Christophe Leroy's on April 3, 2020 8:31 pm:
>
>
> Le 03/04/2020 à 11:35, Nicholas Piggin a écrit :
>> There is no need to allow user accesses when probing kernel addresses.
>
> I just discovered the following commit
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=75a1a607bb7e6d918be3aca11ec2214a275392f4
>
> This commit adds probe_kernel_read_strict() and probe_kernel_write_strict().
>
> When reading the commit log, I understand that probe_kernel_read() may
> be used to access some user memory. Which will not work anymore with
> your patch.
Hmm, I looked at _strict but obviously not hard enough. Good catch.
I don't think probe_kernel_read() should ever access user memory,
the comment certainly says it doesn't, but that patch sort of implies
that they do.
I think it's wrong. The non-_strict maybe could return userspace data to
you if you did pass a user address? I don't see why that shouldn't just
be disallowed always though.
And if the _strict version is required to be safe, then it seems like a
bug or security issue to just allow everyone that doesn't explicitly
override it to use the default implementation.
Also, the way the weak linkage is done in that patch, means parisc and
um archs that were previously overriding probe_kernel_read() now get
the default probe_kernel_read_strict(), which would be wrong for them.
>
> Isn't it probe_kernel_read_strict() and probe_kernel_write_strict() that
> you want to add ?
>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
>> ---
>> v2:
>> - Enable for all powerpc (suggested by Christophe)
>> - Fold helper function together (Christophe)
>> - Rename uaccess.c to maccess.c to match kernel/maccess.c.
>>
>> arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 25 +++++++++++++++-------
>> arch/powerpc/lib/Makefile | 2 +-
>> arch/powerpc/lib/maccess.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
> x86 does it in mm/maccess.c
Yeah I'll fix that up, thanks.
Thanks,
Nick
Nicholas Piggin's on April 3, 2020 9:05 pm:
> Christophe Leroy's on April 3, 2020 8:31 pm:
>>
>>
>> Le 03/04/2020 à 11:35, Nicholas Piggin a écrit :
>>> There is no need to allow user accesses when probing kernel addresses.
>>
>> I just discovered the following commit
>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=75a1a607bb7e6d918be3aca11ec2214a275392f4
>>
>> This commit adds probe_kernel_read_strict() and probe_kernel_write_strict().
>>
>> When reading the commit log, I understand that probe_kernel_read() may
>> be used to access some user memory. Which will not work anymore with
>> your patch.
>
> Hmm, I looked at _strict but obviously not hard enough. Good catch.
>
> I don't think probe_kernel_read() should ever access user memory,
> the comment certainly says it doesn't, but that patch sort of implies
> that they do.
>
> I think it's wrong. The non-_strict maybe could return userspace data to
> you if you did pass a user address? I don't see why that shouldn't just
> be disallowed always though.
>
> And if the _strict version is required to be safe, then it seems like a
> bug or security issue to just allow everyone that doesn't explicitly
> override it to use the default implementation.
>
> Also, the way the weak linkage is done in that patch, means parisc and
> um archs that were previously overriding probe_kernel_read() now get
> the default probe_kernel_read_strict(), which would be wrong for them.
The changelog in commit 75a1a607bb7 makes it a bit clearer. If the
non-_strict variant is used on non-kernel addresses, then it might not
return -EFAULT or it might cause a kernel warning. The _strict variant
is supposed to be usable with any address and it will return -EFAULT if
it was not a valid and mapped kernel address.
The non-_strict variant can not portably access user memory because it
uses KERNEL_DS, and its documentation says its only for kernel pointers.
So powerpc should be fine to run that under KUAP AFAIKS.
I don't know why the _strict behaviour is not just made default, but
the implementation of it does seem to be broken on the archs that
override the non-_strict variant.
Thanks,
Nick
Hey Nicholas,
On 4/7/20 6:01 AM, Nicholas Piggin wrote:
> Nicholas Piggin's on April 3, 2020 9:05 pm:
>> Christophe Leroy's on April 3, 2020 8:31 pm:
>>> Le 03/04/2020 à 11:35, Nicholas Piggin a écrit :
>>>> There is no need to allow user accesses when probing kernel addresses.
>>>
>>> I just discovered the following commit
>>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=75a1a607bb7e6d918be3aca11ec2214a275392f4
>>>
>>> This commit adds probe_kernel_read_strict() and probe_kernel_write_strict().
>>>
>>> When reading the commit log, I understand that probe_kernel_read() may
>>> be used to access some user memory. Which will not work anymore with
>>> your patch.
>>
>> Hmm, I looked at _strict but obviously not hard enough. Good catch.
>>
>> I don't think probe_kernel_read() should ever access user memory,
>> the comment certainly says it doesn't, but that patch sort of implies
>> that they do.
>>
>> I think it's wrong. The non-_strict maybe could return userspace data to
>> you if you did pass a user address? I don't see why that shouldn't just
>> be disallowed always though.
>>
>> And if the _strict version is required to be safe, then it seems like a
>> bug or security issue to just allow everyone that doesn't explicitly
>> override it to use the default implementation.
>>
>> Also, the way the weak linkage is done in that patch, means parisc and
>> um archs that were previously overriding probe_kernel_read() now get
>> the default probe_kernel_read_strict(), which would be wrong for them.
>
> The changelog in commit 75a1a607bb7 makes it a bit clearer. If the
> non-_strict variant is used on non-kernel addresses, then it might not
> return -EFAULT or it might cause a kernel warning. The _strict variant
> is supposed to be usable with any address and it will return -EFAULT if
> it was not a valid and mapped kernel address.
>
> The non-_strict variant can not portably access user memory because it
> uses KERNEL_DS, and its documentation says its only for kernel pointers.
> So powerpc should be fine to run that under KUAP AFAIKS.
>
> I don't know why the _strict behaviour is not just made default, but
> the implementation of it does seem to be broken on the archs that
> override the non-_strict variant.
Yeah, we should make it default and only add a "opt out" for the old legacy
cases; there was also same discussion started over here just recently [0].
Thanks,
Daniel
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/