Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752807Ab2KMCQQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2012 21:16:16 -0500 Received: from out03.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.233]:47514 "EHLO out03.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751736Ab2KMCQP (ORCPT ); Mon, 12 Nov 2012 21:16:15 -0500 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Andrew Morton Cc: Arvid Brodin , "linux-kernel\@vger.kernel.org" , Al Viro , Cyrill Gorcunov , "David Rientjes" References: <50A16BD0.7030600@xdin.com> <20121112150325.2516a0bf.akpm@linux-foundation.org> Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2012 18:16:03 -0800 In-Reply-To: <20121112150325.2516a0bf.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (Andrew Morton's message of "Mon, 12 Nov 2012 15:03:25 -0800") Message-ID: <871ufyjli4.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/Onl5asMJdYSjF4yKHcgaQI6ryESR/ICk= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG * -3.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% * [score: 0.0000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa03 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa03 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Andrew Morton X-Spam-Relay-Country: Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs/proc: Add process text segment md5-summing X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Sun, 08 Jan 2012 03:05:19 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1181 Lines: 32 Andrew Morton writes: > On Mon, 12 Nov 2012 21:36:17 +0000 > Arvid Brodin wrote: > >> Adds /proc//text_md5sum which, when read, calculates an md5sum over >> the process' text segment. This can detect some cases where the system RAM >> has been disturbed by e.g. ESD or cosmic radiation (on systems where ECC >> is not available). It might also detect some accidental or malicious >> modifications of executables, where the perpetrator has not bothered to >> cover up the tracks. > > I thought the review comments regarding the earlier patch were rather > fatal, sorry. To add another nail in the coffin. You can do this with ptrace or with /proc//mem without a kernel patch. To make this safe would need a ptrace_may_acces(PTRACE_MODE_READ) permission check. At which point not doing this with ptrace just adds up to extra kernel maintenance for no real point. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/