Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1162882Ab3DEWNk (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Apr 2013 18:13:40 -0400 Received: from mail-ia0-f174.google.com ([209.85.210.174]:44958 "EHLO mail-ia0-f174.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1162859Ab3DEWNh (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Apr 2013 18:13:37 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <515F4B60.60302@zytor.com> References: <1365106055-22939-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <1365106055-22939-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <20130405071144.GB26889@gmail.com> <515F4B60.60302@zytor.com> Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2013 15:13:37 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR From: Julien Tinnes To: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar , Kees Cook , LKML , "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "x86@kernel.org" , Jarkko Sakkinen , Matthew Garrett , Matt Fleming , Eric Northup , Dan Rosenberg , Will Drewry Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 954 Lines: 24 On Fri, Apr 5, 2013 at 3:08 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > On 04/05/2013 03:06 PM, Julien Tinnes wrote: >> >> Speaking of IDT, and to capture some off-thread discussion here, we >> should remember that the "SGDT" and "SIDT" instructions aren't >> privileged on x86, so user-land can leak these out without any way for >> the kernel to intercept that. >> >> Adding their own random offsets to these two tables would be very >> useful. This could be done in a later patchset of course. >> > > Yes, if the GDT or IDT position is at all correlated to the kernel > position this is pointless. Let's say it's less useful :) Remote attacks and from-inside-a-VM attack would still be mitigated. Julien -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/