Control-flow Enforcement (CET) is a new Intel processor feature that blocks
return/jump-oriented programming attacks. Details are in "Intel 64 and
IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual" [1].
CET can protect applications and the kernel. This series enables only
application-level protection, and has three parts:
- Shadow stack [2],
- Indirect branch tracking [3], and
- Selftests [4].
I have run tests on these patches for quite some time, and they have been
very stable. Linux distributions with CET are available now, and Intel
processors with CET are already on the market. It would be nice if CET
support can be accepted into the kernel. I will be working to address any
issues should they come up.
Changes in v24:
- Split shadow stack and IBT into separate Kconfig options and source
files, update related areas accordingly. Specific changes are called out
in each patch's commit log.
- Patch #15: Instead of arch_maybe_mkwrite(), create x86 versions of
maybe*_mkwrite().
- Patch #17: Instead changing vm_*_gap(), create x86 versions.
- Patch #24, #25: Split signal handling into two patches, update comments/
logs.
- Patch #29, #30: Update arch_validate_flags() and use that for checking
PROT_SHSTK.
- Rebase to Linus tree v5.12-rc5.
[1] Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/download/intel-64-and-ia-32-
architectures-sdm-combined-volumes-1-2a-2b-2c-2d-3a-3b-3c-3d-and-4
[2] CET Shadow Stack patches v23:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[3] Indirect Branch Tracking patches v23.
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[4] I am holding off the selftests changes and working to get Reviewed-by's.
The earlier version of the selftests patches:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[5] The kernel ptrace patch is tested with an Intel-internal updated GDB.
I am holding off the kernel ptrace patch to re-test it with my earlier
patch for fixing regset holes.
Yu-cheng Yu (30):
Documentation/x86: Add CET description
x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack
x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow
Enforcement Technology (CET)
x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions
x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler
x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file
x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW
drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS
x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW
x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for
transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW
mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory
x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly
mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write
mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines
x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property()
x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack
mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to include vma anonymous
mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 +
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 1 +
Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst | 136 ++++++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 5 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 4 +-
arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h | 4 +-
arch/x86/Kconfig | 28 ++
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 16 +
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 52 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 4 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 17 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 13 +
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 23 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 6 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 4 +
arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 87 +++++
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 19 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h | 17 +
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 298 +++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 48 ++-
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 +
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 32 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 28 +-
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 4 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 +
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 3 +
arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 60 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 14 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 3 +
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 143 ++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 10 +-
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 +
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 21 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 32 ++
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 309 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 9 +
arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 63 ++++
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 ++
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 38 +++
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 27 ++
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c | 2 +-
fs/aio.c | 2 +-
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 4 +
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +
include/linux/elf.h | 6 +
include/linux/mm.h | 18 +-
include/linux/mman.h | 2 +-
include/linux/pgtable.h | 11 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +-
include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 9 +
ipc/shm.c | 2 +-
mm/gup.c | 8 +-
mm/huge_memory.c | 17 +-
mm/memory.c | 5 +-
mm/migrate.c | 3 +-
mm/mmap.c | 17 +-
mm/mprotect.c | 13 +-
mm/nommu.c | 4 +-
mm/util.c | 2 +-
68 files changed, 1664 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
--
2.21.0
Explain no_user_shstk/no_user_ibt kernel parameters, and introduce a new
document on Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Update for Kconfig changes from X86_CET to X86_SHADOW_STACK, X86_IBT.
- Update for the change of VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 +
Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst | 136 ++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 143 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 04545725f187..bc79e54be91e 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3220,6 +3220,12 @@
noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)
noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings
+ no_user_shstk [X86-64] Disable Shadow Stack for user-mode
+ applications
+
+ no_user_ibt [X86-64] Disable Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode
+ applications
+
nosmap [X86,PPC]
Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
even if it is supported by processor.
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
index 4693e192b447..cf5250a3cc70 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation
tlb
mtrr
pat
+ intel_cet
intel-iommu
intel_txt
amd-memory-encryption
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ae30c392994a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=========================================
+Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
+=========================================
+
+[1] Overview
+============
+
+Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) is an Intel processor feature
+that provides protection against return/jump-oriented programming (ROP)
+attacks. It can be set up to protect both applications and the kernel.
+Only user-mode protection is implemented in the 64-bit kernel, including
+support for running legacy 32-bit applications.
+
+CET introduces Shadow Stack and Indirect Branch Tracking. Shadow stack is
+a secondary stack allocated from memory and cannot be directly modified by
+applications. When executing a CALL instruction, the processor pushes the
+return address to both the normal stack and the shadow stack. Upon
+function return, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it
+to the normal stack copy. If the two differ, the processor raises a
+control-protection fault. Indirect branch tracking verifies indirect
+CALL/JMP targets are intended as marked by the compiler with 'ENDBR'
+opcodes.
+
+There are two Kconfig options:
+
+ X86_SHADOW_STACK, and X86_IBT.
+
+To build a CET-enabled kernel, Binutils v2.31 and GCC v8.1 or LLVM v10.0.1
+or later are required. To build a CET-enabled application, GLIBC v2.28 or
+later is also required.
+
+There are two command-line options for disabling CET features::
+
+ no_user_shstk - disables user shadow stack, and
+ no_user_ibt - disables user indirect branch tracking.
+
+At run time, /proc/cpuinfo shows CET features if the processor supports
+CET.
+
+[2] Application Enabling
+========================
+
+An application's CET capability is marked in its ELF header and can be
+verified from readelf/llvm-readelf output:
+
+ readelf -n <application> | grep -a SHSTK
+ properties: x86 feature: IBT, SHSTK
+
+If an application supports CET and is statically linked, it will run with
+CET protection. If the application needs any shared libraries, the loader
+checks all dependencies and enables CET when all requirements are met.
+
+[3] Backward Compatibility
+==========================
+
+GLIBC provides a few CET tunables via the GLIBC_TUNABLES environment
+variable:
+
+GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.tune.hwcaps=-SHSTK,-IBT
+ Turn off SHSTK/IBT.
+
+GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.tune.x86_shstk=<on, permissive>
+ This controls how dlopen() handles SHSTK legacy libraries::
+
+ on - continue with SHSTK enabled;
+ permissive - continue with SHSTK off.
+
+Details can be found in the GLIBC manual pages.
+
+[4] CET arch_prctl()'s
+======================
+
+Several arch_prctl()'s have been added for CET:
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, u64 *addr)
+ Return CET feature status.
+
+ The parameter 'addr' is a pointer to a user buffer.
+ On returning to the caller, the kernel fills the following
+ information::
+
+ *addr = shadow stack/indirect branch tracking status
+ *(addr + 1) = shadow stack base address
+ *(addr + 2) = shadow stack size
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned int features)
+ Disable shadow stack and/or indirect branch tracking as specified in
+ 'features'. Return -EPERM if CET is locked.
+
+arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK)
+ Lock in all CET features. They cannot be turned off afterwards.
+
+Note:
+ There is no CET-enabling arch_prctl function. By design, CET is enabled
+ automatically if the binary and the system can support it.
+
+[5] The implementation of the Shadow Stack
+==========================================
+
+Shadow Stack size
+-----------------
+
+A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory to a fixed size of
+MIN(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB). In other words, the shadow stack is allocated to
+the maximum size of the normal stack, but capped to 4 GB. However,
+a compat-mode application's address space is smaller, each of its thread's
+shadow stack size is MIN(1/4 RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB).
+
+Signal
+------
+
+The main program and its signal handlers use the same shadow stack.
+Because the shadow stack stores only return addresses, a large shadow
+stack covers the condition that both the program stack and the signal
+alternate stack run out.
+
+The kernel creates a restore token for the shadow stack restoring address
+and verifies that token when restoring from the signal handler.
+
+Fork
+----
+
+The shadow stack's vma has VM_SHADOW_STACK flag set; its PTEs are required
+to be read-only and dirty. When a shadow stack PTE is not RO and dirty, a
+shadow access triggers a page fault with the shadow stack access bit set
+in the page fault error code.
+
+When a task forks a child, its shadow stack PTEs are copied and both the
+parent's and the child's shadow stack PTEs are cleared of the dirty bit.
+Upon the next shadow stack access, the resulting shadow stack page fault
+is handled by page copy/re-use.
+
+When a pthread child is created, the kernel allocates a new shadow stack
+for the new thread.
--
2.21.0
Shadow Stack provides protection against function return address
corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has
CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built for the
feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is
enabled, legacy non-Shadow Stack applications continue to work, but without
protection.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Update for the splitting X86_CET to X86_SHADOW_STACK and X86_IBT.
arch/x86/Kconfig | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 2792879d398e..f42560b220ef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ config X86_64
select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
+ select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
select HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
select NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE
@@ -1941,6 +1942,31 @@ config X86_SGX
If unsure, say N.
+config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+ def_bool n
+
+config X86_CET
+ def_bool n
+
+config X86_SHADOW_STACK
+ prompt "Intel Shadow Stack"
+ def_bool n
+ depends on AS_WRUSS
+ depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+ select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+ select X86_CET
+ help
+ Shadow Stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
+ return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
+ Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not
+ get protection "for free".
+ Support for this feature is present on Tiger Lake family of
+ processors released in 2020 or later. Enabling this feature
+ increases kernel text size by 3.7 KB.
+ See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst for more information.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
index 26b8c08e2fc4..00c79dd93651 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
@@ -19,3 +19,8 @@ config AS_TPAUSE
def_bool $(as-instr,tpause %ecx)
help
Supported by binutils >= 2.31.1 and LLVM integrated assembler >= V7
+
+config AS_WRUSS
+ def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx))
+ help
+ Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
--
2.21.0
Add CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 7] Shadow stack
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):EDX[bit 20] Indirect Branch Tracking
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Update for splitting CONFIG_X86_CET to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK and CONFIG_X86_IBT.
- Move DISABLE_IBT definition to the IBT series.
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +++++++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 2 ++
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index cc96e26d69f7..bf861fc89fef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (16*32+ 4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
#define X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG (16*32+ 5) /* UMONITOR/UMWAIT/TPAUSE Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2 (16*32+ 6) /* Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK (16*32+ 7) /* Shadow Stack */
#define X86_FEATURE_GFNI (16*32+ 8) /* Galois Field New Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_VAES (16*32+ 9) /* Vector AES */
#define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ (16*32+10) /* Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */
@@ -377,6 +378,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_TSXLDTRK (18*32+16) /* TSX Suspend Load Address Tracking */
#define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG (18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_LBR (18*32+19) /* Intel ARCH LBR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBT (18*32+20) /* Indirect Branch Tracking */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_FP16 (18*32+23) /* AVX512 FP16 */
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index b7dd944dc867..e5c6ed9373e8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -68,6 +68,12 @@
# define DISABLE_SGX (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SGX & 31))
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK 0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
+#endif
+
/*
* Make sure to add features to the correct mask
*/
@@ -88,7 +94,7 @@
#define DISABLED_MASK14 0
#define DISABLED_MASK15 0
#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP| \
- DISABLE_ENQCMD)
+ DISABLE_ENQCMD|DISABLE_SHSTK)
#define DISABLED_MASK17 0
#define DISABLED_MASK18 0
#define DISABLED_MASK19 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
index 42af31b64c2c..52d9a682a0e6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_FP16, X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW },
{ X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES },
{ X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA, X86_FEATURE_MBA },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES },
+ { X86_FEATURE_IBT, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES },
{}
};
--
2.21.0
Shadow stack accesses are those that are performed by the CPU where it
expects to encounter a shadow stack mapping. These accesses are performed
implicitly by CALL/RET at the site of the shadow stack pointer. These
accesses are made explicitly by shadow stack management instructions like
WRUSSQ.
Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mapping can see faults in normal,
valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings. Shadow
stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and
copy-on-write.
Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow
stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack
mapping.
In handling a shadow stack page fault, verify it occurs within a shadow
stack mapping. It is always an error otherwise. For valid shadow stack
accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write. Because clearing
_PAGE_DIRTY (vs. _PAGE_RW) is used to trigger the fault, shadow stack read
fault and shadow stack write fault are not differentiated and both are
handled as a write access.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.
arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h
index 10b1de500ab1..afa524325e55 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
* bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected
* bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch
* bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access
+ * bit 6 == 1: shadow stack access fault
* bit 15 == 1: SGX MMU page-fault
*/
enum x86_pf_error_code {
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {
X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3,
X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4,
X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5,
+ X86_PF_SHSTK = 1 << 6,
X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15,
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index a73347e2cdfc..394e504305b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1100,6 +1100,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
(error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))
return 1;
+ /*
+ * Verify a shadow stack access is within a shadow stack VMA.
+ * It is always an error otherwise. Normal data access to a
+ * shadow stack area is checked in the case followed.
+ */
+ if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) {
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) {
/* write, present and write, not present: */
if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)))
@@ -1293,6 +1304,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address);
+ /*
+ * Clearing _PAGE_DIRTY is used to detect shadow stack access.
+ * This method cannot distinguish shadow stack read vs. write.
+ * For valid shadow stack accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect
+ * copy-on-write.
+ */
+ if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK)
+ flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE)
flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)
--
2.21.0
Introduce a software-defined X86_FEATURE_CET, which indicates either Shadow
Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking (or both) is present. Also introduce
related cpu init/setup functions.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Update #ifdef placement to reflect Kconfig changes of splitting shadow stack and ibt.
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 9 ++++++++-
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 3 +++
5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index bf861fc89fef..d771e62677de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID ( 3*32+26) /* Extended APICID (8 bits) */
#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM ( 3*32+27) /* AMD multi-node processor */
#define X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF ( 3*32+28) /* P-State hardware coordination feedback capability (APERF/MPERF MSRs) */
-/* free ( 3*32+29) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CET ( 3*32+29) /* Control-flow enforcement */
#define X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3 ( 3*32+30) /* TSC doesn't stop in S3 state */
#define X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ ( 3*32+31) /* TSC has known frequency */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index e5c6ed9373e8..018cd7acd3e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -74,13 +74,20 @@
#define DISABLE_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+#define DISABLE_CET 0
+#else
+#define DISABLE_CET (1 << (X86_FEATURE_CET & 31))
+#endif
+
/*
* Make sure to add features to the correct mask
*/
#define DISABLED_MASK0 (DISABLE_VME)
#define DISABLED_MASK1 0
#define DISABLED_MASK2 0
-#define DISABLED_MASK3 (DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR|DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR|DISABLE_K6_MTRR)
+#define DISABLED_MASK3 (DISABLE_CYRIX_ARR|DISABLE_CENTAUR_MCR|DISABLE_K6_MTRR| \
+ DISABLE_CET)
#define DISABLED_MASK4 (DISABLE_PCID)
#define DISABLED_MASK5 0
#define DISABLED_MASK6 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
index bcba3c643e63..a8df907e8017 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@
#define X86_CR4_SMAP _BITUL(X86_CR4_SMAP_BIT)
#define X86_CR4_PKE_BIT 22 /* enable Protection Keys support */
#define X86_CR4_PKE _BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
+#define X86_CR4_CET_BIT 23 /* enable Control-flow Enforcement */
+#define X86_CR4_CET _BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)
/*
* x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index ab640abe26b6..6bd07727089e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -510,6 +510,14 @@ static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
__setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CET))
+ return;
+
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
+}
+
/*
* Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
* be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
@@ -1255,6 +1263,11 @@ static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void)
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaves"))
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no_user_shstk"))
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no_user_ibt"))
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
+
arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "clearcpuid", arg, sizeof(arg));
if (arglen <= 0)
return;
@@ -1594,6 +1607,7 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
x86_init_rdrand(c);
setup_pku(c);
+ setup_cet(c);
/*
* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 0e422a544835..2e11d9555e9b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -334,6 +334,9 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
static void bsp_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CET);
+
resctrl_cpu_detect(c);
}
--
2.21.0
After the introduction of _PAGE_COW, a modified page's PTE can have either
_PAGE_DIRTY or _PAGE_COW. Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: David Airlie <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]>
Cc: Jani Nikula <[email protected]>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
Cc: Zhenyu Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Zhi Wang <[email protected]>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c
index 897c007ea96a..937b6083b2dc 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/gtt.c
@@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ static int split_2MB_gtt_entry(struct intel_vgpu *vgpu,
}
/* Clear dirty field. */
- se->val64 &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY;
+ se->val64 &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
ops->clear_pse(se);
ops->clear_ips(se);
--
2.21.0
A shadow stack PTE must be read-only and have _PAGE_DIRTY set. However,
read-only and Dirty PTEs also exist for copy-on-write (COW) pages. These
two cases are handled differently for page faults. Introduce
VM_SHADOW_STACK to track shadow stack VMAs.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.
- Change CONFIG_X86_CET to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK to reflect Kconfig changes.
