Since userfaultfd doesn't implement a write operation, it is more
appropriate to open it read-only.
When userfaultfds are opened read-write like it is now, and such fd is
passed from one process to another, SELinux will check both read and
write permissions for the target process, even though it can't actually
do any write operation on the fd later.
Inspired by the following bug report, which has hit the SELinux scenario
described above:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1974559
Reported-by: Robert O'Callahan <[email protected]>
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
---
I marked this as RFC, because I'm not sure if this has any unwanted side
effects. I only ran this patch through selinux-testsuite, which has a
simple userfaultfd subtest, and a reproducer from the Bugzilla report.
Please tell me whether this makes sense and/or if it passes any
userfaultfd tests you guys might have.
fs/userfaultfd.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
index 14f92285d04f..24e14c36068f 100644
--- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
+++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
@@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ static int resolve_userfault_fork(struct userfaultfd_ctx *new,
int fd;
fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new,
- O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), inode);
+ O_RDONLY | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), inode);
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
@@ -2088,7 +2088,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
mmgrab(ctx->mm);
fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx,
- O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), NULL);
+ O_RDONLY | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), NULL);
if (fd < 0) {
mmdrop(ctx->mm);
kmem_cache_free(userfaultfd_ctx_cachep, ctx);
--
2.31.1
On Thu, Jun 24, 2021 at 5:25 PM Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Since userfaultfd doesn't implement a write operation, it is more
> appropriate to open it read-only.
>
> When userfaultfds are opened read-write like it is now, and such fd is
> passed from one process to another, SELinux will check both read and
> write permissions for the target process, even though it can't actually
> do any write operation on the fd later.
>
> Inspired by the following bug report, which has hit the SELinux scenario
> described above:
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1974559
>
> Reported-by: Robert O'Callahan <[email protected]>
> Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
> ---
>
> I marked this as RFC, because I'm not sure if this has any unwanted side
> effects. I only ran this patch through selinux-testsuite, which has a
> simple userfaultfd subtest, and a reproducer from the Bugzilla report.
>
> Please tell me whether this makes sense and/or if it passes any
> userfaultfd tests you guys might have.
>
> fs/userfaultfd.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> index 14f92285d04f..24e14c36068f 100644
> --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
> +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> @@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ static int resolve_userfault_fork(struct userfaultfd_ctx *new,
> int fd;
>
> fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new,
> - O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), inode);
> + O_RDONLY | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), inode);
> if (fd < 0)
> return fd;
>
> @@ -2088,7 +2088,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
> mmgrab(ctx->mm);
>
> fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx,
> - O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), NULL);
> + O_RDONLY | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), NULL);
> if (fd < 0) {
> mmdrop(ctx->mm);
> kmem_cache_free(userfaultfd_ctx_cachep, ctx);
> --
> 2.31.1
Ping? Any comments on this patch?
--
Ondrej Mosnacek
Software Engineer, Linux Security - SELinux kernel
Red Hat, Inc.