This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.200 release.
There are 17 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 31 Jul 2021 13:51:22 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.200-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.19.200-rc1
Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: versatile: Fix up interrupt controller node names
Hyunchul Lee <[email protected]>
cifs: fix the out of range assignment to bit fields in parse_server_interfaces
Cristian Marussi <[email protected]>
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix range check for the maximum number of pending messages
Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
firmware: arm_scmi: Fix possible scmi_linux_errmap buffer overflow
Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>
hfs: add lock nesting notation to hfs_find_init
Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>
hfs: fix high memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read
Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>
hfs: add missing clean-up in hfs_fill_super
Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
net: annotate data race around sk_ll_usec
Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
net/802/garp: fix memleak in garp_request_join()
Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
net/802/mrp: fix memleak in mrp_request_join()
Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
workqueue: fix UAF in pwq_unbound_release_workfn()
Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK
Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
net: split out functions related to registering inflight socket files
Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
KVM: x86: determine if an exception has an error code only when injecting it.
Ruslan Babayev <[email protected]>
iio: dac: ds4422/ds4424 drop of_node check
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
selftest: fix build error in tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +-
arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts | 5 +-
arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 13 ++-
drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c | 12 +--
drivers/iio/dac/ds4424.c | 6 --
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 4 +-
fs/hfs/bfind.c | 14 ++-
fs/hfs/bnode.c | 25 ++++--
fs/hfs/btree.h | 7 ++
fs/hfs/super.c | 10 +--
include/net/af_unix.h | 1 +
include/net/busy_poll.h | 2 +-
include/net/sctp/constants.h | 4 +-
kernel/workqueue.c | 20 +++--
net/802/garp.c | 14 +++
net/802/mrp.c | 14 +++
net/Makefile | 2 +-
net/core/sock.c | 2 +-
net/sctp/protocol.c | 3 +-
net/unix/Kconfig | 5 ++
net/unix/Makefile | 2 +
net/unix/af_unix.c | 102 ++++++++++-----------
net/unix/garbage.c | 68 +-------------
net/unix/scm.c | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
net/unix/scm.h | 10 +++
tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c | 2 +-
27 files changed, 329 insertions(+), 172 deletions(-)
From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 42ca63f980842918560b25f0244307fd83b4777c ]
I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810c909b80 (size 64):
comm "syz", pid 957, jiffies 4295220394 (age 399.090s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000ca1f2e2e>] garp_request_join+0x285/0x3d0
[<00000000bf153351>] vlan_gvrp_request_join+0x15b/0x190
[<0000000024005e72>] vlan_dev_open+0x706/0x980
[<00000000dc20c4d4>] __dev_open+0x2bb/0x460
[<0000000066573004>] __dev_change_flags+0x501/0x650
[<0000000035b42f83>] rtnl_configure_link+0xee/0x280
[<00000000a5e69de0>] __rtnl_newlink+0xed5/0x1550
[<00000000a5258f4a>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90
[<00000000506568ee>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x439/0xbd0
[<00000000b7eaeae1>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x420
[<00000000c373ce66>] netlink_unicast+0x550/0x750
[<00000000ec74ce74>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xda0
[<00000000381ff246>] sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120
[<000000008f6a2db3>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x820
[<000000008d9c1735>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x145/0x1c0
[<00000000aa39dd8b>] __sys_sendmsg+0xfe/0x1d0
Calling garp_request_leave() after garp_request_join(), the attr->state
is set to GARP_APPLICANT_VO, garp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last
transmit event in garp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be
leaked. To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before
rerturning from garp_uninit_applicant().
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
net/802/garp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/802/garp.c b/net/802/garp.c
index 7f50d47470bd..8e19f51833d6 100644
--- a/net/802/garp.c
+++ b/net/802/garp.c
@@ -206,6 +206,19 @@ static void garp_attr_destroy(struct garp_applicant *app, struct garp_attr *attr
kfree(attr);
}
+static void garp_attr_destroy_all(struct garp_applicant *app)
+{
+ struct rb_node *node, *next;
+ struct garp_attr *attr;
+
+ for (node = rb_first(&app->gid);
+ next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL;
+ node = next) {
+ attr = rb_entry(node, struct garp_attr, node);
+ garp_attr_destroy(app, attr);
+ }
+}
+
static int garp_pdu_init(struct garp_applicant *app)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
@@ -612,6 +625,7 @@ void garp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct garp_application *appl
spin_lock_bh(&app->lock);
garp_gid_event(app, GARP_EVENT_TRANSMIT_PDU);
+ garp_attr_destroy_all(app);
garp_pdu_queue(app);
spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock);
--
2.30.2
From: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 82a1c67554dff610d6be4e1982c425717b3c6a23 ]
Once the new schema interrupt-controller/arm,vic.yaml is added, we get
the below warnings:
arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml:
intc@10140000: $nodename:0: 'intc@10140000' does not match
'^interrupt-controller(@[0-9a-f,]+)*$'
arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml:
intc@10140000: 'clear-mask' does not match any of the regexes
Fix the node names for the interrupt controller to conform
to the standard node name interrupt-controller@.. Also drop invalid
clear-mask property.