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 1 +
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 2 ++
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +++
include/linux/mm.h | 8 ++++++++
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
index 48fbfc336ebf..5d8a2d75c799 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst
@@ -549,6 +549,7 @@ encoded manner. The codes are the following:
mg mergable advise flag
bt arm64 BTI guarded page
mt arm64 MTE allocation tags are enabled
+ ss shadow stack page
== =======================================
Note that there is no guarantee that every flag and associated mnemonic will
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index c90c20904a60..f3f52c5e2fd6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ unsigned long get_mmap_base(int is_legacy)
const char *arch_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)
+ return "[shadow stack]";
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index e862cab69583..0aa57de9dfab 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -661,6 +661,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
[ilog2(VM_PKEY_BIT4)] = "",
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+ [ilog2(VM_SHADOW_STACK)]= "ss",
+#endif
};
size_t i;
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 8ba434287387..08282eb2f195 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -312,11 +312,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 36 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5 37 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4)
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5)
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -332,6 +334,12 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5
+#else
+# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_NONE
+#endif
+
#if defined(CONFIG_X86)
# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
--
2.21.0
INCSSP(Q/D) increments shadow stack pointer and 'pops and discards' the
first and the last elements in the range, effectively touches those memory
areas.
The maximum moving distance by INCSSPQ is 255 * 8 = 2040 bytes and
255 * 4 = 1020 bytes by INCSSPD. Both ranges are far from PAGE_SIZE.
Thus, putting a gap page on both ends of a shadow stack prevents INCSSP,
CALL, and RET from going beyond.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Instead changing vm_*_gap(), create x86-specific versions.
arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h | 17 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/mm.h | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
index a506a411474d..3a5529bcfd76 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
@@ -73,6 +73,23 @@ bool pfn_range_is_mapped(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn);
extern void initmem_init(void);
+/*
+ * Shadow stack pointer is moved by CALL, RET, and INCSSP(Q/D). INCSSPQ
+ * moves shadow stack pointer up to 255 * 8 = ~2 KB (~1KB for INCSSPD) and
+ * touches the first and the last element in the range, which triggers a
+ * page fault if the range is not in a shadow stack. Because of this,
+ * creating 4-KB guard pages around a shadow stack prevents these
+ * instructions from going beyond.
+ */
+#define SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP PAGE_SIZE
+
+#define vm_start_gap vm_start_gap
+struct vm_area_struct;
+extern unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+
+#define vm_end_gap vm_end_gap
+extern unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PAGE_DEFS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index f3f52c5e2fd6..e714ddc8f3f7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -250,3 +250,39 @@ bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot)
return false;
return true;
}
+
+unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ unsigned long vm_start = vma->vm_start;
+ unsigned long gap = 0;
+
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)
+ gap = stack_guard_gap;
+ else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)
+ gap = SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP;
+
+ if (gap != 0) {
+ vm_start -= gap;
+ if (vm_start > vma->vm_start)
+ vm_start = 0;
+ }
+ return vm_start;
+}
+
+unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ unsigned long vm_end = vma->vm_end;
+ unsigned long gap = 0;
+
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP)
+ gap = stack_guard_gap;
+ else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)
+ gap = SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP;
+
+ if (gap != 0) {
+ vm_end += gap;
+ if (vm_end < vma->vm_end)
+ vm_end = -PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+ return vm_end;
+}
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 6ac9b3e9a865..3e9c84f21ef6 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2660,6 +2660,7 @@ static inline struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_intersection(struct mm_struct * m
return vma;
}
+#ifndef vm_start_gap
static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long vm_start = vma->vm_start;
@@ -2671,7 +2672,9 @@ static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
}
return vm_start;
}
+#endif
+#ifndef vm_end_gap
static inline unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long vm_end = vma->vm_end;
@@ -2683,6 +2686,7 @@ static inline unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
}
return vm_end;
}
+#endif
static inline unsigned long vma_pages(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
--
2.21.0
Account shadow stack pages to stack memory.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Change arch_shadow_stack_mapping() to is_shadow_stack_mapping().
- Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 7 +++++++
include/linux/pgtable.h | 11 +++++++++++
mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index e778dbbef3d8..212a8c1fe5ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -897,3 +897,10 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+bool is_shadow_stack_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
+{
+ return (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/pgtable.h b/include/linux/pgtable.h
index 5e772392a379..0070a6d5c272 100644
--- a/include/linux/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/linux/pgtable.h
@@ -1446,6 +1446,17 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
}
#endif /* !_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED */
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
+bool is_shadow_stack_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags);
+#else
+static inline bool is_shadow_stack_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
+
/*
* Architecture PAGE_KERNEL_* fallbacks
*
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 3f287599a7a3..d77fb39b6ab5 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1718,6 +1718,9 @@ static inline int accountable_mapping(struct file *file, vm_flags_t vm_flags)
if (file && is_file_hugepages(file))
return 0;
+ if (is_shadow_stack_mapping(vm_flags))
+ return 1;
+
return (vm_flags & (VM_NORESERVE | VM_SHARED | VM_WRITE)) == VM_WRITE;
}
@@ -3387,6 +3390,8 @@ void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *mm, vm_flags_t flags, long npages)
mm->stack_vm += npages;
else if (is_data_mapping(flags))
mm->data_vm += npages;
+ else if (is_shadow_stack_mapping(flags))
+ mm->stack_vm += npages;
}
static vm_fault_t special_mapping_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf);
--
2.21.0
To prepare the introduction of _PAGE_COW, move pmd_write() and
pud_write() up in the file, so that they can be used by other
helpers below.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 24 ++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index a02c67291cfc..c1650d0af1b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -185,6 +185,18 @@ static inline int pte_write(pte_t pte)
return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_RW;
}
+#define pmd_write pmd_write
+static inline int pmd_write(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+ return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_RW;
+}
+
+#define pud_write pud_write
+static inline int pud_write(pud_t pud)
+{
+ return pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_RW;
+}
+
static inline int pte_huge(pte_t pte)
{
return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_PSE;
@@ -1128,12 +1140,6 @@ extern int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp);
-#define pmd_write pmd_write
-static inline int pmd_write(pmd_t pmd)
-{
- return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_RW;
-}
-
#define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEAR
static inline pmd_t pmdp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
pmd_t *pmdp)
@@ -1155,12 +1161,6 @@ static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp);
}
-#define pud_write pud_write
-static inline int pud_write(pud_t pud)
-{
- return pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_RW;
-}
-
#ifndef pmdp_establish
#define pmdp_establish pmdp_establish
static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
--
2.21.0
When serving a page fault, maybe_mkwrite() makes a PTE writable if its vma
has VM_WRITE.
A shadow stack vma has VM_SHADOW_STACK. Its PTEs have _PAGE_DIRTY, but not
_PAGE_WRITE. In fork(), _PAGE_DIRTY is cleared to cause copy-on-write,
and in the page fault handler, _PAGE_DIRTY is restored and the shadow stack
page is writable again.
Introduce an x86 version of maybe_mkwrite(), which sets proper PTE bits
according to VM flags.
Apply the same changes to maybe_pmd_mkwrite().
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Instead of doing arch_maybe_mkwrite(), overwrite maybe*_mkwrite() with x86
versions.
- Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++
mm/huge_memory.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 46d9394b884f..51cdf14488b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1686,6 +1686,14 @@ static inline bool arch_faults_on_old_pte(void)
return false;
}
+#define maybe_mkwrite maybe_mkwrite
+extern pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+#define maybe_pmd_mkwrite maybe_pmd_mkwrite
+extern pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index f6a9e2e36642..e778dbbef3d8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -610,6 +610,26 @@ int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
}
#endif
+pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
+ pte = pte_mkwrite(pte);
+ else if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK))
+ pte = pte_mkwrite_shstk(pte);
+ return pte;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
+ pmd = pmd_mkwrite(pmd);
+ else if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK))
+ pmd = pmd_mkwrite_shstk(pmd);
+ return pmd;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */
+
/**
* reserve_top_address - reserves a hole in the top of kernel address space
* @reserve - size of hole to reserve
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 08282eb2f195..6ac9b3e9a865 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -993,12 +993,14 @@ void free_compound_page(struct page *page);
* pte_mkwrite. But get_user_pages can cause write faults for mappings
* that do not have writing enabled, when used by access_process_vm.
*/
+#ifndef maybe_mkwrite
static inline pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
pte = pte_mkwrite(pte);
return pte;
}
+#endif
vm_fault_t do_set_pmd(struct vm_fault *vmf, struct page *page);
void do_set_pte(struct vm_fault *vmf, struct page *page, unsigned long addr);
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index ae907a9c2050..8203bd6ae4bd 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -478,12 +478,14 @@ static int __init setup_transparent_hugepage(char *str)
}
__setup("transparent_hugepage=", setup_transparent_hugepage);
+#ifndef maybe_pmd_mkwrite
pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
pmd = pmd_mkwrite(pmd);
return pmd;
}
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
static inline struct deferred_split *get_deferred_split_queue(struct page *page)
--
2.21.0
Can_follow_write_pte() ensures a read-only page is COWed by checking the
FOLL_COW flag, and uses pte_dirty() to validate the flag is still valid.
Like a writable data page, a shadow stack page is writable, and becomes
read-only during copy-on-write, but it is always dirty. Thus, in the
can_follow_write_pte() check, it belongs to the writable page case and
should be excluded from the read-only page pte_dirty() check. Apply
the same changes to can_follow_write_pmd().
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Change arch_shadow_stack_mapping() to is_shadow_stack_mapping().
mm/gup.c | 8 +++++---
mm/huge_memory.c | 8 +++++---
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index e40579624f10..c313cc988865 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -356,10 +356,12 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
* FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only
* after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
*/
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
return pte_write(pte) ||
- ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
+ ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte) &&
+ !is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags));
}
static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -402,7 +404,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
}
if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
goto no_page;
- if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
+ if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags, vma)) {
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 8203bd6ae4bd..65fc0aedd577 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1338,10 +1338,12 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)
* FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only
* after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
*/
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
return pmd_write(pmd) ||
- ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd));
+ ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd) &&
+ !is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags));
}
struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -1354,7 +1356,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
- if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags))
+ if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags, vma))
goto out;
/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
--
2.21.0
When serving a page fault, maybe_mkwrite() makes a PTE writable if it is in
a writable vma. A shadow stack vma is writable, but its PTEs need
_PAGE_DIRTY to be set to become writable. For this reason, maybe_mkwrite()
has been updated.
There are a few places that call pte_mkwrite() directly, but have the
same result as from maybe_mkwrite(). These sites need to be updated for
shadow stack as well. Thus, change them to maybe_mkwrite():
- do_anonymous_page() and migrate_vma_insert_page() check VM_WRITE directly
and call pte_mkwrite(), which is the same as maybe_mkwrite(). Change
them to maybe_mkwrite().
- In do_numa_page(), if the numa entry was writable, then pte_mkwrite()
is called directly. Fix it by doing maybe_mkwrite().
- In change_pte_range(), pte_mkwrite() is called directly. Replace it with
maybe_mkwrite().
A shadow stack vma is writable but has different vma
flags, and handled accordingly in maybe_mkwrite().
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
mm/memory.c | 5 ++---
mm/migrate.c | 3 +--
mm/mprotect.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index 5efa07fb6cdc..c70c3847f79d 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -3561,8 +3561,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
__SetPageUptodate(page);
entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
- if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
- entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry));
+ entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
vmf->pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address,
&vmf->ptl);
@@ -4125,7 +4124,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_numa_page(struct vm_fault *vmf)
pte = pte_modify(old_pte, vma->vm_page_prot);
pte = pte_mkyoung(pte);
if (was_writable)
- pte = pte_mkwrite(pte);
+ pte = maybe_mkwrite(pte, vma);
ptep_modify_prot_commit(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, old_pte, pte);
update_mmu_cache(vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);
diff --git a/mm/migrate.c b/mm/migrate.c
index 62b81d5257aa..7251c88a3d64 100644
--- a/mm/migrate.c
+++ b/mm/migrate.c
@@ -2976,8 +2976,7 @@ static void migrate_vma_insert_page(struct migrate_vma *migrate,
}
} else {
entry = mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot);
- if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
- entry = pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry));
+ entry = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry), vma);
}
ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmdp, addr, &ptl);
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 94188df1ee55..c1ce78d688b6 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static unsigned long change_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
if (dirty_accountable && pte_dirty(ptent) &&
(pte_soft_dirty(ptent) ||
!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SOFTDIRTY))) {
- ptent = pte_mkwrite(ptent);
+ ptent = maybe_mkwrite(ptent, vma);
}
ptep_modify_prot_commit(vma, addr, pte, oldpte, ptent);
pages++;
--
2.21.0
There is essentially no room left in the x86 hardware PTEs on some OSes
(not Linux). That left the hardware architects looking for a way to
represent a new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits.
They chose to repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0, Dirty=1.
The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by hardware
and cannot normally be set by hardware on a Write=0 PTE. Software must
normally be involved to create one of these PTEs, so software can simply
opt to not create them.
In places where Linux normally creates Write=0, Dirty=1, it can use the
software-defined _PAGE_COW in place of the hardware _PAGE_DIRTY. In other
words, whenever Linux needs to create Write=0, Dirty=1, it instead creates
Write=0, Cow=1, except for shadow stack, which is Write=0, Dirty=1. This
clearly separates shadow stack from other data, and results in the
following:
(a) A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page: (Write=0, Cow=1)
(b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed: (Write=0, Cow=1)
The user page is in a R/O VMA, and get_user_pages() needs a writable
copy. The page fault handler creates a copy of the page and sets
the new copy's PTE as Write=0 and Cow=1.
(c) A shadow stack PTE: (Write=0, Dirty=1)
(d) A shared shadow stack PTE: (Write=0, Cow=1)
When a shadow stack page is being shared among processes (this happens
at fork()), its PTE is made Dirty=0, so the next shadow stack access
causes a fault, and the page is duplicated and Dirty=1 is set again.
This is the COW equivalent for shadow stack pages, even though it's
copy-on-access rather than copy-on-write.
(e) A page where the processor observed a Write=1 PTE, started a write, set
Dirty=1, but then observed a Write=0 PTE. That's possible today, but
will not happen on processors that support shadow stack.
Define _PAGE_COW and update pte_*() helpers and apply the same changes to
pmd and pud.
After this, there are six free bits left in the 64-bit PTE, and no more
free bits in the 32-bit PTE (except for PAE) and Shadow Stack is not
implemented for the 32-bit kernel.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Replace CONFIG_X86_CET with CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK to reflect the Kconfig
changes.
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 195 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 42 +++++-
2 files changed, 216 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index c1650d0af1b5..9c056d5815de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -121,11 +121,21 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;
* The following only work if pte_present() is true.
* Undefined behaviour if not..
*/
-static inline int pte_dirty(pte_t pte)
+static inline bool pte_dirty(pte_t pte)
{
- return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY;
+ /*
+ * A dirty PTE has Dirty=1 or Cow=1.
+ */
+ return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
}
+static inline bool pte_shstk(pte_t pte)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return false;
+
+ return (pte_flags(pte) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)) == _PAGE_DIRTY;
+}
static inline u32 read_pkru(void)
{
@@ -160,9 +170,20 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)
return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED;
}
-static inline int pmd_dirty(pmd_t pmd)
+static inline bool pmd_dirty(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+ /*
+ * A dirty PMD has Dirty=1 or Cow=1.
+ */
+ return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
+}
+
+static inline bool pmd_shstk(pmd_t pmd)
{
- return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY;
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return false;
+
+ return (pmd_flags(pmd) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)) == _PAGE_DIRTY;
}
static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)
@@ -170,9 +191,12 @@ static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)
return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_ACCESSED;
}
-static inline int pud_dirty(pud_t pud)
+static inline bool pud_dirty(pud_t pud)
{
- return pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY;
+ /*
+ * A dirty PUD has Dirty=1 or Cow=1.
+ */
+ return pud_flags(pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS;
}
static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud)
@@ -182,13 +206,23 @@ static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud)
static inline int pte_write(pte_t pte)
{
- return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_RW;
+ /*
+ * Shadow stack pages are always writable - but not by normal
+ * instructions, and only by shadow stack operations. Therefore,
+ * the W=0,D=1 test with pte_shstk().
+ */
+ return (pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_RW) || pte_shstk(pte);
}
#define pmd_write pmd_write
static inline int pmd_write(pmd_t pmd)
{
- return pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_RW;
+ /*
+ * Shadow stack pages are always writable - but not by normal
+ * instructions, and only by shadow stack operations. Therefore,
+ * the W=0,D=1 test with pmd_shstk().
+ */
+ return (pmd_flags(pmd) & _PAGE_RW) || pmd_shstk(pmd);
}
#define pud_write pud_write
@@ -326,6 +360,24 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear)
return native_make_pte(v & ~clear);
}
+static inline pte_t pte_mkcow(pte_t pte)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return pte;
+
+ pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+ return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_COW);
+}
+
+static inline pte_t pte_clear_cow(pte_t pte)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return pte;
+
+ pte = pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+ return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_COW);
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
static inline int pte_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
{
@@ -345,7 +397,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)
static inline pte_t pte_mkclean(pte_t pte)
{
- return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+ return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS);
}
static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)
@@ -355,7 +407,16 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)
static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte)
{
- return pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_RW);
+ pte = pte_clear_flags(pte, _PAGE_RW);
+
+ /*
+ * Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create
+ * a shadow stack PTE (RW=0, Dirty=1). Move the hardware
+ * dirty value to the software bit.
