Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752550Ab3HMEwF (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 Aug 2013 00:52:05 -0400 Received: from smtp.codeaurora.org ([198.145.11.231]:48283 "EHLO smtp.codeaurora.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751457Ab3HMEwE (ORCPT ); Tue, 13 Aug 2013 00:52:04 -0400 Message-ID: <5209BB6F.2000208@codeaurora.org> Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 21:51:59 -0700 From: Laura Abbott User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130801 Thunderbird/17.0.8 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Kees Cook CC: "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" , ksummit-2013-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org, LKML Subject: Re: [ARM ATTEND] catching up on exploit mitigations References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2294 Lines: 61 On 7/30/2013 12:05 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > I'd like to propose the topic of catching up to x86 exploit > mitigations and security features, and potentially identifying > ARM-unique mitigations/features that could be implemented. Several > years ago, with Nicolas Pitre doing all the real work, I coordinated > getting ARM caught up on things like userspace ASLR and > stack-protector. Recently, based on work by Will Drewry, I ported > seccomp-bpf to ARM. I'd like to continue this kind of thing, and I > think it's overdue to examine this area again. A lot of work has > already been done by grsecurity in this area (see > http://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=3292), so it would be > good to start there. > > While it may expose my current ignorance of low level ARM mechanics, > I'd like to examine and discuss: > > - RO and W^X kernel page table protections (similar to x86's > DEBUG_RODATA and DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX; it's not clear to me how much > LPAE and PXN is already handling this, if at all) > We've had support for RO/NX on our tree for a while. I'm interested in attending the summit to share what we've done and to see how much of it could be mainlined. > - something like x86's SMEP and SMAP (to deter kernel exploitation > from userspace) > > - vector table protections (needs to be protected like the x86_64 > vsyscall table, RO, etc) > > - kernel ASLR (I'm close to having this upstreamable for x86) > > - fuzzing (is anyone running trinity or similar on the ARM tree?) > > - any other things ... ? I'd add getting something similar to CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM for ARM. It wouldn't be a direct drop in to x86 but we have some usecases for a framework to hook into the arch_get_random_{int,long}. This is mostly useful for cases where we need random numbers before the kernel's entropy source is completely initialized. The last point is a separate discussion all together. > > Thanks, > > -Kees > Thanks, Laura -- Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member of Code Aurora Forum, hosted by The Linux Foundation -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/