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]'
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts | 5 ++---
arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts
index 6f4f60ba5429..990b7ef1800e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts
@@ -192,16 +192,15 @@
#size-cells = <1>;
ranges;
- vic: intc@10140000 {
+ vic: interrupt-controller@10140000 {
compatible = "arm,versatile-vic";
interrupt-controller;
#interrupt-cells = <1>;
reg = <0x10140000 0x1000>;
- clear-mask = <0xffffffff>;
valid-mask = <0xffffffff>;
};
- sic: intc@10003000 {
+ sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 {
compatible = "arm,versatile-sic";
interrupt-controller;
#interrupt-cells = <1>;
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts
index 06a0fdf24026..e7e751a858d8 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
amba {
/* The Versatile PB is using more SIC IRQ lines than the AB */
- sic: intc@10003000 {
+ sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 {
clear-mask = <0xffffffff>;
/*
* Valid interrupt lines mask according to
--
2.30.2
From: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
commit cbcf01128d0a92e131bd09f1688fe032480b65ca upstream.
unix_gc() assumes that candidate sockets can never gain an external
reference (i.e. be installed into an fd) while the unix_gc_lock is
held. Except for MSG_PEEK this is guaranteed by modifying inflight
count under the unix_gc_lock.
MSG_PEEK does not touch any variable protected by unix_gc_lock (file
count is not), yet it needs to be serialized with garbage collection.
Do this by locking/unlocking unix_gc_lock:
1) increment file count
2) lock/unlock barrier to make sure incremented file count is visible
to garbage collection
3) install file into fd
This is a lock barrier (unlike smp_mb()) that ensures that garbage
collection is run completely before or completely after the barrier.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1517,6 +1517,53 @@ out:
return err;
}
+static void unix_peek_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ scm->fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
+
+ /*
+ * Garbage collection of unix sockets starts by selecting a set of
+ * candidate sockets which have reference only from being in flight
+ * (total_refs == inflight_refs). This condition is checked once during
+ * the candidate collection phase, and candidates are marked as such, so
+ * that non-candidates can later be ignored. While inflight_refs is
+ * protected by unix_gc_lock, total_refs (file count) is not, hence this
+ * is an instantaneous decision.
+ *
+ * Once a candidate, however, the socket must not be reinstalled into a
+ * file descriptor while the garbage collection is in progress.
+ *
+ * If the above conditions are met, then the directed graph of
+ * candidates (*) does not change while unix_gc_lock is held.
+ *
+ * Any operations that changes the file count through file descriptors
+ * (dup, close, sendmsg) does not change the graph since candidates are
+ * not installed in fds.
+ *
+ * Dequeing a candidate via recvmsg would install it into an fd, but
+ * that takes unix_gc_lock to decrement the inflight count, so it's
+ * serialized with garbage collection.
+ *
+ * MSG_PEEK is special in that it does not change the inflight count,
+ * yet does install the socket into an fd. The following lock/unlock
+ * pair is to ensure serialization with garbage collection. It must be
+ * done between incrementing the file count and installing the file into
+ * an fd.
+ *
+ * If garbage collection starts after the barrier provided by the
+ * lock/unlock, then it will see the elevated refcount and not mark this
+ * as a candidate. If a garbage collection is already in progress
+ * before the file count was incremented, then the lock/unlock pair will
+ * ensure that garbage collection is finished before progressing to
+ * installing the fd.
+ *
+ * (*) A -> B where B is on the queue of A or B is on the queue of C
+ * which is on the queue of listening socket A.
+ */
+ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+}
+
static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds)
{
int err = 0;
@@ -2142,7 +2189,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct soc
sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, size);
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
- scm.fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
+ unix_peek_fds(&scm, skb);
}
err = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len - skip : size;
@@ -2383,7 +2430,7 @@ unlock:
/* It is questionable, see note in unix_dgram_recvmsg.
