Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1762948Ab3DDVEr (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Apr 2013 17:04:47 -0400 Received: from mail-wg0-f41.google.com ([74.125.82.41]:34731 "EHLO mail-wg0-f41.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1761015Ab3DDVEq (ORCPT ); Thu, 4 Apr 2013 17:04:46 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <7b09fa09-8ab7-4189-b86b-59fa6a9fbe0e@email.android.com> References: <1365106055-22939-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <1365106055-22939-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <515DDEC0.9000109@zytor.com> <7b09fa09-8ab7-4189-b86b-59fa6a9fbe0e@email.android.com> Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2013 14:04:44 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR From: Eric Northup To: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Kees Cook , LKML , "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "x86@kernel.org" , Jarkko Sakkinen , Matthew Garrett , Matt Fleming , Dan Rosenberg , Julien Tinnes , Will Drewry Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2813 Lines: 77 On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 2:01 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > What system monitoring? Most systems don't have much... The security of an unmonitored system is going to be much lower than of a well-monitored system. That's true independent of whether kASLR is deployed. > > Kees Cook wrote: > >>On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:58 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote: >>> It seems to me that you are assuming that the attacker is targeting a >>specific system, but a bot might as well target 256 different systems >>and see what sticks... >> >>Certainly, but system monitoring will show 255 crashed machines, which >>is a huge blip on any radar. :) >> >>-Kees >> >>> >>> Kees Cook wrote: >>> >>>>On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 1:12 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote: >>>>> On 04/04/2013 01:07 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>>>>> However, the benefits of >>>>>> this feature in certain environments exceed the perceived >>>>weaknesses[2]. >>>>> >>>>> Could you clarify? >>>> >>>>I would summarize the discussion of KASLR weaknesses into to two >>>>general observations: >>>>1- it depends on address location secrecy and leaks are common/easy. >>>>2- it has low entropy so attack success rates may be high. >>>> >>>>For "1", as Julien mentions, remote attacks and attacks from a >>>>significantly contained process (via seccomp-bpf) minimizes the leak >>>>exposure. For local attacks, cache timing attacks and other things >>>>also exist, but the ASLR can be improved to defend against that too. >>>>So, KASLR is useful on systems that are virtualization hosts, >>>>providing remote services, or running locally confined processes. >>>> >>>>For "2", I think that the comparison to userspace ASLR entropy isn't >>>>as direct. For userspace, most systems don't tend to have any kind of >>>>watchdog on segfaulting processes, so a remote attacker could just >>>>keep trying an attack until they got lucky, in which case low entropy >>>>is a serious problem. In the case of KASLR, a single attack failure >>>>means the system goes down, which makes mounting an attack much more >>>>difficult. I think 8 bits is fine to start with, and I think start >>>>with a base offset ASLR is a good first step. We can improve things >>in >>>>the future. >>>> >>>>-Kees >>>> >>>>-- >>>>Kees Cook >>>>Chrome OS Security >>> >>> -- >>> Sent from my mobile phone. Please excuse brevity and lack of >>formatting. >> >> >> >>-- >>Kees Cook >>Chrome OS Security > > -- > Sent from my mobile phone. Please excuse brevity and lack of formatting. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/