Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757246Ab2KBItl (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Nov 2012 04:49:41 -0400 Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:44273 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757555Ab2KBItf (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Nov 2012 04:49:35 -0400 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Matthew Garrett Cc: Alan Cox , James Bottomley , Eric Paris , Jiri Kosina , Oliver Neukum , Chris Friesen , Josh Boyer , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org References: <1351783096.2391.77.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <1351803800.2391.96.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121101210634.GA19723@srcf.ucam.org> <20121101213127.5967327f@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> <20121101212843.GA20309@srcf.ucam.org> <20121101213751.377ebaa8@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> <20121101213452.GA20564@srcf.ucam.org> <20121101215817.79e50ec2@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> <20121101215752.GA21154@srcf.ucam.org> Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2012 01:49:25 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20121101215752.GA21154@srcf.ucam.org> (Matthew Garrett's message of "Thu, 1 Nov 2012 21:57:52 +0000") Message-ID: <87625ogzje.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX18/qlkeAwnhhYHwCkqCXIoTAs4pJCjrZKo= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG * -3.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% * [score: 0.0000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Matthew Garrett X-Spam-Relay-Country: Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Sun, 08 Jan 2012 03:05:19 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1327 Lines: 30 Matthew Garrett writes: > On Thu, Nov 01, 2012 at 09:58:17PM +0000, Alan Cox wrote: >> On Thu, 1 Nov 2012 21:34:52 +0000 >> Matthew Garrett wrote: >> > I think you've misunderstood. Blacklist updates are append only. >> >> I think you've misunderstood - thats a technical detail that merely >> alters the cost to the people who did something improper. > > Winning a case is cold comfort if your software has been uninstallable > for the years it took to get through the courts. If others want to take > that risk, fine. When the goal is to secure Linux I don't see how any of this helps. Windows 8 compromises are already available so if we turn most of these arguments around I am certain clever attackers can go through windows to run compromised kernel on a linux system, at least as easily as the reverse. Short of instructing UEFI to stop trusting the Microsoft signing key I don't see any of the secureboot dance gaining any security of computers running linux or security from keys being revoked for non-sense reasons. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/