+ */
+ if (pte_dirty(pte))
+ pte = pte_mkcow(pte);
+ return pte;
}
static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)
@@ -365,7 +426,18 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)
static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty(pte_t pte)
{
- return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+ pteval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY;
+
+ /* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PTEs */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && !pte_write(pte))
+ dirty = _PAGE_COW;
+
+ return pte_set_flags(pte, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+}
+
+static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_shstk(pte_t pte)
+{
+ return pte_clear_cow(pte);
}
static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)
@@ -375,7 +447,12 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)
static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite(pte_t pte)
{
- return pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_RW);
+ pte = pte_set_flags(pte, _PAGE_RW);
+
+ if (pte_dirty(pte))
+ pte = pte_clear_cow(pte);
+
+ return pte;
}
static inline pte_t pte_mkhuge(pte_t pte)
@@ -422,6 +499,24 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_flags(pmd_t pmd, pmdval_t clear)
return native_make_pmd(v & ~clear);
}
+static inline pmd_t pmd_mkcow(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return pmd;
+
+ pmd = pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+ return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_COW);
+}
+
+static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_cow(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return pmd;
+
+ pmd = pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+ return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_COW);
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
static inline int pmd_uffd_wp(pmd_t pmd)
{
@@ -446,17 +541,36 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd)
static inline pmd_t pmd_mkclean(pmd_t pmd)
{
- return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+ return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS);
}
static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect(pmd_t pmd)
{
- return pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
+ pmd = pmd_clear_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
+ /*
+ * Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create
+ * a shadow stack PMD (RW=0, Dirty=1). Move the hardware
+ * dirty value to the software bit.
+ */
+ if (pmd_dirty(pmd))
+ pmd = pmd_mkcow(pmd);
+ return pmd;
}
static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty(pmd_t pmd)
{
- return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+ pmdval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY;
+
+ /* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PMDs */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && !pmd_write(pmd))
+ dirty = _PAGE_COW;
+
+ return pmd_set_flags(pmd, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+}
+
+static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_shstk(pmd_t pmd)
+{
+ return pmd_clear_cow(pmd);
}
static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdevmap(pmd_t pmd)
@@ -476,7 +590,11 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd)
static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd)
{
- return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
+ pmd = pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_RW);
+
+ if (pmd_dirty(pmd))
+ pmd = pmd_clear_cow(pmd);
+ return pmd;
}
static inline pud_t pud_set_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t set)
@@ -493,6 +611,24 @@ static inline pud_t pud_clear_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t clear)
return native_make_pud(v & ~clear);
}
+static inline pud_t pud_mkcow(pud_t pud)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return pud;
+
+ pud = pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+ return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_COW);
+}
+
+static inline pud_t pud_clear_cow(pud_t pud)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return pud;
+
+ pud = pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+ return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_COW);
+}
+
static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)
{
return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
@@ -500,17 +636,32 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)
static inline pud_t pud_mkclean(pud_t pud)
{
- return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY);
+ return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS);
}
static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect(pud_t pud)
{
- return pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_RW);
+ pud = pud_clear_flags(pud, _PAGE_RW);
+
+ /*
+ * Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create
+ * a shadow stack PUD (RW=0, Dirty=1). Move the hardware
+ * dirty value to the software bit.
+ */
+ if (pud_dirty(pud))
+ pud = pud_mkcow(pud);
+ return pud;
}
static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty(pud_t pud)
{
- return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
+ pudval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY;
+
+ /* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PUDs */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && !pud_write(pud))
+ dirty = _PAGE_COW;
+
+ return pud_set_flags(pud, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY);
}
static inline pud_t pud_mkdevmap(pud_t pud)
@@ -530,7 +681,11 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkyoung(pud_t pud)
static inline pud_t pud_mkwrite(pud_t pud)
{
- return pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_RW);
+ pud = pud_set_flags(pud, _PAGE_RW);
+
+ if (pud_dirty(pud))
+ pud = pud_clear_cow(pud);
+ return pud;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index 9db61817dfff..ce853c28c253 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@
#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW2 10 /* " */
#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 11 /* " */
#define _PAGE_BIT_PAT_LARGE 12 /* On 2MB or 1GB pages */
-#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4 58 /* available for programmer */
+#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4 57 /* available for programmer */
+#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 58 /* available for programmer */
#define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT0 59 /* Protection Keys, bit 1/4 */
#define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT1 60 /* Protection Keys, bit 2/4 */
#define _PAGE_BIT_PKEY_BIT2 61 /* Protection Keys, bit 3/4 */
@@ -36,6 +37,15 @@
#define _PAGE_BIT_SOFT_DIRTY _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW3 /* software dirty tracking */
#define _PAGE_BIT_DEVMAP _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW4
+/*
+ * Indicates a copy-on-write page.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+#define _PAGE_BIT_COW _PAGE_BIT_SOFTW5 /* copy-on-write */
+#else
+#define _PAGE_BIT_COW 0
+#endif
+
/* If _PAGE_BIT_PRESENT is clear, we use these: */
/* - if the user mapped it with PROT_NONE; pte_present gives true */
#define _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE _PAGE_BIT_GLOBAL
@@ -117,6 +127,36 @@
#define _PAGE_DEVMAP (_AT(pteval_t, 0))
#endif
+/*
+ * The hardware requires shadow stack to be read-only and Dirty.
+ * _PAGE_COW is a software-only bit used to separate copy-on-write PTEs
+ * from shadow stack PTEs:
+ * (a) A modified, copy-on-write (COW) page: (Write=0, Cow=1)
+ * (b) A R/O page that has been COW'ed: (Write=0, Cow=1)
+ * The user page is in a R/O VMA, and get_user_pages() needs a
+ * writable copy. The page fault handler creates a copy of the page
+ * and sets the new copy's PTE as Write=0, Cow=1.
+ * (c) A shadow stack PTE: (Write=0, Dirty=1)
+ * (d) A shared (copy-on-access) shadow stack PTE: (Write=0, Cow=1)
+ * When a shadow stack page is being shared among processes (this
+ * happens at fork()), its PTE is cleared of _PAGE_DIRTY, so the next
+ * shadow stack access causes a fault, and the page is duplicated and
+ * _PAGE_DIRTY is set again. This is the COW equivalent for shadow
+ * stack pages, even though it's copy-on-access rather than
+ * copy-on-write.
+ * (e) A page where the processor observed a Write=1 PTE, started a write,
+ * set Dirty=1, but then observed a Write=0 PTE (changed by another
+ * thread). That's possible today, but will not happen on processors
+ * that support shadow stack.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+#define _PAGE_COW (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_COW)
+#else
+#define _PAGE_COW (_AT(pteval_t, 0))
+#endif
+
+#define _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS (_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_COW)
+
#define _PAGE_PROTNONE (_AT(pteval_t, 1) << _PAGE_BIT_PROTNONE)
/*
--
2.21.0
The read-only and Dirty PTE has been used to indicate copy-on-write pages.
However, newer x86 processors also regard a read-only and Dirty PTE as a
shadow stack page. In order to separate the two, the software-defined
_PAGE_COW is created to replace _PAGE_DIRTY for the copy-on-write case, and
pte_*() are updated.
Pte_modify() changes a PTE to 'newprot', but it doesn't use the pte_*().
Introduce fixup_dirty_pte(), which sets a dirty PTE, based on _PAGE_RW,
to either _PAGE_DIRTY or _PAGE_COW.
Apply the same changes to pmd_modify().
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 37 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 9c056d5815de..e1739f590ca6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -799,6 +799,23 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkinvalid(pmd_t pmd)
static inline u64 flip_protnone_guard(u64 oldval, u64 val, u64 mask);
+static inline pteval_t fixup_dirty_pte(pteval_t pteval)
+{
+ pte_t pte = __pte(pteval);
+
+ /*
+ * Fix up potential shadow stack page flags because the RO, Dirty
+ * PTE is special.
+ */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+ if (pte_dirty(pte)) {
+ pte = pte_mkclean(pte);
+ pte = pte_mkdirty(pte);
+ }
+ }
+ return pte_val(pte);
+}
+
static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)
{
pteval_t val = pte_val(pte), oldval = val;
@@ -809,16 +826,36 @@ static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot)
*/
val &= _PAGE_CHG_MASK;
val |= check_pgprot(newprot) & ~_PAGE_CHG_MASK;
+ val = fixup_dirty_pte(val);
val = flip_protnone_guard(oldval, val, PTE_PFN_MASK);
return __pte(val);
}
+static inline int pmd_write(pmd_t pmd);
+static inline pmdval_t fixup_dirty_pmd(pmdval_t pmdval)
+{
+ pmd_t pmd = __pmd(pmdval);
+
+ /*
+ * Fix up potential shadow stack page flags because the RO, Dirty
+ * PMD is special.
+ */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+ if (pmd_dirty(pmd)) {
+ pmd = pmd_mkclean(pmd);
+ pmd = pmd_mkdirty(pmd);
+ }
+ }
+ return pmd_val(pmd);
+}
+
static inline pmd_t pmd_modify(pmd_t pmd, pgprot_t newprot)
{
pmdval_t val = pmd_val(pmd), oldval = val;
val &= _HPAGE_CHG_MASK;
val |= check_pgprot(newprot) & ~_HPAGE_CHG_MASK;
+ val = fixup_dirty_pmd(val);
val = flip_protnone_guard(oldval, val, PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK);
return __pmd(val);
}
--
2.21.0
The kernel allocates (and frees on thread exit) a new shadow stack for a
pthread child.
It is possible for the kernel to complete the clone syscall and set the
child's shadow stack pointer to NULL and let the child thread allocate
a shadow stack for itself. There are two issues in this approach: It
is not compatible with existing code that does inline syscall and it
cannot handle signals before the child can successfully allocate a
shadow stack.
Use stack_size passed from clone3() syscall for thread shadow stack size,
but cap it to min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4 GB). A compat-mode thread shadow stack
size is further reduced to 1/4. This allows more threads to run in a 32-
bit address space.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 5 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 3 ++
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 15 ++++++--
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index aa85d599b184..8b83ded577cc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -16,10 +16,15 @@ struct cet_status {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
int shstk_setup(void);
+int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags,
+ unsigned long stack_size);
void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
void shstk_disable(void);
#else
static inline int shstk_setup(void) { return 0; }
+static inline int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p,
+ unsigned long clone_flags,
+ unsigned long stack_size) { return 0; }
static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline void shstk_disable(void) {}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 27516046117a..53569114aa01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id;
@@ -146,6 +147,8 @@ do { \
#else
#define deactivate_mm(tsk, mm) \
do { \
+ if (!tsk->vfork_done) \
+ shstk_free(tsk); \
load_gs_index(0); \
loadsegment(fs, 0); \
} while (0)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 9c214d7085a4..fa01e8679d01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
#include <asm/proto.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
#include "process.h"
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
free_vm86(t);
+ shstk_free(tsk);
fpu__drop(fpu);
}
@@ -122,8 +124,9 @@ static int set_new_tls(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long tls)
return do_set_thread_area_64(p, ARCH_SET_FS, tls);
}
-int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, unsigned long arg,
- struct task_struct *p, unsigned long tls)
+int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
+ unsigned long stack_size, struct task_struct *p,
+ unsigned long tls)
{
struct inactive_task_frame *frame;
struct fork_frame *fork_frame;
@@ -163,7 +166,7 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, unsigned long arg,
/* Kernel thread ? */
if (unlikely(p->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_IO_WORKER))) {
memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
- kthread_frame_init(frame, sp, arg);
+ kthread_frame_init(frame, sp, stack_size);
return 0;
}
@@ -181,6 +184,12 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp, unsigned long arg,
if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS)
ret = set_new_tls(p, tls);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ /* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = shstk_setup_thread(p, clone_flags, stack_size);
+#endif
+
if (!ret && unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_IO_BITMAP)))
io_bitmap_share(p);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 5406fdf6df3c..9c80785535b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -75,6 +75,55 @@ int shstk_setup(void)
return 0;
}
+int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags,
+ unsigned long stack_size)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, size;
+ struct cet_user_state *state;
+ struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
+
+ if (!cet->shstk_size)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) != CLONE_VM)
+ return 0;
+
+ state = get_xsave_addr(&tsk->thread.fpu.state.xsave,
+ XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+
+ if (!state)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (stack_size == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Cap shadow stack size to 4 GB */
+ size = min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G);
+ size = min(size, stack_size);
+
+ /*
+ * Compat-mode pthreads share a limited address space.
+ * If each function call takes an average of four slots
+ * stack space, allocate 1/4 of stack size for shadow stack.
+ */
+ if (in_compat_syscall())
+ size /= 4;
+ size = round_up(size, PAGE_SIZE);
+ addr = alloc_shstk(size, 0);
+
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) {
+ cet->shstk_base = 0;
+ cet->shstk_size = 0;
+ return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
+ }
+
+ fpu__prepare_write(&tsk->thread.fpu);
+ state->user_ssp = (u64)(addr + size);
+ cet->shstk_base = addr;
+ cet->shstk_size = size;
+ return 0;
+}
+
void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
@@ -84,7 +133,13 @@ void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
!cet->shstk_base)
return;
- if (!tsk->mm)
+ /*
+ * When fork() with CLONE_VM fails, the child (tsk) already has a
+ * shadow stack allocated, and exit_thread() calls this function to
+ * free it. In this case the parent (current) and the child is
+ * sharing the same mm struct.
+ */
+ if (!tsk->mm || tsk->mm != current->mm)
return;
while (1) {
--
2.21.0
There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API:
an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect().
Each has its advantages and compromises.
An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive. However, the existing x86
arch_prctl() takes only two parameters. Multiple parameters must be
passed in a memory buffer. There is a proposal to pass more parameters in
registers [1], but no active discussion on that.
A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame
work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of
mmap()/mprotect().
The introduction of PROT_SHSTK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage of
existing APIs. The x86-specific PROT_SHSTK is translated to
VM_SHADOW_STACK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing
the wheel. There are potential pitfalls though. The most obvious one
would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection. However, the
attacker would have to get to the syscall first.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Update arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(), leave PROT* checking to
arch_validate_prot().
- Update arch_validate_prot(), leave vma flags checking to
arch_validate_flags().
- Add arch_validate_flags().
arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 1 +
include/linux/mm.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
index 629f6c81263a..1821c179f35d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -20,11 +20,68 @@
((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \
+#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \
((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+#else
+#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (0)
#endif
+static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long pkey)
+{
+ unsigned long vm_prot_bits = pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey);
+
+ if (prot & PROT_SHSTK)
+ vm_prot_bits |= VM_SHADOW_STACK;
+
+ return vm_prot_bits;
+}
+
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
+{
+ unsigned long valid = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM |
+ PROT_SHSTK;
+
+ if (prot & ~valid)
+ return false;
+
+ if (prot & PROT_SHSTK) {
+ if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_size)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only
+ * the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write
+ * instructions). PROT_SHSTK and PROT_WRITE are mutually
+ * exclusive.
+ */
+ if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot
+
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags, bool is_anon)
+{
+ if (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) {
+ if ((vm_flags & VM_SHARED) || !is_anon)
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags, is_anon) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags, is_anon)
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
index 3ce1923e6ed9..39bb7db344a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#define MAP_32BIT 0x40 /* only give out 32bit addresses */
+#define PROT_SHSTK 0x10 /* shadow stack pages */
#include <asm-generic/mman.h>
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 1ccec5cc399b..9a7652eea207 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
#if defined(CONFIG_X86)
# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1 /* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
+# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR VM_SHADOW_STACK
#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
# define VM_SAO VM_ARCH_1 /* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */
#elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC)
--
2.21.0
When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn. However,
currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
shadow stack restore token address and WAIT_ENDBR status[1]. The extension
is located above the fpu states, plus alignment.
Introduce routines for the allocation, save, and restore for sc_ext:
- fpu__alloc_sigcontext_ext(),
- save_extra_state_to_sigframe(),
- get_extra_state_from_sigframe(),
- restore_extra_state().
[1] WAIT_ENDBR will be introduced later in the Indirect Branch Tracking
series, but add that into sc_ext now to keep the struct stable in case
the IBT series is applied later.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Split out shadow stack token routines to a separate patch.
- Put signal frame save/restore routines to fpu/signal.c and re-name accordingly.
