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *de
ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
- return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
+ else
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
}
#endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -905,6 +905,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(s
#define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5)
#define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6)
#define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT BIT(7)
+#define NO_MMIO BIT(8)
#define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist) \
{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -922,6 +923,11 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
VULNWL(NSC, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
/* Intel Family 6 */
+ VULNWL_INTEL(TIGERLAKE, NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(TIGERLAKE_L, NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ALDERLAKE, NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ALDERLAKE_L, NO_MMIO),
+
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
@@ -939,9 +945,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
/*
* Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
@@ -954,13 +960,13 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_X, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
- VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
- VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
- VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
{}
};
@@ -1100,10 +1106,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
* Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability,
* but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may
* not want the guest to enumerate the bug.
+ *
+ * Set X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN for CPUs that are neither in the blacklist,
+ * nor in the whitelist and also don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAP MMIO bits.
*/
- if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO) &&
- !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+ if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) {
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+ else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
+ }
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
From: Letu Ren <[email protected]>
commit 19f953e7435644b81332dd632ba1b2d80b1e37af upstream.
In `do_fb_ioctl()` of fbmem.c, if cmd is FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO, var will be
copied from user, then go through `fb_set_var()` and
`info->fbops->fb_check_var()` which could may be `pm2fb_check_var()`.
Along the path, `var->pixclock` won't be modified. This function checks
whether reciprocal of `var->pixclock` is too high. If `var->pixclock` is
zero, there will be a divide by zero error. So, it is necessary to check
whether denominator is zero to avoid crash. As this bug is found by
Syzkaller, logs are listed below.
divide error in pm2fb_check_var
Call Trace:
<TASK>
fb_set_var+0x367/0xeb0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1015
do_fb_ioctl+0x234/0x670 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1110
fb_ioctl+0xdd/0x130 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1189
Reported-by: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Letu Ren <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/video/fbdev/pm2fb.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/pm2fb.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/pm2fb.c
@@ -614,6 +614,11 @@ static int pm2fb_check_var(struct fb_var
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (!var->pixclock) {
+ DPRINTK("pixclock is zero\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (PICOS2KHZ(var->pixclock) > PM2_MAX_PIXCLOCK) {
DPRINTK("pixclock too high (%ldKHz)\n",
PICOS2KHZ(var->pixclock));
From: Bernard Pidoux <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3c53cd65dece47dd1f9d3a809f32e59d1d87b2b8 ]
Commit 3b3fd068c56e3fbea30090859216a368398e39bf added NULL check for
`rose_loopback_neigh->dev` in rose_loopback_timer() but omitted to
check rose_loopback_neigh->loopback.
It thus prevents *all* rose connect.
The reason is that a special rose_neigh loopback has a NULL device.
/proc/net/rose_neigh illustrates it via rose_neigh_show() function :
[...]
seq_printf(seq, "%05d %-9s %-4s %3d %3d %3s %3s %3lu %3lu",
rose_neigh->number,
(rose_neigh->loopback) ? "RSLOOP-0" : ax2asc(buf, &rose_neigh->callsign),
rose_neigh->dev ? rose_neigh->dev->name : "???",
rose_neigh->count,
/proc/net/rose_neigh displays special rose_loopback_neigh->loopback as
callsign RSLOOP-0:
addr callsign dev count use mode restart t0 tf digipeaters
00001 RSLOOP-0 ??? 1 2 DCE yes 0 0
By checking rose_loopback_neigh->loopback, rose_rx_call_request() is called
even in case rose_loopback_neigh->dev is NULL. This repairs rose connections.
Verification with rose client application FPAC:
FPAC-Node v 4.1.3 (built Aug 5 2022) for LINUX (help = h)
F6BVP-4 (Commands = ?) : u
Users - AX.25 Level 2 sessions :
Port Callsign Callsign AX.25 state ROSE state NetRom status
axudp F6BVP-5 -> F6BVP-9 Connected Connected ---------
Fixes: 3b3fd068c56e ("rose: Fix Null pointer dereference in rose_send_frame()")
Signed-off-by: Bernard Pidoux <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Francois Romieu <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas DL9SAU Osterried <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/rose/rose_loopback.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/rose/rose_loopback.c b/net/rose/rose_loopback.c
index c318e5c9f6df3..56eea298b8ef7 100644
--- a/net/rose/rose_loopback.c
+++ b/net/rose/rose_loopback.c
@@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ static void rose_loopback_timer(struct timer_list *unused)
}
if (frametype == ROSE_CALL_REQUEST) {
- if (!rose_loopback_neigh->dev) {
+ if (!rose_loopback_neigh->dev &&
+ !rose_loopback_neigh->loopback) {
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
--
2.35.1
From: Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>
commit ad982c3be4e60c7d39c03f782733503cbd88fd2a upstream.
Audit_alloc_mark() assign pathname to audit_mark->path, on error path
from fsnotify_add_inode_mark(), fsnotify_put_mark will free memory
of audit_mark->path, but the caller of audit_alloc_mark will free
the pathname again, so there will be double free problem.
Fix this by resetting audit_mark->path to NULL pointer on error path
from fsnotify_add_inode_mark().
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 7b1293234084d ("fsnotify: Add group pointer in fsnotify_init_mark()")
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_alloc_
ret = fsnotify_add_mark(&audit_mark->mark, inode, NULL, true);
if (ret < 0) {
+ audit_mark->path = NULL;
fsnotify_put_mark(&audit_mark->mark);
audit_mark = ERR_PTR(ret);
}
From: Denis V. Lunev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 66ba215cb51323e4e55e38fd5f250e0fae0cbc94 ]
Normal processing of ARP request (usually this is Ethernet broadcast
packet) coming to the host is looking like the following:
* the packet comes to arp_process() call and is passed through routing
procedure
* the request is put into the queue using pneigh_enqueue() if
corresponding ARP record is not local (common case for container
records on the host)
* the request is processed by timer (within 80 jiffies by default) and
ARP reply is sent from the same arp_process() using
NEIGH_CB(skb)->flags & LOCALLY_ENQUEUED condition (flag is set inside
pneigh_enqueue())
And here the problem comes. Linux kernel calls pneigh_queue_purge()
which destroys the whole queue of ARP requests on ANY network interface
start/stop event through __neigh_ifdown().
This is actually not a problem within the original world as network
interface start/stop was accessible to the host 'root' only, which
could do more destructive things. But the world is changed and there
are Linux containers available. Here container 'root' has an access
to this API and could be considered as untrusted user in the hosting
(container's) world.
