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To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
cc: ext2-devel@sourceforge.net
Subject: [RFC] [PATCH 1/5] ACL support for ext2/3
From: tytso@mit.edu
Message-Id: <E17zVaD-00069Y-00@snap.thunk.org>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2002 01:10:01 -0400
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This patch (as well as the following one) implements core ACL support
which is needed for XFS as well as ext2/3 ACL support.  Parts of this
were patch was posted by Nathan Scott 2 or 3 days ago.  (Although
apparently XFS doesn't need the library functions provided by
fs/posix_acl.c.)


# This is a BitKeeper generated patch for the following project:
# Project Name: Linux kernel tree
#
# fs/Config.help            |   13 +
# fs/Config.in              |    2 
# fs/Makefile               |    3 
# fs/posix_acl.c            |  465 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
# include/linux/fs.h        |    5 
# include/linux/posix_acl.h |   87 ++++++++
# 6 files changed, 574 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
#
# --------------------------------------------
# 02/10/05	tytso@think.thunk.org	1.669
# Ported 0.8.50 acl patch to 2.5.
# --------------------------------------------
#
diff -Nru a/fs/Config.help b/fs/Config.help
--- a/fs/Config.help	Wed Oct  9 23:53:33 2002
+++ b/fs/Config.help	Wed Oct  9 23:53:33 2002
@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
+CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
+  Posix Access Control Lists (ACLs) support permissions for users and
+  groups beyond the owner/group/world scheme.
+
+  To learn more about Access Control Lists, visit the Posix ACLs for
+  Linux website <http://acl.bestbits.at/>.
+
+  If you plan to use Access Control Lists, you may also need the
+  getfacl and setfacl utilities, along with some additional patches
+  from the website.
+
+  If you don't know what Access Control Lists are, say N.
+
 CONFIG_QUOTA
   If you say Y here, you will be able to set per user limits for disk
   usage (also called disk quotas). Currently, it works for the
diff -Nru a/fs/Config.in b/fs/Config.in
--- a/fs/Config.in	Wed Oct  9 23:53:33 2002
+++ b/fs/Config.in	Wed Oct  9 23:53:33 2002
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 mainmenu_option next_comment
 comment 'File systems'
 
+bool 'POSIX Access Control Lists' CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
+
 bool 'Quota support' CONFIG_QUOTA
 dep_tristate '  Old quota format support' CONFIG_QFMT_V1 $CONFIG_QUOTA
 dep_tristate '  Quota format v2 support' CONFIG_QFMT_V2 $CONFIG_QUOTA
diff -Nru a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile
--- a/fs/Makefile	Wed Oct  9 23:53:33 2002
+++ b/fs/Makefile	Wed Oct  9 23:53:33 2002
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 # 
 
 export-objs :=	open.o dcache.o buffer.o bio.o inode.o dquot.o mpage.o aio.o \
-                fcntl.o mbcache.o
+                fcntl.o mbcache.o posix_acl.o
 
 obj-y :=	open.o read_write.o devices.o file_table.o buffer.o \
 		bio.o super.o block_dev.o char_dev.o stat.o exec.o pipe.o \
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF)	+= binfmt_elf.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_FS_MBCACHE)	+= mbcache.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL)	+= posix_acl.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_QUOTA)		+= dquot.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_QFMT_V1)		+= quota_v1.o
diff -Nru a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 1969
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c	Wed Oct  9 23:53:33 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
+/*
+ * linux/fs/posix_acl.c
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2002 by Andreas Gruenbacher <a.gruenbacher@computer.org>
+ *
+ *  Fixes from William Schumacher incorporated on 15 March 2001.
+ *     (Reported by Charles Bertsch, <CBertsch@microtest.com>).
+ */
+
+/*
+ *  This file contains generic functions for manipulating
+ *  POSIX 1003.1e draft standard 17 ACLs.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/version.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Andreas Gruenbacher <a.gruenbacher@computer.org>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Generic Posix Access Control List (ACL) Manipulation");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_alloc);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_clone);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_valid);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_equiv_mode);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_from_mode);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_create_masq);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_chmod_masq);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_masq_nfs_mode);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(posix_acl_permission);
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_posix_acl);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_posix_acl);
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a new ACL with the specified number of entries.
+ */
+struct posix_acl *
+posix_acl_alloc(int count, int flags)
+{
+	const size_t size = sizeof(struct posix_acl) +
+	                    count * sizeof(struct posix_acl_entry);
+	struct posix_acl *acl = kmalloc(size, flags);
+	if (acl) {
+		atomic_set(&acl->a_refcount, 1);
+		acl->a_count = count;
+	}
+	return acl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clone an ACL.
