Hello,
apparently modules are verified by keys from 'secondary' keyring on all
platforms.
If you happen to know that it's this particular keyring, and know how
to list keyrings recursively you can find the keys that are used for
verifying modules.
However, for kexec we have
- primary keyring on aarch64
- platform keyring on s390
- secondary AND platform keyring on x86
How is a user supposed to know which keys are used for kexec image
verification?
There is an implicit keyring that is ad-hoc constructed by the code that
does the kexec verification but there is no key list observable from
userspace that corresponds to this ad-hoc keyring only known to the kexec
code.
Can the kernel make the information which keys are used for what purpose
available to the user?
Thanks
Michal
On 2022/4/15 1:59, Michal Suchánek wrote:
> Hello,
>
> apparently modules are verified by keys from 'secondary' keyring on all
> platforms.
>
> If you happen to know that it's this particular keyring, and know how
> to list keyrings recursively you can find the keys that are used for
> verifying modules.
>
> However, for kexec we have
>
> - primary keyring on aarch64
> - platform keyring on s390
> - secondary AND platform keyring on x86
>
> How is a user supposed to know which keys are used for kexec image
> verification?
>
> There is an implicit keyring that is ad-hoc constructed by the code that
> does the kexec verification but there is no key list observable from
> userspace that corresponds to this ad-hoc keyring only known to the kexec
> code.
>
> Can the kernel make the information which keys are used for what purpose
> available to the user?
>
> Thanks
>
> Michal
>
> .
Hi Michal
I'll try my best to understand and answer your question.
First of all, the "key" you mentioned here is actually certificate. And
there are no way for the kernel to know "which certificate is used for
what purpose" but to get a hint from the certificate's extension, if
they exist. However, the extension only points out what this certificate
should be used for, but not exactly what it is actually used for.
Secondly, the verification process requires the module (kernel image in
this question) to contain information on which certificate should be
used to verify itself. The signature provided by the module is in PKCS#7
format which contains a list of certificates for the verifier to
construct a "chain of trust". Each certificates contains information
pointing to the certificate of it's issuer, and eventually to one of the
certificate stored in one of the keyrings you mentioned.
All in all, certificates in these keyrings you mentioned can be used for
various purpose, and it's the responsibility for the modules being
verified to provide information stating which certificate should be used
for verification. Thus, the best way to find out which key is used for
kexec is to look at key used to sign the kernel image.
--
Best
GUO Zihua
On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 12:10:13PM +0800, Guozihua (Scott) wrote:
> On 2022/4/15 1:59, Michal Such?nek wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > apparently modules are verified by keys from 'secondary' keyring on all
> > platforms.
> >
> > If you happen to know that it's this particular keyring, and know how
> > to list keyrings recursively you can find the keys that are used for
> > verifying modules.
> >
> > However, for kexec we have
> >
> > - primary keyring on aarch64
> > - platform keyring on s390
> > - secondary AND platform keyring on x86
> >
> > How is a user supposed to know which keys are used for kexec image
> > verification?
> >
> > There is an implicit keyring that is ad-hoc constructed by the code that
> > does the kexec verification but there is no key list observable from
> > userspace that corresponds to this ad-hoc keyring only known to the kexec
> > code.
> >
> > Can the kernel make the information which keys are used for what purpose
> > available to the user?
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> > Michal
> >
> > .
>
> Hi Michal
>
> I'll try my best to understand and answer your question.
>
> First of all, the "key" you mentioned here is actually certificate. And
> there are no way for the kernel to know "which certificate is used for what
> purpose" but to get a hint from the certificate's extension, if they exist.
> However, the extension only points out what this certificate should be used
> for, but not exactly what it is actually used for.
> Secondly, the verification process requires the module (kernel image in this
> question) to contain information on which certificate should be used to
> verify itself. The signature provided by the module is in PKCS#7 format
> which contains a list of certificates for the verifier to construct a "chain
> of trust". Each certificates contains information pointing to the
> certificate of it's issuer, and eventually to one of the certificate stored
> in one of the keyrings you mentioned.
