Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753462Ab3EIN32 (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 May 2013 09:29:28 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:50946 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751222Ab3EIN30 (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 May 2013 09:29:26 -0400 From: Steve Grubb To: linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: Richard Guy Briggs , "Eric W. Biederman" , Andrew Morton , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Al Viro Subject: Re: [PATCH] [BZ905179] audit: omit check for uid and gid validity in audit rules and data Date: Thu, 09 May 2013 09:29:18 -0400 Message-ID: <3133489.jB2ld18Orb@x2> Organization: Red Hat User-Agent: KMail/4.10.2 (Linux/3.8.11-200.fc18.x86_64; KDE/4.10.2; x86_64; ; ) In-Reply-To: <20130416193823.GH6530@madcap2.tricolour.ca> References: <1363807097-13073-1-git-send-email-rgb@redhat.com> <87ip3w59gr.fsf@xmission.com> <20130416193823.GH6530@madcap2.tricolour.ca> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 7693 Lines: 254 On Tuesday, April 16, 2013 03:38:23 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On Tue, Apr 09, 2013 at 02:39:32AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > Andrew Morton writes: > > > On Wed, 20 Mar 2013 15:18:17 -0400 Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > >> audit rule additions containing "-F auid!=4294967295" were failing with > > >> EINVAL.> > > The only case where this appears to make the least little bit of sense > > is if the goal of the test is to test to see if an audit logloginuid > > has been set at all. In which case depending on a test against > > 4294967295 is bogus because you are depending on an intimate internal > > kernel implementation detail. > > > > How about something like my untested patch below that add an explicit > > operation to test if loginuid has been set? > > Sorry for the delay in testing this, I had another urgent bug and a > belligerent test box... > > I like this approach better than mine now that I understand it. I've > tested the patch below without any changes. It works as expected with > my previous test case. I don't know if a Signed-off-by: is appropriate > for me in this case, but I'll throw in a: > > Tested-by: Richard Guy Briggs > > and recommend a: > > Reported-By: Steve Grubb If this is the approved patch, can it be put in stable? The audit system hasn't worked as intended since January. Thanks, -Steve > > From: "Eric W. Biederman" > > Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2013 02:22:10 -0700 > > Subject: [PATCH] audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit. > > > > audit rule additions containing "-F auid!=4294967295" were failing > > with EINVAL. > > > > Apparently some userland audit rule sets want to know if loginuid uid > > has been set and are using a test for auid != 4294967295 to determine > > that. > > > > In practice that is a horrible way to ask if a value has been set, > > because it relies on subtle implementation details and will break > > every time the uid implementation in the kernel changes. > > > > So add a clean way to test if the audit loginuid has been set, and > > silently convert the old idiom to the cleaner and more comprehensible > > new idiom. > > > > Reported-By: Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" > > --- > > > > include/linux/audit.h | 5 +++++ > > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + > > kernel/auditfilter.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > kernel/auditsc.c | 5 ++++- > > 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > > index a9fefe2..8a1ddde 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > > @@ -390,6 +390,11 @@ static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct > > *t) > > > > #define audit_signals 0 > > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ > > > > +static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk) > > +{ > > + return uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk)); > > +} > > + > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT > > /* These are defined in audit.c */ > > > > /* Public API */ > > > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > > index 9f096f1..9554a19 100644 > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > > @@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ > > > > #define AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE 21 > > #define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW 22 > > #define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH 23 > > > > +#define AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET 24 > > > > /* These are ONLY useful when checking > > > > * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */ > > > > diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c > > index 540f986..6381d17 100644 > > --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c > > +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c > > @@ -349,6 +349,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct > > audit_rule *rule)> > > if (f->op == Audit_bad) > > > > goto exit_free; > > > > + /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */ > > + if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == 4294967295)) { > > + f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET; > > + f->val = 0; > > + } > > + > > > > switch(f->type) { > > > > default: > > goto exit_free; > > > > @@ -377,6 +383,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct > > audit_rule *rule)> > > if (!gid_valid(f->gid)) > > > > goto exit_free; > > > > break; > > > > + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: > > + if ((f->op != Audit_not_equal) && (f->op != Audit_equal)) > > + goto exit_free; > > + if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1)) > > + goto exit_free; > > + break; > > > > case AUDIT_PID: > > case AUDIT_PERS: > > > > case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: > > @@ -459,6 +471,13 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct > > audit_rule_data *data,> > > f->gid = INVALID_GID; > > f->lsm_str = NULL; > > f->lsm_rule = NULL; > > > > + > > + /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */ > > + if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == 4294967295)) { > > + f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET; > > + f->val = 0; > > + } > > + > > > > switch(f->type) { > > case AUDIT_UID: > > > > case AUDIT_EUID: > > @@ -487,6 +506,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct > > audit_rule_data *data,> > > if (!gid_valid(f->gid)) > > > > goto exit_free; > > > > break; > > > > + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: > > + if ((f->op != Audit_not_equal) && (f->op != Audit_equal)) > > + goto exit_free; > > + if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1)) > > + goto exit_free; > > + break; > > > > case AUDIT_PID: > > case AUDIT_PERS: > > > > case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: > > @@ -1380,6 +1405,10 @@ static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct > > audit_krule *rule,> > > result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current), > > > > f->op, f->uid); > > > > break; > > > > + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: > > + result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(current), > > + f->op, f->val); > > + break; > > > > case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: > > case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: > > > > case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > > index 3a11d34..27d0a50 100644 > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > > @@ -750,6 +750,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, > > > > if (ctx) > > > > result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid); > > > > break; > > > > + case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: > > + result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val); > > + break; > > > > case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: > > case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: > > > > case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: > > @@ -2317,7 +2320,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) > > > > unsigned int sessionid; > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE > > > > - if (uid_valid(task->loginuid)) > > + if (audit_loginuid_set(task)) > > > > return -EPERM; > > > > #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */ > > > > if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) > > - RGB > > -- > Richard Guy Briggs > Senior Software Engineer > AMER ENG Base Operating Systems > Remote, Canada, Ottawa > Voice: 1.647.777.2635 > Internal: (81) 32635 > > -- > Linux-audit mailing list > Linux-audit@redhat.com > https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/