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 16 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 ++
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 9 ++
6 files changed, 181 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
index 5e3d9b7fd5fb..96b87c5f0bbe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs,
void __user **fpstate)
{
unsigned long sp, fx_aligned, math_size;
+ void __user *restorer = NULL;
/* Default to using normal stack */
sp = regs->sp;
@@ -218,8 +219,23 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs,
ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer)
sp = (unsigned long) ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
+ if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) {
+ restorer = ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
+ } else if (current->mm->context.vdso) {
+ if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO)
+ restorer = current->mm->context.vdso +
+ vdso_image_32.sym___kernel_rt_sigreturn;
+ else
+ restorer = current->mm->context.vdso +
+ vdso_image_32.sym___kernel_sigreturn;
+ }
+
sp = fpu__alloc_mathframe(sp, 1, &fx_aligned, &math_size);
*fpstate = (struct _fpstate_32 __user *) sp;
+
+ if (save_extra_state_to_sigframe(1, *fpstate, (unsigned long)restorer))
+ return (void __user *)-1L;
+
if (copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(*fpstate, (void __user *)fx_aligned,
math_size) < 0)
return (void __user *) -1L;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index ef6155213b7e..5e66919bd2fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
struct task_struct;
+struct sc_ext;
+
/*
* Per-thread CET status
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
index 8d33ad80704f..eb01eb6ea55d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
@@ -443,6 +443,8 @@ static inline void copy_kernel_to_fpregs(union fpregs_state *fpstate)
__copy_kernel_to_fpregs(fpstate, -1);
}
+extern int save_extra_state_to_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp,
+ unsigned long restorer);
extern int copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(void __user *buf, void __user *fp, int size);
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
index 844d60eb1882..cf2d55db3be4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
@@ -196,6 +196,15 @@ struct _xstate {
/* New processor state extensions go here: */
};
+/*
+ * Located at the end of sigcontext->fpstate, aligned to 8.
+ */
+struct sc_ext {
+ unsigned long total_size;
+ unsigned long ssp;
+ unsigned long wait_endbr;
+};
+
/*
* The 32-bit signal frame:
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
index a4ec65317a7f..2e56f2fe8be0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
@@ -52,6 +52,123 @@ static inline int check_for_xstate(struct fxregs_state __user *buf,
return 0;
}
+int save_extra_state_to_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp, unsigned long restorer)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+ struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
+ unsigned long token_addr = 0, new_ssp = 0;
+ struct sc_ext ext = {};
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CET))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (cet->shstk_size) {
+ err = shstk_setup_rstor_token(ia32, restorer,
+ &token_addr, &new_ssp);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ ext.ssp = token_addr;
+
+ fpregs_lock();
+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+ __fpregs_load_activate();
+ if (new_ssp)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, new_ssp);
+ fpregs_unlock();
+ }
+
+ if (ext.ssp) {
+ void __user *p = fp;
+
+ ext.total_size = sizeof(ext);
+
+ p = fp;
+ if (ia32)
+ p += sizeof(struct fregs_state);
+
+ p += fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
+ p = (void __user *)ALIGN((unsigned long)p, 8);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(p, &ext, sizeof(ext)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+#endif
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int get_extra_state_from_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp, struct sc_ext *ext)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+ struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
+ void __user *p;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CET))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!cet->shstk_size)
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(ext, 0, sizeof(*ext));
+
+ p = fp;
+ if (ia32)
+ p += sizeof(struct fregs_state);
+
+ p += fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
+ p = (void __user *)ALIGN((unsigned long)p, 8);
+
+ if (copy_from_user(ext, p, sizeof(*ext)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (ext->total_size != sizeof(*ext))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (cet->shstk_size)
+ err = shstk_check_rstor_token(ia32, ext->ssp, &ext->ssp);
+#endif
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from __fpu__restore_sig() and XSAVES buffer is protected by
+ * set_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD) in the slow path.
+ */
+void restore_extra_state(struct sc_ext *sc_ext)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+ struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
+ struct cet_user_state *cet_user_state;
+ u64 msr_val = 0;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CET))
+ return;
+
+ cet_user_state = get_xsave_addr(¤t->thread.fpu.state.xsave,
+ XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+ if (!cet_user_state)
+ return;
+
+ if (cet->shstk_size) {
+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+ cet_user_state->user_ssp = sc_ext->ssp;
+ else
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, sc_ext->ssp);
+
+ msr_val |= CET_SHSTK_EN;
+ }
+
+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+ cet_user_state->user_cet = msr_val;
+ else
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
+#endif
+}
+
/*
* Signal frame handlers.
*/
@@ -295,6 +412,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu;
struct user_i387_ia32_struct env;
+ struct sc_ext sc_ext;
u64 user_xfeatures = 0;
int fx_only = 0;
int ret = 0;
@@ -335,6 +453,10 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
if ((unsigned long)buf_fx % 64)
fx_only = 1;
+ ret = get_extra_state_from_sigframe(ia32_fxstate, buf, &sc_ext);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
if (!ia32_fxstate) {
/*
* Attempt to restore the FPU registers directly from user
@@ -349,6 +471,8 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
pagefault_enable();
if (!ret) {
+ restore_extra_state(&sc_ext);
+
/*
* Restore supervisor states: previous context switch
* etc has done XSAVES and saved the supervisor states
@@ -423,6 +547,8 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
if (unlikely(init_bv))
copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, init_bv);
+ restore_extra_state(&sc_ext);
+
/*
* Restore previously saved supervisor xstates along with
* copied-in user xstates.
@@ -491,12 +617,29 @@ int fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, int ia32_frame)
return __fpu__restore_sig(buf, buf_fx, size);
}
+static unsigned long fpu__alloc_sigcontext_ext(unsigned long sp)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+ struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
+
+ /*
+ * sigcontext_ext is at: fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size +
+ * FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE, then aligned to 8.
+ */
+ if (cet->shstk_size)
+ sp -= (sizeof(struct sc_ext) + 8);
+#endif
+ return sp;
+}
+
unsigned long
fpu__alloc_mathframe(unsigned long sp, int ia32_frame,
unsigned long *buf_fx, unsigned long *size)
{
unsigned long frame_size = xstate_sigframe_size();
+ sp = fpu__alloc_sigcontext_ext(sp);
+
*buf_fx = sp = round_down(sp - frame_size, 64);
if (ia32_frame && use_fxsr()) {
frame_size += sizeof(struct fregs_state);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
index f306e85a08a6..111faa5a398f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
@@ -239,6 +239,9 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
unsigned long buf_fx = 0;
int onsigstack = on_sig_stack(sp);
int ret;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ void __user *restorer = NULL;
+#endif
/* redzone */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
@@ -270,6 +273,12 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
if (onsigstack && !likely(on_sig_stack(sp)))
return (void __user *)-1L;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
+ restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
+ ret = save_extra_state_to_sigframe(0, *fpstate, (unsigned long)restorer);
+#endif
+
/* save i387 and extended state */
ret = copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(*fpstate, (void __user *)buf_fx, math_size);
if (ret < 0)
--
2.21.0
An ELF file's .note.gnu.property indicates arch features supported by the
file. These features are extracted by arch_parse_elf_property() and stored
in 'arch_elf_state'.
Introduce x86 feature definitions and arch_setup_elf_property(), which
enables such features. The first use-case of this function is Shadow
Stack.
ARM64 is the other arch that has ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY and arch_parse_elf_
property(). Add arch_setup_elf_property() for it.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Martin <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Change cet_setup_shstk() to shstk_setup() to reflect function name changes
relating to the splitting of shadow stack and ibt.
arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 5 +++++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 13 +++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/binfmt_elf.c | 4 ++++
include/linux/elf.h | 6 ++++++
include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 9 +++++++++
7 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
index 8d1c8dcb87fd..d37bc7915935 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -281,6 +281,11 @@ static inline int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data,
return 0;
}
+static inline int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *arch)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int arch_elf_pt_proc(void *ehdr, void *phdr,
struct file *f, bool is_interp,
struct arch_elf_state *state)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index f42560b220ef..a69e351e7386 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1955,6 +1955,8 @@ config X86_SHADOW_STACK
depends on ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
select X86_CET
+ select ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY
+ select ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
help
Shadow Stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
index 9224d40cdefe..6a131047be8a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -390,6 +390,19 @@ extern int compat_arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
extern bool arch_syscall_is_vdso_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_BINFMT_ELF_STATE
+struct arch_elf_state {
+ unsigned int gnu_property;
+};
+
+#define INIT_ARCH_ELF_STATE { \
+ .gnu_property = 0, \
+}
+
+#define arch_elf_pt_proc(ehdr, phdr, elf, interp, state) (0)
+#define arch_check_elf(ehdr, interp, interp_ehdr, state) (0)
+#endif
+
/* Do not change the values. See get_align_mask() */
enum align_flags {
ALIGN_VA_32 = BIT(0),
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index d08307df69ad..892d8e742e3b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -835,3 +835,35 @@ unsigned long KSTK_ESP(struct task_struct *task)
{
return task_pt_regs(task)->sp;
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_GNU_PROPERTY
+int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data, size_t datasz,
+ bool compat, struct arch_elf_state *state)
+{
+ if (type != GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (datasz != sizeof(unsigned int))
+ return -ENOEXEC;
+
+ state->gnu_property = *(unsigned int *)data;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *state)
+{
+ int r = 0;
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_CET))
+ return r;
+
+ memset(¤t->thread.cet, 0, sizeof(struct cet_status));
+
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+ if (state->gnu_property & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
+ r = shstk_setup();
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
index b12ba98ae9f5..fa665eceba04 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -1248,6 +1248,10 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
set_binfmt(&elf_format);
+ retval = arch_setup_elf_property(&arch_state);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+
#ifdef ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES
retval = ARCH_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGES(bprm, elf_ex, !!interpreter);
if (retval < 0)
diff --git a/include/linux/elf.h b/include/linux/elf.h
index c9a46c4e183b..be04d15e937f 100644
--- a/include/linux/elf.h
+++ b/include/linux/elf.h
@@ -92,9 +92,15 @@ static inline int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data,
{
return 0;
}
+
+static inline int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *arch)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#else
extern int arch_parse_elf_property(u32 type, const void *data, size_t datasz,
bool compat, struct arch_elf_state *arch);
+extern int arch_setup_elf_property(struct arch_elf_state *arch);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAVE_ELF_PROT
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/elf.h b/include/uapi/linux/elf.h
index 30f68b42eeb5..24ba55ba8278 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/elf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/elf.h
@@ -455,4 +455,13 @@ typedef struct elf64_note {
/* Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI */
#define GNU_PROPERTY_AARCH64_FEATURE_1_BTI (1U << 0)
+/* .note.gnu.property types for x86: */
+#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND 0xc0000002
+
+/* Bits for GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND */
+#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT 0x00000001
+#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK 0x00000002
+#define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_VALID (GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_IBT | \
+ GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
+
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_ELF_H */
--
2.21.0
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) introduces these MSRs:
MSR_IA32_U_CET (user-mode CET settings),
MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP (user-mode shadow stack pointer),
MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP (kernel-mode shadow stack pointer),
MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP (Privilege Level 1 shadow stack pointer),
MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP (Privilege Level 2 shadow stack pointer),
MSR_IA32_S_CET (kernel-mode CET settings),
MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB (exception shadow stack table).
The two user-mode MSRs belong to XFEATURE_CET_USER. The first three of
kernel-mode MSRs belong to XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL. Both XSAVES states are
supervisor states. This means that there is no direct, unprivileged access
to these states, making it harder for an attacker to subvert CET.
For sigreturn and future ptrace() support, shadow stack address and MSR
reserved bits are checked before written to the supervisor states.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 6 ++++--
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 10 +++++++++-
4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
index f5a38a5f3ae1..035eb0ec665e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ enum xfeature {
XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR,
XFEATURE_PKRU,
XFEATURE_PASID,
- XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_11,
- XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_12,
+ XFEATURE_CET_USER,
+ XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL,
XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13,
XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_14,
XFEATURE_LBR,
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ enum xfeature {
#define XFEATURE_MASK_PT (1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU (1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_PASID (1 << XFEATURE_PASID)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER (1 << XFEATURE_CET_USER)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL (1 << XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR (1 << XFEATURE_LBR)
#define XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE)
@@ -237,6 +239,23 @@ struct pkru_state {
u32 pad;
} __packed;
+/*
+ * State component 11 is Control-flow Enforcement user states
+ */
+struct cet_user_state {
+ u64 user_cet; /* user control-flow settings */
+ u64 user_ssp; /* user shadow stack pointer */
+};
+
+/*
+ * State component 12 is Control-flow Enforcement kernel states
+ */
+struct cet_kernel_state {
+ u64 kernel_ssp; /* kernel shadow stack */
+ u64 pl1_ssp; /* privilege level 1 shadow stack */
+ u64 pl2_ssp; /* privilege level 2 shadow stack */
+};
+
/*
* State component 15: Architectural LBR configuration state.
* The size of Arch LBR state depends on the number of LBRs (lbr_depth).
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
index 47a92232d595..582f3575e0bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h
@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@
XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR)
/* All currently supported supervisor features */
-#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID | \
+ XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)
/*
* A supervisor state component may not always contain valuable information,
@@ -62,7 +63,8 @@
* Unsupported supervisor features. When a supervisor feature in this mask is
* supported in the future, move it to the supported supervisor feature mask.
*/
-#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT)
+#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT | \
+ XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)
/* All supervisor states including supported and unsupported states. */
#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_ALL (XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED | \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 546d6ecf0a35..5f4b7edead0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -933,4 +933,23 @@
#define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115
#define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117
+/* Control-flow Enforcement Technology MSRs */
+#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x000006a0 /* user mode cet setting */
+#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x000006a2 /* kernel mode cet setting */
+#define CET_SHSTK_EN BIT_ULL(0)
+#define CET_WRSS_EN BIT_ULL(1)
+#define CET_ENDBR_EN BIT_ULL(2)
+#define CET_LEG_IW_EN BIT_ULL(3)
+#define CET_NO_TRACK_EN BIT_ULL(4)
+#define CET_SUPPRESS_DISABLE BIT_ULL(5)
+#define CET_RESERVED (BIT_ULL(6) | BIT_ULL(7) | BIT_ULL(8) | BIT_ULL(9))
+#define CET_SUPPRESS BIT_ULL(10)
+#define CET_WAIT_ENDBR BIT_ULL(11)
+
+#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x000006a4 /* kernel shadow stack pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP 0x000006a5 /* ring-1 shadow stack pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP 0x000006a6 /* ring-2 shadow stack pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x000006a7 /* user shadow stack pointer */
+#define MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB 0x000006a8 /* exception shadow stack table */
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
index 683749b80ae2..abd770894489 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ static const char *xfeature_names[] =
"Processor Trace (unused)" ,
"Protection Keys User registers",
"PASID state",
+ "Control-flow User registers" ,
+ "Control-flow Kernel registers" ,
"unknown xstate feature" ,
};
@@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
X86_FEATURE_PKU,
X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,
+ X86_FEATURE_CET, /* XFEATURE_CET_USER */
+ X86_FEATURE_CET, /* XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL */
};
/*
@@ -321,6 +325,8 @@ static void __init print_xstate_features(void)
print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_Hi16_ZMM);
print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU);
print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_PASID);
+ print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER);
+ print_xstate_feature(XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL);
}
/*
@@ -596,6 +602,8 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr)
XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM, struct avx_512_hi16_state);
XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PKRU, struct pkru_state);
XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_PASID, struct ia32_pasid_state);
+ XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_CET_USER, struct cet_user_state);
+ XCHECK_SZ(sz, nr, XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL, struct cet_kernel_state);
/*
* Make *SURE* to add any feature numbers in below if
@@ -605,7 +613,7 @@ static void check_xstate_against_struct(int nr)
if ((nr < XFEATURE_YMM) ||
(nr >= XFEATURE_MAX) ||
(nr == XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR) ||
- ((nr >= XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_11) && (nr <= XFEATURE_LBR))) {
+ ((nr >= XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13) && (nr <= XFEATURE_LBR))) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "no structure for xstate: %d\n", nr);
XSTATE_WARN_ON(1);
}
--
2.21.0
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS, u64 *args)
Get CET feature status.
The parameter 'args' is a pointer to a user buffer. The kernel returns
the following information:
*args = shadow stack/IBT status
*(args + 1) = shadow stack base address
*(args + 2) = shadow stack size
32-bit binaries use the same interface, but only lower 32-bits of each
item.
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE, unsigned int features)
Disable CET features specified in 'features'. Return -EPERM if CET is
locked.
arch_prctl(ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK)
Lock in CET features.
Also change do_arch_prctl_common()'s parameter 'cpuid_enabled' to
'arg2', as it is now also passed to prctl_cet().
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Update #ifdef placement relating to shadow stack and ibt split.
- Update function names.