Indeed, that's not really relevant to this problem.
Sure, if the certificates extension does exist and does not state that
the certificate can be used for code signing then the signature should
be rejected. The same if the signature is malformed and does not provide
enough information to determine which key was used to create it.
The question which key will be checked, though.
>
> All in all, certificates in these keyrings you mentioned can be used for
> various purpose, and it's the responsibility for the modules being verified
> to provide information stating which certificate should be used for
> verification. Thus, the best way to find out which key is used for kexec is
> to look at key used to sign the kernel image.
There aren't really good tools for working with the kernel signatures
but I can tell what certificate it was signed with jumping throught some
hoops.
What I can't tell without reading the kernel code (different for each
architecture) is what certificates the kernel considers valid for
signing kernels. The kernel surely knows but does not tell.
That is, for example, if I have a known bad kernel I want to be able to
tell if it's loadable without actually loading it.
Thanks
Michal
On 2022/4/26 16:52, Michal Suchánek wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 12:10:13PM +0800, Guozihua (Scott) wrote:
>> On 2022/4/15 1:59, Michal Suchánek wrote:
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> apparently modules are verified by keys from 'secondary' keyring on all
>>> platforms.
>>>
>>> If you happen to know that it's this particular keyring, and know how
>>> to list keyrings recursively you can find the keys that are used for
>>> verifying modules.
>>>
>>> However, for kexec we have
>>>
>>> - primary keyring on aarch64
>>> - platform keyring on s390
>>> - secondary AND platform keyring on x86
>>>
>>> How is a user supposed to know which keys are used for kexec image
>>> verification?
>>>
>>> There is an implicit keyring that is ad-hoc constructed by the code that
>>> does the kexec verification but there is no key list observable from
>>> userspace that corresponds to this ad-hoc keyring only known to the kexec
>>> code.
>>>
>>> Can the kernel make the information which keys are used for what purpose
>>> available to the user?
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>>
>>> Michal
>>>
>>> .
>>
>> Hi Michal
>>
>> I'll try my best to understand and answer your question.
>>
>> First of all, the "key" you mentioned here is actually certificate. And
>> there are no way for the kernel to know "which certificate is used for what
>> purpose" but to get a hint from the certificate's extension, if they exist.
>> However, the extension only points out what this certificate should be used
>> for, but not exactly what it is actually used for.
>
>> Secondly, the verification process requires the module (kernel image in this
>> question) to contain information on which certificate should be used to
>> verify itself. The signature provided by the module is in PKCS#7 format
>> which contains a list of certificates for the verifier to construct a "chain
>> of trust". Each certificates contains information pointing to the
>> certificate of it's issuer, and eventually to one of the certificate stored
>> in one of the keyrings you mentioned.
>
> Indeed, that's not really relevant to this problem.
> Sure, if the certificates extension does exist and does not state that
> the certificate can be used for code signing then the signature should
> be rejected. The same if the signature is malformed and does not provide
> enough information to determine which key was used to create it.
>
> The question which key will be checked, though.
>>
>> All in all, certificates in these keyrings you mentioned can be used for
>> various purpose, and it's the responsibility for the modules being verified
>> to provide information stating which certificate should be used for
>> verification. Thus, the best way to find out which key is used for kexec is
>> to look at key used to sign the kernel image.
>
> There aren't really good tools for working with the kernel signatures
> but I can tell what certificate it was signed with jumping throught some
> hoops.
>
> What I can't tell without reading the kernel code (different for each
> architecture) is what certificates the kernel considers valid for
> signing kernels. The kernel surely knows but does not tell.
It's quite true on this one, maybe some documentation would help.
>
> That is, for example, if I have a known bad kernel I want to be able to
> tell if it's loadable without actually loading it.
For this you can try the -l option with kexec which loads the kernel but
will not execute it. And then you can use -u option to unload the kernel
again and see whether it resolves your requirement.
>
> Thanks
>
> Michal
> .
--
Best
GUO Zihua