Currently, krealloc() always calls ksize(), which unpoisons the whole
object including the redzone. This is inefficient, as kasan_krealloc()
repoisons the redzone for objects that fit into the same buffer.
This patch changes krealloc() instrumentation to use uninstrumented
__ksize() that doesn't unpoison the memory. Instead, kasan_kreallos()
is changed to unpoison the memory excluding the redzone.
For objects that don't fit into the old allocation, this patch disables
KASAN accessibility checks when copying memory into a new object instead
of unpoisoning it.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
---
mm/kasan/common.c | 12 ++++++++++--
mm/slab_common.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 7ea643f7e69c..a8a67dca5e55 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
/*
* The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_slab_alloc() for
- * kmalloc() or by ksize() for krealloc().
+ * kmalloc() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
*/
/*
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
/*
* The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_alloc_pages() for
- * alloc_pages() or by ksize() for krealloc().
+ * alloc_pages() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
*/
/*
@@ -554,8 +554,16 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
return (void *)object;
+ /*
+ * Unpoison the object's data.
+ * Part of it might already have been unpoisoned, but it's unknown
+ * how big that part is.
+ */
+ kasan_unpoison(object, size);
+
page = virt_to_head_page(object);
+ /* Piggy-back on kmalloc() instrumentation to poison the redzone. */
if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
else
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index dad70239b54c..60a2f49df6ce 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1140,19 +1140,27 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size,
void *ret;
size_t ks;
- if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p)) && !kasan_check_byte(p))
- return NULL;
-
- ks = ksize(p);
+ /* Don't use instrumented ksize to allow precise KASAN poisoning. */
+ if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p))) {
+ if (!kasan_check_byte(p))
+ return NULL;
+ ks = kfence_ksize(p) ?: __ksize(p);
+ } else
+ ks = 0;
+ /* If the object still fits, repoison it precisely. */
if (ks >= new_size) {
p = kasan_krealloc((void *)p, new_size, flags);
return (void *)p;
}
ret = kmalloc_track_caller(new_size, flags);
- if (ret && p)
- memcpy(ret, p, ks);
+ if (ret && p) {
+ /* Disable KASAN checks as the object's redzone is accessed. */
+ kasan_disable_current();
+ memcpy(ret, kasan_reset_tag(p), ks);
+ kasan_enable_current();
+ }
return ret;
}
--
2.30.0.365.g02bc693789-goog
On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 06:34PM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> Currently, krealloc() always calls ksize(), which unpoisons the whole
> object including the redzone. This is inefficient, as kasan_krealloc()
> repoisons the redzone for objects that fit into the same buffer.
>
> This patch changes krealloc() instrumentation to use uninstrumented
> __ksize() that doesn't unpoison the memory. Instead, kasan_kreallos()
> is changed to unpoison the memory excluding the redzone.
>
> For objects that don't fit into the old allocation, this patch disables
> KASAN accessibility checks when copying memory into a new object instead
> of unpoisoning it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]>
Clarification below.
> ---
> mm/kasan/common.c | 12 ++++++++++--
> mm/slab_common.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
> 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index 7ea643f7e69c..a8a67dca5e55 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
>
> /*
> * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_slab_alloc() for
> - * kmalloc() or by ksize() for krealloc().
> + * kmalloc() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
> */
>
> /*
> @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
>
> /*
> * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_alloc_pages() for
> - * alloc_pages() or by ksize() for krealloc().
> + * alloc_pages() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
> */
>
> /*
> @@ -554,8 +554,16 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
> if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
> return (void *)object;
>
> + /*
> + * Unpoison the object's data.
> + * Part of it might already have been unpoisoned, but it's unknown
> + * how big that part is.