Thus there is an attack vector to other containers on node when
container's root will endlessly start/stop interfaces. We have observed
similar situation on a real production node when docker container was
doing such activity and thus other containers on the node become not
accessible.
The patch proposed doing very simple thing. It drops only packets from
the same namespace in the pneigh_queue_purge() where network interface
state change is detected. This is enough to prevent the problem for the
whole node preserving original semantics of the code.
v2:
- do del_timer_sync() if queue is empty after pneigh_queue_purge()
v3:
- rebase to net tree
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Cc: Yajun Deng <[email protected]>
Cc: Roopa Prabhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <[email protected]>
Cc: Konstantin Khorenko <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Investigated-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/core/neighbour.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c
index 358e84af0210b..8af9761768e00 100644
--- a/net/core/neighbour.c
+++ b/net/core/neighbour.c
@@ -222,14 +222,23 @@ static int neigh_del_timer(struct neighbour *n)
return 0;
}
-static void pneigh_queue_purge(struct sk_buff_head *list)
+static void pneigh_queue_purge(struct sk_buff_head *list, struct net *net)
{
+ unsigned long flags;
struct sk_buff *skb;
- while ((skb = skb_dequeue(list)) != NULL) {
- dev_put(skb->dev);
- kfree_skb(skb);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&list->lock, flags);
+ skb = skb_peek(list);
+ while (skb != NULL) {
+ struct sk_buff *skb_next = skb_peek_next(skb, list);
+ if (net == NULL || net_eq(dev_net(skb->dev), net)) {
+ __skb_unlink(skb, list);
+ dev_put(skb->dev);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
+ skb = skb_next;
}
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&list->lock, flags);
}
static void neigh_flush_dev(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct net_device *dev)
@@ -295,9 +304,9 @@ int neigh_ifdown(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct net_device *dev)
write_lock_bh(&tbl->lock);
neigh_flush_dev(tbl, dev);
pneigh_ifdown_and_unlock(tbl, dev);
-
- del_timer_sync(&tbl->proxy_timer);
- pneigh_queue_purge(&tbl->proxy_queue);
+ pneigh_queue_purge(&tbl->proxy_queue, dev_net(dev));
+ if (skb_queue_empty_lockless(&tbl->proxy_queue))
+ del_timer_sync(&tbl->proxy_timer);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(neigh_ifdown);
@@ -1609,7 +1618,7 @@ int neigh_table_clear(int index, struct neigh_table *tbl)
/* It is not clean... Fix it to unload IPv6 module safely */
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&tbl->gc_work);
del_timer_sync(&tbl->proxy_timer);
- pneigh_queue_purge(&tbl->proxy_queue);
+ pneigh_queue_purge(&tbl->proxy_queue, NULL);
neigh_ifdown(tbl, NULL);
if (atomic_read(&tbl->entries))
pr_crit("neighbour leakage\n");
--
2.35.1
From: Jing Leng <[email protected]>
commit 23a0cb8e3225122496bfa79172005c587c2d64bf upstream.
When building an external module, if users don't need to separate the
compilation output and source code, they run the following command:
"make -C $(LINUX_SRC_DIR) M=$(PWD)". At this point, "$(KBUILD_EXTMOD)"
and "$(src)" are the same.
If they need to separate them, they run "make -C $(KERNEL_SRC_DIR)
O=$(KERNEL_OUT_DIR) M=$(OUT_DIR) src=$(PWD)". Before running the
command, they need to copy "Kbuild" or "Makefile" to "$(OUT_DIR)" to
prevent compilation failure.
So the kernel should change the included path to avoid the copy operation.
Signed-off-by: Jing Leng <[email protected]>
[masahiro: I do not think "M=$(OUT_DIR) src=$(PWD)" is the official way,
but this patch is a nice clean up anyway.]
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
[nsc: updated context for v4.19]
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Schier <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
scripts/Makefile.modpost | 3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/scripts/Makefile.modpost
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.modpost
@@ -51,8 +51,7 @@ obj := $(KBUILD_EXTMOD)
src := $(obj)
# Include the module's Makefile to find KBUILD_EXTRA_SYMBOLS
-include $(if $(wildcard $(KBUILD_EXTMOD)/Kbuild), \
- $(KBUILD_EXTMOD)/Kbuild, $(KBUILD_EXTMOD)/Makefile)
+include $(if $(wildcard $(src)/Kbuild), $(src)/Kbuild, $(src)/Makefile)
endif
include scripts/Makefile.lib
From: Hsin-Yi Wang <[email protected]>
commit e112b032a72c78f15d0c803c5dc6be444c2e6c66 upstream.
Currently in arm64, FDT is mapped to RO before it's passed to
early_init_dt_scan(). However, there might be some codes
(eg. commit "fdt: add support for rng-seed") that need to modify FDT
during init. Map FDT to RO after early fixups are done.
Signed-off-by: Hsin-Yi Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
[mkbestas: fixed trivial conflicts for 4.14 backport]
Signed-off-by: Michael Bestas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c | 5 +----
arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 9 ++++++++-
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 15 +--------------
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ extern void init_mem_pgprot(void);
extern void create_pgd_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, phys_addr_t phys,
unsigned long virt, phys_addr_t size,
pgprot_t prot, bool page_mappings_only);
-extern void *fixmap_remap_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys);
+extern void *fixmap_remap_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys, int *size, pgprot_t prot);
extern void mark_linear_text_alias_ro(void);
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c
@@ -65,9 +65,6 @@ out:
return default_cmdline;
}
-extern void *__init __fixmap_remap_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys, int *size,
- pgprot_t prot);
-
/*
* This routine will be executed with the kernel mapped at its default virtual
* address, and if it returns successfully, the kernel will be remapped, and
@@ -96,7 +93,7 @@ u64 __init kaslr_early_init(u64 dt_phys)
* attempt at mapping the FDT in setup_machine()
*/
early_fixmap_init();
- fdt = __fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys, &size, PAGE_KERNEL);
+ fdt = fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys, &size, PAGE_KERNEL);
if (!fdt)
return 0;
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
@@ -179,9 +179,13 @@ static void __init smp_build_mpidr_hash(
static void __init setup_machine_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys)
{
- void *dt_virt = fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys);
+ int size;
+ void *dt_virt = fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys, &size, PAGE_KERNEL);
const char *name;
+ if (dt_virt)
+ memblock_reserve(dt_phys, size);
+
if (!dt_virt || !early_init_dt_scan(dt_virt)) {
pr_crit("\n"
"Error: invalid device tree blob at physical address %pa (virtual address 0x%p)\n"
@@ -193,6 +197,9 @@ static void __init setup_machine_fdt(phy
cpu_relax();
}
+ /* Early fixups are done, map the FDT as read-only now */
+ fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys, &size, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+
name = of_flat_dt_get_machine_name();
if (!name)
return;
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ void __set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses i
}
}
-void *__init __fixmap_remap_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys, int *size, pgprot_t prot)
+void *__init fixmap_remap_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys, int *size, pgprot_t prot)
{
const u64 dt_virt_base = __fix_to_virt(FIX_FDT);
int offset;
@@ -889,19 +889,6 @@ void *__init __fixmap_remap_fdt(phys_add
return dt_virt;
}
-void *__init fixmap_remap_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys)
-{
- void *dt_virt;
- int size;
-
- dt_virt = __fixmap_remap_fdt(dt_phys, &size, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
- if (!dt_virt)
- return NULL;
-
- memblock_reserve(dt_phys, size);
- return dt_virt;
-}
-
int __init arch_ioremap_pud_supported(void)
{
/*
From: Siddh Raman Pant <[email protected]>
commit c490a0b5a4f36da3918181a8acdc6991d967c5f3 upstream.
