Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752698Ab3IJXna (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Sep 2013 19:43:30 -0400 Received: from e38.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.159]:37984 "EHLO e38.co.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751454Ab3IJXn1 (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Sep 2013 19:43:27 -0400 Message-ID: <1378856601.2257.208.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/12] One more attempt at useful kernel lockdown From: Mimi Zohar To: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: David Lang , Kees Cook , "gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" , Matthew Garrett , Henrique de Moraes Holschuh , "Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , "jmorris@namei.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 19:43:21 -0400 In-Reply-To: <522F768F.1000101@zytor.com> References: <1378767723.17982.27.camel@x230.lan> <1378774394.17982.36.camel@x230.lan> <1378781715.17982.42.camel@x230.lan> <1378785208.17982.54.camel@x230.lan> <20130910172318.GB21530@khazad-dum.debian.net> <1378837571.17615.0.camel@x230.lan> <522F6519.4030004@zytor.com> <20130910185149.GC5559@kroah.com> <522F768F.1000101@zytor.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.6.4 (3.6.4-3.fc18) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-MML: No X-Content-Scanned: Fidelis XPS MAILER x-cbid: 13091023-1344-0000-0000-00000191BA9E Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1409 Lines: 33 On Tue, 2013-09-10 at 12:44 -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > On 09/10/2013 12:17 PM, David Lang wrote: > >> > >> In theory these blobs are traceable to a manufacturer. It's not really > >> an indication that it's "safe" more than it's an indication that it > >> hasn't been changed. But I haven't chased this very hard yet because > >> of below... > > > > well, not if you are trying to defend against root breaking in to the > > machine. > > > > And we have at least some drivers where we even have the firmware in the > Linux kernel tree, and thus aren't opaque blobs at all. > > I suspect we'll need, at some point, a way for vendors that aren't > already doing signatures on their firmware in a device-specific way to > do so in a kernel-supported way. The easiest (in terms of getting > vendors to play along, not necessarily technically) might be a PGP > signature (either inline or standalone) and have the public key as part > of the driver? Why invent yet another method of verifying the integrity of a file based on a signature? Why not use the existing method for appraising files? Just create a new integrity hook at the appropriate place. Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/