Hello,
syzbot found the following crash on:
HEAD commit: ca16eb342ebe Merge tag 'for-linus-20180906' of git://git.k..
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=14cad421400000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6c9564cd177daf0c
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ac488b9811036cea7ea0
compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this crash yet.
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: [email protected]
SELinux: policydb version 983061 does not match my version range 15-31
SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map
Unknown ioctl 1075883590
Unknown ioctl 1075883590
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7505 at mm/slab_common.c:1031 kmalloc_slab+0x56/0x70
mm/slab_common.c:1031
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 1 PID: 7505 Comm: syz-executor7 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2+ #4
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
panic+0x238/0x4e7 kernel/panic.c:184
__warn.cold.8+0x163/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:536
report_bug+0x252/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:186
fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline]
do_error_trap+0x1fc/0x4d0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296
do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:316
invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:993
RIP: 0010:kmalloc_slab+0x56/0x70 mm/slab_common.c:1031
Code: c5 40 db f2 87 5d c3 b8 10 00 00 00 48 85 ff 74 f4 83 ef 01 c1 ef 03
0f b6 87 60 da f2 87 eb d8 31 c0 81 e6 00 02 00 00 75 db <0f> 0b 5d c3 48
8b 04 c5 80 da f2 87 5d c3 66 90 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
RSP: 0018:ffff88018540f280 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000299a7ba5 RCX: ffffc900024eb000
RDX: 00000000000018a3 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000299a7ba6
RBP: ffff88018540f280 R08: ffff88018958a080 R09: ffffed003b6246de
R10: ffffed003b6246de R11: ffff8801db1236f3 R12: 00000000006000c0
R13: ffff88018540f938 R14: ffff88018540f3c8 R15: 00000000006000c0
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3713 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x25/0x720 mm/slab.c:3727
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:518 [inline]
str_read+0x48/0x160 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:1104
class_read+0x4a1/0xde0 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:1345
policydb_read+0xf09/0x5f90 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2407
security_load_policy+0x23b/0x1650 security/selinux/ss/services.c:2165
sel_write_load+0x247/0x460 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c:565
__vfs_write+0x117/0x9d0 fs/read_write.c:485
vfs_write+0x1fc/0x560 fs/read_write.c:549
ksys_write+0x101/0x260 fs/read_write.c:598
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:610 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:607 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:607
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457099
Code: fd b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7
48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
ff 0f 83 cb b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fc5edd57c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc5edd586d4 RCX: 0000000000457099
RDX: 0000000000000094 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000009300a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 00000000004d83b8 R14: 00000000004cae4e R15: 0000000000000000
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Kernel Offset: disabled
Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
---
This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at [email protected].
syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bug-status-tracking for how to communicate with
syzbot.
syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
this case.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
---
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index e9394e7..f4eadd3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
return -EINVAL;
- str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
+ str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
--
1.8.3.1
syzbot has found a reproducer for the following crash on:
HEAD commit: a49a9dcce802 Merge tag 'drm-fixes-2018-09-07' of git://ano..