+ */
+struct posix_acl *
+posix_acl_clone(const struct posix_acl *acl, int flags)
+{
+	struct posix_acl *clone = NULL;
+
+	if (acl) {
+		int size = sizeof(struct posix_acl) + acl->a_count *
+		           sizeof(struct posix_acl_entry);
+		clone = kmalloc(size, flags);
+		if (clone) {
+			memcpy(clone, acl, size);
+			atomic_set(&clone->a_refcount, 1);
+		}
+	}
+	return clone;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if an acl is valid. Returns 0 if it is, or -E... otherwise.
+ */
+int
+posix_acl_valid(const struct posix_acl *acl)
+{
+	const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
+	int state = ACL_USER_OBJ;
+	unsigned int id = 0;  /* keep gcc happy */
+	int needs_mask = 0;
+
+	FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
+		if (pa->e_perm & ~(ACL_READ|ACL_WRITE|ACL_EXECUTE))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		switch (pa->e_tag) {
+			case ACL_USER_OBJ:
+				if (state == ACL_USER_OBJ) {
+					id = 0;
+					state = ACL_USER;
+					break;
+				}
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			case ACL_USER:
+				if (state != ACL_USER)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				if (pa->e_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID ||
+				    pa->e_id < id)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				id = pa->e_id + 1;
+				needs_mask = 1;
+				break;
+
+			case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+				if (state == ACL_USER) {
+					id = 0;
+					state = ACL_GROUP;
+					break;
+				}
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			case ACL_GROUP:
+				if (state != ACL_GROUP)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				if (pa->e_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID ||
+				    pa->e_id < id)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				id = pa->e_id + 1;
+				needs_mask = 1;
+				break;
+
+			case ACL_MASK:
+				if (state != ACL_GROUP)
+					return -EINVAL;
+				state = ACL_OTHER;
+				break;
+
+			case ACL_OTHER:
+				if (state == ACL_OTHER ||
+				    (state == ACL_GROUP && !needs_mask)) {
+					state = 0;
+					break;
+				}
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			default:
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	if (state == 0)
+		return 0;
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0 if the acl can be exactly represented in the traditional
+ * file mode permission bits, or else 1. Returns -E... on error.
+ */
+int
+posix_acl_equiv_mode(const struct posix_acl *acl, mode_t *mode_p)
+{
+	const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
+	mode_t mode = 0;
+	int not_equiv = 0;
+
+	FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
+		switch (pa->e_tag) {
+			case ACL_USER_OBJ:
+				mode |= (pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO) << 6;
+				break;
+			case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+				mode |= (pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO) << 3;
+				break;
+			case ACL_OTHER:
+				mode |= pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO;
+				break;
+			case ACL_MASK:
+				mode = (mode & ~S_IRWXG) |
+				       ((pa->e_perm & S_IRWXO) << 3);
+				not_equiv = 1;
+				break;
+			case ACL_USER:
+			case ACL_GROUP:
+				not_equiv = 1;
+				break;
+			default:
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+        if (mode_p)
+                *mode_p = (*mode_p & ~S_IRWXUGO) | mode;
+        return not_equiv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an ACL representing the file mode permission bits of an inode.
+ */
+struct posix_acl *
+posix_acl_from_mode(mode_t mode, int flags)
+{
+	struct posix_acl *acl = posix_acl_alloc(3, flags);
+	if (!acl)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	acl->a_entries[0].e_tag  = ACL_USER_OBJ;
+	acl->a_entries[0].e_id   = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
+	acl->a_entries[0].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6;
+
+	acl->a_entries[1].e_tag  = ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
+	acl->a_entries[1].e_id   = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
+	acl->a_entries[1].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3;
+
+	acl->a_entries[2].e_tag  = ACL_OTHER;
+	acl->a_entries[2].e_id   = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
+	acl->a_entries[2].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXO);
+	return acl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 0 if current is granted want access to the inode
+ * by the acl. Returns -E... otherwise.
+ */
+int
+posix_acl_permission(struct inode *inode, const struct posix_acl *acl, int want)
+{
+	const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe, *mask_obj;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
+                switch(pa->e_tag) {
+                        case ACL_USER_OBJ:
+				/* (May have been checked already) */
+                                if (inode->i_uid == current->fsuid)
+                                        goto check_perm;
+                                break;
+                        case ACL_USER:
+                                if (pa->e_id == current->fsuid)
+                                        goto mask;
+				break;
+                        case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+                                if (in_group_p(inode->i_gid)) {
+					found = 1;
+					if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want)
+						goto mask;
+                                }
+				break;
+                        case ACL_GROUP:
+                                if (in_group_p(pa->e_id)) {
+					found = 1;
+					if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want)
+						goto mask;
+                                }
+                                break;
+                        case ACL_MASK:
+                                break;
+                        case ACL_OTHER:
+				if (found)
+					return -EACCES;
+				else
+					goto check_perm;
+			default:
+				return -EIO;
+                }
+        }
+	return -EIO;
+
+mask:
+	for (mask_obj = pa+1; mask_obj != pe; mask_obj++) {
+		if (mask_obj->e_tag == ACL_MASK) {
+			if ((pa->e_perm & mask_obj->e_perm & want) == want)
+				return 0;
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+	}
+
+check_perm:
+	if ((pa->e_perm & want) == want)
+		return 0;
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Modify acl when creating a new inode. The caller must ensure the acl is
+ * only referenced once.
