Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1761315Ab2KBWDR (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Nov 2012 18:03:17 -0400 Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:42085 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752795Ab2KBWDO (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 Nov 2012 18:03:14 -0400 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Matthew Garrett Cc: Alan Cox , James Bottomley , Eric Paris , Jiri Kosina , Oliver Neukum , Chris Friesen , Josh Boyer , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org References: <1351803800.2391.96.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121101210634.GA19723@srcf.ucam.org> <20121101213127.5967327f@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> <20121101212843.GA20309@srcf.ucam.org> <20121101213751.377ebaa8@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> <20121101213452.GA20564@srcf.ucam.org> <20121101215817.79e50ec2@pyramind.ukuu.org.uk> <20121101215752.GA21154@srcf.ucam.org> <87625ogzje.fsf@xmission.com> <20121102140057.GA4668@srcf.ucam.org> Date: Fri, 02 Nov 2012 15:03:02 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20121102140057.GA4668@srcf.ucam.org> (Matthew Garrett's message of "Fri, 2 Nov 2012 14:00:57 +0000") Message-ID: <87liejacix.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1+OxKqi3+uCD0EecW6qkwuuFAzVq32efc4= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG * -3.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% * [score: 0.0000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Matthew Garrett X-Spam-Relay-Country: Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Sun, 08 Jan 2012 03:05:19 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1164 Lines: 28 Matthew Garrett writes: > On Fri, Nov 02, 2012 at 01:49:25AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > >> When the goal is to secure Linux I don't see how any of this helps. >> Windows 8 compromises are already available so if we turn most of these >> arguments around I am certain clever attackers can go through windows to >> run compromised kernel on a linux system, at least as easily as the >> reverse. > > And if any of them are used to attack Linux, we'd expect those versions > of Windows to be blacklisted. I fail to see the logic here. It is ok to trust Microsofts signing key because after I have been p0wned they will blacklist the version of windows that has was used to compromise my system? A key revokation will help me when my system is p0wned how? I don't want my system p0wned in the first place and I don't want to run windows. Why should I trust Microsoft's signing key? Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/