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=11981149400000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=6c9564cd177daf0c
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ac488b9811036cea7ea0
compiler: gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1717dfa9400000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=13c1adea400000
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: [email protected]
random: sshd: uninitialized urandom read (32 bytes read)
random: sshd: uninitialized urandom read (32 bytes read)
random: sshd: uninitialized urandom read (32 bytes read)
random: sshd: uninitialized urandom read (32 bytes read)
audit: type=1400 audit(1536355256.676:7): avc: denied { map } for
pid=4365 comm="syz-executor462" path="/root/syz-executor462675731"
dev="sda1" ino=16481 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 tclass=file permissive=1
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 4365 at mm/slab_common.c:1031 kmalloc_slab+0x56/0x70
mm/slab_common.c:1031
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 4365 Comm: syz-executor462 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc2+ #5
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
panic+0x238/0x4e7 kernel/panic.c:184
__warn.cold.8+0x163/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:536
report_bug+0x252/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:186
fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline]
do_error_trap+0x1fc/0x4d0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296
do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:316
invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:993
RIP: 0010:kmalloc_slab+0x56/0x70 mm/slab_common.c:1031
Code: c5 40 db f2 87 5d c3 b8 10 00 00 00 48 85 ff 74 f4 83 ef 01 c1 ef 03
0f b6 87 60 da f2 87 eb d8 31 c0 81 e6 00 02 00 00 75 db <0f> 0b 5d c3 48
8b 04 c5 80 da f2 87 5d c3 66 90 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8801c2317298 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000d7fffd6 RCX: ffffffff832e9d2e
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000d7fffd7
RBP: ffff8801c2317298 R08: ffff8801c197a700 R09: ffffed003b6046de
R10: ffffed003b6046de R11: ffff8801db0236f3 R12: 00000000006000c0
R13: ffff8801c2317938 R14: ffff8801c23173c0 R15: 00000000006000c0
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3713 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x25/0x720 mm/slab.c:3727
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:518 [inline]
str_read+0x48/0x160 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:1104
common_read+0x37c/0x560 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:1177
policydb_read+0xf09/0x5f90 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2407
security_load_policy+0x23b/0x1650 security/selinux/ss/services.c:2165
sel_write_load+0x247/0x460 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c:565
__vfs_write+0x117/0x9d0 fs/read_write.c:485
vfs_write+0x1fc/0x560 fs/read_write.c:549
ksys_write+0x101/0x260 fs/read_write.c:598
__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:610 [inline]
__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:607 [inline]
__x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:607
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x440049
Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7
48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007ffd03e23ca8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440049
RDX: 0000000000000163 RSI: 0000000020000380 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 00000000004018d0
R13: 0000000000401960 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Kernel Offset: disabled
Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:43 PM Tetsuo Handa
<[email protected]> wrote:
> syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
> become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
> this case.
>
> [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
>
> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
> ---
> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> index e9394e7..f4eadd3 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> @@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
> + str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
> if (!str)
> return -ENOMEM;
Thanks for the patch.
My eyes are starting to glaze over a bit chasing down all of the
different kmalloc() code paths trying to ensure that this always does
the right thing based on size of the allocation and the different slab
allocators ... are we sure that this will always return NULL when (len
+ 1) is greater than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE for the different slab allocator
configurations?
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On 2018/09/13 12:02, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:43 PM Tetsuo Handa
> <[email protected]> wrote:
>> syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
>> become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
>> this case.
>>
>> [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
>> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 +-
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>> index e9394e7..f4eadd3 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>> @@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
>> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> - str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
>> + str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
>> if (!str)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>
> Thanks for the patch.
>
> My eyes are starting to glaze over a bit chasing down all of the
> different kmalloc() code paths trying to ensure that this always does
> the right thing based on size of the allocation and the different slab
> allocators ... are we sure that this will always return NULL when (len
> + 1) is greater than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE for the different slab allocator
> configurations?
>
Yes, for (len + 1) cannot become 0 (which causes kmalloc() to return
ZERO_SIZE_PTR) due to (len == (u32)-1) check above.
The only concern would be whether you want allocation failure messages.
I assumed you don't need it because we are returning -ENOMEM to the caller.
On 09/13/2018 08:26 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> On 2018/09/13 12:02, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:43 PM Tetsuo Handa
>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
>>> become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
>>> this case.
>>>
>>> [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
>>> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
>>> ---
>>> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 +-
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>>> index e9394e7..f4eadd3 100644
>>> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>>> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>>> @@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
>>> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>>
>>> - str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
>>> + str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
>>> if (!str)
>>> return -ENOMEM;
>> Thanks for the patch.
>>
>> My eyes are starting to glaze over a bit chasing down all of the
>> different kmalloc() code paths trying to ensure that this always does
>> the right thing based on size of the allocation and the different slab
>> allocators ... are we sure that this will always return NULL when (len
>> + 1) is greater than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE for the different slab allocator
>> configurations?
>>
> Yes, for (len + 1) cannot become 0 (which causes kmalloc() to return
> ZERO_SIZE_PTR) due to (len == (u32)-1) check above.
>
> The only concern would be whether you want allocation failure messages.
