Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753301Ab2KEIU2 (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Nov 2012 03:20:28 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:52131 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751979Ab2KEIUY (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Nov 2012 03:20:24 -0500 Message-ID: <1352103617.2456.3.camel@dabdike> Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support From: James Bottomley To: Matthew Garrett Cc: Pavel Machek , Chris Friesen , Eric Paris , Jiri Kosina , Oliver Neukum , Alan Cox , Josh Boyer , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Date: Mon, 05 Nov 2012 09:20:17 +0100 In-Reply-To: <20121104135251.GA17894@srcf.ucam.org> References: <20121102175416.GA11816@srcf.ucam.org> <1351879058.2439.46.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121102180458.GA12052@srcf.ucam.org> <1351899503.2439.49.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121103002244.GC18691@srcf.ucam.org> <1351944236.2417.7.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121103134630.GA28166@srcf.ucam.org> <1351983400.2417.21.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121104042802.GA11295@srcf.ucam.org> <1352020487.2427.5.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121104135251.GA17894@srcf.ucam.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.4.4 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1771 Lines: 40 On Sun, 2012-11-04 at 13:52 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Sun, Nov 04, 2012 at 09:14:47AM +0000, James Bottomley wrote: > > > I've actually had more than enough experience with automated installs > > over my career: they're either done by paying someone or using a > > provisioning system. In either case, they provision a static image and > > boot environment description, including EFI boot services variables, so > > you can provision a default MOK database if you want the ignition image > > not to pause on firstboot. > > And now you've moved the attack vector to a copy of your provisioning > system instead. Well, no, it always exists: a lot of provisioning systems install efi (or previously dos) based agents not linux kernels. However it's a different vector since the efi agents tend to want to PXE boot and contact the image server. > > There is obviously the question of making the provisioning systems > > secure, but it's a separate one from making boot secure. > > You don't get to punt on making the kernel secure by simply asserting > that some other system can be secure instead. The chain of trust needs > to go all the way back - if your security model is based on all installs > needing a physically present end user, all installs need a physically > present end user. That's not acceptable, so we need a different security > model. I didn't. I advocated a simple security model which you asserted wouldn't allow unattended installs, so I explained how they could be done. James -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/