*/
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
- scm.fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
+ unix_peek_fds(&scm, skb);
sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, chunk);
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0dbffbb5335a1e3aa6855e4ee317e25e669dd302 ]
sk_ll_usec is read locklessly from sk_can_busy_loop()
while another thread can change its value in sock_setsockopt()
This is correct but needs annotations.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __skb_try_recv_datagram / sock_setsockopt
write to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14011 on cpu 0:
sock_setsockopt+0x1287/0x2090 net/core/sock.c:1175
__sys_setsockopt+0x14f/0x200 net/socket.c:2100
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2115 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2112 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2112
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14001 on cpu 1:
sk_can_busy_loop include/net/busy_poll.h:41 [inline]
__skb_try_recv_datagram+0x14f/0x320 net/core/datagram.c:273
unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x14c/0x870 net/unix/af_unix.c:2101
unix_seqpacket_recvmsg+0x5a/0x70 net/unix/af_unix.c:2067
____sys_recvmsg+0x15d/0x310 include/linux/uio.h:244
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2598 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x35c/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2692
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2794 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2787 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xcf/0x150 net/socket.c:2787
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000101
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 14001 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
include/net/busy_poll.h | 2 +-
net/core/sock.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/busy_poll.h b/include/net/busy_poll.h
index cf8f792743ec..c76a5e9894da 100644
--- a/include/net/busy_poll.h
+++ b/include/net/busy_poll.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static inline bool net_busy_loop_on(void)
static inline bool sk_can_busy_loop(const struct sock *sk)
{
- return sk->sk_ll_usec && !signal_pending(current);
+ return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec) && !signal_pending(current);
}
bool sk_busy_loop_end(void *p, unsigned long start_time);
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index e6cbe137cb6f..956af38aa0d6 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ set_rcvbuf:
if (val < 0)
ret = -EINVAL;
else
- sk->sk_ll_usec = val;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec, val);
}
break;
#endif
--
2.30.2
From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
commit b42b0bddcbc87b4c66f6497f66fc72d52b712aa7 upstream.
I got a UAF report when doing fuzz test:
[ 152.880091][ T8030] ==================================================================
[ 152.881240][ T8030] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.882442][ T8030] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810d31bd00 by task kworker/3:2/8030
[ 152.883578][ T8030]
[ 152.883932][ T8030] CPU: 3 PID: 8030 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.13.0+ #249
[ 152.885014][ T8030] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[ 152.886442][ T8030] Workqueue: events pwq_unbound_release_workfn
[ 152.887358][ T8030] Call Trace:
[ 152.887837][ T8030] dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0x9b
[ 152.888525][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.889371][ T8030] print_address_description.constprop.10+0x48/0x70
[ 152.890326][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.891163][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.891999][ T8030] kasan_report.cold.15+0x82/0xdb
[ 152.892740][ T8030] ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.893594][ T8030] __asan_load4+0x69/0x90
[ 152.894243][ T8030] pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[ 152.895057][ T8030] process_one_work+0x47b/0x890
[ 152.895778][ T8030] worker_thread+0x5c/0x790
[ 152.896439][ T8030] ? process_one_work+0x890/0x890
[ 152.897163][ T8030] kthread+0x223/0x250
[ 152.897747][ T8030] ? set_kthread_struct+0xb0/0xb0
[ 152.898471][ T8030] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 152.899114][ T8030]
[ 152.899446][ T8030] Allocated by task 8884:
[ 152.900084][ T8030] kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[ 152.900769][ T8030] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[ 152.901416][ T8030] __kmalloc+0x29c/0x460
[ 152.902014][ T8030] alloc_workqueue+0x111/0x8e0
[ 152.902690][ T8030] __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[ 152.903459][ T8030] btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[ 152.904198][ T8030] scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[ 152.904929][ T8030] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[ 152.905599][ T8030] btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[ 152.906247][ T8030] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[ 152.906916][ T8030] do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[ 152.907535][ T8030] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 152.908365][ T8030]
[ 152.908688][ T8030] Freed by task 8884:
[ 152.909243][ T8030] kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[ 152.909893][ T8030] kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30
[ 152.910541][ T8030] kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40
[ 152.911265][ T8030] __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140
[ 152.911964][ T8030] kfree+0x9e/0x3d0
[ 152.912501][ T8030] alloc_workqueue+0x7d7/0x8e0
[ 152.913182][ T8030] __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[ 152.913949][ T8030] btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[ 152.914703][ T8030] scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[ 152.915402][ T8030] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[ 152.916077][ T8030] btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[ 152.916729][ T8030] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[ 152.917414][ T8030] do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[ 152.918034][ T8030] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 152.918872][ T8030]
[ 152.919203][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810d31bc00
[ 152.919203][ T8030] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 152.921155][ T8030] The buggy address is located 256 bytes inside of
[ 152.921155][ T8030] 512-byte region [ffff88810d31bc00, ffff88810d31be00)
[ 152.922993][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 152.923800][ T8030] page:ffffea000434c600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10d318
[ 152.925249][ T8030] head:ffffea000434c600 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[ 152.926399][ T8030] flags: 0x57ff00000010200(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[ 152.927515][ T8030] raw: 057ff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888009c42c80
[ 152.928716][ T8030] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 152.929890][ T8030] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 152.930759][ T8030]
[ 152.931076][ T8030] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 152.931851][ T8030] ffff88810d31bc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 152.932967][ T8030] ffff88810d31bc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 152.934068][ T8030] >ffff88810d31bd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 152.935189][ T8030] ^
[ 152.935763][ T8030] ffff88810d31bd80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 152.936847][ T8030] ffff88810d31be00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 152.937940][ T8030] ==================================================================
If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails in alloc_workqueue(), it will call put_pwq()
which invoke a work queue to call pwq_unbound_release_workfn() and use the 'wq'.