> I assumed you don't need it because we are returning -ENOMEM to the caller.
>
Would it not be better with
char *str;
if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1) || (len >= KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 5:02 AM, Paul Moore <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:43 PM Tetsuo Handa
> <[email protected]> wrote:
>> syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
>> become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
>> this case.
>>
>> [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
>> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 +-
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>> index e9394e7..f4eadd3 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>> @@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
>> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> - str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
>> + str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
>> if (!str)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>
> Thanks for the patch.
>
> My eyes are starting to glaze over a bit chasing down all of the
> different kmalloc() code paths trying to ensure that this always does
> the right thing based on size of the allocation and the different slab
> allocators ... are we sure that this will always return NULL when (len
> + 1) is greater than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE for the different slab allocator
> configurations?
Yes, it's the blessed way to do it. We have lots of similar cases:
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v4.19-rc3/ident/__GFP_NOWARN
On Thu 13-09-18 09:12:04, peter enderborg wrote:
> On 09/13/2018 08:26 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > On 2018/09/13 12:02, Paul Moore wrote:
> >> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:43 PM Tetsuo Handa
> >> <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>> syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
> >>> become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
> >>> this case.
> >>>
> >>> [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
> >>> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
> >>> ---
> >>> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 +-
> >>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>>
> >>> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> >>> index e9394e7..f4eadd3 100644
> >>> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> >>> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> >>> @@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
> >>> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
> >>> return -EINVAL;
> >>>
> >>> - str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
> >>> + str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
> >>> if (!str)
> >>> return -ENOMEM;
> >> Thanks for the patch.
> >>
> >> My eyes are starting to glaze over a bit chasing down all of the
> >> different kmalloc() code paths trying to ensure that this always does
> >> the right thing based on size of the allocation and the different slab
> >> allocators ... are we sure that this will always return NULL when (len
> >> + 1) is greater than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE for the different slab allocator
> >> configurations?
> >>
> > Yes, for (len + 1) cannot become 0 (which causes kmalloc() to return
> > ZERO_SIZE_PTR) due to (len == (u32)-1) check above.
> >
> > The only concern would be whether you want allocation failure messages.
> > I assumed you don't need it because we are returning -ENOMEM to the caller.
> >
> Would it not be better with
>
> ??? char *str;
>
> ??? if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1) || (len >= KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE))
> ??? ??? return -EINVAL;
>
> ??? str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
> ??? if (!str)
> ??? ??? return -ENOMEM;
I strongly suspect that you want kvmalloc rather than kmalloc here. The
larger the request the more likely is the allocation to fail.
I am not familiar with the code but I assume this is a root only
interface so we don't have to worry about nasty users scenario.
--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs
On 09/13/2018 01:11 PM, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Thu 13-09-18 09:12:04, peter enderborg wrote:
>> On 09/13/2018 08:26 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>>> On 2018/09/13 12:02, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:43 PM Tetsuo Handa
>>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>> syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
>>>>> become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
>>>>> this case.
>>>>>
>>>>> [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
>>>>> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 +-
>>>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>>>>> index e9394e7..f4eadd3 100644
>>>>> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>>>>> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>>>>> @@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
>>>>> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
>>>>> return -EINVAL;
>>>>>
>>>>> - str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
>>>>> + str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
>>>>> if (!str)
>>>>> return -ENOMEM;
>>>> Thanks for the patch.
>>>>
>>>> My eyes are starting to glaze over a bit chasing down all of the
>>>> different kmalloc() code paths trying to ensure that this always does
>>>> the right thing based on size of the allocation and the different slab
>>>> allocators ... are we sure that this will always return NULL when (len
>>>> + 1) is greater than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE for the different slab allocator
>>>> configurations?
>>>>
>>> Yes, for (len + 1) cannot become 0 (which causes kmalloc() to return
>>> ZERO_SIZE_PTR) due to (len == (u32)-1) check above.
>>>
>>> The only concern would be whether you want allocation failure messages.
>>> I assumed you don't need it because we are returning -ENOMEM to the caller.
