Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757254Ab3CTSMr (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Mar 2013 14:12:47 -0400 Received: from tx2ehsobe002.messaging.microsoft.com ([65.55.88.12]:19905 "EHLO tx2outboundpool.messaging.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752289Ab3CTSMo (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Mar 2013 14:12:44 -0400 X-Forefront-Antispam-Report: CIP:157.56.236.101;KIP:(null);UIP:(null);IPV:NLI;H:BY2PRD0510HT005.namprd05.prod.outlook.com;RD:none;EFVD:NLI X-SpamScore: -2 X-BigFish: PS-2(zz98dI936eIzz1f42h1ee6h1de0h1202h1e76h1d1ah1d2ahzz8275dhz2fh2a8h668h839h93fhd24hf0ah1288h12a5h12a9h12bdh137ah13b6h1441h1504h1537h153bh162dh1631h1758h18e1h1946h19b5h1ad9h1b0ah1155h) From: Matthew Garrett To: Mimi Zohar CC: James Morris , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , "kexec@lists.infradead.org" , "linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL Thread-Topic: [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL Thread-Index: AQHOJCAqmvU0usyXI0yxxCAslUbX+ZiscZuAgAJZ0ICAAAIXAIAAFDYAgAADCQA= Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2013 18:12:38 +0000 Message-ID: <1363803158.2553.33.camel@x230.sbx07502.somerma.wayport.net> References: <1363642353-30749-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> <1363797717.2580.10.camel@falcor1.watson.ibm.com> <1363798166.2553.29.camel@x230.sbx07502.somerma.wayport.net> <1363802506.2580.55.camel@falcor1.watson.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <1363802506.2580.55.camel@falcor1.watson.ibm.com> Accept-Language: en-US Content-Language: en-US X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: x-originating-ip: [10.255.84.4] Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-ID: <6D5CF2C08100094E80297D4B419C1B64@namprd05.prod.outlook.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-OriginatorOrg: nebula.com Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-MIME-Autoconverted: from base64 to 8bit by mail.home.local id r2KICo9e001722 Content-Length: 861 Lines: 16 On Wed, 2013-03-20 at 14:01 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > Sorry, I'm not sure to which work you're referring. If you're referring > to Dmitry's "initramfs with digital signature protection" patches, then > we're speaking about enforcing integrity, not MAC security. Well, in the absence of hardcoded in-kernel policy, there needs to be some mechanism for ensuring the integrity of a policy. Shipping a signed policy initramfs fragment and having any Secure Boot bootloaders pass a flag in bootparams indicating that the kernel should panic if that fragment isn't present would seem to be the easiest way of doing that. Or have I misunderstood the question? -- Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org ????{.n?+???????+%?????ݶ??w??{.n?+????{??G?????{ay?ʇڙ?,j??f???h?????????z_??(?階?ݢj"???m??????G????????????&???~???iO???z??v?^?m???? ????????I?