The userspace can configure a loop using an ioctl call, wherein
a configuration of type loop_config is passed (see lo_ioctl()'s
case on line 1550 of drivers/block/loop.c). This proceeds to call
loop_configure() which in turn calls loop_set_status_from_info()
(see line 1050 of loop.c), passing &config->info which is of type
loop_info64*. This function then sets the appropriate values, like
the offset.
loop_device has lo_offset of type loff_t (see line 52 of loop.c),
which is typdef-chained to long long, whereas loop_info64 has
lo_offset of type __u64 (see line 56 of include/uapi/linux/loop.h).
The function directly copies offset from info to the device as
follows (See line 980 of loop.c):
lo->lo_offset = info->lo_offset;
This results in an overflow, which triggers a warning in iomap_iter()
due to a call to iomap_iter_done() which has:
WARN_ON_ONCE(iter->iomap.offset > iter->pos);
Thus, check for negative value during loop_set_status_from_info().
Bug report: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=c620fe14aac810396d3c3edc9ad73848bf69a29e
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Siddh Raman Pant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/block/loop.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
+++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
@@ -1212,6 +1212,11 @@ loop_get_status(struct loop_device *lo,
info->lo_number = lo->lo_number;
info->lo_offset = lo->lo_offset;
info->lo_sizelimit = lo->lo_sizelimit;
+
+ /* loff_t vars have been assigned __u64 */
+ if (lo->lo_offset < 0 || lo->lo_sizelimit < 0)
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+
info->lo_flags = lo->lo_flags;
memcpy(info->lo_file_name, lo->lo_file_name, LO_NAME_SIZE);
memcpy(info->lo_crypt_name, lo->lo_crypt_name, LO_NAME_SIZE);
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2e0c42374ee32e72948559d2ae2f7ba3dc6b977c ]
While reading netdev_budget, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
Fixes: 51b0bdedb8e7 ("[NET]: Separate two usages of netdev_max_backlog.")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/core/dev.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index 51721fb2e30cf..f6d3cbc57425c 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -5649,7 +5649,7 @@ static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
unsigned long time_limit = jiffies +
usecs_to_jiffies(netdev_budget_usecs);
- int budget = netdev_budget;
+ int budget = READ_ONCE(netdev_budget);
LIST_HEAD(list);
LIST_HEAD(repoll);
--
2.35.1
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3c9ba81d72047f2e81bb535d42856517b613aba7 ]
While reading sysctl_somaxconn, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/socket.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index c74cfe1ee1699..7bcd7053e61f2 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(listen, int, fd, int, backlog)
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (sock) {
- somaxconn = sock_net(sock->sk)->core.sysctl_somaxconn;
+ somaxconn = READ_ONCE(sock_net(sock->sk)->core.sysctl_somaxconn);
if ((unsigned int)backlog > somaxconn)
backlog = somaxconn;
--
2.35.1
From: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
commit f96f7a40874d7c746680c0b9f57cef2262ae551f upstream.
Patch series "mm/hugetlb: fix write-fault handling for shared mappings", v2.
I observed that hugetlb does not support/expect write-faults in shared
mappings that would have to map the R/O-mapped page writable -- and I
found two case where we could currently get such faults and would
erroneously map an anon page into a shared mapping.
Reproducers part of the patches.
I propose to backport both fixes to stable trees. The first fix needs a
small adjustment.
This patch (of 2):
Staring at hugetlb_wp(), one might wonder where all the logic for shared
mappings is when stumbling over a write-protected page in a shared
mapping. In fact, there is none, and so far we thought we could get away
with that because e.g., mprotect() should always do the right thing and
map all pages directly writable.
Looks like we were wrong:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define HUGETLB_SIZE (2 * 1024 * 1024u)
static void clear_softdirty(void)
{
int fd = open("/proc/self/clear_refs", O_WRONLY);
const char *ctrl = "4";
int ret;
if (fd < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "open(clear_refs) failed\n");
exit(1);
}
ret = write(fd, ctrl, strlen(ctrl));
if (ret != strlen(ctrl)) {
fprintf(stderr, "write(clear_refs) failed\n");
exit(1);
}
close(fd);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *map;
int fd;
fd = open("/dev/hugepages/tmp", O_RDWR | O_CREAT);
if (!fd) {
fprintf(stderr, "open() failed\n");
return -errno;
}
if (ftruncate(fd, HUGETLB_SIZE)) {
fprintf(stderr, "ftruncate() failed\n");
return -errno;
}
map = mmap(NULL, HUGETLB_SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
fprintf(stderr, "mmap() failed\n");
return -errno;
}
*map = 0;
if (mprotect(map, HUGETLB_SIZE, PROT_READ)) {
fprintf(stderr, "mmprotect() failed\n");
return -errno;
}
clear_softdirty();
if (mprotect(map, HUGETLB_SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE)) {
fprintf(stderr, "mmprotect() failed\n");
return -errno;
}
*map = 0;
return 0;
}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Above test fails with SIGBUS when there is only a single free hugetlb page.