>>>
>> Would it not be better with
>>
>> char *str;
>>
>> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1) || (len >= KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE))
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
>> if (!str)
>> return -ENOMEM;
> I strongly suspect that you want kvmalloc rather than kmalloc here. The
> larger the request the more likely is the allocation to fail.
>
> I am not familiar with the code but I assume this is a root only
> interface so we don't have to worry about nasty users scenario.
>
I don't think we get any big data there at all. Usually less than 32 bytes. However this data can be in fast path so a vmalloc is not an option.
And some of the calls are GFP_ATOMC.
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 2:55 PM, peter enderborg
<[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>> syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
>>>>>> become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
>>>>>> this case.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
>>>>>> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 +-
>>>>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>>>>>> index e9394e7..f4eadd3 100644
>>>>>> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>>>>>> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
>>>>>> @@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
>>>>>> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
>>>>>> return -EINVAL;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
>>>>>> + str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
>>>>>> if (!str)
>>>>>> return -ENOMEM;
>>>>> Thanks for the patch.
>>>>>
>>>>> My eyes are starting to glaze over a bit chasing down all of the
>>>>> different kmalloc() code paths trying to ensure that this always does
>>>>> the right thing based on size of the allocation and the different slab
>>>>> allocators ... are we sure that this will always return NULL when (len
>>>>> + 1) is greater than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE for the different slab allocator
>>>>> configurations?
>>>>>
>>>> Yes, for (len + 1) cannot become 0 (which causes kmalloc() to return
>>>> ZERO_SIZE_PTR) due to (len == (u32)-1) check above.
>>>>
>>>> The only concern would be whether you want allocation failure messages.
>>>> I assumed you don't need it because we are returning -ENOMEM to the caller.
>>>>
>>> Would it not be better with
>>>
>>> char *str;
>>>
>>> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1) || (len >= KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE))
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>>
>>> str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
>>> if (!str)
>>> return -ENOMEM;
>> I strongly suspect that you want kvmalloc rather than kmalloc here. The
>> larger the request the more likely is the allocation to fail.
>>
>> I am not familiar with the code but I assume this is a root only
>> interface so we don't have to worry about nasty users scenario.
>>
> I don't think we get any big data there at all. Usually less than 32 bytes. However this data can be in fast path so a vmalloc is not an option.
>
> And some of the calls are GFP_ATOMC.
Then another option is to introduce reasonable application-specific
limit and not rely on kmalloc-anything at all. We did this for some
instances of this warning too. One advantage of it is that it prevents
users from doing silly things (or maybe will discover bugs in
user-space code better, why are they asking for megs here?). Another
advantage is that what works on one version of kernel will continue to
work on another version of kernel. Today it's possible that a policy
works on one kernel with 4MB kmalloc limit, but breaks on another with
2MB limit. Ideally exact value of KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE does not affect
anything in user-space.
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 2:26 AM Tetsuo Handa
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2018/09/13 12:02, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:43 PM Tetsuo Handa
> > <[email protected]> wrote:
> >> syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
> >> become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
> >> this case.
> >>
> >> [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
> >> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
> >> ---
> >> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 +-
> >> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> >> index e9394e7..f4eadd3 100644
> >> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> >> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> >> @@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
> >> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
> >> return -EINVAL;
> >>
> >> - str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
> >> + str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
> >> if (!str)
> >> return -ENOMEM;
> >
> > Thanks for the patch.
> >
> > My eyes are starting to glaze over a bit chasing down all of the
> > different kmalloc() code paths trying to ensure that this always does
> > the right thing based on size of the allocation and the different slab
> > allocators ... are we sure that this will always return NULL when (len
> > + 1) is greater than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE for the different slab allocator
> > configurations?
>
> Yes, for (len + 1) cannot become 0 (which causes kmalloc() to return
> ZERO_SIZE_PTR) due to (len == (u32)-1) check above.
>
> The only concern would be whether you want allocation failure messages.
> I assumed you don't need it because we are returning -ENOMEM to the caller.
I'm not to worried about the failure messages, returning -ENOMEM
should be sufficient in this case.
