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Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2013 11:22:27 -0700
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Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 2:23 AM, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> On Mon, 8 Apr 2013, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
>
>> On 04/08/2013 03:43 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > This makes the IDT unconditionally read-only. This primarily removes
>> > the IDT from being a target for arbitrary memory write attacks. It has
>> > an added benefit of also not leaking (via the "sidt" instruction) the
>> > kernel base offset, if it has been relocated.
>> >
>> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> > Cc: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
>>
>> Also, tglx: does this interfere with your per-cpu IDT efforts?
>
> I don't think so. And it's on the backburner at the moment.

What would be a good way to do something similar for the GDT? sgdt
leaks GDT location as well, and even though it's percpu, it should be
trivial to figure out a kernel base address, IIUC.

$ ./sgdt
ffff88001fc04000
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
...
---[ Low Kernel Mapping ]---
...
0xffff880001e00000-0xffff88001fe00000         480M     RW         PSE GLB NX pmd

With the IDT patch, things look good for sidt:

$ ./sidt
ffffffffff579000
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
...
---[ End Modules ]---
0xffffffffff579000-0xffffffffff57a000           4K     ro             GLB NX pte

Can we create a RO fixed per-cpu area?

-Kees

--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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