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Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2002 01:51:06 -0400
From: Eric Buddington <eric@ma-northadams1b-3.bur.adelphia.net>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: can chroot be made safe for non-root?
Message-ID: <20021016015106.E30836@ma-northadams1b-3.bur.adelphia.net>
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I am eager to be able to sandbox my processes on a system without the
help of suid-root programs (as I prefer to have none of these on my
system).

Would it be reasonable to allow non-root processes to chroot(), if the
chroot syscall also changed the cwd for non-root processes?

Is there a reason besides standards compliance that chroot() does not
already change directory to the chroot'd directory for root processes?
Would it actually break existing apps if it did change the directory?

-Eric
(who wishes there were better ways to run untrusted code)
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