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Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2012 04:28:02 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@genband.com>,
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        Josh Boyer <jwboyer@gmail.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
Message-ID: <20121104042802.GA11295@srcf.ucam.org>
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On Sat, Nov 03, 2012 at 10:56:40PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Sat, 2012-11-03 at 13:46 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > I... what? Our signed bootloader will boot our signed kernel without any 
> > physically present end-user involvement. We therefore need to make it 
> > as difficult as practically possible for an attacker to use our signed 
> > bootloader and our signed kernel as an attack vector against other 
> > operating systems, which includes worrying about hibernate and kexec. If 
> > people want to support this use case then patches to deal with that need 
> > to be present in the upstream kernel.
> 
> Right, but what I'm telling you is that by deciding to allow automatic
> first boot, you're causing the windows attack vector problem.  You could
> easily do a present user test only on first boot which would eliminate
> it.  Instead, we get all of this.

Your definition of "Best practices" is "Automated installs are 
impossible"? Have you ever actually spoken to a user?

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org
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