The 'wq' allocated in alloc_workqueue() will be freed in error path when
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails. So it will lead a UAF.
CPU0 CPU1
alloc_workqueue()
alloc_and_link_pwqs()
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails
apply_wqattrs_cleanup()
schedule_work(&pwq->unbound_release_work)
kfree(wq)
worker_thread()
pwq_unbound_release_workfn() <- trigger uaf here
If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails, the new pwq are not linked, it doesn't
hold any reference to the 'wq', 'wq' is invalid to access in the worker,
so add check pwq if linked to fix this.
Fixes: 2d5f0764b526 ("workqueue: split apply_workqueue_attrs() into 3 stages")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.2+
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lai Jiangshan <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
---
kernel/workqueue.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/workqueue.c
+++ b/kernel/workqueue.c
@@ -3498,15 +3498,21 @@ static void pwq_unbound_release_workfn(s
unbound_release_work);
struct workqueue_struct *wq = pwq->wq;
struct worker_pool *pool = pwq->pool;
- bool is_last;
+ bool is_last = false;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(wq->flags & WQ_UNBOUND)))
- return;
+ /*
+ * when @pwq is not linked, it doesn't hold any reference to the
+ * @wq, and @wq is invalid to access.
+ */
+ if (!list_empty(&pwq->pwqs_node)) {
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(wq->flags & WQ_UNBOUND)))
+ return;
- mutex_lock(&wq->mutex);
- list_del_rcu(&pwq->pwqs_node);
- is_last = list_empty(&wq->pwqs);
- mutex_unlock(&wq->mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&wq->mutex);
+ list_del_rcu(&pwq->pwqs_node);
+ is_last = list_empty(&wq->pwqs);
+ mutex_unlock(&wq->mutex);
+ }
mutex_lock(&wq_pool_mutex);
put_unbound_pool(pool);
From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 54a5ead6f5e2b47131a7385d0c0af18e7b89cb02 ]
Pages that we read in hfs_bnode_read need to be kmapped into kernel
address space. However, currently only the 0th page is kmapped. If the
given offset + length exceeds this 0th page, then we have an invalid
memory access.
To fix this, we kmap relevant pages one by one and copy their relevant
portions of data.
