Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933327Ab3CTTQn (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Mar 2013 15:16:43 -0400 Received: from e34.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.152]:51193 "EHLO e34.co.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757831Ab3CTTQk (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Mar 2013 15:16:40 -0400 Message-ID: <1363806968.2580.86.camel@falcor1.watson.ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL From: Mimi Zohar To: Matthew Garrett Cc: James Morris , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , "kexec@lists.infradead.org" , "linux-pci@vger.kernel.org" Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2013 15:16:08 -0400 In-Reply-To: <1363803158.2553.33.camel@x230.sbx07502.somerma.wayport.net> References: <1363642353-30749-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> <1363797717.2580.10.camel@falcor1.watson.ibm.com> <1363798166.2553.29.camel@x230.sbx07502.somerma.wayport.net> <1363802506.2580.55.camel@falcor1.watson.ibm.com> <1363803158.2553.33.camel@x230.sbx07502.somerma.wayport.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.2.3 (3.2.3-3.fc16) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mime-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-MML: No X-Content-Scanned: Fidelis XPS MAILER x-cbid: 13032019-2876-0000-0000-00000688C7FF Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1420 Lines: 31 On Wed, 2013-03-20 at 18:12 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Wed, 2013-03-20 at 14:01 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > Sorry, I'm not sure to which work you're referring. If you're referring > > to Dmitry's "initramfs with digital signature protection" patches, then > > we're speaking about enforcing integrity, not MAC security. > > Well, in the absence of hardcoded in-kernel policy, there needs to be > some mechanism for ensuring the integrity of a policy. Shipping a signed > policy initramfs fragment and having any Secure Boot bootloaders pass a > flag in bootparams indicating that the kernel should panic if that > fragment isn't present would seem to be the easiest way of doing that. > Or have I misunderstood the question? Ok, I was confused by the term "fragmented" initramfs. So once you have verified the "early" fragmented initramfs signature, this initramfs will load the "trusted" public keys and could also load the MAC policy. (I realize that dracut is currently loading the MAC policy, not the initramfs.) The MAC policy would then be trusted, right? Could we then use the LSM labels for defining an integrity policy for kexec? thanks, Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/