Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932979Ab3CGNit (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Mar 2013 08:38:49 -0500 Received: from e9.ny.us.ibm.com ([32.97.182.139]:52091 "EHLO e9.ny.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932798Ab3CGNil (ORCPT ); Thu, 7 Mar 2013 08:38:41 -0500 Message-ID: <1362663507.4392.422.camel@falcor1> Subject: Re: IMA: How to manage user space signing policy with others From: Mimi Zohar To: Vivek Goyal Cc: Eric Paris , linux kernel mailing list , LSM List Date: Thu, 07 Mar 2013 08:38:27 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20130306233837.GA29229@redhat.com> References: <20130301213329.GC3457@redhat.com> <1362346944.18325.1.camel@falcor1> <20130304152919.GA15199@redhat.com> <1362423581.4392.46.camel@falcor1> <20130304191546.GF15199@redhat.com> <1362446491.4392.133.camel@falcor1> <20130305151829.GB4519@redhat.com> <1362516018.4392.233.camel@falcor1> <20130306155452.GB18337@redhat.com> <1362610081.4392.364.camel@falcor1> <20130306233837.GA29229@redhat.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.2.3 (3.2.3-3.fc16) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mime-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-MML: No X-Content-Scanned: Fidelis XPS MAILER x-cbid: 13030713-7182-0000-0000-000005AE4145 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1950 Lines: 44 On Wed, 2013-03-06 at 18:38 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote: > On Wed, Mar 06, 2013 at 05:48:01PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Wed, 2013-03-06 at 10:54 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote: [...] > > > - Because policy can be replaced easily, some of the functionality > > > will automatically be disabled. (because associated policy is not > > > there any more). And this can be very unintutive. > > > > Limiting the additional functionality to a single policy, is wrong. A > > new policy option (eg. memlock) or even action primitive (eg. > > appraise_memlock) should be defined, allowing any policy to achieve the > > same results. > > Sorry I did not get this part. How does any policy achieve the same > results. This discussion has gone through many twists and turns - original direct crypto calls to verify appended signature, 'optional' policy flag, locking memory, fixing appraisal results, differentiating ima vs. evm appraisal results, iint caching, merging policies vs. either/or policy, new policy memory lock option/action, separating policy from locking memory, and now exporting integrity calls. Once you resolve the 'special' processing (eg. memory locking issue) being tied to the policy, either by removing the requirement or by defining a new policy option/action primitive, you'll be able to resolve your policy requirements, without merging rules or limiting functionality for other policies. Limiting functionality (eg. kexec) to a single builtin policy is unacceptable. The same mechanism, that the builtin kmem_lock policy uses to make kexec permissible, should be available to all policies. It is then up to the system administrator to define an appropriate policy. thanks, Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/