# echo 1 > /sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages
# ./test
Bus error (core dumped)
And worse, with sufficient free hugetlb pages it will map an anonymous page
into a shared mapping, for example, messing up accounting during unmap
and breaking MAP_SHARED semantics:
# echo 2 > /sys/kernel/mm/hugepages/hugepages-2048kB/nr_hugepages
# ./test
# cat /proc/meminfo | grep HugePages_
HugePages_Total: 2
HugePages_Free: 1
HugePages_Rsvd: 18446744073709551615
HugePages_Surp: 0
Reason in this particular case is that vma_wants_writenotify() will
return "true", removing VM_SHARED in vma_set_page_prot() to map pages
write-protected. Let's teach vma_wants_writenotify() that hugetlb does not
support softdirty tracking.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 64e455079e1b ("mm: softdirty: enable write notifications on VMAs after VM_SOFTDIRTY cleared")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Feiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jamie Liu <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <[email protected]>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <[email protected]>
Cc: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [3.18+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/mmap.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1598,8 +1598,12 @@ int vma_wants_writenotify(struct vm_area
pgprot_val(vm_pgprot_modify(vm_page_prot, vm_flags)))
return 0;
- /* Do we need to track softdirty? */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY) && !(vm_flags & VM_SOFTDIRTY))
+ /*
+ * Do we need to track softdirty? hugetlb does not support softdirty
+ * tracking yet.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY) && !(vm_flags & VM_SOFTDIRTY) &&
+ !is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
return 1;
/* Specialty mapping? */
From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
commit b67fbebd4cf980aecbcc750e1462128bffe8ae15 upstream.
Some drivers rely on having all VMAs through which a PFN might be
accessible listed in the rmap for correctness.
However, on X86, it was possible for a VMA with stale TLB entries
to not be listed in the rmap.
This was fixed in mainline with
commit b67fbebd4cf9 ("mmu_gather: Force tlb-flush VM_PFNMAP vmas"),
but that commit relies on preceding refactoring in
commit 18ba064e42df3 ("mmu_gather: Let there be one tlb_{start,end}_vma()
implementation") and commit 1e9fdf21a4339 ("mmu_gather: Remove per arch
tlb_{start,end}_vma()").
This patch provides equivalent protection without needing that
refactoring, by forcing a TLB flush between removing PTEs in
unmap_vmas() and the call to unlink_file_vma() in free_pgtables().
[This is a stable-specific rewrite of the upstream commit!]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
mm/mmap.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2529,6 +2529,18 @@ static void unmap_region(struct mm_struc
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, start, end);
update_hiwater_rss(mm);
unmap_vmas(&tlb, vma, start, end);
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure we have no stale TLB entries by the time this mapping is
+ * removed from the rmap.
+ * Note that we don't have to worry about nested flushes here because
+ * we're holding the mm semaphore for removing the mapping - so any
+ * concurrent flush in this region has to be coming through the rmap,
+ * and we synchronize against that using the rmap lock.
+ */
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_PFNMAP|VM_MIXEDMAP)) != 0)
+ tlb_flush_mmu(&tlb);
+
free_pgtables(&tlb, vma, prev ? prev->vm_end : FIRST_USER_ADDRESS,
next ? next->vm_start : USER_PGTABLES_CEILING);
tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, start, end);
From: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 25d7a5f5a6bb15a2dae0a3f39ea5dda215024726 ]
The ixgbe_ptp_start_cyclecounter is intended to be called whenever the
cyclecounter parameters need to be changed.
Since commit a9763f3cb54c ("ixgbe: Update PTP to support X550EM_x
devices"), this function has cleared the SYSTIME registers and reset the
TSAUXC DISABLE_SYSTIME bit.
While these need to be cleared during ixgbe_ptp_reset, it is wrong to clear
them during ixgbe_ptp_start_cyclecounter. This function may be called
during both reset and link status change. When link changes, the SYSTIME
counter is still operating normally, but the cyclecounter should be updated
to account for the possibly changed parameters.
Clearing SYSTIME when link changes causes the timecounter to jump because
the cycle counter now reads zero.
Extract the SYSTIME initialization out to a new function and call this
during ixgbe_ptp_reset. This prevents the timecounter adjustment and avoids
an unnecessary reset of the current time.
This also restores the original SYSTIME clearing that occurred during
ixgbe_ptp_reset before the commit above.
Reported-by: Steve Payne <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Ilya Evenbach <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9763f3cb54c ("ixgbe: Update PTP to support X550EM_x devices")
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Gurucharan <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ptp.c | 59 +++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ptp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ptp.c
index 86d6924a2b714..ad51b521e693a 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ptp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ptp.c
@@ -1090,7 +1090,6 @@ void ixgbe_ptp_start_cyclecounter(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter)
struct cyclecounter cc;
unsigned long flags;
u32 incval = 0;
- u32 tsauxc = 0;
u32 fuse0 = 0;
/* For some of the boards below this mask is technically incorrect.
@@ -1125,18 +1124,6 @@ void ixgbe_ptp_start_cyclecounter(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter)
case ixgbe_mac_x550em_a:
case ixgbe_mac_X550:
cc.read = ixgbe_ptp_read_X550;
-
- /* enable SYSTIME counter */
- IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_SYSTIMR, 0);
- IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_SYSTIML, 0);
- IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_SYSTIMH, 0);
- tsauxc = IXGBE_READ_REG(hw, IXGBE_TSAUXC);
- IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_TSAUXC,
- tsauxc & ~IXGBE_TSAUXC_DISABLE_SYSTIME);
- IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_TSIM, IXGBE_TSIM_TXTS);
- IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_EIMS, IXGBE_EIMS_TIMESYNC);
-
- IXGBE_WRITE_FLUSH(hw);
break;
case ixgbe_mac_X540:
cc.read = ixgbe_ptp_read_82599;
@@ -1168,6 +1155,50 @@ void ixgbe_ptp_start_cyclecounter(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->tmreg_lock, flags);
}
+/**
+ * ixgbe_ptp_init_systime - Initialize SYSTIME registers
+ * @adapter: the ixgbe private board structure
+ *
+ * Initialize and start the SYSTIME registers.
