Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753042Ab3IROvY (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Sep 2013 10:51:24 -0400 Received: from mail-lb0-f182.google.com ([209.85.217.182]:52797 "EHLO mail-lb0-f182.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751741Ab3IROvX (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Sep 2013 10:51:23 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20130916142852.GB20753@redhat.com> References: <1378849471-10521-1-git-send-email-vgoyal@redhat.com> <20130912034023.GA10877@kroah.com> <20130912114336.GA28500@redhat.com> <20130912161705.GA2650@kroah.com> <1379010250.9796.118.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com> <20130916142852.GB20753@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2013 16:51:21 +0200 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/16] [RFC PATCH] Signed kexec support From: Andrea Adami To: Vivek Goyal Cc: Mimi Zohar , matthew.garrett@nebula.com, Greg KH , d.kasatkin@samsung.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org, "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com, "H. Peter Anvin" , akpm@linux-foundation.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1959 Lines: 56 Hello, as one of the developers of kexecboot, a kexec-based linux-as-bootloader, I'm following with interest this thread. FWIW since the beginning we are compiling kexec-tools statically against klibc for size constraints. We have 2.02 and 2.0.4 almost finished (some issue with purgatory in this last version). There are some hacks needed but it is surely possible. Cheers Andrea On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 4:28 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote: > On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 02:24:10PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > [..] >> > > So existing IMA does not seem to have been written for an environment >> > > where all the user space is not signed we don't trust root and root can >> > > attack a signed binary. And my patches try to fill that gap. >> > >> > It sounds like your changes should go into the IMA core code to resolve >> > the issues there, as I'm sure they want to also protect from the issues >> > you have pointed out here. Have you talked to those developers about >> > this? >> >> IMA assumes a different threat model and performance tradeoffs. The >> solutions suggested for the kexec, single userspace application threat >> model, presumably wouldn't scale very well. > > Hi Mimi, > > Does IMA trust root or not? I got a feeling that IMA is assuming that > root is trusted. Otherwise root can do raw writes to disk and bypass > all the logic related to appraisal result caching. > > In fact on my system root disk belongs to group "disk". So any user in > "disk" group seems to be a trusted user for IMA to work. > > Thanks > Vivek > > _______________________________________________ > kexec mailing list > kexec@lists.infradead.org > http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/