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Date: Mon, 5 Nov 2012 12:36:38 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@genband.com>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
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        Josh Boyer <jwboyer@gmail.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
Message-ID: <20121105123638.GA4374@srcf.ucam.org>
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On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 09:20:17AM +0100, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Sun, 2012-11-04 at 13:52 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > You don't get to punt on making the kernel secure by simply asserting 
> > that some other system can be secure instead. The chain of trust needs 
> > to go all the way back - if your security model is based on all installs 
> > needing a physically present end user, all installs need a physically 
> > present end user. That's not acceptable, so we need a different security 
> > model.
> 
> I didn't.  I advocated a simple security model which you asserted
> wouldn't allow unattended installs, so I explained how they could be
> done.  

You've explained that a hypothetical piece of software could handle key 
provisioning without providing any explanation for how it would be able 
to do so in a secure manner.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org
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