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Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2012 17:54:16 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@genband.com>,
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        Josh Boyer <jwboyer@gmail.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
Message-ID: <20121102175416.GA11816@srcf.ucam.org>
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On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 05:48:31PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Fri, 2012-11-02 at 16:54 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 04:52:44PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote:
> > 
> > > The first question is how many compromises do you need.  Without
> > > co-operation from windows, you don't get to install something in the
> > > boot system, so if you're looking for a single compromise vector, the
> > > only realistic attack is to trick the user into booting a hacked linux
> > > system from USB or DVD.
> > 
> > You run a binary. It pops up a box saying "Windows needs your permission 
> > to continue", just like almost every other Windows binary that's any 
> > use. Done.
> 
> And if all the loaders do some type of present user test on a virgin
> system, how do you propose to get that message up there?

? That's the message generated by the Windows access control mechanism 
when you run a binary that requests elevated privileges.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org
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