Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752673Ab3JFAND (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Oct 2013 20:13:03 -0400 Received: from mail-oa0-f44.google.com ([209.85.219.44]:43802 "EHLO mail-oa0-f44.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752766Ab3JFAM7 convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Oct 2013 20:12:59 -0400 Date: Sat, 05 Oct 2013 19:12:55 -0500 From: Rob Landley Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/3] vfs: Detach mounts on unlink. To: Linus Torvalds Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" , Miklos Szeredi , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Al Viro , Linux-Fsdevel , Kernel Mailing List , Andy Lutomirski In-Reply-To: (from torvalds@linux-foundation.org on Sat Oct 5 18:17:55 2013) X-Mailer: Balsa 2.4.11 Message-Id: <1381018375.1974.164@driftwood> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; DelSp=Yes; Format=Flowed Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2347 Lines: 63 On 10/05/2013 06:17:55 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote: > On Sat, Oct 5, 2013 at 4:07 PM, Rob Landley wrote: > > > > A todo item I've had _forever_ is fixing chroot() to not be broken > so that > > you can trivially break out of a chroot via: > > What drugs are you on? Enough caffeine to count as a plural. > Your example is moronic, and against all _documented_ uses of chroot. Yes. That's why it's an exploit. My example allows someone who can chroot again to break out of a previous chroot, which is the reason that lxc doesn't use chroot. > > chdir("/"); > > mkdir("sub"); > > chroot("sub"); > > chdir("./../../../../../../../.."); > > After you do a chroot(), you need to chdir *into* the root. The reason > chroot() itself doesn't do that is simple: you may still be doing > various setup stuff. Yes, I asked you about this years ago before I implemented chroot and switch_root for busybox and toybox, I know how to use it _right_. What I'm saying is it doesn't prevent something running in the chroot from doing it _wrong_, which is why lxc can't use chroot to implement containers and instead uses pivot_root, which is a HORRIBLE system call I'd like to move away from. I want to implement a lightweight container command for toybox, but when I dug into lxc and tried to swap their pivot_root for a simple chroot, I got corrected. > But your example is just stupid. Yes, chroot'ed environments can > generally be escaped, but your example escape is simply because you > didn't use chroot() correctly. The above is code you run _in_ the chroot. After the first user used chroot incorrectly. The problem is that there's only one "/" symlink. If you move it down under your current "." then nothing stops you from following .. all the way up the tree. The fact you can do this after the fact, from within an existing chroot, is the problem. > So learn this pattern: every time you use chroot, add a simple > > chdir("/"); > > immediately after the chroot call. I do. But I can't stop other people from NOT doing that afterwards. Rob-- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/