Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752998Ab3HVLEe (ORCPT ); Thu, 22 Aug 2013 07:04:34 -0400 Received: from mail-pd0-f178.google.com ([209.85.192.178]:44584 "EHLO mail-pd0-f178.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753588Ab3HVLEb (ORCPT ); Thu, 22 Aug 2013 07:04:31 -0400 From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, opensuse-kernel@opensuse.org, David Howells , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Matthew Garrett , Len Brown , Pavel Machek , Josh Boyer , Vojtech Pavlik , Matt Fleming , James Bottomley , Greg KH , JKosina@suse.com, Rusty Russell , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , "H. Peter Anvin" , Michal Marek , Gary Lin , Vivek Goyal , "Lee, Chun-Yi" Subject: [PATCH 07/18] asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 19:01:46 +0800 Message-Id: <1377169317-5959-8-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.6.0.2 In-Reply-To: <1377169317-5959-1-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com> References: <1377169317-5959-1-git-send-email-jlee@suse.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2329 Lines: 61 Per PKCS1 spec, the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoded message is leading by 0x00 0x01 in its first 2 bytes. The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI so we pass a pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify() in original code, but it has risk for the byte is not zero because it's not in EM buffer's scope, neither RSA_verify() nor mpi_get_buffer() didn't take care the leading byte. To avoid the risk, that's better we explicitly add the leading zero byte to EM for pass to RSA_verify(). This patch allocate a _EM buffer to capture the result from RSA_I2OSP(), then set the first byte to zero in EM and copy the remaining bytes from _EM. Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Lee, Chun-Yi --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c index e60defe..1fadc7f 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c @@ -401,6 +401,7 @@ static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key, /* Variables as per RFC3447 sec 8.2.2 */ const u8 *H = sig->digest; u8 *EM = NULL; + u8 *_EM = NULL; MPI m = NULL; size_t k; @@ -435,14 +436,19 @@ static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key, /* (2c) Convert the message representative (m) to an encoded message * (EM) of length k octets. * - * NOTE! The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we pass a - * pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify()! + * NOTE! The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we add it + * back to EM before input to RSA_verify()! */ - ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &EM); + ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &_EM); if (ret < 0) goto error; - ret = RSA_verify(H, EM - 1, k, sig->digest_size, + EM = kmalloc(k, GFP_KERNEL); + memset(EM, 0, 1); + memcpy(EM + 1, _EM, k-1); + kfree(_EM); + + ret = RSA_verify(H, EM, k, sig->digest_size, RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data, RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].size); -- 1.6.4.2 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/