Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755730Ab3DZLJr (ORCPT ); Fri, 26 Apr 2013 07:09:47 -0400 Received: from cam-admin0.cambridge.arm.com ([217.140.96.50]:56734 "EHLO cam-admin0.cambridge.arm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754367Ab3DZLJq (ORCPT ); Fri, 26 Apr 2013 07:09:46 -0400 Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2013 12:09:29 +0100 From: Mark Rutland To: Rob Herring Cc: Stephen Boyd , "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" , linux-arm-msm , "devicetree-discuss@lists.ozlabs.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , Marc Zyngier Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 1/4] Documentation: Add memory mapped ARM architected timer binding Message-ID: <20130426110929.GB11648@e106331-lin.cambridge.arm.com> References: <1365812863-5367-1-git-send-email-sboyd@codeaurora.org> <1365812863-5367-2-git-send-email-sboyd@codeaurora.org> <516C6F12.5020208@gmail.com> <516C7231.6060305@codeaurora.org> <5179A488.5050102@gmail.com> <5179B2B2.8000201@codeaurora.org> <5179B6ED.9000301@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <5179B6ED.9000301@gmail.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 5675 Lines: 111 On Fri, Apr 26, 2013 at 12:06:21AM +0100, Rob Herring wrote: > On 04/25/2013 05:48 PM, Stephen Boyd wrote: > > On 04/25/13 14:47, Rob Herring wrote: > >> On 04/15/2013 04:33 PM, Stephen Boyd wrote: > >>> On 04/15/13 14:20, Rob Herring wrote: > >>>> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 7:27 PM, Stephen Boyd wrote: > >>>>> @@ -26,3 +30,52 @@ Example: > >>>>> <1 10 0xf08>; > >>>>> clock-frequency = <100000000>; > >>>>> }; > >>>>> + > >>>>> +** Memory mapped timer node properties > >>>>> + > >>>>> +- compatible : Should at least contain "arm,armv7-timer-mem". > >>>> Everything about this timer is architecturally defined? If not, let's > >>>> use a more specific name. > >>> I'm not sure I'm following you, but everything described here is part of > >>> the ARM definition. What would be a more specific name? > >> Something that corresponds to the particular implementation like > >> cortex-a15 (obviously not an example that has this). I'm fine with > >> leaving this for now, but would like to see that added when specific SOC > >> dts are added. Better to be specific in case we need to use it for > >> something like errata work-arounds. Of course we haven't done that so > >> far with the arch timer bindings... > > > > Agreed. I'm under the impression that most of our compatible fields > > should be more specific than they currently are so we can workaround hw > > bugs like you say. Perhaps the catch all generic one should just be > > "arm,arm-timer-mem" since it isn't tied to any particular CPU type? > > > >> > >>>>> + > >>>>> +- clock-frequency : The frequency of the main counter, in Hz. Optional. > >>>>> + > >>>>> +- reg : The control frame base address. > >>>>> + > >>>>> +Note that #address-cells, #size-cells, and ranges shall be present to ensure > >>>>> +the CPU can address a frame's registers. > >>>>> + > >>>>> +Frame: > >>>>> + > >>>>> +- frame-number: 0 to 7. > >>>> I'd really like to get rid of the frame numbers and sub-nodes. Is the > >>>> frame number significant to software? > >>> We need the frame number to read and write registers in the control > >>> frame (the first base in the parent node). We currently use it to > >>> determine if a frame has support for the virtual timer by reading the > >>> CNTTIDR (a register with 4 bits per frame describing capabilities). If > >>> we wanted to control access to the second view of a frame we would also > >>> need to configure the CNTPL0ACRn register that pertains to the frame > >>> we're controlling. Without a frame number we wouldn't know which > >>> register to write. > >> I've gone thru the memory mapped part of the spec now, so I think I > >> understand things better. I see how the frame number is needed, but... > >> > >> The control base is only accessible in secure or hyp mode. How does a > >> guest know that it is a guest and can't map the control base? Seems like > >> we need to allow a subset of the binding that is just a reg and > >> interrupts properties without the frame sub nodes. > > > > I don't see that part. My understanding is that the control base is > > accessible in non-secure mode and by the guests. There are certain > > registers within that base that are only accessible in secure mode > > though: CNTFRQ and CNTNSAR. Also some registers are configurable: > > CNTACRn and CNTVOFFN. CNTVOFFN is only accessible in the hypervisor. > > The example is section E.8 seems to say otherwise. Perhaps Mark R can > comment further. I believe E.8 is an example system, not the general case. However, I don't see anything limiting accesses to CNTVOFFn to the hypervisor. As far as I can see, if the guest has access to the CNTCTLBase frame, it has the same access privileges as the host (and hypervisor). CNTACRn and CNTVOFFn only seem to be configurable with regard to secure/non-secure accesses. > > > We don't really care about CNTFRQ because it's duplicated into each > > view. We do care about CNTNSAR. Luckily the spec "just works" there in > > the sense that we can use CNTTIDR in conjunction with CNTACRn and > > determine if we have access to a frame we're interested in if the > > CNTTIDR bits say the frame is present and the CNTACRn register says we > > can access it. If not then it must be locked down for secure users. > > > > Unfortunately hardware doesn't have a way to say that a particular frame > > is reserved for the hypervisor or the guest kernel/userspace. We need > > some help from software, so we have the status property express that a > > particular frame is available. We have to assume the DT is going to be > > different depending on if you're the hypervisor or the guest. That's a > > valid assumption right? Otherwise I hope we can do some trapping of the > > guest's mapping to the control base and then rewrite what they read so > > that they only see the frame that we want to be available to them. > > Yeah, I believe the only way to prevent access within non-secure world > is with the MMU. So I guess the example is just policy that the > hypervisor would/may not create a stage2 mapping. You still have the > same issue that the guest should not be passed the control base. You > could make the reg property optional, but then what do you do with the > node name? I'm not sure on if and how we'd want to expose this to guests. I'm adding Marc Zyngier to Cc, he may have some relevant thoughts. Mark. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/