Message-ID: <51673E8C.9080806@zytor.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2013 15:51:56 -0700
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
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To: Thomas Renninger <trenn@suse.de>
CC: "Yu, Fenghua" <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com>,
        Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Early microcode signing in secure boot environment -  Was: x86,
 microcode: Use common get_ramdisk_image()
References: <1365119186-23487-1-git-send-email-yinghai@kernel.org> <1478755.iNa1PauEka@skinner.arch.suse.de> <3E5A0FA7E9CA944F9D5414FEC6C712205594C20D@ORSMSX105.amr.corp.intel.com> <195101369.cgl3lvkTHk@skinner.arch.suse.de>
In-Reply-To: <195101369.cgl3lvkTHk@skinner.arch.suse.de>
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On 04/11/2013 01:59 AM, Thomas Renninger wrote:
> 
>>> Is this "cryptographically authenticated by the CPU itself" thing
>>> documented
>>> somewhere so that security people can double check that it is really
>>> secure?
>>
>> X86 SDM defines that the second part of microcode update is the encrypted
>> data.
> 
> Again, I doubt it is allowed to bypass UEFI authentication with arbitrary, 
> vendor specific authentication checks.
> 

What does that even mean in this context?

	-hpa


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