Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1161797Ab3DENu3 (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Apr 2013 09:50:29 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:12002 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1161203Ab3DENu1 (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Apr 2013 09:50:27 -0400 Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2013 09:50:00 -0400 From: Vivek Goyal To: "Kasatkin, Dmitry" Cc: Matthew Garrett , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar Subject: Re: [RFC 2/2] initramfs with digital signature protection Message-ID: <20130405135000.GB6299@redhat.com> References: <20130205181926.GA13942@srcf.ucam.org> <20130205183436.GC12853@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1113 Lines: 31 On Tue, Feb 05, 2013 at 11:55:09PM +0200, Kasatkin, Dmitry wrote: [..] > > Also I am assuming that from signed initramfs, keys will be loaded in > > appropriate keyrings and then keyring will be locked so that any > > tools from unsigned initramfs can not load additional keys. > > > > Exactly like that. Dmitry, [ Following up on this thread after a very long time ] I was thinking about this point that keys can be loaded from signed initramfs. But how is it better than embedding the keys in kernel the way we do for module signing and lock down ima keyring before control is passed to initramfs. Reason being, that anyway a user can not put its own keys in signed initramfs. Signed initramfs will be shipped by distribution. So then it does not matter whether distribution's keys are embedded in the kernel or are loaded from signed initramfs. Thanks Vivek -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/