+ */
+static void ixgbe_ptp_init_systime(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter)
+{
+ struct ixgbe_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
+ u32 tsauxc;
+
+ switch (hw->mac.type) {
+ case ixgbe_mac_X550EM_x:
+ case ixgbe_mac_x550em_a:
+ case ixgbe_mac_X550:
+ tsauxc = IXGBE_READ_REG(hw, IXGBE_TSAUXC);
+
+ /* Reset SYSTIME registers to 0 */
+ IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_SYSTIMR, 0);
+ IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_SYSTIML, 0);
+ IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_SYSTIMH, 0);
+
+ /* Reset interrupt settings */
+ IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_TSIM, IXGBE_TSIM_TXTS);
+ IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_EIMS, IXGBE_EIMS_TIMESYNC);
+
+ /* Activate the SYSTIME counter */
+ IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_TSAUXC,
+ tsauxc & ~IXGBE_TSAUXC_DISABLE_SYSTIME);
+ break;
+ case ixgbe_mac_X540:
+ case ixgbe_mac_82599EB:
+ /* Reset SYSTIME registers to 0 */
+ IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_SYSTIML, 0);
+ IXGBE_WRITE_REG(hw, IXGBE_SYSTIMH, 0);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Other devices aren't supported */
+ return;
+ };
+
+ IXGBE_WRITE_FLUSH(hw);
+}
+
/**
* ixgbe_ptp_reset
* @adapter: the ixgbe private board structure
@@ -1194,6 +1225,8 @@ void ixgbe_ptp_reset(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter)
ixgbe_ptp_start_cyclecounter(adapter);
+ ixgbe_ptp_init_systime(adapter);
+
spin_lock_irqsave(&adapter->tmreg_lock, flags);
timecounter_init(&adapter->hw_tc, &adapter->hw_cc,
ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()));
--
2.35.1
From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
commit b840304fb46cdf7012722f456bce06f151b3e81b upstream.
This attempts to fix the follow errors:
In function 'memcmp',
inlined from 'bacmp' at ./include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h:347:9,
inlined from 'l2cap_global_chan_by_psm' at
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:2003:15:
./include/linux/fortify-string.h:44:33: error: '__builtin_memcmp'
specified bound 6 exceeds source size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread]
44 | #define __underlying_memcmp __builtin_memcmp
| ^
./include/linux/fortify-string.h:420:16: note: in expansion of macro
'__underlying_memcmp'
420 | return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In function 'memcmp',
inlined from 'bacmp' at ./include/net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h:347:9,
inlined from 'l2cap_global_chan_by_psm' at
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:2004:15:
./include/linux/fortify-string.h:44:33: error: '__builtin_memcmp'
specified bound 6 exceeds source size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread]
44 | #define __underlying_memcmp __builtin_memcmp
| ^
./include/linux/fortify-string.h:420:16: note: in expansion of macro
'__underlying_memcmp'
420 | return __underlying_memcmp(p, q, size);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fixes: 332f1795ca20 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix l2cap_global_chan_by_psm regression")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Cc: Sudip Mukherjee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -1826,11 +1826,11 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_global_c
src_match = !bacmp(&c->src, src);
dst_match = !bacmp(&c->dst, dst);
if (src_match && dst_match) {
- c = l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero(c);
- if (c) {
- read_unlock(&chan_list_lock);
- return c;
- }
+ if (!l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero(c))
+ continue;
+
+ read_unlock(&chan_list_lock);
+ return c;
}
/* Closest match */
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d2154b0afa73c0159b2856f875c6b4fe7cf6a95e ]
While reading sysctl_tstamp_allow_data, it can be changed
concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
Fixes: b245be1f4db1 ("net-timestamp: no-payload only sysctl")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/core/skbuff.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index 629997753f69b..11d0ffc51c24a 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -4352,7 +4352,7 @@ static bool skb_may_tx_timestamp(struct sock *sk, bool tsonly)
{
bool ret;
- if (likely(sysctl_tstamp_allow_data || tsonly))
+ if (likely(READ_ONCE(sysctl_tstamp_allow_data) || tsonly))
return true;
read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
--
2.35.1
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fa45d484c52c73f79db2c23b0cdfc6c6455093ad ]
While reading netdev_budget_usecs, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
Fixes: 7acf8a1e8a28 ("Replace 2 jiffies with sysctl netdev_budget_usecs to enable softirq tuning")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/core/dev.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index f6d3cbc57425c..4741c239af170 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -5648,7 +5648,7 @@ static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
{
struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
unsigned long time_limit = jiffies +
- usecs_to_jiffies(netdev_budget_usecs);
+ usecs_to_jiffies(READ_ONCE(netdev_budget_usecs));
int budget = READ_ONCE(netdev_budget);
LIST_HEAD(list);
LIST_HEAD(repoll);
--
2.35.1
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e59ef36f0795696ab229569c153936bfd068d21c ]
While reading sysctl_net_busy_read, it can be changed concurrently.
Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
Fixes: 2d48d67fa8cd ("net: poll/select low latency socket support")
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/core/sock.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index bbf9517218ff3..002c91dd7191f 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -2783,7 +2783,7 @@ void sock_init_data(struct socket *sock, struct sock *sk)
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL
sk->sk_napi_id = 0;
- sk->sk_ll_usec = sysctl_net_busy_read;
+ sk->sk_ll_usec = READ_ONCE(sysctl_net_busy_read);
#endif
sk->sk_max_pacing_rate = ~0U;
--
2.35.1
From: Gayatri Kammela <[email protected]>
commit 6e1c32c5dbb4b90eea8f964c2869d0bde050dbe0 upstream.
Add the model numbers/CPUIDs of Tiger Lake mobile and desktop to the
Intel family.
Suggested-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gayatri Kammela <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Rahul Tanwar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE 0x97
#define INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L 0x9A
+#define INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE_L 0x8C
+#define INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE 0x8D
+
/* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */
#define INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL 0x1C /* Diamondville, Pineview */
From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
commit 2555283eb40df89945557273121e9393ef9b542b upstream.
anon_vma->degree tracks the combined number of child anon_vmas and VMAs
that use the anon_vma as their ->anon_vma.
anon_vma_clone() then assumes that for any anon_vma attached to
src->anon_vma_chain other than src->anon_vma, it is impossible for it to
be a leaf node of the VMA tree, meaning that for such VMAs ->degree is
elevated by 1 because of a child anon_vma, meaning that if ->degree
equals 1 there are no VMAs that use the anon_vma as their ->anon_vma.
This assumption is wrong because the ->degree optimization leads to leaf
nodes being abandoned on anon_vma_clone() - an existing anon_vma is
reused and no new parent-child relationship is created. So it is
possible to reuse an anon_vma for one VMA while it is still tied to
another VMA.
This is an issue because is_mergeable_anon_vma() and its callers assume
that if two VMAs have the same ->anon_vma, the list of anon_vmas
attached to the VMAs is guaranteed to be the same. When this assumption
is violated, vma_merge() can merge pages into a VMA that is not attached
to the corresponding anon_vma, leading to dangling page->mapping
pointers that will be dereferenced during rmap walks.