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 3:12 AM peter enderborg
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On 09/13/2018 08:26 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> > On 2018/09/13 12:02, Paul Moore wrote:
> >> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:43 PM Tetsuo Handa
> >> <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>> syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
> >>> become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
> >>> this case.
> >>>
> >>> [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
> >>> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
> >>> ---
> >>> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 +-
> >>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>>
> >>> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> >>> index e9394e7..f4eadd3 100644
> >>> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> >>> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> >>> @@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
> >>> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
> >>> return -EINVAL;
> >>>
> >>> - str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
> >>> + str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
> >>> if (!str)
> >>> return -ENOMEM;
> >> Thanks for the patch.
> >>
> >> My eyes are starting to glaze over a bit chasing down all of the
> >> different kmalloc() code paths trying to ensure that this always does
> >> the right thing based on size of the allocation and the different slab
> >> allocators ... are we sure that this will always return NULL when (len
> >> + 1) is greater than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE for the different slab allocator
> >> configurations?
> >>
> > Yes, for (len + 1) cannot become 0 (which causes kmalloc() to return
> > ZERO_SIZE_PTR) due to (len == (u32)-1) check above.
> >
> > The only concern would be whether you want allocation failure messages.
> > I assumed you don't need it because we are returning -ENOMEM to the caller.
> >
> Would it not be better with
>
> char *str;
>
> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1) || (len >= KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
> if (!str)
> return -ENOMEM;
As long as it's safe, I'd rather leave the maximum allocation limit as
a kmalloc internal and let kmalloc return NULL if we try too large of
an allocation.
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 8:55 AM peter enderborg
<[email protected]> wrote:
> On 09/13/2018 01:11 PM, Michal Hocko wrote:
> > On Thu 13-09-18 09:12:04, peter enderborg wrote:
> >> On 09/13/2018 08:26 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
> >>> On 2018/09/13 12:02, Paul Moore wrote:
> >>>> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:43 PM Tetsuo Handa
> >>>> <[email protected]> wrote:
> >>>>> syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
> >>>>> become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
> >>>>> this case.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
> >>>>> Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
> >>>>> ---
> >>>>> security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 2 +-
> >>>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >>>>>
> >>>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> >>>>> index e9394e7..f4eadd3 100644
> >>>>> --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> >>>>> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
> >>>>> @@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
> >>>>> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
> >>>>> return -EINVAL;
> >>>>>
> >>>>> - str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
> >>>>> + str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
> >>>>> if (!str)
> >>>>> return -ENOMEM;
> >>>> Thanks for the patch.
> >>>>
> >>>> My eyes are starting to glaze over a bit chasing down all of the
> >>>> different kmalloc() code paths trying to ensure that this always does
> >>>> the right thing based on size of the allocation and the different slab
> >>>> allocators ... are we sure that this will always return NULL when (len
> >>>> + 1) is greater than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE for the different slab allocator
> >>>> configurations?
> >>>>
> >>> Yes, for (len + 1) cannot become 0 (which causes kmalloc() to return
> >>> ZERO_SIZE_PTR) due to (len == (u32)-1) check above.
> >>>
> >>> The only concern would be whether you want allocation failure messages.
> >>> I assumed you don't need it because we are returning -ENOMEM to the caller.
> >>>
> >> Would it not be better with
> >>
> >> char *str;
> >>
> >> if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1) || (len >= KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE))
> >> return -EINVAL;
> >>
> >> str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
> >> if (!str)
> >> return -ENOMEM;
> > I strongly suspect that you want kvmalloc rather than kmalloc here. The
> > larger the request the more likely is the allocation to fail.
> >
> > I am not familiar with the code but I assume this is a root only
> > interface so we don't have to worry about nasty users scenario.
> >
> I don't think we get any big data there at all. Usually less than 32 bytes. However this data can be in fast path so a vmalloc is not an option.
>
> And some of the calls are GFP_ATOMC.
Based on all the comments it looks like Tetsuo's original patch is
probably the best fix right now. I'm going to merge this into
selinux/next.
Tetsuo, thanks for the patch, and thanks to everyone else for the
comments/review.
--
paul moore
http://www.paul-moore.com