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 7 ++++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 4 +++
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 6 ++--
5 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index 5e66919bd2fe..26124820d46f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ struct sc_ext;
struct cet_status {
unsigned long shstk_base;
unsigned long shstk_size;
+ unsigned int locked:1;
};
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
@@ -40,6 +41,12 @@ static inline int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long token_addr,
unsigned long *new_ssp) { return 0; }
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+int prctl_cet(int option, u64 arg2);
+#else
+static inline int prctl_cet(int option, u64 arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
+#endif
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
index 5a6aac9fa41f..9245bf629120 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
@@ -14,4 +14,8 @@
#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32 0x2002
#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64 0x2003
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS 0x3001
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE 0x3002
+#define ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK 0x3003
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 0f99b093f350..868cb3aac618 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev-es.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK) += shstk.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CET) += cet_prctl.o
###
# 64 bit specific files
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5f0054177d2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet_prctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/elfcore.h>
+#include <linux/processor.h>
+#include <asm/prctl.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+
+/* See Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst. */
+
+static int cet_copy_status_to_user(struct cet_status *cet, u64 __user *ubuf)
+{
+ u64 buf[3] = {};
+
+ if (cet->shstk_size) {
+ buf[0] |= GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK;
+ buf[1] = cet->shstk_base;
+ buf[2] = cet->shstk_size;
+ }
+
+ return copy_to_user(ubuf, buf, sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+int prctl_cet(int option, u64 arg2)
+{
+ struct cet_status *cet;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CET))
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+ cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
+
+ if (option == ARCH_X86_CET_STATUS)
+ return cet_copy_status_to_user(cet, (u64 __user *)arg2);
+
+ switch (option) {
+ case ARCH_X86_CET_DISABLE:
+ if (cet->locked)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (arg2 & ~GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_VALID)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (arg2 & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK)
+ shstk_disable();
+ return 0;
+
+ case ARCH_X86_CET_LOCK:
+ if (arg2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ cet->locked = 1;
+ return 0;
+
+ default:
+ return -ENOSYS;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index fa01e8679d01..315668a334fd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -980,14 +980,14 @@ unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p)
}
long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option,
- unsigned long cpuid_enabled)
+ unsigned long arg2)
{
switch (option) {
case ARCH_GET_CPUID:
return get_cpuid_mode();
case ARCH_SET_CPUID:
- return set_cpuid_mode(task, cpuid_enabled);
+ return set_cpuid_mode(task, arg2);
}
- return -EINVAL;
+ return prctl_cet(option, arg2);
}
--
2.21.0
The x86 family of processors do not directly create read-only and Dirty
PTEs. These PTEs are created by software. One such case is that kernel
read-only pages are historically setup as Dirty.
New processors that support Shadow Stack regard read-only and Dirty PTEs as
shadow stack pages. This results in ambiguity between shadow stack and
kernel read-only pages. To resolve this, removed Dirty from kernel read-
only pages.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 6 +++---
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index f24d7ef8fffa..9db61817dfff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -192,10 +192,10 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
#define _KERNPG_TABLE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0| _ENC)
#define _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC (__PP|__RW|_USR|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0)
#define _PAGE_TABLE (__PP|__RW|_USR|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0| _ENC)
-#define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO (__PP| 0| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G)
-#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ROX (__PP| 0| 0|___A| 0|___D| 0|___G)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO (__PP| 0| 0|___A|__NX| 0| 0|___G)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ROX (__PP| 0| 0|___A| 0| 0| 0|___G)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G| __NC)
-#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR (__PP| 0|_USR|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G)
+#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR (__PP| 0|_USR|___A|__NX| 0| 0|___G)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D|_PSE|___G)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC (__PP|__RW| 0|___A| 0|___D|_PSE|___G)
#define __PAGE_KERNEL_WP (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G| __WP)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index 16f878c26667..6bebb95a6988 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -1932,7 +1932,7 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
int set_memory_ro(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
{
- return change_page_attr_clear(&addr, numpages, __pgprot(_PAGE_RW), 0);
+ return change_page_attr_clear(&addr, numpages, __pgprot(_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY), 0);
}
int set_memory_rw(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
--
2.21.0
A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer
attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints.
For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy
on the shadow stack; or an indirect JMP instruction, without the NOTRACK
prefix, arrives at a non-ENDBR opcode.
The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general
protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal
handler.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 4 ++
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 4 ++
arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +-
5 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index 5eb3bdf36a41..fa98ca6a17a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -571,6 +571,10 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_SS, exc_stack_segment);
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_GP, exc_general_protection);
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_AC, exc_alignment_check);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_CP, exc_control_protection);
+#endif
+
/* Raw exception entries which need extra work */
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_UD, exc_invalid_op);
DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_BP, exc_int3);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index ee1a283f8e96..e8166d9bbb10 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -105,6 +105,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
SYSG(IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR, entry_INT80_32),
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+ INTG(X86_TRAP_CP, asm_exc_control_protection),
+#endif
};
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
index a5330ff498f0..dd92490b1e7f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGILL != 11);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGFPE != 15);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 9);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 10);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS != 5);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 5);
BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index ac1874a2a70e..ee9c88e4e1bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/hardirq.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -606,6 +607,68 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection)
cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+static const char * const control_protection_err[] = {
+ "unknown",
+ "near-ret",
+ "far-ret/iret",
+ "endbranch",
+ "rstorssp",
+ "setssbsy",
+ "unknown",
+};
+
+static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(cpf_rate, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
+ DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
+
+/*
+ * When a control protection exception occurs, send a signal to the responsible
+ * application. Currently, control protection is only enabled for user mode.
+ * This exception should not come from kernel mode.
+ */
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk;
+
+ if (!user_mode(regs)) {
+ pr_emerg("PANIC: unexpected kernel control protection fault\n");
+ die("kernel control protection fault", regs, error_code);
+ panic("Machine halted.");
+ }
+
+ cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CET))
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "Control protection fault with CET support disabled\n");
+
+ tsk = current;
+ tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+ tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
+
+ /*
+ * Ratelimit to prevent log spamming.
+ */
+ if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
+ __ratelimit(&cpf_rate)) {
+ unsigned long ssp;
+ int cpf_type;
+
+ cpf_type = array_index_nospec(error_code, ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err));
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+ pr_emerg("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)",
+ tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
+ regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
+ control_protection_err[cpf_type]);
+ print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
+ pr_cont("\n");
+ }
+
+ force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR, (void __user *)0);
+ cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
+}
+#endif
+
static bool do_int3(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int res;
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index d2597000407a..1c2ea91284a0 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -231,7 +231,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
#define SEGV_ADIPERR 7 /* Precise MCD exception */
#define SEGV_MTEAERR 8 /* Asynchronous ARM MTE error */
#define SEGV_MTESERR 9 /* Synchronous ARM MTE exception */
-#define NSIGSEGV 9
+#define SEGV_CPERR 10 /* Control protection fault */
+#define NSIGSEGV 10
/*
* SIGBUS si_codes
--
2.21.0
There was no more caller passing vm_flags to do_mmap(), and vm_flags was
removed from the function's input by:
commit 45e55300f114 ("mm: remove unnecessary wrapper function do_mmap_pgoff()").
There is a new user now. Shadow stack allocation passes VM_SHADOW_STACK to
do_mmap(). Thus, re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap().
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Collingbourne <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
---
v24:
- Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.
- Update commit log.
fs/aio.c | 2 +-
include/linux/mm.h | 3 ++-
ipc/shm.c | 2 +-
mm/mmap.c | 10 +++++-----
mm/nommu.c | 4 ++--
mm/util.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index 1f32da13d39e..b5d0586209a7 100644
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static int aio_setup_ring(struct kioctx *ctx, unsigned int nr_events)
ctx->mmap_base = do_mmap(ctx->aio_ring_file, 0, ctx->mmap_size,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
- MAP_SHARED, 0, &unused, NULL);
+ MAP_SHARED, 0, 0, &unused, NULL);
mmap_write_unlock(mm);
if (IS_ERR((void *)ctx->mmap_base)) {
ctx->mmap_size = 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 3e9c84f21ef6..1ccec5cc399b 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2576,7 +2576,8 @@ extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
struct list_head *uf);
extern unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf);
+ vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate,
+ struct list_head *uf);
extern int __do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t,
struct list_head *uf, bool downgrade);
extern int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t,
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index febd88daba8c..b6370eb1eaab 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg,
goto invalid;
}
- addr = do_mmap(file, addr, size, prot, flags, 0, &populate, NULL);
+ addr = do_mmap(file, addr, size, prot, flags, 0, 0, &populate, NULL);
*raddr = addr;
err = 0;
if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index d77fb39b6ab5..7b2992ef8ee0 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1401,11 +1401,11 @@ static inline bool file_mmap_ok(struct file *file, struct inode *inode,
*/
unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
- unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff,
- unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf)
+ unsigned long flags, vm_flags_t vm_flags,
+ unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate,
+ struct list_head *uf)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
- vm_flags_t vm_flags;
int pkey = 0;
*populate = 0;
@@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
* to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open
* of the memory object, so we don't do any here.
*/
- vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
+ vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
@@ -3047,7 +3047,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size,
file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size,
- prot, flags, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
+ prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
fput(file);
out:
mmap_write_unlock(mm);
diff --git a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c
index 5c9ab799c0e6..9b6f7a1895c2 100644
--- a/mm/nommu.c
+++ b/mm/nommu.c
@@ -1071,6 +1071,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
unsigned long len,
unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags,
+ vm_flags_t vm_flags,
unsigned long pgoff,
unsigned long *populate,
struct list_head *uf)
@@ -1078,7 +1079,6 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct vm_region *region;
struct rb_node *rb;
- vm_flags_t vm_flags;
unsigned long capabilities, result;
int ret;
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
/* we've determined that we can make the mapping, now translate what we
* now know into VMA flags */
- vm_flags = determine_vm_flags(file, prot, flags, capabilities);
+ vm_flags |= determine_vm_flags(file, prot, flags, capabilities);
/* we're going to need to record the mapping */
region = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_region_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
index 54870226cea6..49cbd4400d13 100644
--- a/mm/util.c
+++ b/mm/util.c
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
if (!ret) {
if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
return -EINTR;
- ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flag, pgoff, &populate,
+ ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flag, 0, pgoff, &populate,
&uf);
mmap_write_unlock(mm);
userfaultfd_unmap_complete(mm, &uf);
--
2.21.0
When Shadow Stack is introduced, [R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY] PTE is reserved for
shadow stack. Copy-on-write PTEs have [R/O + _PAGE_COW].
When a PTE goes from [R/W + _PAGE_DIRTY] to [R/O + _PAGE_COW], it could
become a transient shadow stack PTE in two cases:
The first case is that some processors can start a write but end up seeing
a read-only PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit, creating a transient
shadow stack PTE. However, this will not occur on processors supporting
Shadow Stack, and a TLB flush is not necessary.
The second case is that when _PAGE_DIRTY is replaced with _PAGE_COW non-
atomically, a transient shadow stack PTE can be created as a result.
Thus, prevent that with cmpxchg.
Dave Hansen, Jann Horn, Andy Lutomirski, and Peter Zijlstra provided many
insights to the issue. Jann Horn provided the cmpxchg solution.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index e1739f590ca6..46d9394b884f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -1306,6 +1306,24 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,
static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long addr, pte_t *ptep)
{
+ /*
+ * If Shadow Stack is enabled, pte_wrprotect() moves _PAGE_DIRTY
+ * to _PAGE_COW (see comments at pte_wrprotect()).
+ * When a thread reads a RW=1, Dirty=0 PTE and before changing it
+ * to RW=0, Dirty=0, another thread could have written to the page
+ * and the PTE is RW=1, Dirty=1 now. Use try_cmpxchg() to detect
+ * PTE changes and update old_pte, then try again.
+ */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+ pte_t old_pte, new_pte;
+
+ old_pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
+ do {
+ new_pte = pte_wrprotect(old_pte);
+ } while (!try_cmpxchg(&ptep->pte, &old_pte.pte, new_pte.pte));
+
+ return;
+ }
clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)&ptep->pte);
}
@@ -1350,6 +1368,24 @@ static inline pud_t pudp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,
static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long addr, pmd_t *pmdp)
{
+ /*
+ * If Shadow Stack is enabled, pmd_wrprotect() moves _PAGE_DIRTY
+ * to _PAGE_COW (see comments at pmd_wrprotect()).
+ * When a thread reads a RW=1, Dirty=0 PMD and before changing it
+ * to RW=0, Dirty=0, another thread could have written to the page
+ * and the PMD is RW=1, Dirty=1 now. Use try_cmpxchg() to detect
+ * PMD changes and update old_pmd, then try again.
+ */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+ pmd_t old_pmd, new_pmd;
+
+ old_pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp);
+ do {
+ new_pmd = pmd_wrprotect(old_pmd);
+ } while (!try_cmpxchg((pmdval_t *)pmdp, (pmdval_t *)&old_pmd, pmd_val(new_pmd)));
+
+ return;
+ }
clear_bit(_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp);
}
--
2.21.0
When newer VM flags are being created, such as VM_MTE, it becomes necessary
for mmap/mprotect to verify if certain flags are being applied to an
anonymous VMA.
To solve this, one approach is adding a VM flag to track that MAP_ANONYMOUS
is specified [1], and then using the flag in arch_validate_flags().
Another approach is passing vma_is_anonymous() to arch_validate_flags().
To prepare the introduction of PROT_SHSTK, which creates a shadow stack
mapping and can only be applied to an anonymous VMA, update arch_validate_
flags() to include anonymous VMA information.
[1] commit 9f3419315f3c ("arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()"),
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 4 ++--
arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/mman.h | 2 +-
mm/mmap.c | 2 +-
mm/mprotect.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
index e3e28f7daf62..44add1a09041 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot,
}
#define arch_validate_prot(prot, addr) arch_validate_prot(prot, addr)
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags, bool is_anon)
{
if (!system_supports_mte())
return true;
@@ -82,6 +82,6 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
/* only allow VM_MTE if VM_MTE_ALLOWED has been set previously */
return !(vm_flags & VM_MTE) || (vm_flags & VM_MTE_ALLOWED);
}
-#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags)
+#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags, is_anon) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags, is_anon)
#endif /* ! __ASM_MMAN_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
index 274217e7ed70..4a897c8a3f1a 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -60,11 +60,11 @@ static inline int sparc_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
return 1;
}
-#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags)
+#define arch_validate_flags(vm_flags, is_anon) arch_validate_flags(vm_flags, is_anon)
/* arch_validate_flags() - Ensure combination of flags is valid for a
* VMA.
*/
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long vm_flags, bool is_anon)
{
/* If ADI is being enabled on this VMA, check for ADI
* capability on the platform and ensure VMA is suitable
diff --git a/include/linux/mman.h b/include/linux/mman.h
index 629cefc4ecba..a22ed4495d13 100644
--- a/include/linux/mman.h
+++ b/include/linux/mman.h
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
*
* Returns true if the VM_* flags are valid.
*/
-static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long flags)
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(unsigned long flags, bool is_anonymous)
{
return true;
}
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 7b2992ef8ee0..db849e3ed9d3 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@ unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
}
/* Allow architectures to sanity-check the vm_flags */
- if (!arch_validate_flags(vma->vm_flags)) {
+ if (!arch_validate_flags(vma->vm_flags, vma_is_anonymous(vma))) {
error = -EINVAL;
if (file)
goto unmap_and_free_vma;
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 550448dc5ff1..621d73e3667d 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
}
/* Allow architectures to sanity-check the new flags */
- if (!arch_validate_flags(newflags)) {
+ if (!arch_validate_flags(newflags, vma_is_anonymous(vma))) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
--
2.21.0
In change_pte_range(), when a PTE is changed for prot_numa, _PAGE_RW is
preserved to avoid the additional write fault after the NUMA hinting fault.
However, pte_write() now includes both normal writable and shadow stack
(RW=0, Dirty=1) PTEs, but the latter does not have _PAGE_RW and has no need
to preserve it.
Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write test, and apply the same change to
change_huge_pmd().
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Change arch_shadow_stack_mapping() to is_shadow_stack_mapping().
mm/huge_memory.c | 7 ++++++-
mm/mprotect.c | 9 ++++++++-
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index 65fc0aedd577..1d41138c4f74 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1812,12 +1812,17 @@ int change_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
bool prot_numa = cp_flags & MM_CP_PROT_NUMA;
bool uffd_wp = cp_flags & MM_CP_UFFD_WP;
bool uffd_wp_resolve = cp_flags & MM_CP_UFFD_WP_RESOLVE;
+ bool shstk = is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags);
ptl = __pmd_trans_huge_lock(pmd, vma);
if (!ptl)
return 0;
- preserve_write = prot_numa && pmd_write(*pmd);
+ /*
+ * Preserve only normal writable huge PMD, but not shadow
+ * stack (RW=0, Dirty=1).
+ */
+ preserve_write = prot_numa && pmd_write(*pmd) && !shstk;
ret = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index c1ce78d688b6..550448dc5ff1 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -75,7 +75,14 @@ static unsigned long change_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
oldpte = *pte;
if (pte_present(oldpte)) {
pte_t ptent;
- bool preserve_write = prot_numa && pte_write(oldpte);
+ bool shstk = is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags);
+ bool preserve_write;
+
+ /*
+ * Preserve only normal writable PTE, but not shadow
+ * stack (RW=0, Dirty=1).
