Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755805Ab3F1QHU (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Jun 2013 12:07:20 -0400 Received: from mail-ee0-f54.google.com ([74.125.83.54]:50155 "EHLO mail-ee0-f54.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755748Ab3F1QHP (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Jun 2013 12:07:15 -0400 Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2013 18:07:11 +0200 From: Ingo Molnar To: David Ahern Cc: Jiri Olsa , Peter Zijlstra , Namhyung Kim , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Paul Mackerras , Namhyung Kim , LKML Subject: Re: [PATCH] perf tools: Fixup for removing -f option in perf record Message-ID: <20130628160711.GA4389@gmail.com> References: <1372307120-737-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org> <20130627093609.GO28407@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net> <20130627103931.GA5534@gmail.com> <20130627104750.GB27378@dyad.programming.kicks-ass.net> <20130628094738.GA28751@krava.brq.redhat.com> <51CD9AE4.6060307@gmail.com> <20130628153736.GA462@gmail.com> <51CDB3CB.8040304@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <51CDB3CB.8040304@gmail.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1446 Lines: 43 * David Ahern wrote: > On 6/28/13 9:37 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > > >* David Ahern wrote: > > > >>On 6/28/13 3:47 AM, Jiri Olsa wrote: > >>>>>I thought -f was the implied default for ages? > >>>> > >>>>OK.. I've been dutifully typing it all this while :-) > >>> > >>>The '-f' option in record command had no affect.. myabe it got > >>>depreceated when we started to backup perf.data to perf.data.old..? > >> > >>Way back in 2010, 2.6.34 kernel - 7865e817 commit. I've been typing > >>the -f for while too. Now about the need for the pesky -f on the > >>analysis side.... > > > >That's only needed when perf.data is owned by a different user, right? > > > > Yes, why not let file permissions dictate of uid x can read uid y files? > Why does perf need to have that restriction? For example, QA collects > the data files, developers analyze them. So, the thinking behind that is that user should not be able to generate a malicious perf.data file and let root (or another user) run it accidentally. ( That presumes some sort of exploitable parsing bug or other buffer overflow in perf. ) I don't feel terribly strongly about it though. Thanks, Ingo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/