Fix it by separately tracking the number of child anon_vmas and the
number of VMAs using the anon_vma as their ->anon_vma.
Fixes: 7a3ef208e662 ("mm: prevent endless growth of anon_vma hierarchy")
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/linux/rmap.h | 7 +++++--
mm/rmap.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/rmap.h
+++ b/include/linux/rmap.h
@@ -39,12 +39,15 @@ struct anon_vma {
atomic_t refcount;
/*
- * Count of child anon_vmas and VMAs which points to this anon_vma.
+ * Count of child anon_vmas. Equals to the count of all anon_vmas that
+ * have ->parent pointing to this one, including itself.
*
* This counter is used for making decision about reusing anon_vma
* instead of forking new one. See comments in function anon_vma_clone.
*/
- unsigned degree;
+ unsigned long num_children;
+ /* Count of VMAs whose ->anon_vma pointer points to this object. */
+ unsigned long num_active_vmas;
struct anon_vma *parent; /* Parent of this anon_vma */
--- a/mm/rmap.c
+++ b/mm/rmap.c
@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ static inline struct anon_vma *anon_vma_
anon_vma = kmem_cache_alloc(anon_vma_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (anon_vma) {
atomic_set(&anon_vma->refcount, 1);
- anon_vma->degree = 1; /* Reference for first vma */
+ anon_vma->num_children = 0;
+ anon_vma->num_active_vmas = 0;
anon_vma->parent = anon_vma;
/*
* Initialise the anon_vma root to point to itself. If called
@@ -190,6 +191,7 @@ int __anon_vma_prepare(struct vm_area_st
anon_vma = anon_vma_alloc();
if (unlikely(!anon_vma))
goto out_enomem_free_avc;
+ anon_vma->num_children++; /* self-parent link for new root */
allocated = anon_vma;
}
@@ -199,8 +201,7 @@ int __anon_vma_prepare(struct vm_area_st
if (likely(!vma->anon_vma)) {
vma->anon_vma = anon_vma;
anon_vma_chain_link(vma, avc, anon_vma);
- /* vma reference or self-parent link for new root */
- anon_vma->degree++;
+ anon_vma->num_active_vmas++;
allocated = NULL;
avc = NULL;
}
@@ -279,19 +280,19 @@ int anon_vma_clone(struct vm_area_struct
anon_vma_chain_link(dst, avc, anon_vma);
/*
- * Reuse existing anon_vma if its degree lower than two,
- * that means it has no vma and only one anon_vma child.
+ * Reuse existing anon_vma if it has no vma and only one
+ * anon_vma child.
*
- * Do not chose parent anon_vma, otherwise first child
- * will always reuse it. Root anon_vma is never reused:
+ * Root anon_vma is never reused:
* it has self-parent reference and at least one child.
*/
- if (!dst->anon_vma && anon_vma != src->anon_vma &&
- anon_vma->degree < 2)
+ if (!dst->anon_vma &&
+ anon_vma->num_children < 2 &&
+ anon_vma->num_active_vmas == 0)
dst->anon_vma = anon_vma;
}
if (dst->anon_vma)
- dst->anon_vma->degree++;
+ dst->anon_vma->num_active_vmas++;
unlock_anon_vma_root(root);
return 0;
@@ -341,6 +342,7 @@ int anon_vma_fork(struct vm_area_struct
anon_vma = anon_vma_alloc();
if (!anon_vma)
goto out_error;
+ anon_vma->num_active_vmas++;
avc = anon_vma_chain_alloc(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!avc)
goto out_error_free_anon_vma;
@@ -361,7 +363,7 @@ int anon_vma_fork(struct vm_area_struct
vma->anon_vma = anon_vma;
anon_vma_lock_write(anon_vma);
anon_vma_chain_link(vma, avc, anon_vma);
- anon_vma->parent->degree++;
+ anon_vma->parent->num_children++;
anon_vma_unlock_write(anon_vma);
return 0;
@@ -393,7 +395,7 @@ void unlink_anon_vmas(struct vm_area_str
* to free them outside the lock.
*/
if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&anon_vma->rb_root.rb_root)) {
- anon_vma->parent->degree--;
+ anon_vma->parent->num_children--;
continue;
}
@@ -401,7 +403,7 @@ void unlink_anon_vmas(struct vm_area_str
anon_vma_chain_free(avc);
}
if (vma->anon_vma)
- vma->anon_vma->degree--;
+ vma->anon_vma->num_active_vmas--;
unlock_anon_vma_root(root);
/*
@@ -412,7 +414,8 @@ void unlink_anon_vmas(struct vm_area_str
list_for_each_entry_safe(avc, next, &vma->anon_vma_chain, same_vma) {
struct anon_vma *anon_vma = avc->anon_vma;
- VM_WARN_ON(anon_vma->degree);
+ VM_WARN_ON(anon_vma->num_children);
+ VM_WARN_ON(anon_vma->num_active_vmas);
put_anon_vma(anon_vma);
list_del(&avc->same_vma);
From: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7b6670b03641ac308aaa6fa2e6f964ac993b5ea3 ]
When booting under KVM the following error messages are issued:
hypfs.7f5705: The hardware system does not support hypfs
hypfs.7a79f0: Initialization of hypfs failed with rc=-61
Demote the severity of first message from "error" to "info" and issue
the second message only in other error cases.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
[arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.c changed description]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.c | 2 +-
arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.c b/arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.c
index be8cc53204b50..46338c65c75bf 100644
--- a/arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.c
+++ b/arch/s390/hypfs/hypfs_diag.c
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ __init int hypfs_diag_init(void)
int rc;
if (diag204_probe()) {
- pr_err("The hardware system does not support hypfs\n");
+ pr_info("The hardware system does not support hypfs\n");
return -ENODATA;
}
if (diag204_info_type == DIAG204_INFO_EXT) {
diff --git a/arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c b/arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c
index 32f5b3fb069f3..2a34c075fef66 100644
--- a/arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c
+++ b/arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c
@@ -494,9 +494,9 @@ static int __init hypfs_init(void)
hypfs_vm_exit();
fail_hypfs_diag_exit:
hypfs_diag_exit();
+ pr_err("Initialization of hypfs failed with rc=%i\n", rc);
fail_dbfs_exit:
hypfs_dbfs_exit();
- pr_err("Initialization of hypfs failed with rc=%i\n", rc);
return rc;
}
device_initcall(hypfs_init)
--
2.35.1
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 94254f990c07e9ddf1634e0b727fab821c3b5bf9 ]
Instead of offset and length are truncation to u8, report ERANGE.
Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/nft_payload.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c b/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c
index fd87216bc0a99..04b9df9e39554 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c
@@ -398,6 +398,7 @@ nft_payload_select_ops(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
{
enum nft_payload_bases base;
unsigned int offset, len;
+ int err;
if (tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_BASE] == NULL ||
tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_OFFSET] == NULL ||
@@ -423,8 +424,13 @@ nft_payload_select_ops(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
if (tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_DREG] == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- offset = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_OFFSET]));
- len = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_LEN]));
+ err = nft_parse_u32_check(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_OFFSET], U8_MAX, &offset);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+
+ err = nft_parse_u32_check(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_LEN], U8_MAX, &len);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
if (len <= 4 && is_power_of_2(len) && IS_ALIGNED(offset, len) &&
base != NFT_PAYLOAD_LL_HEADER)
--
2.35.1
From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
commit d5485d9dd24e1d04e5509916515260186eb1455c upstream.
It is not allowed to call kfree_skb() from hardware interrupt
context or with interrupts being disabled. So add all skb to
a tmp list, then free them after spin_unlock_irqrestore() at
once.
Fixes: 66ba215cb513 ("neigh: fix possible DoS due to net iface start/stop loop")
Suggested-by: Denis V. Lunev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/core/neighbour.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/core/neighbour.c
+++ b/net/core/neighbour.c
@@ -224,21 +224,27 @@ static int neigh_del_timer(struct neighb
static void pneigh_queue_purge(struct sk_buff_head *list, struct net *net)
{
+ struct sk_buff_head tmp;
unsigned long flags;
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ skb_queue_head_init(&tmp);
spin_lock_irqsave(&list->lock, flags);
skb = skb_peek(list);
while (skb != NULL) {
struct sk_buff *skb_next = skb_peek_next(skb, list);
if (net == NULL || net_eq(dev_net(skb->dev), net)) {
__skb_unlink(skb, list);
- dev_put(skb->dev);
- kfree_skb(skb);
+ __skb_queue_tail(&tmp, skb);
}
skb = skb_next;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&list->lock, flags);
+
+ while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&tmp))) {
+ dev_put(skb->dev);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
}
static void neigh_flush_dev(struct neigh_table *tbl, struct net_device *dev)
From: Quanyang Wang <[email protected]>
commit 0c7d7cc2b4fe2e74ef8728f030f0f1674f9f6aee upstream.
There are two problems with the current code of memory_intersects:
First, it doesn't check whether the region (begin, end) falls inside the
region (virt, vend), that is (virt < begin && vend > end).
The second problem is if vend is equal to begin, it will return true but
this is wrong since vend (virt + size) is not the last address of the
memory region but (virt + size -1) is. The wrong determination will
trigger the misreporting when the function check_for_illegal_area calls
memory_intersects to check if the dma region intersects with stext region.
The misreporting is as below (stext is at 0x80100000):
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 77 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1073 check_for_illegal_area+0x130/0x168
DMA-API: chipidea-usb2 e0002000.usb: device driver maps memory from kernel text or rodata [addr=800f0000] [len=65536]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 77 Comm: usb-storage Not tainted 5.19.0-yocto-standard #5
Hardware name: Xilinx Zynq Platform
unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c
show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70
dump_stack_lvl from __warn+0xb0/0x198
__warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x80/0xb4
warn_slowpath_fmt from check_for_illegal_area+0x130/0x168
check_for_illegal_area from debug_dma_map_sg+0x94/0x368
debug_dma_map_sg from __dma_map_sg_attrs+0x114/0x128
__dma_map_sg_attrs from dma_map_sg_attrs+0x18/0x24
dma_map_sg_attrs from usb_hcd_map_urb_for_dma+0x250/0x3b4
usb_hcd_map_urb_for_dma from usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x194/0x214
usb_hcd_submit_urb from usb_sg_wait+0xa4/0x118
usb_sg_wait from usb_stor_bulk_transfer_sglist+0xa0/0xec
usb_stor_bulk_transfer_sglist from usb_stor_bulk_srb+0x38/0x70
usb_stor_bulk_srb from usb_stor_Bulk_transport+0x150/0x360
usb_stor_Bulk_transport from usb_stor_invoke_transport+0x38/0x440
usb_stor_invoke_transport from usb_stor_control_thread+0x1e0/0x238
usb_stor_control_thread from kthread+0xf8/0x104
kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c
Refactor memory_intersects to fix the two problems above.
Before the 1d7db834a027e ("dma-debug: use memory_intersects()
directly"), memory_intersects is called only by printk_late_init:
printk_late_init -> init_section_intersects ->memory_intersects.
There were few places where memory_intersects was called.
When commit 1d7db834a027e ("dma-debug: use memory_intersects()
directly") was merged and CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG is enabled, the DMA
subsystem uses it to check for an illegal area and the calltrace above
is triggered.
[[email protected]: fix nearby comment typo]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 979559362516 ("asm/sections: add helpers to check for section data")
Signed-off-by: Quanyang Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Thierry Reding <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
include/asm-generic/sections.h | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/include/asm-generic/sections.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/sections.h
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static inline bool memory_contains(void
/**
* memory_intersects - checks if the region occupied by an object intersects
* with another memory region
- * @begin: virtual address of the beginning of the memory regien
+ * @begin: virtual address of the beginning of the memory region
* @end: virtual address of the end of the memory region
* @virt: virtual address of the memory object
* @size: size of the memory object
@@ -105,7 +105,10 @@ static inline bool memory_intersects(voi
{
void *vend = virt + size;
- return (virt >= begin && virt < end) || (vend >= begin && vend < end);
+ if (virt < end && vend > begin)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
}
/**
From: Guoqing Jiang <[email protected]>
commit 0dd84b319352bb8ba64752d4e45396d8b13e6018 upstream.
>From the link [1], we can see raid1d was running even after the path
raid_dtr -> md_stop -> __md_stop.
Let's stop write first in destructor to align with normal md-raid to
fix the KASAN issue.
[1]. https://lore.kernel.org/linux-raid/CAPhsuW5gc4AakdGNdF8ubpezAuDLFOYUO_sfMZcec6hQFm8nhg@mail.gmail.com/T/#m7f12bf90481c02c6d2da68c64aeed4779b7df74a
Fixes: 48df498daf62 ("md: move bitmap_destroy to the beginning of __md_stop")
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
drivers/md/md.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/drivers/md/md.c
+++ b/drivers/md/md.c
@@ -5908,6 +5908,7 @@ void md_stop(struct mddev *mddev)
/* stop the array and free an attached data structures.