An example of invalid memory access occurring without this fix can be seen
in the following crash report:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888125fdcffe by task syz-executor5/4634
CPU: 0 PID: 4634 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x195/0x1f8 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:233
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x7b/0xd4 mm/kasan/report.c:436
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:180 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x154/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:186
memcpy+0x24/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65
memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26
hfs_bnode_read_u16 fs/hfs/bnode.c:34 [inline]
hfs_bnode_find+0x880/0xcc0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:365
hfs_brec_find+0x2d8/0x540 fs/hfs/bfind.c:126
hfs_brec_read+0x27/0x120 fs/hfs/bfind.c:165
hfs_cat_find_brec+0x19a/0x3b0 fs/hfs/catalog.c:194
hfs_fill_super+0xc13/0x1460 fs/hfs/super.c:419
mount_bdev+0x331/0x3f0 fs/super.c:1368
hfs_mount+0x35/0x40 fs/hfs/super.c:457
legacy_get_tree+0x10c/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592
vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300 fs/super.c:1498
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2905 [inline]
path_mount+0x13f5/0x20e0 fs/namespace.c:3235
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3248 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3456 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3433 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x2b8/0x340 fs/namespace.c:3433
do_syscall_64+0x37/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x45e63a
Code: 48 c7 c2 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d2 e8 88 04 00 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9404d410d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000248 RCX: 000000000045e63a
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007f9404d41120
RBP: 00007f9404d41120 R08: 00000000200002c0 R09: 0000000020000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00000000004ad5d8 R15: 0000000000000000
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:00000000dadbcf3e refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x125fdc
flags: 0x2fffc0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fff)
raw: 02fffc0000000000 ffffea000497f748 ffffea000497f6c8 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888125fdce80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff888125fdcf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff888125fdcf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff888125fdd000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff888125fdd080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
==================================================================
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
Cc: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
---
fs/hfs/bnode.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/hfs/bnode.c b/fs/hfs/bnode.c
index b63a4df7327b..c0a73a6ffb28 100644
--- a/fs/hfs/bnode.c
+++ b/fs/hfs/bnode.c
@@ -15,16 +15,31 @@
#include "btree.h"
-void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf,
- int off, int len)
+void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, int off, int len)
{
struct page *page;
+ int pagenum;
+ int bytes_read;
+ int bytes_to_read;
+ void *vaddr;
off += node->page_offset;
- page = node->page[0];
+ pagenum = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ off &= ~PAGE_MASK; /* compute page offset for the first page */
- memcpy(buf, kmap(page) + off, len);
- kunmap(page);
+ for (bytes_read = 0; bytes_read < len; bytes_read += bytes_to_read) {
+ if (pagenum >= node->tree->pages_per_bnode)
+ break;
+ page = node->page[pagenum];
+ bytes_to_read = min_t(int, len - bytes_read, PAGE_SIZE - off);
+
+ vaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
+ memcpy(buf + bytes_read, vaddr + off, bytes_to_read);
+ kunmap_atomic(vaddr);
+
+ pagenum++;
+ off = 0; /* page offset only applies to the first page */
+ }
}
u16 hfs_bnode_read_u16(struct hfs_bnode *node, int off)
--
2.30.2
Hi!
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.200 release.
> There are 17 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
CIP testing did not find any problems here:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-4.19.y
Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <[email protected]>
Best regards,
Pavel
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
On 7/29/21 7:54 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.200 release.
> There are 17 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat, 31 Jul 2021 13:51:22 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.200-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
Tested-by: Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
thanks,
-- Shuah
Hi Greg,
On Thu, Jul 29, 2021 at 03:54:01PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.200 release.
> There are 17 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat, 31 Jul 2021 13:51:22 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build test:
mips (gcc version 11.1.1 20210723): 63 configs -> no failure
arm (gcc version 11.1.1 20210723): 116 configs -> no new failure
arm64 (gcc version 11.1.1 20210723): 2 configs -> no failure
x86_64 (gcc version 10.2.1 20210110): 2 configs -> no failure
Boot test:
x86_64: Booted on my test laptop. No regression.
x86_64: Booted on qemu. No regression.
Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee <[email protected]>
--
Regards
Sudip
On Thu, 29 Jul 2021 at 19:27, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.200 release.
> There are 17 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat, 31 Jul 2021 13:51:22 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.200-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <[email protected]>
## Build
* kernel: 4.19.200-rc1
* git: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
* git branch: linux-4.19.y
* git commit: 3b0f6d777e8545324198eca00a5758c7b287aee7
* git describe: v4.19.199-18-g3b0f6d777e85
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.19.y/build/v4.19.199-18-g3b0f6d777e85
## No regressions (compared to v4.19.198-120-gb72fc3c0016d)
## No fixes (compared to v4.19.198-120-gb72fc3c0016d)
## Test result summary
total: 74142, pass: 57856, fail: 1674, skip: 12842, xfail: 1770,
## Build Summary
* arm: 97 total, 97 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 25 total, 25 passed, 0 failed
* dragonboard-410c: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* hi6220-hikey: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* i386: 14 total, 13 passed, 1 failed
* juno-r2: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* mips: 39 total, 39 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 9 total, 9 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 9 total, 9 passed, 0 failed
* x15: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* x86: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 15 total, 15 passed, 0 failed
## Test suites summary
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest-
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-bpf
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-lkdtm
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native-
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none-
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kvm-unit-tests
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* ltp[
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* perf
* rcutorture
* ssuite
* v4l2-compliance
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
On Thu, Jul 29, 2021 at 03:54:01PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.200 release.
> There are 17 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat, 31 Jul 2021 13:51:22 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 155 pass: 155 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 431 pass: 431 fail: 0
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Guenter