Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751970Ab2KSVKL (ORCPT ); Mon, 19 Nov 2012 16:10:11 -0500 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:60239 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751791Ab2KSVKJ (ORCPT ); Mon, 19 Nov 2012 16:10:09 -0500 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Serge Hallyn Cc: Linux Containers , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <87lidx8wbo.fsf@xmission.com> <1353337961-12962-1-git-send-email-ebiederm@xmission.com> <1353337961-12962-12-git-send-email-ebiederm@xmission.com> <20121119180322.GC1883@serge-ThinkPad-X130e> <87fw451m5i.fsf@xmission.com> <20121119210153.GA11904@sergelap> Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 13:09:54 -0800 In-Reply-To: <20121119210153.GA11904@sergelap> (Serge Hallyn's message of "Mon, 19 Nov 2012 15:01:53 -0600") Message-ID: <877gphz4d9.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/Il0BImdXfbBsa8lL4QKbezZ9QiFHqeEo= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.1 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG * -3.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% * [score: 0.0000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_04 7+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject * 2.2 XMSubMetaSxObfu_03 Obfuscated Sexy Noun-People * 0.0 T_XMDrugObfuBody_08 obfuscated drug references * 1.6 XMSubMetaSx_00 1+ Sexy Words * 0.0 T_TooManySym_03 6+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_02 5+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Serge Hallyn X-Spam-Relay-Country: Subject: Re: [PATCH review 12/16] userns: For /proc/self/{uid, gid}_map derive the lower userns from the struct file X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Sun, 08 Jan 2012 03:05:19 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2791 Lines: 72 Serge Hallyn writes: > Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com): >> Serge Hallyn writes: >> >> > Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com): >> >> From: "Eric W. Biederman" >> >> >> >> To keep things sane in the context of file descriptor passing derive the >> >> user namespace that uids are mapped into from the opener of the file >> >> instead of from current. >> >> >> >> When writing to the maps file the lower user namespace must always >> >> be the parent user namespace, or setting the mapping simply does >> >> not make sense. Enforce that the opener of the file was in >> >> the parent user namespace or the user namespace whose mapping >> >> is being set. >> > >> > Is there a reasonable use case for writing from the ns whose mapping >> > is being set? Are you expecting cases where the child opens the file >> > and passes it back to the parent to set the mappings? >> >> Passing the open mappings file no. Although by using seq_user_ns I do >> make certain the semantics are correct if the file descriptor is passed, >> but I did that on general principles. >> >> I expect a process in the user namespace to be able to meaningfully set >> the mapping to some the current uid and the current gid. > > Sorry, I think a word is missing there. To be precise (bc I haven't > thought about this much before as it's not my target goal :) you're > saying if I'm uid 1000 gid 1000, I can create a new user namespace > and, from inside that new userns (where I'm first uid/gid -1) I can > map any uid+gid in the container to 1000 in the parent ns? Or is there > something more? Only that for now. I had once imagined magic would happen in the background to verify the parent. > It still seems to me no less flexible to require being in the parent > ns, so > >> >> + if ((seq_ns != ns) && (seq_ns != ns->parent)) >> >> + return -EPERM; > > would become > >> >> + if (seq_ns != ns->parent) >> >> + return -EPERM; > In practice when playing around it is the difference between. unshare -U /bin/bash echo 0 1000 1 > /proc/self/uid_map And the need to pre-plan something. You can set the uid_map from the parent in a shell script but it is a real pain. So for just messing around allowing seq_ns == ns is a real advantage. > I also wonder if -EINVAL would be a more appropriate choice here. > We're trying to keep things sane, rather than saying "not allowed" > for its own sake. A different error code might be better. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/