Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1764857Ab3DDUXn (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Apr 2013 16:23:43 -0400 Received: from mail-ia0-f174.google.com ([209.85.210.174]:59261 "EHLO mail-ia0-f174.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1764774Ab3DDUXm (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Apr 2013 16:23:42 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <1365106055-22939-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <1365106055-22939-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <515DDEC0.9000109@zytor.com> Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2013 13:23:41 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR From: Julien Tinnes To: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Kees Cook , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , x86@kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Matthew Garrett , Matt Fleming , Eric Northup , Dan Rosenberg , Will Drewry Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1019 Lines: 25 On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:19 PM, Julien Tinnes wrote: > On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:12 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote: >> On 04/04/2013 01:07 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> However, the benefits of >>> this feature in certain environments exceed the perceived weaknesses[2]. >> >> Could you clarify? > > I think privilege reduction in general, and sandboxing in particular, > can make KASLR even more useful. A lot of the information leaks can be > mitigated in the same way as attack surface and vulnerabilities can be > mitigated. Case in point: - leaks of 64 bits kernel values to userland in compatibility sub-mode. Sandboxing by using seccomp-bpf can restrict a process to the 64-bit mode API. - restricting access to the syslog() system call Julien -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/