Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way
toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++---------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 1a143340103e..a2c3e2d42a7f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
sev_flush_asids();
}
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
+{
+ if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+ return 0;
+
+ sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
* returning them to the system.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index bb7b99743bea..89b95fb87a0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
{
struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+ int ret;
sd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sd)
return -ENOMEM;
sd->cpu = cpu;
sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sd->save_area)
+ if (!sd->save_area) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_cpu_data;
+ }
clear_page(page_address(sd->save_area));
- if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
- sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1,
- sizeof(void *),
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
- if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
- goto free_save_area;
- }
+ ret = sev_cpu_init(sd);
+ if (ret)
+ goto free_save_area;
per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd;
@@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
__free_page(sd->save_area);
free_cpu_data:
kfree(sd);
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return ret;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 8e169835f52a..4eb4bab0ca3e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu);
void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
void sev_hardware_teardown(void);
+int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
--
2.30.0.284.gd98b1dd5eaa7-goog
On 1/13/21 6:37 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way
> toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c.
>
> No functional change intended.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++---------
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 1a143340103e..a2c3e2d42a7f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
> sev_flush_asids();
> }
>
> +int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
> +{
> + if (!svm_sev_enabled())
> + return 0;
> +
> + sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),
> + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
I saw Tom recommended to use kzalloc.. instead of __GFP_ZERO in previous
patch. With that fixed,
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
> + if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
> * returning them to the system.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index bb7b99743bea..89b95fb87a0c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
> static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
> {
> struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
> + int ret;
>
> sd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!sd)
> return -ENOMEM;
> sd->cpu = cpu;
> sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!sd->save_area)
> + if (!sd->save_area) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto free_cpu_data;
> + }
> clear_page(page_address(sd->save_area));
>
> - if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
> - sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1,
> - sizeof(void *),
> - GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
> - if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
> - goto free_save_area;
> - }
> + ret = sev_cpu_init(sd);
> + if (ret)
> + goto free_save_area;
>
> per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd;
>
> @@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
> __free_page(sd->save_area);
> free_cpu_data:
> kfree(sd);
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + return ret;
>
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 8e169835f52a..4eb4bab0ca3e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
> void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu);
> void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
> void sev_hardware_teardown(void);
> +int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
> void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
> int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
On 1/14/21 3:37 PM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
>
> On 1/13/21 6:37 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>> Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way
>> toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c.
>>
>> No functional change intended.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++---------
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
>> 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> index 1a143340103e..a2c3e2d42a7f 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> @@ -1330,6 +1330,19 @@ void sev_hardware_teardown(void)
>> sev_flush_asids();
>> }
>>
>> +int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
>> +{
>> + if (!svm_sev_enabled())
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1, sizeof(void *),
>> + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
>
>
> I saw Tom recommended to use kzalloc.. instead of __GFP_ZERO in previous
kcalloc :)
Thanks,
Tom
> patch. With that fixed,
>
> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
>
>
>> + if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
>> * returning them to the system.
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> index bb7b99743bea..89b95fb87a0c 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
>> @@ -552,23 +552,22 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
>> static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
>> {
>> struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
>> + int ret;
>>
>> sd = kzalloc(sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data), GFP_KERNEL);
>> if (!sd)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>> sd->cpu = cpu;
>> sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
>> - if (!sd->save_area)
>> + if (!sd->save_area) {
>> + ret = -ENOMEM;
>> goto free_cpu_data;
>> + }
>> clear_page(page_address(sd->save_area));
>>
>> - if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
>> - sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc_array(max_sev_asid + 1,
>> - sizeof(void *),
>> - GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
>> - if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
>> - goto free_save_area;
>> - }
>> + ret = sev_cpu_init(sd);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto free_save_area;
>>
>> per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd;
>>
>> @@ -578,7 +577,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
>> __free_page(sd->save_area);
>> free_cpu_data:
>> kfree(sd);
>> - return -ENOMEM;
>> + return ret;
>>
>> }
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
>> index 8e169835f52a..4eb4bab0ca3e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
>> @@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
>> void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu);
>> void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
>> void sev_hardware_teardown(void);
>> +int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd);
>> void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>> int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
>> int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
On 1/13/21 6:37 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Move the allocation of the SEV VMCB array to sev.c to help pave the way
> toward encapsulating SEV enabling wholly within sev.c.
>
> No functional change intended.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 17 ++++++++---------
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>