+ */
+ preserve_write = prot_numa && pte_write(oldpte) && !shstk;
/*
* Avoid trapping faults against the zero or KSM
--
2.21.0
Introduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines.
A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHADOW_STACK flag
and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
v24:
- Rename cet.c to shstk.c, update related areas accordingly.
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 29 +++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 164 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..aa85d599b184
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
+#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct task_struct;
+/*
+ * Per-thread CET status
+ */
+struct cet_status {
+ unsigned long shstk_base;
+ unsigned long shstk_size;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+int shstk_setup(void);
+void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
+void shstk_disable(void);
+#else
+static inline int shstk_setup(void) { return 0; }
+static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
+static inline void shstk_disable(void) {}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index f1b9ed5efaa9..a5d703fda74e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct vm86;
#include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
#include <asm/vmxfeatures.h>
#include <asm/vdso/processor.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -535,6 +536,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
+ struct cet_status cet;
+#endif
+
/* Floating point and extended processor state */
struct fpu fpu;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 2ddf08351f0b..0f99b093f350 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o
obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev-es.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK) += shstk.o
+
###
# 64 bit specific files
ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5406fdf6df3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * shstk.c - Intel shadow stack support
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, Intel Corporation.
+ * Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
+#include <linux/user.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
+
+static void start_update_msrs(void)
+{
+ fpregs_lock();
+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
+ __fpregs_load_activate();
+}
+
+static void end_update_msrs(void)
+{
+ fpregs_unlock();
+}
+
+static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size, int flags)
+{
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ unsigned long addr, populate;
+
+ /* VM_SHADOW_STACK requires MAP_ANONYMOUS, MAP_PRIVATE */
+ flags |= MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
+
+ mmap_write_lock(mm);
+ addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, flags, VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0,
+ &populate, NULL);
+ mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+
+ if (populate)
+ mm_populate(addr, populate);
+
+ return addr;
+}
+
+int shstk_setup(void)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, size;
+ struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ size = round_up(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G), PAGE_SIZE);
+ addr = alloc_shstk(size, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+ return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
+
+ cet->shstk_base = addr;
+ cet->shstk_size = size;
+
+ start_update_msrs();
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
+ end_update_msrs();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+ !cet->shstk_size ||
+ !cet->shstk_base)
+ return;
+
+ if (!tsk->mm)
+ return;
+
+ while (1) {
+ int r;
+
+ r = vm_munmap(cet->shstk_base, cet->shstk_size);
+
+ /*
+ * vm_munmap() returns -EINTR when mmap_lock is held by
+ * something else, and that lock should not be held for a
+ * long time. Retry it for the case.
+ */
+ if (r == -EINTR) {
+ cond_resched();
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ cet->shstk_base = 0;
+ cet->shstk_size = 0;
+}
+
+void shstk_disable(void)
+{
+ struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
+ u64 msr_val;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
+ !cet->shstk_size ||
+ !cet->shstk_base)
+ return;
+
+ start_update_msrs();
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val & ~CET_SHSTK_EN);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+ end_update_msrs();
+
+ shstk_free(current);
+}
--
2.21.0
A shadow stack restore token marks a restore point of the shadow stack, and
the address in a token must point directly above the token, which is within
the same shadow stack. This is distinctively different from other pointers
on the shadow stack, since those pointers point to executable code area.
The restore token can be used as an extra protection for signal handling.
To deliver a signal, create a shadow stack restore token and put the token
and the signal restorer address on the shadow stack. In sigreturn, verify
the token and restore from it the shadow stack pointer.
Introduce token setup and verify routines. Also introduce WRUSS, which is
a kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to user shadow stack. It is
used to construct user signal stack as described above.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 9 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 32 +++++++
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 167 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index 8b83ded577cc..ef6155213b7e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_size);
void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
void shstk_disable(void);
+int shstk_setup_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor,
+ unsigned long *token_addr, unsigned long *new_ssp);
+int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long token_addr,
+ unsigned long *new_ssp);
#else
static inline int shstk_setup(void) { return 0; }
static inline int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p,
@@ -27,6 +31,11 @@ static inline int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p,
unsigned long stack_size) { return 0; }
static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
static inline void shstk_disable(void) {}
+static inline int shstk_setup_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor,
+ unsigned long *token_addr,
+ unsigned long *new_ssp) { return 0; }
+static inline int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long token_addr,
+ unsigned long *new_ssp) { return 0; }
#endif
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
index 1d3cbaef4bb7..c41c371f6c7d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
@@ -234,6 +234,38 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p)
: [pax] "a" (p));
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+#if defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) || defined(CONFIG_X86_X32)
+static inline int write_user_shstk_32(unsigned long addr, unsigned int val)
+{
+ asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussd %1, (%0)\n"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail])
+ :: "r" (addr), "r" (val)
+ :: fail);
+ return 0;
+fail:
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+#else
+static inline int write_user_shstk_32(unsigned long addr, unsigned int val)
+{
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "%s used but not supported.\n", __func__);
+ return -EFAULT;
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline int write_user_shstk_64(unsigned long addr, unsigned long val)
+{
+ asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussq %1, (%0)\n"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail])
+ :: "r" (addr), "r" (val)
+ :: fail);
+ return 0;
+fail:
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */
+
#define nop() asm volatile ("nop")
static inline void serialize(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
index 9c80785535b9..6fa98b228ee3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
#include <asm/cet.h>
+#include <asm/special_insns.h>
static void start_update_msrs(void)
{
@@ -181,3 +182,128 @@ void shstk_disable(void)
shstk_free(current);
}
+
+static unsigned long _get_user_shstk_addr(void)
+{
+ struct fpu *fpu = ¤t->thread.fpu;
+ unsigned long ssp = 0;
+
+ fpregs_lock();
+
+ if (fpregs_state_valid(fpu, smp_processor_id())) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+ } else {
+ struct cet_user_state *p;
+
+ p = get_xsave_addr(&fpu->state.xsave, XFEATURE_CET_USER);
+ if (p)
+ ssp = p->user_ssp;
+ }
+
+ fpregs_unlock();
+ return ssp;
+}
+
+#define TOKEN_MODE_MASK 3UL
+#define TOKEN_MODE_64 1UL
+#define IS_TOKEN_64(token) (((token) & TOKEN_MODE_MASK) == TOKEN_MODE_64)
+#define IS_TOKEN_32(token) (((token) & TOKEN_MODE_MASK) == 0)
+
+/*
+ * Create a restore token on the shadow stack. A token is always 8-byte
+ * and aligned to 8.
+ */
+static int _create_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp,
+ unsigned long *token_addr)
+{
+ unsigned long addr;
+
+ *token_addr = 0;
+
+ if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 4))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ addr = ALIGN_DOWN(ssp, 8) - 8;
+
+ /* Is the token for 64-bit? */
+ if (!ia32)
+ ssp |= TOKEN_MODE_64;
+
+ if (write_user_shstk_64(addr, ssp))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ *token_addr = addr;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a restore token on shadow stack, and then push the user-mode
+ * function return address.
+ */
+int shstk_setup_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ret_addr,
+ unsigned long *token_addr, unsigned long *new_ssp)
+{
+ struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
+ unsigned long ssp = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (cet->shstk_size) {
+ if (!ret_addr)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ssp = _get_user_shstk_addr();
+ err = _create_rstor_token(ia32, ssp, token_addr);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (ia32) {
+ *new_ssp = *token_addr - sizeof(u32);
+ err = write_user_shstk_32(*new_ssp, (unsigned int)ret_addr);
+ } else {
+ *new_ssp = *token_addr - sizeof(u64);
+ err = write_user_shstk_64(*new_ssp, ret_addr);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify token_addr point to a valid token, and then set *new_ssp
+ * according to the token.
+ */
+int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long token_addr, unsigned long *new_ssp)
+{
+ unsigned long token;
+
+ *new_ssp = 0;
+
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(token_addr, 8))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (get_user(token, (unsigned long __user *)token_addr))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ /* Is 64-bit mode flag correct? */
+ if (!ia32 && !IS_TOKEN_64(token))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ else if (ia32 && !IS_TOKEN_32(token))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ token &= ~TOKEN_MODE_MASK;
+
+ /*
+ * Restore address properly aligned?
+ */
+ if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(token, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(token, 4))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Token was placed properly?
+ */
+ if (((ALIGN_DOWN(token, 8) - 8) != token_addr) || token >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *new_ssp = token;
+ return 0;
+}
--
2.21.0
To prepare the introduction of PROT_SHSTK and be consistent with other
architectures, move arch_vm_get_page_prot() and arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to
arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 27 +++------------------------
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..629f6c81263a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/mman.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+/*
+ * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags
+ * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in
+ * to a pte.
+ *
+ * Only override these if Protection Keys are available
+ * (which is only on 64-bit).
+ */
+#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) __pgprot( \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
+ ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \
+ ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
+ ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
+ ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
+ ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
index d4a8d0424bfb..3ce1923e6ed9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
@@ -1,31 +1,10 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
-#ifndef _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
-#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+#ifndef _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H
+#define _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H
#define MAP_32BIT 0x40 /* only give out 32bit addresses */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
-/*
- * Take the 4 protection key bits out of the vma->vm_flags
- * value and turn them in to the bits that we can put in
- * to a pte.
- *
- * Only override these if Protection Keys are available
- * (which is only on 64-bit).
- */
-#define arch_vm_get_page_prot(vm_flags) __pgprot( \
- ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT0 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
- ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT1 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
- ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
- ((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
-
-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) ( \
- ((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) | \
- ((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) | \
- ((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) | \
- ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
-#endif
#include <asm-generic/mman.h>
-#endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
+#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
--
2.21.0
On Thu, Apr 1, 2021 at 3:12 PM Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> A shadow stack restore token marks a restore point of the shadow stack, and
> the address in a token must point directly above the token, which is within
> the same shadow stack. This is distinctively different from other pointers
> on the shadow stack, since those pointers point to executable code area.
>
> The restore token can be used as an extra protection for signal handling.
> To deliver a signal, create a shadow stack restore token and put the token
> and the signal restorer address on the shadow stack. In sigreturn, verify
> the token and restore from it the shadow stack pointer.
>
> Introduce token setup and verify routines. Also introduce WRUSS, which is
> a kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to user shadow stack. It is
> used to construct user signal stack as described above.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 9 ++
> arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 32 +++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 167 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> index 8b83ded577cc..ef6155213b7e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> @@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags,
> unsigned long stack_size);
> void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
> void shstk_disable(void);
> +int shstk_setup_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor,
> + unsigned long *token_addr, unsigned long *new_ssp);
> +int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long token_addr,
> + unsigned long *new_ssp);
> #else
> static inline int shstk_setup(void) { return 0; }
> static inline int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p,
> @@ -27,6 +31,11 @@ static inline int shstk_setup_thread(struct task_struct *p,
> unsigned long stack_size) { return 0; }
> static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
> static inline void shstk_disable(void) {}
> +static inline int shstk_setup_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor,
> + unsigned long *token_addr,
> + unsigned long *new_ssp) { return 0; }
> +static inline int shstk_check_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long token_addr,
> + unsigned long *new_ssp) { return 0; }
> #endif
>
> #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
> index 1d3cbaef4bb7..c41c371f6c7d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h
> @@ -234,6 +234,38 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p)
> : [pax] "a" (p));
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
> +#if defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION) || defined(CONFIG_X86_X32)
> +static inline int write_user_shstk_32(unsigned long addr, unsigned int val)
u32 __user *addr?
> +{
> + asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussd %1, (%0)\n"
> + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail])
> + :: "r" (addr), "r" (val)
> + :: fail);
> + return 0;
> +fail:
> + return -EPERM;
-EFAULT?
> +}
> +#else
> +static inline int write_user_shstk_32(unsigned long addr, unsigned int val)
> +{
> + WARN_ONCE(1, "%s used but not supported.\n", __func__);
> + return -EFAULT;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> +static inline int write_user_shstk_64(unsigned long addr, unsigned long val)
u64 __user *addr, perhaps?
> +{
> + asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussq %1, (%0)\n"
> + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail])
> + :: "r" (addr), "r" (val)
Can you use the modern [addr] "r" (addr) syntax?
On Thu, Apr 1, 2021 at 3:11 PM Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn. However,
> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
>
> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
> shadow stack restore token address and WAIT_ENDBR status[1]. The extension
> is located above the fpu states, plus alignment.
>
> Introduce routines for the allocation, save, and restore for sc_ext:
> - fpu__alloc_sigcontext_ext(),
> - save_extra_state_to_sigframe(),
> - get_extra_state_from_sigframe(),
> - restore_extra_state().
>
> [1] WAIT_ENDBR will be introduced later in the Indirect Branch Tracking
> series, but add that into sc_ext now to keep the struct stable in case
> the IBT series is applied later.
Please don't. Instead, please figure out how that structure gets
extended for real, and organize your patches to demonstrate that the
extension works.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> ---
> v24:
> - Split out shadow stack token routines to a separate patch.
> - Put signal frame save/restore routines to fpu/signal.c and re-name accordingly.
>
> arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 16 +++
> arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 9 ++
> 6 files changed, 181 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
> index 5e3d9b7fd5fb..96b87c5f0bbe 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
> @@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs,
> void __user **fpstate)
> {
> unsigned long sp, fx_aligned, math_size;
> + void __user *restorer = NULL;
>
> /* Default to using normal stack */
> sp = regs->sp;
> @@ -218,8 +219,23 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs,
> ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer)
> sp = (unsigned long) ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
>
> + if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) {
> + restorer = ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
> + } else if (current->mm->context.vdso) {
> + if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO)
> + restorer = current->mm->context.vdso +
> + vdso_image_32.sym___kernel_rt_sigreturn;
> + else
> + restorer = current->mm->context.vdso +
> + vdso_image_32.sym___kernel_sigreturn;
> + }
> +
Why do we need another copy of this logic? You're trying to push the
correct return address for the signal handler function onto the stack.
Please calculate that return address once and then use it here.
> sp = fpu__alloc_mathframe(sp, 1, &fx_aligned, &math_size);
> *fpstate = (struct _fpstate_32 __user *) sp;
> +
> + if (save_extra_state_to_sigframe(1, *fpstate, (unsigned long)restorer))
> + return (void __user *)-1L;
> +
> if (copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(*fpstate, (void __user *)fx_aligned,
> math_size) < 0)
> return (void __user *) -1L;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> index ef6155213b7e..5e66919bd2fe 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
> #include <linux/types.h>
>
> struct task_struct;
> +struct sc_ext;
> +
> /*
> * Per-thread CET status
> */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
> index 8d33ad80704f..eb01eb6ea55d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h
> @@ -443,6 +443,8 @@ static inline void copy_kernel_to_fpregs(union fpregs_state *fpstate)
> __copy_kernel_to_fpregs(fpstate, -1);
> }
>
> +extern int save_extra_state_to_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp,
> + unsigned long restorer);
> extern int copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(void __user *buf, void __user *fp, int size);
>
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
> index 844d60eb1882..cf2d55db3be4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
> @@ -196,6 +196,15 @@ struct _xstate {
> /* New processor state extensions go here: */
> };
>
> +/*
> + * Located at the end of sigcontext->fpstate, aligned to 8.
> + */
> +struct sc_ext {
> + unsigned long total_size;
> + unsigned long ssp;
> + unsigned long wait_endbr;
> +};
We need some proper documentation and an extensibility story for this.
This won't be the last time we extend the signal state. Keep in mind
that the FPU state is very likely to become genuinely variable sized
due to AVX-512 and AMX.
We also have the ability to extend ucontext, I believe, and I'd like
some analysis of why we want to put ssp and wait_endbr into the FPU
context instead of the ucontext.
> +
> /*
> * The 32-bit signal frame:
> */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
> index a4ec65317a7f..2e56f2fe8be0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
> @@ -52,6 +52,123 @@ static inline int check_for_xstate(struct fxregs_state __user *buf,
> return 0;
> }
>
> +int save_extra_state_to_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp, unsigned long restorer)
> +{
> + int err = 0;
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
> + struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
> + unsigned long token_addr = 0, new_ssp = 0;
> + struct sc_ext ext = {};
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CET))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (cet->shstk_size) {
> + err = shstk_setup_rstor_token(ia32, restorer,
> + &token_addr, &new_ssp);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + ext.ssp = token_addr;
> +
> + fpregs_lock();
> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
> + __fpregs_load_activate();
> + if (new_ssp)
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, new_ssp);
wrmsrl_safe, please, with appropriate error handling.