> + */
> + kasan_unpoison(object, size);
> +
> page = virt_to_head_page(object);
>
> + /* Piggy-back on kmalloc() instrumentation to poison the redzone. */
> if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
> return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
> else
> diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
> index dad70239b54c..60a2f49df6ce 100644
> --- a/mm/slab_common.c
> +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
> @@ -1140,19 +1140,27 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size,
> void *ret;
> size_t ks;
>
> - if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p)) && !kasan_check_byte(p))
> - return NULL;
> -
> - ks = ksize(p);
> + /* Don't use instrumented ksize to allow precise KASAN poisoning. */
> + if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p))) {
> + if (!kasan_check_byte(p))
> + return NULL;
Just checking: Check byte returns true if the object is not tracked by KASAN, right? I.e. if it's a KFENCE object, kasan_check_byte() always returns true.
> + ks = kfence_ksize(p) ?: __ksize(p);
> + } else
> + ks = 0;
>
> + /* If the object still fits, repoison it precisely. */
> if (ks >= new_size) {
> p = kasan_krealloc((void *)p, new_size, flags);
> return (void *)p;
> }
>
> ret = kmalloc_track_caller(new_size, flags);
> - if (ret && p)
> - memcpy(ret, p, ks);
> + if (ret && p) {
> + /* Disable KASAN checks as the object's redzone is accessed. */
> + kasan_disable_current();
> + memcpy(ret, kasan_reset_tag(p), ks);
> + kasan_enable_current();
> + }
>
> return ret;
> }
> --
> 2.30.0.365.g02bc693789-goog
>
On Mon, Feb 8, 2021 at 11:48 AM Marco Elver <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Feb 05, 2021 at 06:34PM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> > Currently, krealloc() always calls ksize(), which unpoisons the whole
> > object including the redzone. This is inefficient, as kasan_krealloc()
> > repoisons the redzone for objects that fit into the same buffer.
> >
> > This patch changes krealloc() instrumentation to use uninstrumented
> > __ksize() that doesn't unpoison the memory. Instead, kasan_kreallos()
> > is changed to unpoison the memory excluding the redzone.
> >
> > For objects that don't fit into the old allocation, this patch disables
> > KASAN accessibility checks when copying memory into a new object instead
> > of unpoisoning it.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
>
> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]>
>
> Clarification below.
>
> > ---
> > mm/kasan/common.c | 12 ++++++++++--
> > mm/slab_common.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
> > 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > index 7ea643f7e69c..a8a67dca5e55 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> > @@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
> >
> > /*
> > * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_slab_alloc() for
> > - * kmalloc() or by ksize() for krealloc().
> > + * kmalloc() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
> > */
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
> >
> > /*
> > * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_alloc_pages() for
> > - * alloc_pages() or by ksize() for krealloc().
> > + * alloc_pages() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
> > */
> >
> > /*
> > @@ -554,8 +554,16 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag
> > if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
> > return (void *)object;
> >
> > + /*
> > + * Unpoison the object's data.
> > + * Part of it might already have been unpoisoned, but it's unknown
> > + * how big that part is.
> > + */
> > + kasan_unpoison(object, size);
> > +
> > page = virt_to_head_page(object);
> >
> > + /* Piggy-back on kmalloc() instrumentation to poison the redzone. */
> > if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
> > return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
> > else
> > diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
> > index dad70239b54c..60a2f49df6ce 100644
> > --- a/mm/slab_common.c
> > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
> > @@ -1140,19 +1140,27 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size,
> > void *ret;
> > size_t ks;
> >
> > - if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p)) && !kasan_check_byte(p))
> > - return NULL;
> > -
> > - ks = ksize(p);
> > + /* Don't use instrumented ksize to allow precise KASAN poisoning. */
> > + if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p))) {
> > + if (!kasan_check_byte(p))
> > + return NULL;
>
> Just checking: Check byte returns true if the object is not tracked by KASAN, right? I.e. if it's a KFENCE object, kasan_check_byte() always returns true.
kasan_check_byte() still performs the check, but since KFENCE objects
are never poisoned, the check always passes.
Thanks!