The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the vdso)
skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local attacker to
bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting the available pages
for special mappings. bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, although I don't
think this can be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not
to have the security check.
$ uname -m
x86_64
$ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
65536
$ cat install_special_mapping.s
section .bss
resb BSS_SIZE
section .text
global _start
_start:
mov eax, __NR_pause
int 0x80
$ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
$ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o
$ ./install_special_mapping &
[1] 14303
$ cat /proc/14303/maps
0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665 /home/taviso/install_special_mapping
00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to 4096.
Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Robert Swiecki <[email protected]>
---
fs/exec.c | 7 +++++++
mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index d68c378..7e8c4b6 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -275,7 +275,14 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
vma->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->anon_vma_chain);
+
+ err = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
+
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+
err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
+
if (err)
goto err;
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index b179abb..1de3f4b 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
vma->vm_private_data = pages;
+ if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) {
+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) {
kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
return -ENOMEM;
--
-------------------------------------
[email protected] | pgp encrypted mail preferred
-------------------------------------------------------
On Thu, 9 Dec 2010 15:29:42 +0100 Tavis Ormandy wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> Acked-by: Robert Swiecki <[email protected]>
> ---
>
> fs/exec.c | 7 +++++++
> mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++
> 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index d68c378..7e8c4b6 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -275,7 +275,14 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> vma->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
> vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
> INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->anon_vma_chain);
> +
> + err = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
> +
> + if (err)
> + goto err;
> +
> err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
> +
> if (err)
> goto err;
>
Uh, something happened to the tabs at the beginning of each line...
I.e., the original file content has been mucked up.
> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> index b179abb..1de3f4b 100644
> --- a/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
> vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
> vma->vm_private_data = pages;
>
> + if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) {
> + kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> +
> if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) {
> kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
> return -ENOMEM;
>
>
> --
> -------------------------------------
---
~Randy
*** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code ***
On Thu, Dec 09, 2010 at 10:38:53AM -0800, Randy Dunlap wrote:
>
> Uh, something happened to the tabs at the beginning of each line...
> I.e., the original file content has been mucked up.
>
Gah. Apologies, second attempt...
The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the vdso)
skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local attacker to
bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting the available pages
for special mappings. bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, although I don't
think this can be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not
to have the security check.
$ uname -m
x86_64
$ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
65536
$ cat install_special_mapping.s
section .bss
resb BSS_SIZE
section .text
global _start
_start:
mov eax, __NR_pause
int 0x80
$ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
$ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o
$ ./install_special_mapping &
[1] 14303
$ cat /proc/14303/maps
0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665 /home/taviso/install_special_mapping
00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to 4096.
Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Robert Swiecki <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
---
fs/exec.c | 7 +++++++
mm/mmap.c | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index d68c378..7e8c4b6 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -275,7 +275,14 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
vma->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->anon_vma_chain);
+
+ err = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
+
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
+
err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
+
if (err)
goto err;
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index b179abb..1de3f4b 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
vma->vm_private_data = pages;
+ if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) {
+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) {
kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
return -ENOMEM;
--
-------------------------------------
[email protected] | pgp encrypted mail preferred
-------------------------------------------------------
On Thu, 9 Dec 2010 20:16:37 +0100
Tavis Ormandy <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 09, 2010 at 10:38:53AM -0800, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> >
> > Uh, something happened to the tabs at the beginning of each line...
> > I.e., the original file content has been mucked up.
> >
>
> Gah. Apologies, second attempt...
>
> The install_special_mapping routine (used, for example, to setup the vdso)
> skips the security check before insert_vm_struct, allowing a local attacker to
> bypass the mmap_min_addr security restriction by limiting the available pages
> for special mappings. bprm_mm_init() also skips the check, although I don't
> think this can be used to bypass any restrictions, I don't see any reason not
> to have the security check.
>
> $ uname -m
> x86_64
> $ cat /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
> 65536
> $ cat install_special_mapping.s
> section .bss
> resb BSS_SIZE
> section .text
> global _start
> _start:
> mov eax, __NR_pause
> int 0x80
> $ nasm -D__NR_pause=29 -DBSS_SIZE=0xfffed000 -f elf -o install_special_mapping.o install_special_mapping.s
> $ ld -m elf_i386 -Ttext=0x10000 -Tbss=0x11000 -o install_special_mapping install_special_mapping.o
> $ ./install_special_mapping &
> [1] 14303
> $ cat /proc/14303/maps
> 0000f000-00010000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
> 00010000-00011000 r-xp 00001000 00:19 2453665 /home/taviso/install_special_mapping
> 00011000-ffffe000 rwxp 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
>
> It's worth noting that Red Hat are shipping with mmap_min_addr set to 4096.
>
> ...
>
> --- a/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -2479,6 +2479,11 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
> vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
> vma->vm_private_data = pages;
>
> + if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) {
> + kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
This should return the security_file_mmap() errno rather than assuming
EPERM. Although it happens to be the case that EPERM is the only errno
which security_file_mmap() presently returns, afacit.
Ditto insert_vm_struct(), with s/EPERM/ENOMEM/
Please review and test?
--- a/mm/mmap.c~mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check-fix
+++ a/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2463,6 +2463,7 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st
unsigned long vm_flags, struct page **pages)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ int ret;
vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(vma == NULL))
@@ -2479,21 +2480,21 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st
vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
vma->vm_private_data = pages;
- if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) {
- kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
- return -EPERM;
- }
-
- if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) {
- kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
+ ret = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
perf_event_mmap(vma);
-
return 0;
+out:
+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
+ return ret;
}
static DEFINE_MUTEX(mm_all_locks_mutex);
_
On Thu, 9 Dec 2010, Andrew Morton wrote:
> This should return the security_file_mmap() errno rather than assuming
> EPERM. Although it happens to be the case that EPERM is the only errno
> which security_file_mmap() presently returns, afacit.
>
> Ditto insert_vm_struct(), with s/EPERM/ENOMEM/
>
> Please review and test?
Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
>
>
> --- a/mm/mmap.c~mm-install_special_mapping-skips-security_file_mmap-check-fix
> +++ a/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -2463,6 +2463,7 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st
> unsigned long vm_flags, struct page **pages)
> {
> struct vm_area_struct *vma;
> + int ret;
>
> vma = kmem_cache_zalloc(vm_area_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (unlikely(vma == NULL))
> @@ -2479,21 +2480,21 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_st
> vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
> vma->vm_private_data = pages;
>
> - if (security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1)) {
> - kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
> - return -EPERM;
> - }
> -
> - if (unlikely(insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) {
> - kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> - }
> + ret = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto out;
> +
> + ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto out;
>
> mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>
> perf_event_mmap(vma);
> -
> return 0;
> +out:
> + kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
> + return ret;
> }
>
> static DEFINE_MUTEX(mm_all_locks_mutex);
> _
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
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> Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
>
--
James Morris
<[email protected]>