> + fpregs_unlock();
> + }
> +
> + if (ext.ssp) {
> + void __user *p = fp;
> +
> + ext.total_size = sizeof(ext);
> +
> + p = fp;
> + if (ia32)
> + p += sizeof(struct fregs_state);
> +
> + p += fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
> + p = (void __user *)ALIGN((unsigned long)p, 8);
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(p, &ext, sizeof(ext)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> + }
> +#endif
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +static int get_extra_state_from_sigframe(int ia32, void __user *fp, struct sc_ext *ext)
> +{
> + int err = 0;
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
> + struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
> + void __user *p;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CET))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!cet->shstk_size)
> + return 0;
> +
> + memset(ext, 0, sizeof(*ext));
> +
> + p = fp;
> + if (ia32)
> + p += sizeof(struct fregs_state);
> +
> + p += fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
> + p = (void __user *)ALIGN((unsigned long)p, 8);
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(ext, p, sizeof(*ext)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (ext->total_size != sizeof(*ext))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (cet->shstk_size)
> + err = shstk_check_rstor_token(ia32, ext->ssp, &ext->ssp);
> +#endif
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Called from __fpu__restore_sig() and XSAVES buffer is protected by
> + * set_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD) in the slow path.
> + */
> +void restore_extra_state(struct sc_ext *sc_ext)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
> + struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
> + struct cet_user_state *cet_user_state;
> + u64 msr_val = 0;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CET))
> + return;
> +
> + cet_user_state = get_xsave_addr(¤t->thread.fpu.state.xsave,
> + XFEATURE_CET_USER);
> + if (!cet_user_state)
> + return;
> +
> + if (cet->shstk_size) {
Is fpregs_lock() needed?
> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
> + cet_user_state->user_ssp = sc_ext->ssp;
> + else
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, sc_ext->ssp);
wrmsrl_safe() please.
> +
> + msr_val |= CET_SHSTK_EN;
> + }
> +
> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
> + cet_user_state->user_cet = msr_val;
> + else
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
> +#endif
I don't understand. Why are you recomputing MSR_IA32_U_CET here?
As another general complaint about this patch set, there's
cet->shstk_size and there's MSR_IA32_U_CET (and its copy in the fpu
state), and they seem to be used somewhat interchangably. Why are
both needed? Could there be some new helpers to help manage them all
in a unified way?
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Signal frame handlers.
> */
> @@ -295,6 +412,7 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
> struct task_struct *tsk = current;
> struct fpu *fpu = &tsk->thread.fpu;
> struct user_i387_ia32_struct env;
> + struct sc_ext sc_ext;
> u64 user_xfeatures = 0;
> int fx_only = 0;
> int ret = 0;
> @@ -335,6 +453,10 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
> if ((unsigned long)buf_fx % 64)
> fx_only = 1;
>
> + ret = get_extra_state_from_sigframe(ia32_fxstate, buf, &sc_ext);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> if (!ia32_fxstate) {
> /*
> * Attempt to restore the FPU registers directly from user
> @@ -349,6 +471,8 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
> pagefault_enable();
> if (!ret) {
>
> + restore_extra_state(&sc_ext);
> +
> /*
> * Restore supervisor states: previous context switch
> * etc has done XSAVES and saved the supervisor states
> @@ -423,6 +547,8 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size)
> if (unlikely(init_bv))
> copy_kernel_to_xregs(&init_fpstate.xsave, init_bv);
>
> + restore_extra_state(&sc_ext);
> +
> /*
> * Restore previously saved supervisor xstates along with
> * copied-in user xstates.
> @@ -491,12 +617,29 @@ int fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, int ia32_frame)
> return __fpu__restore_sig(buf, buf_fx, size);
> }
>
> +static unsigned long fpu__alloc_sigcontext_ext(unsigned long sp)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
> + struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
> +
> + /*
> + * sigcontext_ext is at: fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size +
> + * FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE, then aligned to 8.
> + */
> + if (cet->shstk_size)
> + sp -= (sizeof(struct sc_ext) + 8);
> +#endif
> + return sp;
> +}
> +
> unsigned long
> fpu__alloc_mathframe(unsigned long sp, int ia32_frame,
> unsigned long *buf_fx, unsigned long *size)
> {
> unsigned long frame_size = xstate_sigframe_size();
>
> + sp = fpu__alloc_sigcontext_ext(sp);
> +
> *buf_fx = sp = round_down(sp - frame_size, 64);
> if (ia32_frame && use_fxsr()) {
> frame_size += sizeof(struct fregs_state);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
> index f306e85a08a6..111faa5a398f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
> @@ -239,6 +239,9 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
> unsigned long buf_fx = 0;
> int onsigstack = on_sig_stack(sp);
> int ret;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> + void __user *restorer = NULL;
> +#endif
>
> /* redzone */
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
> @@ -270,6 +273,12 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
> if (onsigstack && !likely(on_sig_stack(sp)))
> return (void __user *)-1L;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> + if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
> + restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
> + ret = save_extra_state_to_sigframe(0, *fpstate, (unsigned long)restorer);
> +#endif
> +
> /* save i387 and extended state */
> ret = copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(*fpstate, (void __user *)buf_fx, math_size);
> if (ret < 0)
> --
> 2.21.0
>
On 4/6/2021 3:50 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 1, 2021 at 3:11 PM Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>> When shadow stack is enabled, a task's shadow stack states must be saved
>> along with the signal context and later restored in sigreturn. However,
>> currently there is no systematic facility for extending a signal context.
>>
>> Introduce a signal context extension struct 'sc_ext', which is used to save
>> shadow stack restore token address and WAIT_ENDBR status[1]. The extension
>> is located above the fpu states, plus alignment.
>>
>> Introduce routines for the allocation, save, and restore for sc_ext:
>> - fpu__alloc_sigcontext_ext(),
>> - save_extra_state_to_sigframe(),
>> - get_extra_state_from_sigframe(),
>> - restore_extra_state().
>>
>> [1] WAIT_ENDBR will be introduced later in the Indirect Branch Tracking
>> series, but add that into sc_ext now to keep the struct stable in case
>> the IBT series is applied later.
>
> Please don't. Instead, please figure out how that structure gets
> extended for real, and organize your patches to demonstrate that the
> extension works.
>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> v24:
>> - Split out shadow stack token routines to a separate patch.
>> - Put signal frame save/restore routines to fpu/signal.c and re-name accordingly.
>>
>> arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 16 +++
>> arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 2 +
>> arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 2 +
>> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 9 ++
>> arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 9 ++
>> 6 files changed, 181 insertions(+)
>>
[...]
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
>> index 844d60eb1882..cf2d55db3be4 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
>> @@ -196,6 +196,15 @@ struct _xstate {
>> /* New processor state extensions go here: */
>> };
>>
>> +/*
>> + * Located at the end of sigcontext->fpstate, aligned to 8.
>> + */
>> +struct sc_ext {
>> + unsigned long total_size;
>> + unsigned long ssp;
>> + unsigned long wait_endbr;
>> +};
>
> We need some proper documentation and an extensibility story for this.
> This won't be the last time we extend the signal state. Keep in mind
> that the FPU state is very likely to become genuinely variable sized
> due to AVX-512 and AMX.
>
Right now, on the signal stack, we have:
- siginfo, ucontext,
- fpu states (xsave state),
We might not want to change ucontext. The concern is breaking existing
app's.
Fpu states are all user states (vs. ssp, wait_endbr are supervisor
states). Therefore, we cannot put ssp and wait_endbr in fpu states.
Fpu states can grow to whatever size (AVX-512 etc.), the extension is
always above it if the user stack has room. If the user stack does not
have enough room, fpu__aloc_mathframe() fails.
The struct sc_ext has a simple 'total_size' field for error checking.
To extend it, newer fields are always added to the end and total_size
keeps track of it. I will put more comments about this.
> We also have the ability to extend ucontext, I believe, and I'd like
> some analysis of why we want to put ssp and wait_endbr into the FPU
> context instead of the ucontext.
>
[...]
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
>> index a4ec65317a7f..2e56f2fe8be0 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c
[...]
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Called from __fpu__restore_sig() and XSAVES buffer is protected by
>> + * set_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD) in the slow path.
>> + */
>> +void restore_extra_state(struct sc_ext *sc_ext)
>> +{
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
>> + struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
>> + struct cet_user_state *cet_user_state;
>> + u64 msr_val = 0;
>> +
>> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CET))
>> + return;
>> +
>> + cet_user_state = get_xsave_addr(¤t->thread.fpu.state.xsave,
>> + XFEATURE_CET_USER);
>> + if (!cet_user_state)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + if (cet->shstk_size) {
>
> Is fpregs_lock() needed?
This path is already protected.
>
>> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
>> + cet_user_state->user_ssp = sc_ext->ssp;
>> + else
>> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, sc_ext->ssp);
>
> wrmsrl_safe() please.
>
>> +
>> + msr_val |= CET_SHSTK_EN;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
>> + cet_user_state->user_cet = msr_val;
>> + else
>> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
>> +#endif
>
> I don't understand. Why are you recomputing MSR_IA32_U_CET here?
>
> As another general complaint about this patch set, there's
> cet->shstk_size and there's MSR_IA32_U_CET (and its copy in the fpu
> state), and they seem to be used somewhat interchangably. Why are
> both needed? Could there be some new helpers to help manage them all
> in a unified way?
>
Indeed, shadow stack/IBT states are cached in the thread header. Their
MSRs and XSAVES states are accessed only when necessary. The signal
restore path has been optimized in the past and I hope not to put in
code that negates past work.
I agree with your other comments for the patch and will update in the
next revision.
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:38PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Introduce a software-defined X86_FEATURE_CET, which indicates either Shadow
> Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking (or both) is present. Also introduce
> related cpu init/setup functions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> ---
> v24:
> - Update #ifdef placement to reflect Kconfig changes of splitting shadow stack and ibt.
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 9 ++++++++-
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 3 +++
> 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index bf861fc89fef..d771e62677de 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
> #define X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID ( 3*32+26) /* Extended APICID (8 bits) */
> #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM ( 3*32+27) /* AMD multi-node processor */
> #define X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF ( 3*32+28) /* P-State hardware coordination feedback capability (APERF/MPERF MSRs) */
> -/* free ( 3*32+29) */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_CET ( 3*32+29) /* Control-flow enforcement */
Right, I know we talked about having this synthetic flag but now that we
are moving to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK and separate SHSTK and IBT feature
bits, that synthetic flag is not needed anymore.
For the cases where you wanna test whether any of the two are present,
we're probably better off adding a x86_cet_enabled() helper which tests
SHSTK and IBT bits.
I haven't gone through the whole thing yet but depending on the context
and the fact that AMD doesn't support IBT, that helper might need some
tweaking too. I'll see.
> #define X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3 ( 3*32+30) /* TSC doesn't stop in S3 state */
> #define X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ ( 3*32+31) /* TSC has known frequency */
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> index e5c6ed9373e8..018cd7acd3e9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
> @@ -74,13 +74,20 @@
> #define DISABLE_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
And you don't need that config item either - AFAICT, you can use
CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK everywhere.
Which would simplify that config space.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:46PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> When Shadow Stack is introduced, [R/O + _PAGE_DIRTY] PTE is reserved for
> shadow stack. Copy-on-write PTEs have [R/O + _PAGE_COW].
>
> When a PTE goes from [R/W + _PAGE_DIRTY] to [R/O + _PAGE_COW], it could
> become a transient shadow stack PTE in two cases:
>
> The first case is that some processors can start a write but end up seeing
> a read-only PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit, creating a transient
> shadow stack PTE. However, this will not occur on processors supporting
> Shadow Stack, and a TLB flush is not necessary.
>
> The second case is that when _PAGE_DIRTY is replaced with _PAGE_COW non-
> atomically, a transient shadow stack PTE can be created as a result.
> Thus, prevent that with cmpxchg.
>
> Dave Hansen, Jann Horn, Andy Lutomirski, and Peter Zijlstra provided many
> insights to the issue. Jann Horn provided the cmpxchg solution.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:47PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> A shadow stack PTE must be read-only and have _PAGE_DIRTY set. However,
> read-only and Dirty PTEs also exist for copy-on-write (COW) pages. These
> two cases are handled differently for page faults. Introduce
> VM_SHADOW_STACK to track shadow stack VMAs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:48PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Shadow stack accesses are those that are performed by the CPU where it
> expects to encounter a shadow stack mapping. These accesses are performed
> implicitly by CALL/RET at the site of the shadow stack pointer. These
> accesses are made explicitly by shadow stack management instructions like
> WRUSSQ.
>
> Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mapping can see faults in normal,
> valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings. Shadow
> stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and
> copy-on-write.
>
> Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow
> stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack
> mapping.
>
> In handling a shadow stack page fault, verify it occurs within a shadow
> stack mapping. It is always an error otherwise. For valid shadow stack
> accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write. Because clearing
> _PAGE_DIRTY (vs. _PAGE_RW) is used to trigger the fault, shadow stack read
> fault and shadow stack write fault are not differentiated and both are
> handled as a write access.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:49PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> When serving a page fault, maybe_mkwrite() makes a PTE writable if its vma
> has VM_WRITE.
>
> A shadow stack vma has VM_SHADOW_STACK. Its PTEs have _PAGE_DIRTY, but not
> _PAGE_WRITE. In fork(), _PAGE_DIRTY is cleared to cause copy-on-write,
> and in the page fault handler, _PAGE_DIRTY is restored and the shadow stack
> page is writable again.
>
> Introduce an x86 version of maybe_mkwrite(), which sets proper PTE bits
> according to VM flags.
>
> Apply the same changes to maybe_pmd_mkwrite().
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
> ---
> v24:
> - Instead of doing arch_maybe_mkwrite(), overwrite maybe*_mkwrite() with x86
> versions.
> - Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 8 ++++++++
> arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++
> mm/huge_memory.c | 2 ++
> 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> index 46d9394b884f..51cdf14488b7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> @@ -1686,6 +1686,14 @@ static inline bool arch_faults_on_old_pte(void)
> return false;
> }
>
> +#define maybe_mkwrite maybe_mkwrite
> +extern pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
> +#define maybe_pmd_mkwrite maybe_pmd_mkwrite
> +extern pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
> +#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */
Move it next to other THP-depended stuff.
Otherwise looks good to me:
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:50PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> When serving a page fault, maybe_mkwrite() makes a PTE writable if it is in
> a writable vma. A shadow stack vma is writable, but its PTEs need
> _PAGE_DIRTY to be set to become writable. For this reason, maybe_mkwrite()
> has been updated.
>
> There are a few places that call pte_mkwrite() directly, but have the
> same result as from maybe_mkwrite(). These sites need to be updated for
> shadow stack as well. Thus, change them to maybe_mkwrite():
>
> - do_anonymous_page() and migrate_vma_insert_page() check VM_WRITE directly
> and call pte_mkwrite(), which is the same as maybe_mkwrite(). Change
> them to maybe_mkwrite().
>
> - In do_numa_page(), if the numa entry was writable, then pte_mkwrite()
> is called directly. Fix it by doing maybe_mkwrite().
>
> - In change_pte_range(), pte_mkwrite() is called directly. Replace it with
> maybe_mkwrite().
>
> A shadow stack vma is writable but has different vma
> flags, and handled accordingly in maybe_mkwrite().
>
Have you checked THP side? Looks like at least do_huge_pmd_numa_page()
needs adjustment, no?
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:51PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> INCSSP(Q/D) increments shadow stack pointer and 'pops and discards' the
> first and the last elements in the range, effectively touches those memory
> areas.
>
> The maximum moving distance by INCSSPQ is 255 * 8 = 2040 bytes and
> 255 * 4 = 1020 bytes by INCSSPD. Both ranges are far from PAGE_SIZE.
> Thus, putting a gap page on both ends of a shadow stack prevents INCSSP,
> CALL, and RET from going beyond.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
> ---
> v24:
> - Instead changing vm_*_gap(), create x86-specific versions.
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h | 17 +++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/mm/mmap.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/mm.h | 4 ++++
> 3 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
> index a506a411474d..3a5529bcfd76 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_types.h
> @@ -73,6 +73,23 @@ bool pfn_range_is_mapped(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn);
>
> extern void initmem_init(void);
>
> +/*
> + * Shadow stack pointer is moved by CALL, RET, and INCSSP(Q/D). INCSSPQ
> + * moves shadow stack pointer up to 255 * 8 = ~2 KB (~1KB for INCSSPD) and
> + * touches the first and the last element in the range, which triggers a
> + * page fault if the range is not in a shadow stack. Because of this,
> + * creating 4-KB guard pages around a shadow stack prevents these
> + * instructions from going beyond.
> + */
> +#define SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP PAGE_SIZE
The define is only used within arch/x86/mm/mmap.c. Maybe move it there?
Otherwise:
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:52PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Account shadow stack pages to stack memory.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
> ---
> v24:
> - Change arch_shadow_stack_mapping() to is_shadow_stack_mapping().
> - Change VM_SHSTK to VM_SHADOW_STACK.
>
> arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 7 +++++++
> include/linux/pgtable.h | 11 +++++++++++
> mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++
> 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
> index e778dbbef3d8..212a8c1fe5ba 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
> @@ -897,3 +897,10 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
> #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
> +bool is_shadow_stack_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
> +{
> + return (vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK);
> +}
No, just define it as you have here in linux/mm.h. It will always be false
for !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK as VM_SHADOW_STACK is 0 there.
This maze of #ifdefs are unneeded.