+ *
+ * mode_p initially must contain the mode parameter to the open() / creat()
+ * system calls. All permissions that are not granted by the acl are removed.
+ * The permissions in the acl are changed to reflect the mode_p parameter.
+ */
+int
+posix_acl_create_masq(struct posix_acl *acl, mode_t *mode_p)
+{
+	struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
+	struct posix_acl_entry *group_obj = NULL, *mask_obj = NULL;
+	mode_t mode = *mode_p;
+	int not_equiv = 0;
+
+	/* assert(atomic_read(acl->a_refcount) == 1); */
+
+	FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
+                switch(pa->e_tag) {
+                        case ACL_USER_OBJ:
+				pa->e_perm &= (mode >> 6) | ~S_IRWXO;
+				mode &= (pa->e_perm << 6) | ~S_IRWXU;
+				break;
+
+			case ACL_USER:
+			case ACL_GROUP:
+				not_equiv = 1;
+				break;
+
+                        case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+				group_obj = pa;
+                                break;
+
+                        case ACL_OTHER:
+				pa->e_perm &= mode | ~S_IRWXO;
+				mode &= pa->e_perm | ~S_IRWXO;
+                                break;
+
+                        case ACL_MASK:
+				mask_obj = pa;
+				not_equiv = 1;
+                                break;
+
+			default:
+				return -EIO;
+                }
+        }
+
+	if (mask_obj) {
+		mask_obj->e_perm &= (mode >> 3) | ~S_IRWXO;
+		mode &= (mask_obj->e_perm << 3) | ~S_IRWXG;
+	} else {
+		if (!group_obj)
+			return -EIO;
+		group_obj->e_perm &= (mode >> 3) | ~S_IRWXO;
+		mode &= (group_obj->e_perm << 3) | ~S_IRWXG;
+	}
+
+	*mode_p = (*mode_p & ~S_IRWXUGO) | mode;
+        return not_equiv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Modify the ACL for the chmod syscall.
+ */
+int
+posix_acl_chmod_masq(struct posix_acl *acl, mode_t mode)
+{
+	struct posix_acl_entry *group_obj = NULL, *mask_obj = NULL;
+	struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe;
+
+	/* assert(atomic_read(acl->a_refcount) == 1); */
+
+	FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
+		switch(pa->e_tag) {
+			case ACL_USER_OBJ:
+				pa->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6;
+				break;
+
+			case ACL_USER:
+			case ACL_GROUP:
+				break;
+
+			case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+				group_obj = pa;
+				break;
+
+			case ACL_MASK:
+				mask_obj = pa;
+				break;
+
+			case ACL_OTHER:
+				pa->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXO);
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				return -EIO;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (mask_obj) {
+		mask_obj->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3;
+	} else {
+		if (!group_obj)
+			return -EIO;
+		group_obj->e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adjust the mode parameter so that NFSv2 grants nobody permissions
+ * that may not be granted by the ACL. This is necessary because NFSv2
+ * may compute access permissions on the client side, and may serve cached
+ * data whenever it assumes access would be granted.  Since ACLs may also
+ * be used to deny access to specific users, the minimal permissions
+ * for secure operation over NFSv2 are very restrictive. Permissions
+ * granted to users via Access Control Lists will not be effective over
+ * NFSv2.
+ *
+ * Privilege escalation can only happen for read operations, as writes are
+ * always carried out on the NFS server, where the proper access checks are
+ * implemented.
+ */
+int
+posix_acl_masq_nfs_mode(struct posix_acl *acl, mode_t *mode_p)
+{
+	struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe; int min_perm = S_IRWXO;
+
+	FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) {
+                switch(pa->e_tag) {
+			case ACL_USER_OBJ:
+				break;
+
+			case ACL_USER:
+			case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
+			case ACL_GROUP:
+			case ACL_MASK:
+			case ACL_OTHER:
+				min_perm &= pa->e_perm;
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				return -EIO;
+		}
+	}
+	*mode_p = (*mode_p & ~(S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) | (min_perm << 3) | min_perm;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the POSIX ACL of an inode.
