Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755557Ab3IITwu (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Sep 2013 15:52:50 -0400 Received: from mail-oa0-f44.google.com ([209.85.219.44]:59266 "EHLO mail-oa0-f44.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754643Ab3IITwt (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Sep 2013 15:52:49 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <522E2487.90109@zytor.com> References: <1378741786-18430-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> <19562.1378747124@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <27562.1378753264@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <522E2487.90109@zytor.com> Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2013 15:52:48 -0400 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/12] One more attempt at useful kernel lockdown From: Josh Boyer To: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Valdis Kletnieks , David Lang , Matthew Garrett , "Linux-Kernel@Vger. Kernel. Org" , Kees Cook , Greg KH , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , James Morris , linux-security-module Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1487 Lines: 35 On Mon, Sep 9, 2013 at 3:41 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > On 09/09/2013 12:01 PM, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote: >> On Mon, 09 Sep 2013 11:25:38 -0700, David Lang said: >> >>> Given that we know that people want signed binaries without >>> blocking kexec, you should have '1' just enforce module signing >>> and '2' (or higher) implement a full lockdown including kexec. >> >>> Or, eliminate the -1 permanently insecure option and make this a >>> bitmask, if someone wants to enable every possible lockdown, have >>> them set it to "all 1's", define the bits only as you need them. >> >> This strikes me as much more workable than one big sledgehammer. >> > > I.e. capabilities ;) Circles. All I see here are circles. Having lived an entire release with a capabilities based mechanism for this in Fedora, please no. And if you are talking about non-POSIX capabilities as you mentioned earlier, that seems to be no different than having securelevel being a bitmask of, well, levels. I don't have much opinion on securelevel being a big hammer or a bitmask of finer grained things, but I do think it's a more manageable way forward. Calling the implementation "capabilities" seems to just be unnecessarily confusing. josh -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/