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:53PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Can_follow_write_pte() ensures a read-only page is COWed by checking the
> FOLL_COW flag, and uses pte_dirty() to validate the flag is still valid.
>
> Like a writable data page, a shadow stack page is writable, and becomes
> read-only during copy-on-write, but it is always dirty. Thus, in the
> can_follow_write_pte() check, it belongs to the writable page case and
> should be excluded from the read-only page pte_dirty() check. Apply
> the same changes to can_follow_write_pmd().
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
> ---
> v24:
> - Change arch_shadow_stack_mapping() to is_shadow_stack_mapping().
>
> mm/gup.c | 8 +++++---
> mm/huge_memory.c | 8 +++++---
> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
> index e40579624f10..c313cc988865 100644
> --- a/mm/gup.c
> +++ b/mm/gup.c
> @@ -356,10 +356,12 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
> * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only
> * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
> */
> -static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
> +static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags,
> + struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> {
> return pte_write(pte) ||
> - ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
> + ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte) &&
> + !is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags));
It's getting too ugly. I think it deserve to be rewritten. What about:
if (pte_write(pte))
return true;
if ((flags & (FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_COW)) != (FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_COW))
return false;
if (!pte_dirty(pte))
return false;
if (is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
return false;
return true;
?
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:54PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> In change_pte_range(), when a PTE is changed for prot_numa, _PAGE_RW is
> preserved to avoid the additional write fault after the NUMA hinting fault.
> However, pte_write() now includes both normal writable and shadow stack
> (RW=0, Dirty=1) PTEs, but the latter does not have _PAGE_RW and has no need
> to preserve it.
>
> Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write test, and apply the same change to
> change_huge_pmd().
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
> ---
> v24:
> - Change arch_shadow_stack_mapping() to is_shadow_stack_mapping().
>
> mm/huge_memory.c | 7 ++++++-
> mm/mprotect.c | 9 ++++++++-
> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
> index 65fc0aedd577..1d41138c4f74 100644
> --- a/mm/huge_memory.c
> +++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
> @@ -1812,12 +1812,17 @@ int change_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
> bool prot_numa = cp_flags & MM_CP_PROT_NUMA;
> bool uffd_wp = cp_flags & MM_CP_UFFD_WP;
> bool uffd_wp_resolve = cp_flags & MM_CP_UFFD_WP_RESOLVE;
> + bool shstk = is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags);
>
> ptl = __pmd_trans_huge_lock(pmd, vma);
> if (!ptl)
> return 0;
>
> - preserve_write = prot_numa && pmd_write(*pmd);
> + /*
> + * Preserve only normal writable huge PMD, but not shadow
> + * stack (RW=0, Dirty=1).
> + */
> + preserve_write = prot_numa && pmd_write(*pmd) && !shstk;
New variable seems unnecessary. What about just:
if (is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
preserve_write = false;
?
> ret = 1;
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION
> diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
> index c1ce78d688b6..550448dc5ff1 100644
> --- a/mm/mprotect.c
> +++ b/mm/mprotect.c
> @@ -75,7 +75,14 @@ static unsigned long change_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
> oldpte = *pte;
> if (pte_present(oldpte)) {
> pte_t ptent;
> - bool preserve_write = prot_numa && pte_write(oldpte);
> + bool shstk = is_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags);
> + bool preserve_write;
> +
> + /*
> + * Preserve only normal writable PTE, but not shadow
> + * stack (RW=0, Dirty=1).
> + */
> + preserve_write = prot_numa && pte_write(oldpte) && !shstk;
Ditto.
>
> /*
> * Avoid trapping faults against the zero or KSM
> --
> 2.21.0
>
>
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
On 4/9/2021 3:12 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:38PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> Introduce a software-defined X86_FEATURE_CET, which indicates either Shadow
>> Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking (or both) is present. Also introduce
>> related cpu init/setup functions.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> v24:
>> - Update #ifdef placement to reflect Kconfig changes of splitting shadow stack and ibt.
>>
>> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
>> arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 9 ++++++++-
>> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 ++
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 3 +++
>> 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
>> index bf861fc89fef..d771e62677de 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
>> @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@
>> #define X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID ( 3*32+26) /* Extended APICID (8 bits) */
>> #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM ( 3*32+27) /* AMD multi-node processor */
>> #define X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF ( 3*32+28) /* P-State hardware coordination feedback capability (APERF/MPERF MSRs) */
>> -/* free ( 3*32+29) */
>> +#define X86_FEATURE_CET ( 3*32+29) /* Control-flow enforcement */
>
> Right, I know we talked about having this synthetic flag but now that we
> are moving to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK and separate SHSTK and IBT feature
> bits, that synthetic flag is not needed anymore.
>
> For the cases where you wanna test whether any of the two are present,
> we're probably better off adding a x86_cet_enabled() helper which tests
> SHSTK and IBT bits.
>
Recall we had complicated code for the XSAVES features detection in
xstate.c. Dave Hansen proposed the solution and then the whole thing
becomes simple. Because of this flag, even when only the shadow stack
is available, the code handles it nicely.
> I haven't gone through the whole thing yet but depending on the context
> and the fact that AMD doesn't support IBT, that helper might need some
> tweaking too. I'll see.
>
>> #define X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3 ( 3*32+30) /* TSC doesn't stop in S3 state */
>> #define X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ ( 3*32+31) /* TSC has known frequency */
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
>> index e5c6ed9373e8..018cd7acd3e9 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
>> @@ -74,13 +74,20 @@
>> #define DISABLE_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK & 31))
>> #endif
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
>
> And you don't need that config item either - AFAICT, you can use
> CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK everywhere.
>
> Which would simplify that config space.
Would this equal to only CONFIG_X86_CET (one Kconfig option)? In fact,
when you proposed only CONFIG_X86_CET, things became much simpler.
Practically, IBT is not much in terms of code size. Since we have
already separated the two, why don't we leave it as-is. When people
start using it more, there will be more feedback, and we can decide if
one Kconfig is better?
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:56PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Introduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines.
> A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHADOW_STACK flag
> and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> ---
> v24:
> - Rename cet.c to shstk.c, update related areas accordingly.
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 29 +++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
> arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 164 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..aa85d599b184
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#ifndef _ASM_X86_CET_H
> +#define _ASM_X86_CET_H
> +
> +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +struct task_struct;
> +/*
> + * Per-thread CET status
> + */
> +struct cet_status {
> + unsigned long shstk_base;
> + unsigned long shstk_size;
> +};
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
> +int shstk_setup(void);
> +void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
> +void shstk_disable(void);
> +#else
> +static inline int shstk_setup(void) { return 0; }
> +static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
> +static inline void shstk_disable(void) {}
> +#endif
> +
> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> +
> +#endif /* _ASM_X86_CET_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> index f1b9ed5efaa9..a5d703fda74e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct vm86;
> #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
> #include <asm/vmxfeatures.h>
> #include <asm/vdso/processor.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
>
> #include <linux/personality.h>
> #include <linux/cache.h>
> @@ -535,6 +536,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
>
> unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET
> + struct cet_status cet;
> +#endif
> +
> /* Floating point and extended processor state */
> struct fpu fpu;
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> index 2ddf08351f0b..0f99b093f350 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER) += unwind_frame.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev-es.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK) += shstk.o
> +
> ###
> # 64 bit specific files
> ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..5406fdf6df3c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * shstk.c - Intel shadow stack support
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2021, Intel Corporation.
> + * Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/mman.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
> +#include <linux/compat.h>
> +#include <linux/sizes.h>
> +#include <linux/user.h>
> +#include <asm/msr.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
> +
> +static void start_update_msrs(void)
> +{
> + fpregs_lock();
> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
> + __fpregs_load_activate();
> +}
> +
> +static void end_update_msrs(void)
> +{
> + fpregs_unlock();
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size, int flags)
> +{
> + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> + unsigned long addr, populate;
> +
> + /* VM_SHADOW_STACK requires MAP_ANONYMOUS, MAP_PRIVATE */
> + flags |= MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
Looks like all callers has flags == 0. Do I miss something.
> +
> + mmap_write_lock(mm);
> + addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, flags, VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0,
> + &populate, NULL);
> + mmap_write_unlock(mm);
> +
> + if (populate)
> + mm_populate(addr, populate);
If all callers pass down flags==0, populate will never happen.
> +
> + return addr;
> +}
> +
> +int shstk_setup(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long addr, size;
> + struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + size = round_up(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G), PAGE_SIZE);
> + addr = alloc_shstk(size, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
> + return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
> +
> + cet->shstk_base = addr;
> + cet->shstk_size = size;
> +
> + start_update_msrs();
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
> + end_update_msrs();
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> + !cet->shstk_size ||
> + !cet->shstk_base)
> + return;
> +
> + if (!tsk->mm)
> + return;
> +
> + while (1) {
> + int r;
> +
> + r = vm_munmap(cet->shstk_base, cet->shstk_size);
> +
> + /*
> + * vm_munmap() returns -EINTR when mmap_lock is held by
> + * something else, and that lock should not be held for a
> + * long time. Retry it for the case.
> + */
Hm, no. -EINTR is not about the lock being held by somebody else. The task
got a signal and need to return to userspace.
I have not looked at the rest of the patches yet, but why do you need a
special free path for shadow stack? Why the normal unmap route doesn't
work for you?
> + if (r == -EINTR) {
> + cond_resched();
> + continue;
> + }
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + cet->shstk_base = 0;
> + cet->shstk_size = 0;
> +}
> +
> +void shstk_disable(void)
> +{
> + struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
> + u64 msr_val;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> + !cet->shstk_size ||
> + !cet->shstk_base)
> + return;
> +
> + start_update_msrs();
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msr_val & ~CET_SHSTK_EN);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
> + end_update_msrs();
> +
> + shstk_free(current);
> +}
> --
> 2.21.0
>
>
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
On Fri, Apr 09, 2021 at 08:52:52AM -0700, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> Recall we had complicated code for the XSAVES features detection in
> xstate.c. Dave Hansen proposed the solution and then the whole thing
> becomes simple. Because of this flag, even when only the shadow stack is
> available, the code handles it nicely.
Is that what you mean?
@@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
X86_FEATURE_PKU,
X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,
+ X86_FEATURE_CET, /* XFEATURE_CET_USER */
+ X86_FEATURE_CET, /* XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL */
or what is the piece which becomes simpler?
> Would this equal to only CONFIG_X86_CET (one Kconfig option)? In fact, when
> you proposed only CONFIG_X86_CET, things became much simpler.
When you use CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK instead, it should remain same
simple no?
> Practically, IBT is not much in terms of code size. Since we have already
> separated the two, why don't we leave it as-is. When people start using it
> more, there will be more feedback, and we can decide if one Kconfig is
> better?
Because when we add stuff to the kernel, we add the simplest and
cleanest version possible and later, when we determine that additional
functionality is needed, *then* we add it. Not the other way around.
Our Kconfig symbol space is already an abomination so we can't just add
some more and decide later.
What happens in such situations usually is stuff gets added, it bitrots
and some poor soul - very likely a maintainer who has to mop up after
everybody - comes and cleans it up. I'd like to save myself that
cleaning up.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
On 4/9/2021 10:14 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 09, 2021 at 08:52:52AM -0700, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
>> Recall we had complicated code for the XSAVES features detection in
>> xstate.c. Dave Hansen proposed the solution and then the whole thing
>> becomes simple. Because of this flag, even when only the shadow stack is
>> available, the code handles it nicely.
>
> Is that what you mean?
>
> @@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
> X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
> X86_FEATURE_PKU,
> X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,
> + X86_FEATURE_CET, /* XFEATURE_CET_USER */
> + X86_FEATURE_CET, /* XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL */
>
> or what is the piece which becomes simpler?
Yes, this is it.
>> Would this equal to only CONFIG_X86_CET (one Kconfig option)? In fact, when
>> you proposed only CONFIG_X86_CET, things became much simpler.
>
> When you use CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK instead, it should remain same
> simple no?
>
Signals, arch_prctl, and ELF header are three places that need to depend
on either shadow stack or IBT is configured. To remain simple, we can
make all three depend on CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK, and in Kconfig, make
CONFIG_X86_IBT depend on CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK. Without shadow stack,
IBT itself is not as useful anyway.
>> Practically, IBT is not much in terms of code size. Since we have already
>> separated the two, why don't we leave it as-is. When people start using it
>> more, there will be more feedback, and we can decide if one Kconfig is
>> better?
>
> Because when we add stuff to the kernel, we add the simplest and
> cleanest version possible and later, when we determine that additional
> functionality is needed, *then* we add it. Not the other way around.
>
> Our Kconfig symbol space is already an abomination so we can't just add
> some more and decide later.
>
> What happens in such situations usually is stuff gets added, it bitrots
> and some poor soul - very likely a maintainer who has to mop up after
> everybody - comes and cleans it up. I'd like to save myself that
> cleaning up.
>
> Thx.
>
On 4/9/2021 8:57 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:56PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
>> Introduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines.
>> A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHADOW_STACK flag
>> and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[...]
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..5406fdf6df3c
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +/*
>> + * shstk.c - Intel shadow stack support
>> + *
>> + * Copyright (c) 2021, Intel Corporation.
>> + * Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <linux/types.h>
>> +#include <linux/mm.h>
>> +#include <linux/mman.h>
>> +#include <linux/slab.h>
>> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
>> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
>> +#include <linux/compat.h>
>> +#include <linux/sizes.h>
>> +#include <linux/user.h>
>> +#include <asm/msr.h>
>> +#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
>> +#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
>> +#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
>> +#include <asm/cet.h>
>> +
>> +static void start_update_msrs(void)
>> +{
>> + fpregs_lock();
>> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD))
>> + __fpregs_load_activate();
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void end_update_msrs(void)
>> +{
>> + fpregs_unlock();
>> +}
>> +
>> +static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size, int flags)
>> +{
>> + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
>> + unsigned long addr, populate;
>> +
>> + /* VM_SHADOW_STACK requires MAP_ANONYMOUS, MAP_PRIVATE */
>> + flags |= MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
>
> Looks like all callers has flags == 0. Do I miss something.
My earlier versions use this flag. I should have removed it.
>> +
>> + mmap_write_lock(mm);
>> + addr = do_mmap(NULL, 0, size, PROT_READ, flags, VM_SHADOW_STACK, 0,
>> + &populate, NULL);
>> + mmap_write_unlock(mm);
>> +
>> + if (populate)
>> + mm_populate(addr, populate);
>
> If all callers pass down flags==0, populate will never happen.
I will fix it.
>> +
>> + return addr;
>> +}
>> +
>> +int shstk_setup(void)
>> +{
>> + unsigned long addr, size;
>> + struct cet_status *cet = ¤t->thread.cet;
>> +
>> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
>> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> +
>> + size = round_up(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G), PAGE_SIZE);
>> + addr = alloc_shstk(size, 0);
>> + if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
>> + return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
>> +
>> + cet->shstk_base = addr;
>> + cet->shstk_size = size;
>> +
>> + start_update_msrs();
>> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
>> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
>> + end_update_msrs();
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
>> +{
>> + struct cet_status *cet = &tsk->thread.cet;
>> +
>> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
>> + !cet->shstk_size ||
>> + !cet->shstk_base)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + if (!tsk->mm)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + while (1) {
>> + int r;
>> +
>> + r = vm_munmap(cet->shstk_base, cet->shstk_size);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * vm_munmap() returns -EINTR when mmap_lock is held by
>> + * something else, and that lock should not be held for a
>> + * long time. Retry it for the case.
>> + */
>
> Hm, no. -EINTR is not about the lock being held by somebody else. The task
> got a signal and need to return to userspace.
From tracing the code itself, it looks like it cannot acquire the lock.
Let me dig into it.
> I have not looked at the rest of the patches yet, but why do you need a
> special free path for shadow stack? Why the normal unmap route doesn't
> work for you?
The thread's shadow stack is allocated by the kernel, so it needs to be
freed when the thread exits.
>> + if (r == -EINTR) {
>> + cond_resched();
>> + continue;
>> + }
>> + break;
>> + }
>> +
>> + cet->shstk_base = 0;
>> + cet->shstk_size = 0;
>> +}
>> +
[...]
Thanks,
Yu-cheng
On Fri, Apr 09, 2021 at 04:14:09PM -0700, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> > @@ -53,6 +55,8 @@ static short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = {
> > X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT,
> > X86_FEATURE_PKU,
> > X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,
> > + X86_FEATURE_CET, /* XFEATURE_CET_USER */
> > + X86_FEATURE_CET, /* XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL */
> >
> > or what is the piece which becomes simpler?
>
> Yes, this is it.
Those should be X86_FEATURE_SHSTK no?
> Signals, arch_prctl, and ELF header are three places that need to depend on
> either shadow stack or IBT is configured. To remain simple, we can make all
> three depend on CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK, and in Kconfig, make CONFIG_X86_IBT
> depend on CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK. Without shadow stack, IBT itself is not
> as useful anyway.
Makes sense to me.
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette