Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756044Ab3JGUzN (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Oct 2013 16:55:13 -0400 Received: from cantor2.suse.de ([195.135.220.15]:33894 "EHLO mx2.suse.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752785Ab3JGUzL (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Oct 2013 16:55:11 -0400 Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 22:55:08 +0200 From: Jan Kara To: KOSAKI Motohiro Cc: Jan Kara , LKML , linux-mm@kvack.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 18/26] mm: Convert process_vm_rw_pages() to use get_user_pages_unlocked() Message-ID: <20131007205508.GE30441@quack.suse.cz> References: <1380724087-13927-1-git-send-email-jack@suse.cz> <1380724087-13927-19-git-send-email-jack@suse.cz> <524C4AA1.7000409@gmail.com> <20131002193631.GB16998@quack.suse.cz> <524DF246.9050309@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <524DF246.9050309@gmail.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 4295 Lines: 89 On Thu 03-10-13 18:40:06, KOSAKI Motohiro wrote: > (10/2/13 3:36 PM), Jan Kara wrote: > >On Wed 02-10-13 12:32:33, KOSAKI Motohiro wrote: > >>(10/2/13 10:27 AM), Jan Kara wrote: > >>>Signed-off-by: Jan Kara > >>>--- > >>> mm/process_vm_access.c | 8 ++------ > >>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > >>> > >>>diff --git a/mm/process_vm_access.c b/mm/process_vm_access.c > >>>index fd26d0433509..c1bc47d8ed90 100644 > >>>--- a/mm/process_vm_access.c > >>>+++ b/mm/process_vm_access.c > >>>@@ -64,12 +64,8 @@ static int process_vm_rw_pages(struct task_struct *task, > >>> *bytes_copied = 0; > >>> > >>> /* Get the pages we're interested in */ > >>>- down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); > >>>- pages_pinned = get_user_pages(task, mm, pa, > >>>- nr_pages_to_copy, > >>>- vm_write, 0, process_pages, NULL); > >>>- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); > >>>- > >>>+ pages_pinned = get_user_pages_unlocked(task, mm, pa, nr_pages_to_copy, > >>>+ vm_write, 0, process_pages); > >>> if (pages_pinned != nr_pages_to_copy) { > >>> rc = -EFAULT; > >>> goto end; > >> > >>This is wrong because original code is wrong. In this function, page may > >>be pointed to anon pages. Then, you should keep to take mmap_sem until > >>finish to copying. Otherwise concurrent fork() makes nasty COW issue. > > Hum, can you be more specific? I suppose you are speaking about situation > >when the remote task we are copying data from/to does fork while > >process_vm_rw_pages() runs. If we are copying data from remote task, I > >don't see how COW could cause any problem. If we are copying to remote task > >and fork happens after get_user_pages() but before copy_to_user() then I > >can see we might be having some trouble. copy_to_user() would then copy > >data into both original remote process and its child thus essentially > >bypassing COW. If the child process manages to COW some of the pages before > >copy_to_user() happens, it can even see only some of the pages. Is that what > >you mean? > > scenario 1: vm_write==0 > > Process P1 call get_user_pages(pa, process_pages) in process_vm_rw_pages > P1 unlock mmap_sem. > Process P2 call fork(). and make P3. > P2 write memory pa. now the "process_pages" is owned by P3 (the child process) > P3 write memory pa. and then the content of "process_pages" is changed. > P1 read process_pages as P2's page. but actually, it is P3's data. Then, > P1 observe garbage, at least unintended, data was read. Yeah, this really looks buggy because P1 can see data in (supposedly) P2's address space which P2 never wrote there. > scenario 2: vm_write==1 > > Process P1 call get_user_pages(pa, process_pages) in process_vm_rw_pages. > It makes COW break and any anon page sharing broke. > P1 unlock mmap_sem. > P2 call fork(). and make P3. And, now COW page sharing is restored. > P2 write memory pa. now the "process_pages" is owned by P3. > P3 write memory pa. it mean P3 changes "process_pages". > P1 write process_pages as P2's page. but actually, it is P3's. It > override above P3's write and then P3 observe data corruption. Yep, this is a similar problem as above. Thanks for pointing this out. > The solution is to keep holding mmap_sem until finishing process_pages > access because mmap_sem prevent fork. and then race never be happen. I > mean you cann't use get_user_pages_unlock() if target address point to > anon pages. Yeah, if you are accessing third party mm, you've convinced me you currently need mmap_sem to avoid problems with COW on anon pages. I'm just thinking that this "hold mmap_sem to prevent fork" is somewhat subtle (definitely would deserve a comment) and if it would be needed in more places we might be better off if we have a more explicit mechanism for that (like a special lock, fork sequence count, or something like that). Anyway I'll have this in mind and if I see other places that need this, I'll try to come up with some solution. Thanks again for explanation. Honza -- Jan Kara SUSE Labs, CR -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/