Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1758145Ab3GZB5O (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Jul 2013 21:57:14 -0400 Received: from mail-vc0-f179.google.com ([209.85.220.179]:63666 "EHLO mail-vc0-f179.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1756932Ab3GZB5L (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Jul 2013 21:57:11 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2013 18:56:50 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Should unprivileged linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) work on O_TMPFILE files? To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Linux FS Devel , Al Viro Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1850 Lines: 58 The change: commit f4e0c30c191f87851c4a53454abb55ee276f4a7e Author: Al Viro Date: Tue Jun 11 08:34:36 2013 +0400 allow the temp files created by open() to be linked to O_TMPFILE | O_CREAT => linkat() with AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW and /proc/self/fd/ as oldpath (i.e. flink()) will create a link O_TMPFILE | O_CREAT | O_EXCL => ENOENT on attempt to link those guys Signed-off-by: Al Viro makes it possible to hardlink an O_TMPFILE file using procfs. Should linkat(fd, "", newdirfd, newpath, AT_EMPTY_PATH) also work? AFAICS it currently requires CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, but I'm a bit confused as to why linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH) should have a stricter check than linkat(AT_FDCWD, "/proc/self/fd/n", ..., AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW), (The relevant change is 11a7b371b64ef39fc5fb1b6f2218eef7c4d035e3.) FWIW, this program works on Linux 3.9, which makes me doubt that the security restriction on linkat is doing any good: #include #include #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char buf[128]; if (argc != 3) errx(1, "Usage: flink FD PATH"); sprintf(buf, "/proc/self/fd/%d", atoi(argv[1])); if (linkat(AT_FDCWD, buf, AT_FDCWD, argv[2], AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW) != 0) err(1, "linkat"); return 0; } Removing the check from the AT_EMPTY_PATH case would simplify code that wants to write a file, fsync it, and then flink it in. --Andy P.S. For even more fun, I'd *love* a linkat flag that would allow the destination to be overwritten, but that's a different can of worms. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/