* This is called from dm-raid
*/
+ __md_stop_writes(mddev);
__md_stop(mddev);
if (mddev->bio_set)
bioset_free(mddev->bio_set);
From: Goldwyn Rodrigues <[email protected]>
commit b51111271b0352aa596c5ae8faf06939e91b3b68 upstream.
For a filesystem which has btrfs read-only property set to true, all
write operations including xattr should be denied. However, security
xattr can still be changed even if btrfs ro property is true.
This happens because xattr_permission() does not have any restrictions
on security.*, system.* and in some cases trusted.* from VFS and
the decision is left to the underlying filesystem. See comments in
xattr_permission() for more details.
This patch checks if the root is read-only before performing the set
xattr operation.
Testcase:
DEV=/dev/vdb
MNT=/mnt
mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT
echo "file one" > $MNT/f1
setfattr -n "security.one" -v 2 $MNT/f1
btrfs property set /mnt ro true
setfattr -n "security.one" -v 1 $MNT/f1
umount $MNT
CC: [email protected] # 4.9+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
fs/btrfs/xattr.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/xattr.c
@@ -378,6 +378,9 @@ static int btrfs_xattr_handler_get(const
struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
{
+ if (btrfs_root_readonly(BTRFS_I(inode)->root))
+ return -EROFS;
+
name = xattr_full_name(handler, name);
return __btrfs_getxattr(inode, name, buffer, size);
}
From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
commit 7ae1f5508d9a33fd58ed3059bd2d569961e3b8bd upstream.
The exception handler is broken for unaligned memory acceses with fldw
and fstw instructions, because it trashes or uses randomly some other
floating point register than the one specified in the instruction word
on loads and stores.
The instruction "fldw 0(addr),%fr22L" (and the other fldw/fstw
instructions) encode the target register (%fr22) in the rightmost 5 bits
of the instruction word. The 7th rightmost bit of the instruction word
defines if the left or right half of %fr22 should be used.
While processing unaligned address accesses, the FR3() define is used to
extract the offset into the local floating-point register set. But the
calculation in FR3() was buggy, so that for example instead of %fr22,
register %fr12 [((22 * 2) & 0x1f) = 12] was used.
This bug has been since forever in the parisc kernel and I wonder why it
wasn't detected earlier. Interestingly I noticed this bug just because
the libime debian package failed to build on *native* hardware, while it
successfully built in qemu.
This patch corrects the bitshift and masking calculation in FR3().
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
#define R1(i) (((i)>>21)&0x1f)
#define R2(i) (((i)>>16)&0x1f)
#define R3(i) ((i)&0x1f)
-#define FR3(i) ((((i)<<1)&0x1f)|(((i)>>6)&1))
+#define FR3(i) ((((i)&0x1f)<<1)|(((i)>>6)&1))
#define IM(i,n) (((i)>>1&((1<<(n-1))-1))|((i)&1?((0-1L)<<(n-1)):0))
#define IM5_2(i) IM((i)>>16,5)
#define IM5_3(i) IM((i),5)
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7044ab281febae9e2fa9b0b247693d6026166293 ]
Instead report ERANGE if csum_offset is too long, and EOPNOTSUPP if type
is not support.
Fixes: 7ec3f7b47b8d ("netfilter: nft_payload: add packet mangling support")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/netfilter/nft_payload.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c b/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c
index 04b9df9e39554..5732b32ab9320 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c
@@ -332,6 +332,8 @@ static int nft_payload_set_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
const struct nlattr * const tb[])
{
struct nft_payload_set *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr);
+ u32 csum_offset, csum_type = NFT_PAYLOAD_CSUM_NONE;
+ int err;
priv->base = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_BASE]));
priv->offset = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_OFFSET]));
@@ -339,11 +341,15 @@ static int nft_payload_set_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
priv->sreg = nft_parse_register(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_SREG]);
if (tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_CSUM_TYPE])
- priv->csum_type =
- ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_CSUM_TYPE]));
- if (tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_CSUM_OFFSET])
- priv->csum_offset =
- ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_CSUM_OFFSET]));
+ csum_type = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_CSUM_TYPE]));
+ if (tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_CSUM_OFFSET]) {
+ err = nft_parse_u32_check(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_CSUM_OFFSET], U8_MAX,
+ &csum_offset);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ priv->csum_offset = csum_offset;
+ }
if (tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_CSUM_FLAGS]) {
u32 flags;
@@ -354,13 +360,14 @@ static int nft_payload_set_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
priv->csum_flags = flags;
}
- switch (priv->csum_type) {
+ switch (csum_type) {
case NFT_PAYLOAD_CSUM_NONE:
case NFT_PAYLOAD_CSUM_INET:
break;
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+ priv->csum_type = csum_type;
return nft_validate_register_load(priv->sreg, priv->len);
}
--
2.35.1
On Fri, Sep 02, 2022 at 02:18:24PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.292 release.
> There are 42 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 04 Sep 2022 12:13:47 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 170 pass: 170 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 421 pass: 421 fail: 0
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Guenter
On Fri, 2 Sept 2022 at 17:52, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.292 release.
> There are 42 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sun, 04 Sep 2022 12:13:47 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.292-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Results from Linaro's test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <[email protected]>
## Build
* kernel: 4.14.292-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-4.14.y
* git commit: 3eabc273fb30895fa15e9a0381c946b9d826b51d
* git describe: v4.14.291-43-g3eabc273fb30
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.14.y/build/v4.14.291-43-g3eabc273fb30
## No test Regressions (compared to v4.14.291)
## No metric Regressions (compared to v4.14.291)
## No test Fixes (compared to v4.14.291)
## No metric Fixes (compared to v4.14.291)
## Test result summary
total: 84645, pass: 73321, fail: 727, skip: 10171, xfail: 426
## Build Summary
* arc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 281 total, 276 passed, 5 failed
* arm64: 50 total, 47 passed, 3 failed
* i386: 26 total, 25 passed, 1 failed
* mips: 30 total, 30 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 16 total, 16 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 12 total, 9 passed, 3 failed
* sh: 24 total, 24 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 48 total, 47 passed, 1 failed
## Test suites summary
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-fsx
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* rcutorture
* v4l2-compliance
* vdso
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org