Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933655Ab2KFCqp (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Nov 2012 21:46:45 -0500 Received: from out03.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.233]:37142 "EHLO out03.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933504Ab2KFCqn (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Nov 2012 21:46:43 -0500 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Matthew Garrett Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" , James Bottomley , Pavel Machek , Chris Friesen , Eric Paris , Jiri Kosina , Oliver Neukum , Alan Cox , Josh Boyer , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org References: <20121103134630.GA28166@srcf.ucam.org> <1351983400.2417.21.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121104042802.GA11295@srcf.ucam.org> <1352020487.2427.5.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> <20121104135251.GA17894@srcf.ucam.org> <87d2zsmv8r.fsf@xmission.com> <509766DB.9090906@zytor.com> <87625kh5r2.fsf@xmission.com> <20121105123858.GB4374@srcf.ucam.org> <87sj8nc137.fsf@xmission.com> <20121105202557.GA16076@srcf.ucam.org> Date: Mon, 05 Nov 2012 18:46:32 -0800 In-Reply-To: <20121105202557.GA16076@srcf.ucam.org> (Matthew Garrett's message of "Mon, 5 Nov 2012 20:25:57 +0000") Message-ID: <87hap3zbw7.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/zOv+/lF7u1GMGHUqm7E5goG5DAPxXb7w= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG * -3.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% * [score: 0.0000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_XMDrugObfuBody_08 obfuscated drug references X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Matthew Garrett X-Spam-Relay-Country: Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Sun, 08 Jan 2012 03:05:19 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1284 Lines: 32 Matthew Garrett writes: > On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 11:16:12AM -0800, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Matthew Garrett writes: >> > No, in the general case the system will do that once it fails to find a >> > bootable OS on the drive. >> >> In the general case there will be a bootable OS on the drive. > > That's in no way a given. You have it backwards. The conclusion here is that having a case where a non-interactive install is possible is not a given. Therefore inflicting the entire rest of the ecosystem with requirements that only exist in the union of the requirements for non-interactive installs and installs on a machine with an existing machine does not make sense. In situations where a non-interactive install is interesting. Aka an empty boot disk it is not interesting to guard against. In situations where interaction happens is where windows may already exists and so spoofing windows is a design consideration and and a user presence test does not break the design. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/