+ */
+struct posix_acl *
+get_posix_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
+{
+	struct posix_acl *acl;
+
+	if (!inode->i_op->get_posix_acl)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+	down(&inode->i_sem);
+	acl = inode->i_op->get_posix_acl(inode, type);
+	up(&inode->i_sem);
+
+	return acl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the POSIX ACL of an inode.
+ */
+int
+set_posix_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if (!inode->i_op->set_posix_acl)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	down(&inode->i_sem);
+	error = inode->i_op->set_posix_acl(inode, type, acl);
+	up(&inode->i_sem);
+
+	return error;
+}
diff -Nru a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
--- a/include/linux/fs.h	Wed Oct  9 23:53:33 2002
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h	Wed Oct  9 23:53:33 2002
@@ -770,6 +770,9 @@
 	unsigned long (*get_unmapped_area)(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
 };
 
+/* posix_acl.h */
+struct posix_acl;
+
 struct inode_operations {
 	int (*create) (struct inode *,struct dentry *,int);
 	struct dentry * (*lookup) (struct inode *,struct dentry *);
@@ -791,6 +794,8 @@
 	ssize_t (*getxattr) (struct dentry *, const char *, void *, size_t);
 	ssize_t (*listxattr) (struct dentry *, char *, size_t);
 	int (*removexattr) (struct dentry *, const char *);
+	struct posix_acl *(*get_posix_acl) (struct inode *, int);
+	int (*set_posix_acl) (struct inode *, int, struct posix_acl *);
 };
 
 struct seq_file;
diff -Nru a/include/linux/posix_acl.h b/include/linux/posix_acl.h
--- /dev/null	Wed Dec 31 16:00:00 1969
+++ b/include/linux/posix_acl.h	Wed Oct  9 23:53:33 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+  File: linux/posix_acl.h
+
+  (C) 2002 Andreas Gruenbacher, <a.gruenbacher@computer.org>
+*/
+
+
+#ifndef __LINUX_POSIX_ACL_H
+#define __LINUX_POSIX_ACL_H
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#define ACL_UNDEFINED_ID	(-1)
+
+/* a_type field in acl_user_posix_entry_t */
+#define ACL_TYPE_ACCESS		(0x8000)
+#define ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT	(0x4000)
+
+/* e_tag entry in struct posix_acl_entry */
+#define ACL_USER_OBJ		(0x01)
+#define ACL_USER		(0x02)
+#define ACL_GROUP_OBJ		(0x04)
+#define ACL_GROUP		(0x08)
+#define ACL_MASK		(0x10)
+#define ACL_OTHER		(0x20)
+
+/* permissions in the e_perm field */
+#define ACL_READ		(0x04)
+#define ACL_WRITE		(0x02)
+#define ACL_EXECUTE		(0x01)
+//#define ACL_ADD		(0x08)
+//#define ACL_DELETE		(0x10)
+
+struct posix_acl_entry {
+	short			e_tag;
+	unsigned short		e_perm;
+	unsigned int		e_id;
+};
+
+struct posix_acl {
+	atomic_t		a_refcount;
+	unsigned int		a_count;
+	struct posix_acl_entry	a_entries[0];
+};
+
+#define FOREACH_ACL_ENTRY(pa, acl, pe) \
+	for(pa=(acl)->a_entries, pe=pa+(acl)->a_count; pa<pe; pa++)
+
+
+/*
+ * Duplicate an ACL handle.
+ */
+static inline struct posix_acl *
+posix_acl_dup(struct posix_acl *acl)
+{
+	if (acl)
+		atomic_inc(&acl->a_refcount);
+	return acl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free an ACL handle.
+ */
+static inline void
+posix_acl_release(struct posix_acl *acl)
+{
+	if (acl && atomic_dec_and_test(&acl->a_refcount))
+		kfree(acl);
+}
+
+
+/* posix_acl.c */
+
+extern struct posix_acl *posix_acl_alloc(int, int);
+extern struct posix_acl *posix_acl_clone(const struct posix_acl *, int);
+extern int posix_acl_valid(const struct posix_acl *);
+extern int posix_acl_permission(struct inode *, const struct posix_acl *, int);
+extern struct posix_acl *posix_acl_from_mode(mode_t, int);
+extern int posix_acl_equiv_mode(const struct posix_acl *, mode_t *);
+extern int posix_acl_create_masq(struct posix_acl *, mode_t *);
+extern int posix_acl_chmod_masq(struct posix_acl *, mode_t);
+extern int posix_acl_masq_nfs_mode(struct posix_acl *, mode_t *);
+
+extern struct posix_acl *get_posix_acl(struct inode *, int);
+extern int set_posix_acl(struct inode *, int, struct posix_acl *);
+
+#endif  /* __LINUX_POSIX_ACL_H */
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