Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1758470Ab3DXWBV (ORCPT ); Wed, 24 Apr 2013 18:01:21 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:54407 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1758268Ab3DXWBU (ORCPT ); Wed, 24 Apr 2013 18:01:20 -0400 Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2013 18:01:11 -0400 From: Josh Boyer To: Linus Torvalds Cc: Kees Cook , Kay Sievers , Andrew Morton , Eric Paris , Christian Kujau , "# 3.4.x" , LKML , Karel Zak Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kmsg: Honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg Message-ID: <20130424220111.GJ15272@hansolo.jdub.homelinux.org> References: <1256775981.281402.1364864751771.JavaMail.root@redhat.com> <20130409005050.GE18176@hansolo.jdub.homelinux.org> <20130409154820.GE32476@hansolo.jdub.homelinux.org> <20130424175835.GF15272@hansolo.jdub.homelinux.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1734 Lines: 40 On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 02:30:53PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote: > On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 1:35 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > > > > That said, I much prefer doing the privilege test at read time since > > that means passing a file descriptor to another process doesn't mean > > the new process can just continue reading. > > Bullshit. > > That's exactly the wrong kind of thinking. If you had privileges to > open something, and you pass it off, it's *your* choice. > > In contrast, the "anybody can open, but some people can read/write" > has several times resulted in real security issues. Notably the whole > "open something, then fool a suid program to write its error message > to it". > > This whole discussion has been f*cking moronic. The "security" > arguments have been utter shite with clearly no thinking behind it, > the feature is total crap (people need dmesg to do basic bug > reporting), and I'm seriously considering just getting rid of this > idiotic dmesg_restrict thing entirely. Your comment is the very > epitome of bad security thinking. I was just trying to get the 3 interfaces all honoring the same thing. Let this be a lesson to you all: I am the harbinger of security features removal. If you see me sending patches, run away or I might accidentally cross the streams and make your feature undergo total protonic reversal. Now if only I could use this power for good, like somehow getting Linus to remove capabilities entirely... josh -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/